U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
50 Fremont Street, Suite 2100
San Francisco, CA 94105
DATE: SEPTEMBER 18, 1998
Case No. 97-WPC-1
In the Matter of
JOSEPH TRACANNA, Complainant
v.
ARCTIC SLOP INSPECTION SERVICE, Respondent.
Appearances:
Billie Pirner Garde, Esq.
John Clifford, Esq.
Clifford, Lyons & Garde
1036 Green Tree Ravine Court, Unit C
Appleton, WI 54915
For the Complainant
Gregory L. Youngmun, Esq.
DeLisio, Moran, Geraghty & Zobel, PC
943 West 6th Avenue
Anchorage, AL 99501
For the Respondent
Before: Henry B. Lasky
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
This matter arises under the employee protection provisions of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622, the Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §
[Page 2]
1367, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6971 (hereinafter "Acts"). The applicable regulations enacted thereunder are
contained at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. Such Acts prohibit an employer from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee engaged in activities that were statutorily
protected. See also 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)-(c).
Complainant Joseph Tracanna commenced this proceeding by filing a
complaint dated August 29, 1995, alleging that Respondent, Arctic Slope Inspection Service
(hereinafter "ASIS"), had violated the statutes enumerated herein. Specifically,
Complainant states that he because he engaged in protected conduct, he was subjected to
harassment and intimidation during his employment with ASIS, including unnecessary medical
examinations, blacklisting, pay cuts, demotions, and employment discrimination in hiring and
recall.
Pursuant to a trial notice issued by the undersigned on February 8, 1998, a
formal hearing was convened on June 9, 10, and 11, 1998 in Anchorage, Alaska. At the time of
the hearing, Complainant's exhibits (CX) 1-94 and Respondent's exhibits (RX) 1-63 and 66-72
were admitted into the record. In addition, Complainant presented two demonstrative documents
identified as Complainant's exhibits 95 and 96; such documents were not admitted as evidence
but were retained as part of the record as demonstrative exhibits.
At the outset of the hearing, there was a preliminary discussion of the
various motions that Respondent had filed prior to the date of the hearing: a Renewed Motion
for Summary Decision, a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Medical Expenses, and a
Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Emotional Pain, Suffering, Mental Anguish,
Embarrassment and Humiliation. With respect to Respondent's Motion for Summary Decision,
the undersigned denied such motion without prejudice subject to renewal at the conclusion of
Complainant's case, as there appeared to be triable issues of fact. During the course of the
hearing, Respondent did not renew its Motion for Summary Decision. With respect to
Respondent's Motions in Limine, the undersigned similarly denied such motions, but in the
interest of due process and fairness afforded Respondent the opportunity to rebut such evidence
by performing any necessary discovery after the hearing.
The parties were ordered to complete all necessary post-hearing discovery
with respect to damages and also to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on or
before August 14, 1998. I note that while both parties' post-hearing briefs were duly received
within the time required, no supplemental evidence with respect to compensatory damages
related to medical expenses or emotional distress was submitted. Based upon the stipulations of
both parties, the evidence introduced at the trial, the testimony of the witnesses, and having
considered the arguments made in their post-hearing submissions, I make the following findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision and order.
Thus, the total amount that Complainant would have earned based on the
number of hours that a similarly situated employee actually worked during the relevant time
period is $146,967.00.
2. Complainant's Interim Earnings.
As mentioned, however, Complainant's back pay award must be
offset by any income which Complainant earned during the interim. I note for purposes of the
record that the evidence presented with respect to Complainant's interim earnings during the
period April 2, 1994 through August 12, 1996 is deficient in several respects. Other than one
work sheet delineating hours that Complainant worked for ASIS throughout 1994, 1995, and part
of 1996, there is no clear indication as to the actual salary which Mr. Tracanna earned during the
relevant time period. There was testimony regarding Complainant's interim earnings during a
short-call in Miami, Florida, yet no specific evidence was submitted with respect to actual
earnings. In the absence of contradictory evidence, I find that pursuant to his testimony during
the hearing, Mr. Tracanna earned a total of $35,811.00 in his interim earnings, and such shall be
deducted from his back pay amount. See TR 36.
