JUDGES' BENCHBOOK OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT                 CHAPTER 28
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE FEBRUARY 2005 ________________________ PREPARED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES         WASHINGTON, DC
________________________ [Note: This is a new Chapter to the Black Lung Benchbook. Supplements to this Chapter
will be maintained separately until the Chapter is incorporated into the Black Lung
Benchbook.]

1 Table of Contents for Chapter 28 I.    Applicability of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure A.    Examples of application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure B.    Discovery provisions of the FRCP inapplicable unless expressly provided by statute or regulation II.    Authority of the administrative law judge, generally
A. Unreasonable claim/defense
1.    Rule 11 sanctions   2.    Costs B.    Issues of constitutionality C.    Determination of insurance coverage D.    Overpayment and repayment E.    Reconsideration 1.    Consecutive motions not permitted 2.    Submission of evidence on reconsideration F.    Interest and penalties G.   Summary judgment 1.    ALJ has sua sponte authority 2.    ALJ does not have sua sponte authority H.    Failure to file timely controversion I.    ALJ’s discretionary finding on procedural matter is binding J.    Remand for further evidentiary development – authority limited III.    Closing the record
A. Decision on the record—ALJ’s di scretion to consider briefs B. Submission of evidence post-hearing
1. Untimely a. Evidence excluded b. Evidence admitted 2. Must permit responsive evidence if “late” evidence is admitted 3. Results of pulmonary evaluation; record incomplete 4. Failure of opposing party to receive copy of evidence submitted
at hearing C. Error to close record prematurely IV. Continuances
A. Denial proper
1. Counsel failed to appear 2. Party failed to timely obtain evidence 3. Third continuance request; claimant failed to appear B. Denial improper
Statutory right to representation; first continuance request Last Revised: 3/2/2005

2 V.    Decision of the administrative law judge A.    Compliance with APA’s requirements 1.    Adopting a party’s brief constitutes error 2.    Correction of clerical error 3.    Delay in issuance of decision and order 4.    Evidence generated by adverse, dismissed party B.    Finality of decision; appeals 1.    Decision final within 30 days 2.    Defect in notice VI.       Depositions A. Adequate notice required
1. Reasonable notice in writing; objections and waiver 2. Location of deposition; right of cross-examination 3. Expert witness provisions at § 725.457 inapplicable B. Submission of pre-hearing deposition
1. Generally 2. Pre-hearing deposition submitted post-hearing C. Submission of post-hearing deposition
1. Factors to be considered 2. Exclusion proper 3. Exclusion improper a. ALJ admitted one party’s evidence post-hearing but
did not admit opposing party’s post-hearing evidence b. Party’s evidence submittedpost-hearing subject to  
opposing party’s opportunity to cross-examine c. Evidence submitted on eve of the 20-day deadline d. Evidence was unknown or unavailable prior to hearing
due to opposing party’s failure to cooperate VII.      Due process A. Notice required for transfer of case to another ALJ
1. On remand 2. On modification B. Timely notice; opportunity to fully present case
1. Presentation of evidence
a.    Copy of opposing party’s evidence b.    Expert witness testimony c.    Failure to notify representative of examination; evidence excluded 2. Notice to carrier 3. Delay in notice of liability C. Issuance of decision and order Last Revised: 3/2/2005

3 VIII.    Expert witness testimony A. Actual notice of intent to present required B. Expert witness provisions at § 725.457 inapplicable to expert deposition
testimony IX.       Failure to attend hearing A. Physical ailment; ALJ to make every reasonable accommodation B. Consideration of client’s age and illness before binding client to
acts of counsel C. ALJ properly proceeded with hearing despite claimant’s absence D. Error to dismiss claim for failure to attend hearing where Director
objected and payments were being made by Trust Fund E. Inadvertent delay; no waiver of appeal rights X.    Fair hearing A.    Impartiality required 1.    Conduct by the ALJ 2.    Treatment of witnesses 3.    Competency of witnesses B.    Right to oral hearing 1.    On remand a.    No oral hearing necessary; witness credibility not dispositive b.    New hearing required; witness credibility at issue c.    Notice to parties 2.    Multiple claims under § 725.309 3.    Overpayment claims C.    Waiver of hearing 1.    Waiver must be voluntary, intentional, and in writing 2.    Withdrawal of waiver of hearing 3.    Error to decide merits of claim where hearing not waived D.    Hearing limited to contested issues XI. Hearsay
A. Medical reports and testing
1. Elements of reliability 2. Reports based on physical examinations 3. Consultative reports 4. Results of objective testing B. Affidavits C. Death of authoring physician D. Evidence that is lost or destroyed Last Revised: 3/2/2005

