This cases is before me pursuant to the employee protection provision of
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, as amended in 1994 (STAA), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 31105 (1995).
Complainant Gale Cook (Cook) alleged that "he was discharged [by Respondent Kidimula
International, Inc. (Kidimula)] on April 24, 1995 in retaliation for his refusal to operate an
overweight vehicle." 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(i) prohibits the discharge of an
employee when "the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because the operation violates a
regulation, standard, or order of the United States related to commercial motor vehicle safety or
health."
1The basis of Cook's complaint is also
reflected in his September 29, 1995 preheating statement to the ALJ that "[alfter my refusal
to haul more containers from United Motor Freight that were over the legal limits I was
terminated by Mr. Mugenyi of Kidimula International." Similarly, at the hearing, Cook
referred to "my complaint of being terminated for refusing to haul overloads, loads that are
over the legal limits." Hearing Transcript (T.) at 16.
2The R. D. and O. refers to
various types of protected employee activity under the STAA involving: (1) engaging in safety-related complaints, 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1)(A); (2) refusals to operate a vehicle, the
operation of which would in fact violate federal safety standards, 49 U.S.C.A. §
31105(a)(1)(B)(i); and (3) refusals to operate a vehicle if an employee has a reasonable
apprehension of serious injury to himself or the public because of the vehicle's unsafe condition,
49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii). R. D. and O. at 5. Although Cook's complaint
encompassed only 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(i) (discussed supra through n.1),
and the ALJ focused on that issue, he also ruled against Cook on § 31105(a)(1)(A) and
(B)(ii). R. D. and O. at 5-6. Since the latter were not issues raised in this case, the discussion of
those issues is irrelevant. See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v.Martin, 954 F.2d
353, 357-59 (6th Cir. 1992); Caimano v. Brink'sInc., Case No. 95-STA-4, Sec.
Dec. and Ord. of Rem., Jan. 26, 1996, slip op. at 9; Brandt v. United Parcel Service,
Case No. 95-STA-26, Sec. Fin. Dec. and Ord., Oct. 26, 1995, slip op. at 34.
3The ALJ's analysis contains
various references to the presentation of a prima facie case. R. D. and O. at 4-8. Since
this case was fully tried on the merits, it is not necessary to engage in an analysis of the elements
of a prima facie case. If Cook has not prevailed by a preponderance of the evidence on
the ultimate question of liability, it does not matter whether he presented a prima facie case.
Brown v. Wilson Trucking Corp., Case No. 94-STA-54, Sec. Dec. and Rem. Ord., Jan. 25,
1996, slip op. at 3 n.3; Williams v. CMS Transportation Services, Inc., Case No. 94-STA-00005, Sec. Fin. Dec. and Ord., Oct. 25, 1995, slip op. at 2-3; Asst. Sec. and Boyles v.
Highway Express, Inc., Case No. 94-STA-21, Sec. Fin. Dec. and Ord., July 13, 1995, slip
op. at 2-3; Wignall v. Golden State Carriers, Inc., Case No. 95-STA7, Sec. Dec. and
Ord., July 12, 1995, slip op. at 2.