3. Complainant's Duty to Mitigate Damages.
ASIS argues that even if liability were to exist, Complainant is not entitled
to back pay because he failed to mitigate his damages. ASIS relies on the various positions
which it offered to Complainant pursuant to his resignation from the AKOSH Project on April 1,
[Page 22]
1994, and the fact that Complainant rejected each such offer. In wholesale fashion, ASIS argues
that Complainant's mere rejection prevents him from recovering back pay since he made no
effort to mitigate his damages, and thus "cannot recover for any item or damages which
could have been avoided." Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief, p. 26.
However, the law is not as simple as ASIS claims it to be. Rather, the law
states that once the complainant establishes the gross amount of back pay due, the burden shifts
to the respondent to prove facts that the complainant failed to mitigate his damages. In order for
the respondent to show that the complainant has failed to do so, the respondent must prove that it
made an unconditional offer to the complainant of reinstatement to his former position, or of
substantially equivalent employment. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
Thus, ASIS must prove that their various offers of employment of the QCE
position, the two week on/two week off Fairbanks position, the electrical quality specialist
position, the two week on/two week off terminal electrical inspector position opposite Larry
Coffman, and the baseline inspector position were either reinstatements to "his former
position" or "of substantially equivalent employment." In addition, the law
states that a complainant is not required to work outside of his field of training; he need not
relocate in order to mitigate damages; he need not accept a demotion; nor must he make any
extraordinary efforts to find interim employment. NLRB v. Madison Currier, Inc.,
472 F.2d 1307, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (employee need not "seek employment which is
not consonant with his particular skills, background, and experience" or "which
involves conditions that are substantially more onerous than his previous position");
Wonder Markets, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 787, (1978) (offer of reinstatement ineffective
when discharged employee offered a different job, through former position still existed);
Good Foods Manufacturing & Processing Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 418, 419 (1972) (offer
of reinstatement ineffective because job offered had different conditions of employment and
benefits).
a. QCE Position
In March and April of 1994, Mr. Tracanna was offered the QCE position in
the projects department in Anchorage. It appears that Mr. Swink and Mr. Tracanna engaged in
multiple discussions regarding this position, specifically they discussed the job requirements, a
proposed salary of $75,000, and Mr. Tracanna was sent a copy of the job description. The
position, however, had nothing to do with electrical inspection, was not connected with any
projects at VMT, and was not a field inspector position. Mr. Swink testified that the position
involved the reviewing of engineering drawings for accuracy and completeness; Mr. Tracanna
recalled that the position had something to do with fiber optics, and believed such position to be
a demotion. Based on the fact that the QCE Position was entirely outside of Mr. Tracanna's field
of expertise, I find that such position is not a reinstatement to his former position, nor can it be
considered substantially equivalent employment.
b. Two Week On/Two Week Off
Fairbanks Position
Although this position was an electrical inspector position, it was beyond
the geographical bounds which Mr. Tracanna was required to go in order to obtain suitable
employment. Mr. Tracanna wanted to remain in Valdez or Anchorage and the Fairbanks position
would have required him to relocate. As such, Mr. Tracanna was under no obligation to take this
job so as to mitigate his damages.
[Page 23]
c. Electrical Quality Specialist
Position
This was a full-time position doing electrical inspection work inside
Alyeska's office buildings in Anchorage. Mr. Tracanna believed such position to be a demotion,
as his skills and expertise were superior to those of an employee who would have regularly taken
the position. This position was outside of Mr. Tracanna's expertise as an electrical inspector, and
thus I find that it is not a substantially equivalent offer of employment.
d. Two Week On/Two Week Off
Terminal Inspector Position
With respect to this terminal inspector position, I find that Mr. Tracanna
was under an obligation to accept such position, as it does meet with the standards of a
substantially equivalent offer of employment. It was within his area of expertise, and although
only a half-time position, it supports an income that is reasonably commensurate with that of a
full-time position. The acceptance of such employment would have reasonably minimized the
damages which ASIS incurred by not offering him a full-time position.