4 XII. Judicial/Official Notice
A. Procedure used B. Taking official notice of one expert but not another expert
constitutes error C. Examples of judicial/official notice
1. Medical opinion; no judicial notice 2. Unreliability of early Social Security records 3. Dictionary of Occupational Titles 4. Directory of Medical Specialists 5. Criminal conviction of a physician XIII.    Reassignment/transfer of cases A. Bias by original deciding judge B.    Unavailability of original deciding judge
1. On remand 2. On modification XIV.    Representatives A. Right to representation
1.    The pro se claimant a.    Informing claimant of his or her rights b.    Claimant’s counsel fails to appear at hearing; whether to proceed Proceeding is not per se error Inquiring whether claimant wants to proceed Determining whether claimant has capacity to proceed Leaving record open for post-hearing submissions 2.    Claimant fails to appear at hearing B.    Disqualification of representative; appearance of impropriety C.    Party bound by acts of representative XV.     Right to cross-examination A. Generally B. Waiver of right of cross-examination C. Improper denial of right of cross-examination
1. Delay in notifying employer of potential liability 2. Party’s failure to cooperate during discovery D. The 20-day rule for exchanging evidence and “good cause”
1.    Requiring exchange of evidence more than 20 days             in advance of hearing is permitted
2.        Exchange of evidence less than 20 days prior to hearing a.    “Good cause” not established Unreasonable delay Knowledge of contents of late evidence not determinative Relevancy of late evidence not determinative b.    “Good cause” established Last Revised: 3/2/2005

5 Evidence exchanged in connection with earlier state claim Evidence to be used for impeachment purposes Examination more than 20 days before hearing; report not available until after hearing 3. Admission of late evidence; must allow responsive evidence a.    Record must be left open for both parties b.    Failure to timely submit responsive evidence—waiver of right of cross-examination 4.    Admission of evidence post-hearing a.      Evidence submitted after the hearing   “Good cause” established; responsive evidence   “Good cause” not established b. Evidence submitted on reconsideration c. Reopening the record for submission of evidence
“Good cause” established
“Good cause” not established XVI.    Settlements and withdrawals of claims A. Settlement of black lung claim prohibited B. Contingent withdrawal of controversion illegal C. Remand for payment of benefits proper; withdrawal of controversion
of issues D. Withdrawal of claim XVII.   Stipulations A. Stipulation of fact
1. Binding when received into evidence 2. Stipulation against pro se Claimant’s interest; not binding B. Parties cannot stipulate to legal effect of stipulated facts XVIII.  Subpoenas A. ALJ has subpoena power when case pending before district director B. Party’s due process right limited to requesting subpoena C. Party may be subpoenaed to attend hearing XIX.    Summary judgment A. Sua sponte authority to render summary judgment
1. ALJ has authority 2. ALJ does not have authority C. Unresolved factual issues; summary judgment inappropriate Last Revised: 3/2/2005

6 Chapter 28 Rules of Procedure and Evidence             The procedural and evidential rules applicable to black lung claims are found at
20  C.F.R.  Part  725  and  29  C.F.R.  Part  18.    Although  29  C.F.R.  §§  18.101  through
18.1104  set  forth  rules  of  evidence  that  are  similar  to  rules  applied  in  federal  district
courts, black lung proceedings are exempt from these provisions pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
18.1101(b)(2) with the exception of §§ 18.403 (excluding relevant evidence on grounds
of  confusion  or  waste  of  time),  18.611(a)  (exercising  control  over  mode  and  order  in
interrogation   of   witnesses),   and   18.614   (examination   and   cross-examination   of
witnesses).    In  this  chapter,  general  rules  of  proce dure  and  evidence  applicable  to  all  black lung claims will be discussed.  For black lung claims filed after January 19, 2001 and for
a  discussion  of  the  “good  cause”  standard,  see  also  Chapter  4:    Limitations  on Admission  of  Evidence.    For  a  discussion  of  the  application  of  the  “Tobias”  rule  to claims  filed  before  January  1,  1982,  see  Chapter  11:    Living  Miner’s  Claims-- Entitlement Under Part 718.    I.    Applicability of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure             Certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) may apply to the adjudication of
black lung claims pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 18.1, if the rules are not in conflict with the Act
or its implementing regulations.  Hamrick v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 12 B.L.R. 1-
39 (1988). A. Examples of application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure · Trump  v   Eastern  Assoc.  Coal  Corp. ,  6  B.L.R.  1-1268  (1984)  (applying FRCP 5(b)  and  30(b)(1)  that  parties  receive  reasonable  notice  of  a  deposition  in
writing); • Arnold v. Consolidation Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-648 (1985) (applying FRCP 26(c)
to issue a protective order for Claimant, an Ohio resident, from the undue expense
of attending Employer’s physician’s examination in New York); • Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899, 11 B.L.R. 2-92 (1988) (applying
FRCP 32(d)(1) that all errors in a notice for taking a deposition are waived unless
an objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice); • Howell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-259 (1984) (holding that FRCP 41(b) is
similar to § 725.461(b) in the management of an ALJ’s docket); • Hamrick v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 12 B.L.R. 1-39 (1988) (applying
FRCP 56 permitting an ALJ to issue summary decision sua sponte );  Montoya v. Last Revised: 3/2/2005

