Therefore, though Watkins was aware of some irregularities in Redweik's travel expense statements, the record does not support Redweik's argument that Wahleithner and Watkins examined and approved the double billings, the Amsterdam refund, or the family expense reimbursements.
In the same vein, Redweik argues that since the investigators did not interview Patterson, the ALJ erred in crediting testimony by the Shell investigators and Robinson that they believed that Redweik double-billed SEPCO deliberately and should be fired for that reason. As Redweik sees it, their failure to interview a person who reviewed his expense statements and found irregularities shows that the investigators did not want to know that Madro knew of and approved Redweik's billing practices. The only possible reason the investigators and Robinson could have had for avoiding exculpatory evidence, Redweik asserts, would be their wish to cover up their true motive – to punish Redweik for his environmental reporting. As we have already explained, however, Patterson did
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not inform Madro about Redweik's egregious expense policy violations because she did not know about them. Thus, this argument fails.
CONCLUSION
The preponderance of evidence does not support Redweik's pretext argument. Instead, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Shell terminated Redweik because they believed that he committed fraud and theft, not because of his protected complaints about environmental safety at the Colorado project. Since Redweik did not adequately prove that he was terminated because of protected activity, we accept the ALJ's recommendation and DENY the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
OLIVER M. TRANSUE
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2001).
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622 (West 2003).
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 9610 (West 2005).
4 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971 (West 2003).
5 Redweik v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., ALJ No. 2004-SWD-002 (Jan. 18, 2005).
6 Respondent's Exhibit (RX) 1 at SHE 00532-00533; Complainant's Exhibit (CX) 8 at B53-54.
7 RX 1.
8 RX 2 at SHE 00391.
9 Transcript (T.) 660-665.
10 RX 28 at SHE 01264; T. 675.
11 T. 674, 731.
12 RX 25; T. 674-675, 678, 731.
13 RX 25; T. 675-678.
14 T. 732-733.
15 T. 674-683, 721.
16 RX 28; T. 680-681.
17 RX 28 at SHE 01406; RX 26; CX 86; T. 671-673.
18 T. 679-681.
19 T. 734.
20 RX 22; RX 26; RX 28, T. 679-684, 734.
21 T. 537, 555-556.
22 T. 756-757.
23 RX 20, T. 332-334, 538-548, 547, 550-554, 646.
24 RX 9 Attachment 2 at pp 6-8.
25 T. 551.
26 RX 20; RX 27 (Jan. 28, 2003 Redweik email to Estes), Jan. 27, 2003, (Redweik email to Estes); T. 654.
27 RX 20; T. 570-571, 539-540, 556, 635, 635, 685-686.
28 In the meantime, the EEO group presented its findings concerning damage to Redweik's reputation. They concluded that SEPCO had not retaliated against Redweik after he reported the environmental hazards to Watkins. They found that the slightly-below-average rating was consistent with Watkins's ratings of other NBD employees. Furthermore, Redweik's reputation had not been injured – as demonstrated by the fact that he requested and received a transfer back to the HSE division in March 2002. Moreover, Watkins recommended a bonus and a promotion for Redweik that Redweik duly received.
29 T. 882-885.
30 T. 886-888.
31 See Secretary's Order 1-2002, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002) (delegating the Secretary's authority to review ALJ recommended decisions issued under the environmental whistleblower statutes set out at 29 C.F.R. § 24.100, 24.110 (2007).
32 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West 1996).
33 See Sayre v. VECO Alaska, Inc., ARB No. 03-069, ALJ No. 2000-CAA-007, slip op. at 2 (ARB May 31, 2005).
34 72 Fed. Reg. 44,956 (Aug. 10, 2007), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b).
35 Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998).
36 Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (the parties have the burden of calling the court's attention to any pertinent and significant authorities that came to the party's attention after its brief has been filed).
37 Recommended Decision and Order (R. D. & O.) at 22.
38 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a).
39 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a).
40 Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1993); Sasse v. Office of U.S. Attorney, ARB Nos. 02-077, 02-078, 03-044, ALJ No. 1998-CAA-007, slip op. at 9 (ARB Jan. 30, 2004).
41 Pogue v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1288-1289 (9th Cir. 1991); Sasse, slip op. at 11.
42 See Schlagel v. Dow Corning Corp., ARB No. 02-092 ALJ No. 2001-CER-001, slip op. at 5 (ARB Apr. 30, 2004).
43 R. D. & O. at 24.
44 R. D. & O. at 25.
45 R. D. & O. at 24-25.
46 See Ridgley v. C.J. Dannemiller, ARB No. 05-063, ALJ No. 2004-STA-053, slip op. at 5 (ARB May 24, 2007); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.").
47 R. D. & O. at 25.
48 R. D. & O. at 19.
49 R. Initial Br. at 3, 10, 18.
50 CX 104 at 18, 20, 23, 24, 29, 31, 34-36, 40, 56-57.
51 R. Initial Br. at 19.
52 CX 104 at 21.
53 T. 408-421.
54 T. 412-414, 420-421.
55 CX 104 at 23-24.
56 R. Initial Br. at 15, 17.
57 Id. at 27-28.
58 CX 104 at 23-24; T. 777-778.
59 T. 777-778.
60 RX 1 at SHE 00391.