As there was testimony that the workload would have sustained a 60-70
hour workweek, I find it reasonable to assign an average of 65 hours of work every week,
delineating 40 hours of standard time and 25 hours of overtime each week. As there was
testimony that this position would have lasted three months, the actual time worked would be 6
weeks. Consequently, Mr. Tracanna would have worked a total of 240 standard hours (40 hours
x 6 weeks) and 150 overtime hours (25 hours x 6). This position was offered to Mr. Tracanna
prior to the across-the-board salary decreases, thus he would have been paid his normal rate of
pay, $26.00/hour standard time and $39.00/hour overtime. As Mr. Tracanna was under an
obligation to accept this position so as to minimize his damages, his back pay award is reduced
by $12,090.00 (240 standard hours x $26 plus 150 overtime hours x $39).
e. Baseline Inspector Position
I find that Mr. Tracanna was under no obligation to take this baseline
inspector position. The unusual circumstances surrounding the personal safety of the inspectors
working out in remote areas of the pipeline are enough to demonstrate to the undersigned that
Mr. Tracanna had good reason to reject such offer of employment. Mr. Tracanna need not make
any extraordinary effort or compromise, as in the case of his personal safety, so as to mitigate his
damages. Thus, Mr. Tracanna's refusal to accept such position did not amount to a failure to
mitigate his damages.
[Page 24]
Accordingly, I find that Complainant is entitled to an award of pack pay
from April 2, 1994, the date of his constructive termination, through August 12, 1996, the date in
which he obtained suitable alternative employment, in the amount of $146,967.00. However,
such amount is offset by his interim earnings in the amount of $35,811.00 and his failure to
mitigate damages in the amount of $12,090.00. Complainant's total back pay award amounts to
$99,066.00.
B. Compensatory Damages
1. Damages related to medical costs.
The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the complainant
"whole." Blackburn v. Martin, 982 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1992). Fringe
benefits are an important part of an employee's overall compensation package, and therefore an
employee cannot be made whole without receiving compensation for the loss of these benefits.
"Accordingly, a damage award . . . should include those fringe benefits which the
employee would have actually received had his employment not been wrongfully terminated.
Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Crow v. Noble Roman's, Inc., 95-CAA-8 (Sec'y Feb. 26, 1996) (Respondent
ordered to pay as compensatory damages any reasonable medical costs that would have been
covered under the Respondent's health insurance coverage).
Throughout his employ with ASIS, Mr. Tracanna was provided with
employment benefits in form of medical coverage and health insurance. In light of the aforesaid
legal principle, ASIS shall pay Mr. Tracanna any out of pocket medical expenses he incurred that
would have been paid for by the health insurance available to him as an ASIS employee.
SeeDoyle v. Hydro Nuclear Services, 89-ERA-22 @ 6 (ARB Sept. 6, 1996).
As Mr. Tracanna suffered a heart attack on August 12, 1996, he is entitled to reimbursement for
the costs associated with such treatment. Thus, Mr. Tracanna is entitled to recover $38,662.49 in
medical expenses, an amount that would have been covered had he not been subjected to
discrimination.
2. Damages related to emotional distress.
I note for purposes of the record that at the conclusion of the formal
hearing, Counsel for both parties stated that there would be additional correspondence and/or
post-hearing discovery with respect to the emotional distress claim. Neither party has
subsequently made submission with respect to this issue, nor did either party mention or argue
such issue in their post-hearing briefs. As such, I find that the issue of Complainant's mental
distress claim is deemed abandoned.
C. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Pursuant to the statutes enumerated herein and the applicable regulations
thereunder, Complainant is entitled to payment of costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees,
reasonably incurred in bringing this complaint.
[Page 25]
ORDER
1. ASIS shall pay Complainant back pay in the amount of $99,066.00.
2. Consistent with this Recommended Decision and Order, ASIS shall pay
Complainant back pay plus interest at the rate specified in 26 U.S.C. § 6621
(1988).
3. ASIS shall pay Complainant compensatory damages for out-of-pocket
medical costs in the amount of $38,662.49. ASIS is entitled to receive credit for
all medical expenses reimbursed by its insurance.
4. (a) Counsel for Complainant shall file a Petition for Fees and Costs
within 30 days after the filing of the Recommended Decision and Order for all
legal services rendered with service on Counsel for Respondent. Such submission
shall be on a line item basis and shall separately itemize the time billed for each
service rendered and costs incurred. Each such item shall be separately
numbered.
(b) Respondent may file objections, if any, to said
application for fees and costs within 15 days of receipt, but all objections to said
Counsel's petition shall be on a line item basis using Complainant's numbering
system, and any item not objected to in such manner and within such time
required shall be deemed acquiesced in by Respondent.
(c) Within 10 days after receipt of any such
objections from Respondent, Counsel for Complainant may file a response
thereto. Such submission shall be in the form of a line item response. Any
objections not responded to in such manner and within such time will be deemed
acquiesced in by Counsel for Complainant.
HENRY B.
LASKY
Administrative Law
Judge
Dated: September 18, 1998
San Francisco, California
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order will automatically become the final
order of the Secretary unless, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 24.8, a petition for review is timely
filed with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of labor, Room S-4309,
Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210. Such
petition for review must be received by the Administrative Review Board within ten business
days of the date of this Recommended Decision and Order, and shall be served on all parties and
on the Chief Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.8 and 24.9, as
amended by 63 Fed. Reg. 6614 (1998).
[ENDNOTES]
1 The Wage and Hour Division lost
the
complaint and did not begin investigating until ten months after the original filing.
2 In addition to Respondent's
Motion to
Dismiss for reasons related to discovery matters, on June 25, 1997 Respondent filed a Motion for
Summary
Decision based both on procedural and substantive issues. The undersigned did not consider the
merits of this
motion as the matter was disposed of pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
3 All transcript citations
throughout this
Recommended Decision and Order refer to the Official Transcript produced by Bayley
Reporting, Inc. It is noted
for the record, however, that both parties have made citation references in their post-hearing
submissions to an
unofficial transcript produced by R & R Court Reporters, Inc.
4 Mr. Tracanna was involved in
an
earlier whistleblower proceeding before the Department of Labor against Alyeska in 1992. This
whistleblower
complaint resulted in a settlement prior to the commencement of the 1993 Congressional
hearings. TR 32-33; CX
10.
5 Mr. Tracanna testified at the
July 1993
Congressional hearing about the harassment, intimidation, and eventual termination from
previous employment at
the Valdez Marine Terminal which he suffered after he identified significant electrical system
problems in 1990 and
1991. CX 10.
6 Although the actual NCR was
dated
and signed by Mr. Richardson on February 28, 1994, Mr. Tracanna is skeptical of the actual date
in which Mr.
Richardson took action on the NCR, as the date in Box Number 14 appears to have been altered.
TR 60; CX 14.
While I am inclined to agree with Mr. Tracanna's observations, I make no finding as to the actual
date in which Mr.
Richardson actually validated and signed the NCR, as such information serves no useful purpose
to the analysis
herein.
7 Although the new QA 136
procedures
were approved on March 17 and 18, 1994 by Alyeska, Mr. Tracanna's March 31, 1994 NCR uses
the NEC
standard. There is no clear evidence in the record delineating the exact time in which the new
procedures were
adopted.