7 National King Coal Co., 10 B.L.R. 1-56, 1-61 (1986) (applying FRCP 56 that summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact
exists), but also see Part XIX of this Chapter; and • Coleman v. Ramey Coal Co., 18 B.L.R. 1-9 (1993) (applying FRCP 60 to correct
misidentification of a party liable for the payment of a representative’s fees). B. Discovery provisions of the FRCP       inapplicable unless expressly
provided by statute or regulation The  Board  has  held  that  the  discovery  provisions  of  the  FRCP  do  not  apply  to black lung proceedings, unless expressly permitted by statute or regulation.  In Cline v.
Westmoreland   Coal   Co.,   21   B.L.R.   1-69   (1997),   Claimant   requested   “medical
information  obtained  by  employer  which  employer  did  not  intend  to  introduce  into
evidence and considered ‘privileged’” duringthe discovery period.  The Board declined
to find that FRCP 26(b)(4)(B) applied to black lung claims.  Rather, it determined that
the  federal  procedural  rules  “for  discovery do  not  apply  to  administrative  proceedings,
unless specifically provided by statute or regulation.”  The Board held that, on remand,
the “ALJ should reconsider his Order Denying Motion to Compel in accordance with the
standard for the scope of discovery provided at 29 C.F.R. § 18.14 in conjunction with the
provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 725.455” under his “discretionary authority.”  It further stated: We  reject,  however,  as  overbroad,  claimant’s  interpretation  of  Section
725.455  that  an  ‘ALJ  has  an  obligation  to  fully  develop  the  record,
develop  the  evidence,  get  all  the  evidence  in  .  .  ..’  We  also  reject  the
position  of  claimant  and  the  Director  that  the  provision  of  20  C.F.R.  §
725.414,  which  requires  the  operator  to  submit  evidence  obtained  to  the
district director and all parties, is extended to the administrative law judge. II.    Authority of the administrative law judge, generally The conduct hearing is within the        sound discretion of the ALJ.  The ALJ is
not bound by formal rules of evidence or procedure except as provided for at 5 U.S.C. §
501 et seq., 20 C.F.R. Part 725, and 29 C.F.R. Part 18.  See Chapter 25, Principles of Finality.  Note, however, that there are specific limitations on the admission of evidence in  claims  filed  after  January  19,  2001,  see  Chapter  4:    Limitations  on  Medical
Evidence. A.    Unreasonable claim/defense 1. Rule 11 sanctions In Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887 (9^th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on whether Rule 11 sanctions are incorporated into administrative
proceedings  through  29  C.F.R.  §  18.1  because  §  926  of  the  LHWCA  provides  for  the
assessment  of  costs  against  a  party  who  institutes  or  continues  a  proceeding  without Last Revised: 3/2/2005

8 reasonable ground.  The court held that this “impliedly includes a sanction for bad faith
claims . . ..”  The court did state, however, that its “doubts” that Rule 11 is incorporated
through § 18.1 “are increased by 20 C.F.R. §18.29(b) which recognizes that enforcement
actions against those who misbehave in proceedings before an ALJ are to be referred to
the court system.”  See also Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Rihner, 41 F.3d 997 (5^th Cir.
1995). 2. Costs             In  Crum  v.  Wolf  Creek  Collieries,  18  B.L.R.  1-81  (1994),  the  Board  held  that
“only  a  federal  court  can  assess  a  party’s  costs  as  a  sanction  against  a  claimant  who
institutes  or  continues,  without  reasonable  ground,  workers’  compensation  proceedings
under the LHWCA,” portions of which are incorporated into the Black Lung Benfits Act
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 931. For   additional   discussion,   see   Chapter   27:      Representative’s   Fees   and Representation Issues. B.    Issues of constitutionality The  ALJ  is  without  authority  to  decide  issues  of  constitutionality.    Kosh  v. Director, OWCP, 8 B.L.R. 1-168, 1-169 (1985). C.    Determination of insurance coverage                   The  ALJ  has  jurisdiction  to  decide  whether  an  insurance  fund  is  liable  under
contract for the payment of benefits; however, this jurisdiction does not extend to matters
outside the insurance contract.  Gilbert v. Williamson Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-289, 1-291
and 1-292 (1984). For additional discussion on proper designation of an operator and/or carrier, see Chapter 7:  Designation of Responsible Operator. D.        Overpayment and repayment In Kieffer v. Director, OWCP, 18 B.L.R. 1-35 (1993), the Board held that an ALJ has authority to determine whether an overpayment exists and, if so, whether the miner is
liable  for  its  repayment.    However,  an  ALJ  does  not  have  authority  to  determine  a
repayment schedule.                For   additional   discussion,   see   Chapter  18:    Overpayment;  Waiver;  and
Recovery. Last Revised: 3/2/2005

9 E. Reconsideration 1. Consecutive motions not permitted In Midland Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 149 F.3d 558 (7 th                                                                                                                    Cir. 1998), the court
held that an ALJ has jurisdiction to adjudicate a motion for reconsideration, if it is filed
within 30 days of the date of issuance of his or her decision.  The ALJ is not empowered,
however,  to  entertain  subsequent  motions  for  reconsideration  filed  outside  the  30  day
time period.    In  Knight  v.  Director,  OWCP,  14  B.L.R.  1-166  (1991),  the  Board  held  that  a second  motion  for  reconsideration,  which  was  filed  within  30  days  of  the  decision  on
reconsideration but not within 30 days of the original decision and order, was untimely.  
Moreover, the Board concluded that, even if the second motion was timely, it improperly
raised issues which were not raised in the first motion. 2. Submission of evidence on reconsideration             In Hensley v. Grays Knob Coal Co., 10 B.L.R. 1-88, 1-91 (1987), the Board held
that the ALJ had jurisdiction to consider a motion for reconsideration, which was filed
within  30  days  of  the  date  the  decision  and  order  became  “effective”  pursuant  to  §§
725.479 and 725.480.  The Board then concluded that the ALJ may, but is not required
to, accept new evidence on reconsideration.  Prior to admitting such evidence, however,
the  ALJ  must  find  that  “good  cause”  existed for  failure  to  obtain  and  exchange  the
evidence in compliance with Section 725.456(b)(2). For   additional   discussion   of   motions   for   reconsideration,   see   Chapter  25:   Principles of Finality and Chapter 26:  Motions. F. Interest and penalties An  ALJ  does  not  have  authority  to  decide  issues  involving  the  computation  of interest or penalties assessed against an employer for reimbursements owed to the Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund for medical benefits paid by the Fund.                                                                    Wade v. Island Creek
Coal Co., BRB No. 93-549 BLA (Feb. 22, 1996) (unpub.).  See also Bethenergy Mines v.
Director,  OWCP,  32  F.3d  843  (3^rd  Cir.  1994);  Vahalik  v.  Youghiogheny  &  Ohio  Coal
Co., 970 F.2d 161 (6^th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Sea “B” Mining Co.                                                                                                        , 17 B.L.R. 1-115 (1993)
(en banc); Balaban v. Duquesne Light Co., 16 B.L.R. 1-120 (1992).    Of interest, in Nowlin v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 465 (N.D. W. Va. 2004), the court held that a widow was entitled to a 20 percent penalty on unpaid benefits  from  Employer,  despite  the  fact  that  she  received  timely  payments  of  benefits from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.    Last Revised: 3/2/2005