8 Although the initial discussion
of this
job between Mr. Swink and Mr. Tracanna occurred prior to the date in which Mr. Tracanna was
put on lay off
status, such chronology is insignificant to the analysis of the matter herein.
9 Although not necessary, a brief
discussion of the prima facie elements is a useful starting point and helps to facilitate this
analysis. The prima facie
elements are: that Complainant engaged in protected conduct; that Respondent was aware of
such conduct; that
Respondent took some adverse action against Complainant; and that there is an inference the
protected activity was
the likely reason for the adverse action. Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems,
735 F.2d 1159 (9thCir. 1984); Dartey v. Zack Company of Chicago, 82-ERA-2 (Sec'y
Apr. 25, 1983).
There is no dispute that Mr. Tracanna engaged in protected activity prior to
and during the
course of his employment with ASIS; not only did he testify before Congress in 1993 regarding
Alyeska's severe
compliance problems, but Mr. Tracanna also wrote two NCR's while working for ASIS which
identified significant
deficiencies in the electrical system. In addition, there is no dispute that ASIS was aware of Mr.
Tracanna's
protected activity; the record is replete with evidence that ASIS, by and through its various
supervisors, were aware
of Mr. Tracanna's status as a previous whistleblower and as the author of two NCR's in 1994.
10 Although there is no
evidence that
any ASIS employee was ever subjected to fines or criminal penalties, based on Mr. Coffman's
corroborating
testimony, I find it sufficient that Mr. Tracanna legitimately perceived the possibility of such
consequences if he
had remained on the AKOSH Project.
11 The theory forwarded
herein, that
ASIS' action of placing Mr. Tracanna on lay off status on April 2, 1994 rather than allowing him
to maintain active
status is an adverse employment action motivated by protected conducted, is distinguishable
from the theory
discussed infra, that ASIS failed to rehire Mr. Tracanna subsequent to his lay off. The
distinctive element
is that when Mr. Tracanna was constructively discharged from the AKOSH Project, he was still
on active status and
requested to be reassigned to another electrical inspector position at VMT. At such time, ASIS
would not be
"rehiring" Mr. Tracanna, but merely reassigning him.
12 There is evidence regarding
Mr.
Tracanna's application for a certain rotating electrical inspector position in May of 1996.
However, such
application was received by ASCG Human Resources after the closing date for such position.
TR 500-503.
13 There was testimony by Mr.
Coffman stating that Mr. Carver "referred to whistle-blowers as one of the reasons that
ASIS was in trouble
with Alyeska and that now that they seemed to have [them] gone from the terminal . . . that they
were hoping that
they could get back in good graces with Alyeska." At the time Mr. Carver made this
statement, Mr. Tracanna
was not working at the terminal. TR 251.
14 Mr. Glover earned slightly
more
per hour than Mr. Tracanna in standard and overtime pay, however, I find such difference
insignificant in
determining that Mr. Glover is similarly situated employee to Complainant. In light of the other
similarities that the
two employees share, this fact is negligible.
15 Although the pay period
actually
begins on March 28, 1994, the hours herein are calculated so as to reflect the proportional
number of hours that Mr.
Glover worked during the period between April 2, 1994 through the end of that pay period on
April 10, 1994, i.e.,
he worked 80 standard hours in a 14-day period (assuming a 6-day work week), he thus worked
6.67 standard hours
a day; he also worked 119 overtime hours in a 14-day period (assuming a 6-day work week), he
thus worked 9.92
overtime hours a day. Using these numbers, Mr. Glover worked approximately 60 standard
hours (6.67 x 9 days)
and approximately 89 overtime hours (9.92 x 9 days) between the period April 2, 1994 through
April 10, 1994.
16 The effective date of the
salary
decrease was April 3, 1995. However, for purposes of administrative convenience the salary
decrease shall only be
reflected from the pay period beginning April 10, 1995.