10             For additional discussion of issues regarding assessments of interest and penalties,
see Chapter 21:  Interest on Past Due Medical Bills and Penalties. G.    Summary judgment 1. ALJ has sua sponte authority The ALJ has authority to issue orders of summary judgment sua sponte where the parties  have  been  given  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  respond.    In  this  vein,  the  Board concluded  that  FRCP  56,  permitting  sua  sponte  summary  judgment  orders  by  a  judge,
applies to black lung proceedings because it is “not inconsistent” with § 725.452(c) of the
regulations.    Under  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  ALJ  provided  100  days’  notice  of  the
hearings to be conducted and requested that the parties exchange evidence 40 days prior
to the hearing.  Thirty days before the hearing the ALJ sua sponte issued an order to show
cause why the claims should not be denied based upon the evidence received.  The Board
held  that  the  ALJ  had  authority  to  issue  the  order.    However,  it  warned  that  such
deviation from standard procedures was “strongly discouraged” because of the “negative” affect  on  the  process.    Smith  v.  Westmoreland  Coal  Co.,  12  B.L.R.  1-39,  1-43  (1988), aff’d. sub nom., Henshew v. Royal Coal Co. , 871 F.2d 417 (4^th Cir. 1989)(table). 2. ALJ does not have sua sponte authority             In  Robbins  v.  Cyprus  Cumberland  Coal  Co.,  146  F.3d  425  (6^th  Cir.  1998),  the
Sixth Circuit held that an ALJ may issue a decision without holding a hearing only if the
parties agree to (1) a waiver of the hearing, or (2) a party moves for summary judgment.  
The court noted the following: A hearing is not necessary if all parties give written waiver of their rights
to a hearing and request a decision on the documentary record.  (citation
and footnote omitted).  The only other instance in the regulations which
permits  a  decision  without  holding  a  requested  hearing  is  when  a  party
moves  for  summary  judgment,  and  the  ALJ  determines  that  there  is  no
genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and  that  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to
judgment as a matter of law.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(c).  As the Director
points  out,  ‘[t]here  is no  regulatory  provision  which  would  permit  an
administrative  law  judge  to  initiate  summary  judgment  proceedings  sua
sponte.’ (citation omitted). For  additional  discussion  and  case  law  on  summary  judgment,  see  Part  XIX  of  this
Chapter.   Last Revised: 3/2/2005

11 H. Failure to file timely controversion             In Pyro Mining Co. v. Slaton, 879 F.2d 187, 12 B.L.R. 2-238 (6^th Cir. 1989), the
Sixth Circuit held that it is within the jurisdiction of the ALJ to determine, upon de novo
review of the issue, whether Employer established “good cause” for its failure to timely
controvert the claim.  The Board adopted this holding in Krizner v. U.S. Steel Mining Co.,
17 B.L.R. 1-31 (1992)(en banc) wherein it held that any party dissatisfied with the district
director’s  determination  on  the  issue  of  timeliness  of  filing  a  controversion  or  finding
“good cause” for an untimely filing is entitled to have the issued decided de novo by an
ALJ.     If  the  ALJ  finds  that  Employer  failed  to  timely  controvert  the  claim,  then entitlement is established.   See 20 C.F.R. § 725.413(b)(3) (2001).               For additional discussion of failure to timely controvert a claim, see Chapter 26:  
Motions. I. Discretionary finding on procedural matter by ALJ is binding An   ALJ’s   discretionary   finding   on   a   procedural   matter   is   not   subject   to modification.    By  unpublished  decision  in  Bowman  v.  Director,  OWCP,  BRB  No.  03-
0720  BLA  (Sept.  10,  2004)  (unpub.),  the  Board  held  that  an  ALJ’s  “discretionary
determination that the Director established good cause for the untimely submission of Dr.
Green’s  report  is  not  subject  to  modification  because  (the  ALJ)  was  resolving  a
procedural matter that not within the scope of issues th at are subject to modification, i.e.,  issues  of  entitlement.”          The  Board  further  stated  that  the  “proper  recourse  for
correction   of   error,   if   any,   would   have   been   a   timely   appeal   or   motion   for
reconsideration, neither of which were timely pursued.” J. Remand for further evidentiary development—authority limited   It  was  error  for  the  ALJ remand  a  clai m  to  the  district  director  for  further evidentiary development where “the administrative law judge did not find the evidence to
be incomplete on any issue before him but rather required the development of cumulative
evidence.”   The Board held that, “unless mutually consented to by the parties under 20
C.F.R. § 725.456(b)(2), further development of the evidence by the administrative law
judge is precluded.”  Morgan v. Director, OWCP, 8 B.L.R. 1-491, 1-494 (1986). III.      Closing the record A. Decision the record–ALJ’s discretion to consider briefs Where  Employer  consented  to  a  decision  on  the  record  without  a  hearing  and “requested”   30   days   to   submit   a   written   memorandum,   the   ALJ   did   not   violate Last Revised: 3/2/2005

12 Employer’s  due  process  rights  by  issuing  a decision  without  considering  Employer’s
memorandum.  The court noted that 29 C.F.R. § 18.53 and 20 C.F.R. § 725.459A (1992)
“demonstrate  that  the  ALJ  had  discretion  to  accept  legal  memoranda,  and  was  not
required  to  accept  [Employer’s]  memorandum.”    Because  Employer’s  consent  to  a
decision   on   the   record   was   not   contingent   upon   the   ALJ’s   consideration   of   its
memorandum, Employer’s due process rights were not violated.  Freeman United Coal
Mining Co. v. Cooper, 965 F.2d 443 (7^th Cir. 1992). B. Submission of evidence post-hearing 1. Untimely a.    Evidence excluded             Closing the record was not an abuse of discretion where the record was held open
for ten months to allow the Director to submit an x-ray re-reading and the Director failed
to do so.  Amorose v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-899, 1-900 (1985).    b. Evidence admitted             In  Pendleton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-815, 1-819 n. 4 (1984), the Board
held that it was proper for the ALJ to accept a physician’s report submitted two days after
the record closed where Claimant’s attorney “explained that the report was forwarded to
the administrative law judge on the date it was received.”     2.        Must permit responsive evidence if “late” evidence is admitted When  late  evidence,  such  as  a  medical  report,  is  submitted,  the  opposing  party must be provided an opportunity to respond to the medical report or to cross-examine the physician who prepared the report.  North American Coal Co. v. Miller                                                                  , 870 F.2d 948, 12
B.L.R. 2-222 (3d Cir. 1989); Fowler v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-495
(1984), aff’d sub. nom.                                       ,   Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, No. 85-
1013 (7^th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986)(unpub.). 3.        Results of pulmonary evaluation; record incomplete     Twenty-nine  C.F.R.  §  18.54,  which  addresses  the  procedure  for  closing  the record,  does  not  preclude  submission  of  a  complete  pulmonary  examination  by  the
Department of Labor where the record is incomplete as to any issue in a claim filed under
20  C.F.R.  §  725.309.    However,  Employer  must  be  provided  an  opportunity  to  submit
responsive evidence.  Hodges v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 18 B.L.R. 1-84 (1994). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

13 4. Failure of opposing party to receive copy of evidence              submitted at hearing                     Due process required a remand to the ALJ to reopen the record where Employer
never received a copy of a report admitted at hearing and where “the administrative law
judge  appears  to  have  been  unaware  of  this  fact  when  employer  moved  to  close  the
record.” Pendleton v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 6 B.L.R. 1-815, 1-819 (1985). C. Error to close record prematurely             The ALJ violated the parties’ rights to a “full and fair” hearing by prematurely
closing the record.  Specifically, the ALJ left the record open for a party to file responsive
evidence, but erred in issuing her decision two weeks prior to the date the record closed.  
Lane v. Harman Mining Corp., 5 B.L.R. 1-87, 1-90 (1982).   For  additional  discussion  of  the  submission  of  evidence  post-hearing,  see  also Chapter 4:  Admission of Evidence and Chapter 26:  Motions as well as Parts VI and
VIII of this Chapter. IV.      Continuances A. Denial proper 1. Counsel failed to appear             It is within the ALJ’s discretion to proceed with a hearing despite the absence of
Claimant’s counsel.  The ALJ acted properly in a case where Claimant was present at the
hearing without counsel, and the ALJ inquired whether he wished to proceed after fully
informing Claimant of his rights with respect to the presentation of his case.  The ALJ
also  left  the  record  open  for  the  submissi       on of post-hearing evidence by counsel.  The
Board concluded that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.454(d), counsel failed to provide ten
days’  notice  of  his  request  for  continuance  and  his  “scheduling  conflict”  did  not
constitute “good cause” to grant a continuance.  In particular, counsel notified the ALJ of
a  scheduling  conflict  20  minutes  after  the  hearing  was  to  start.    In  denying  the
continuance,  the  ALJ  noted  that  Claimant  traveled  400  miles  to  the  hearing  location,
waited  five  hours  for  the  hearing  to  commence,  and  chose  to  proceed  without  counsel
when asked on two occasions.  Prater v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-121 (1989).      2. Party failed to timely obtain evidence Denial  of  a  continuance  requested  by  Employer  was  proper  where  Employer wanted to obtain autopsy slides for an independent review, but had access to the slides
and failed to secure them for one year.  As noted by the Board, Claimant consented to
release  of  the  autopsy  slides,  but  “Employer simply  failed  to  secure  the  evidence  in  a
timely fashion.”  Witt v. Dean Jones Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-21 (1984). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

14 3. Third continuance request; claimant failed to appear             The  ALJ  acted  within  his  discretion  in  proceeding  with  a  hearing  despite
Claimant’s absence.  Claimant’s right to participate fully at the hearing was adequately
protected where the ALJ allowed Claimant an opportunity to submit a sworn statement in
lieu of live testimony within 30 days of the hearing.  The Board further concluded that
the   ALJ   did   not   abuse   his   discretion   in   denying   Claimant’s   third   request   for   a
continuance.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(b); Wagner v. Beltrami Enterprises, 16 B.L.R. 1-
65 (1990). B. Denial improper Statutory right to representation; first continuance request The Board vacated an ALJ’s denial of benefits and remanded the claim for a de novo hearing on grounds that the ALJ had abused his discretion in denying Claimant’s
request for a continuance.  Claimant was entitled to be represented by counsel but could
not retain one by the date of the initial hearing.  Moreover, Claimant did not waive his
“statutory” right to counsel, the Director did not oppose the continuance, and this was the
first  request  for  a  continuance  submitted  in  the  case.    Johnson  v.  Director,  OWCP,  9
B.L.R. 1-218, 1-220 (1986). For additional discussion of continuances, see Chapter 26:  Motions. V.    Decision of the administrative law judge A. Compliance with APA’s requirements             The requirements of the APA at 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557 direct that the ALJ
issue  a  decision  containing  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  with  supporting
rationale.    Arjonov  v.  Interport  Maintenance  Co.,  34  B.R.B.S.  15  (2000)  (“The  APA
requires  an  administrative  law  judge  to  adequately  detail  that  rationale  behind  her
decision, analyze and discuss the relevant evidence of record, and explicitly set forth the
reasons for her acceptance or rejection of such evidence”); Boggs v. Falcon Coal Co., 17
B.L.R. 1-62 (1992); Wojtowicz v. Duquesne Light Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-162 (1989). 1.   Adopting party’s brief constitutes error The Board remanded a case and directed that the ALJ independently evaluate the evidence of record instead of adopting the Director’s post-hearing brief in its entirety.  It
concluded  that,  “[i]f  a  decision  cannot  withstand  scrutiny  on  the  four  corners  of  the
document,  parties  are  compelled  to  rely  on  a  document  with  which  they  may  be
unfamiliar, and which may not be easily accessible.”  The Board further noted that the
Director’s  brief  contained  factual  errors.   Hall  v.  Director,  OWCP ,  12  B.L.R.  1-80 (1988). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

15 2. Correction of clerical error The  ALJ  may  correct  the  misidentification  of  a  party  liable  for  attorney’s  fees pursuant   to   Federal   Rule   of   Civil   Procedure   60(a)   where   such   misidentification
constituted a mere clerical error.  Coleman v. Ramey Coal Co., 18 B.L.R. 1-9 (1993).  See also Allied Materials Corp. v. Superior Products Co., 620 F.2d 224, 226 (10^th Cir. 1980). 3. Delay in issuance of decision and order; intervening case law   A  delay  in  the  issuance  of decision by  the  ALJ  did  not  constitute  prejudicial error  where  intervening  case  law  did  not  substantively  affect  the  claim.    Worrell  v. Consolidation Coal Co., 8 B.L.R. 1-158, 1-162 (1985) (the ALJ found § 727.203(b)(2) rebuttal  and  the  change  in  law  addressed  only  (b)(3)  rebuttal;  other  intervening  law
requiring that more weight be given to examining physicians’ opinions did not affect the
ALJ’s decision since both parties submitted such reports).             An ALJ’s decision is not invalid merely because it is not filed within 20 days of
the date the record is closed.  A delay of more than 20 days in issuing a decision does not
warrant a remand for a new hearing unless the aggrieved party establishes prejudice due
to the delay.  Williams v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-188 (1983). 4.    Evidence generated by adverse, dismissed party             An  ALJ  may  properly  admit  evidence  obtained  by  an  adverse  party  who  was
dismissed prior to the hearing.  York v. Benefits Review Board, 819 F.2d 134, 10 B.L.R.
2-99 (6^th Cir. 1987).  See also Hardisty v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-322, aff’d 776
F.2d 129, 8 B.L.R. 2-72 (7^th Cir. 1985) (the court held that the Director could contest an
ALJ’s award and could benefit from evidence developed by a dismissed employer even
though  the  Director  had  supported  Claimant’s  pursuit  of  benefits  while  the  case  was
pending before the ALJ and had joined in Claimant’s objection to the admission of the
evidence at that time). B. Service by certified mail             By  law,  all  final  orders,  supplemental  orders  regarding  fees  and  costs,  and
decisions on the merits must be served by certified mail to counsel for the claimant and
employer.  If a party appears pro se, then the document must be served via certified mail
to that party.  20 C.F.R. § 725.478 (2001). 1. Decision final within 30 days The  ALJ’s  decision  becomes  final  thirty  days  after  it  is  filed  in  the  district director’s office.  The ALJ is without authority to extend the 30-day time period.  Mecca v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 14 B.L.R. 1-101 (1990). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

16 2. Defect in notice             The Sixth Circuit held that, even though notice of an ALJ’s adverse decision had
not been sent to Claimant’s attorney, the attorney had actual notice of the decision and,
therefore,  the  defect  in  notice  would  not  toll  the  30-day  period  for  filing  an  appeal.  
Claimant was hospitalized when his wife signed for the certified letter and advised the
attorney of the decision.  Wellman v. Director, OWCP , 706 F.2d 191, 193 (6 th Cir. 1983).                The Third Circuit also held that, where Employer’s counsel was not served with
the district director’s award, but had actual knowledge of the decision and did not file a
controversion,   the   30-day   period   for   filing   such   a   controversion   was   not   tolled.  
Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d 1321, 1329, 12 B.L.R. 2-60, 2-72 and 2-73 (3^rd
Cir. 1988).  However, the Third Circuit concluded that, where an attorney was not served
with the ALJ’s decision and where he did not have actual notice of the decision, the 30-
day time period from the date the decision was filed with the district director was tolled.  
Patton v. Director, OWCP, 763 F.2d 553, 560, 7 B.L.R. 2-216, 2-227 and 2-228 (3^rd  Cir.
1985).    For additional discussion of “actual receipt” of a decision, see the discussion on circuit  court  jurisdiction  at  Chapter  1:    Introduction  to  the  Claims  Process  and
Research Tools. VI.      Depositions             For a discussion of the presentation of expert witness testimony at the hearing, see
Part VIII of this Chapter. A. Adequate notice required The  regulatory  provisions  at  20  C.F.R.  §  725.458  (2001)  provide,  in  part,  that “[t]he  testimony  of  any  witness  or  party  may  be  taken  by  deposition  or  interrogatory according to the rules of practice of the Federal district court for the judicial district in
which the case is pending (or of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia if the
case is pending in the District or outside the United States), except that at least 30 days prior notice of any deposition shall be given to all parties unless such notice is waived.” 1. Reasonable notice in writ ing; objections and waiver The  Board  applied  FRCP  30(b)(1),  which  requires  that  the  party  taking  a deposition  give  “reasonable  notice  in  writing to  every  other  party  to  the  action.”    The Board  further  noted  that  FRCP  5(b)  requires  that  service  be  made  upon  the  attorney
representing a party unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ.  Thus, it was error to admit
deposition  testimony  where  claimant’s  lay  representative  was  not  given  notice  of  the
deposition.  The Board concluded that the fact that Claimant’s representative was not a
member  of  the  Bar  was  irrelevant  as  “[a] lay  representative,  once  qualified,  holds  the Last Revised: 3/2/2005

17 same powers and is bound by the same procedural rules as an attorney.”  However, the
Board held that the error in admitting the deposition was cured because the ALJ left the
record open for 30 days to allow Claimant to cross-examine witnesses.  Trump v. Eastern
Assoc. Coal Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-1268 (1984).             In Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899, 11 B.L.R. 2-92 (6^th Cir. 1988),
Employer  sent  notice  of  a  deposition  to  Claimant’s  counsel’s  partner,  but  Claimant’s
counsel  never  received  the  notice.    The  Sixth  Circuit  held  that  FRCP  32(d)(1)  is
applicable to proceedings arising under the Act such that a deposition taken in violation
of  the  thirty-day  notice  requirement  set  forth  in  20  C.F.R.  §  725.458  was  admissible
unless the opposing party expressly objects, in        writing, to “[a]ll errors and irregularities”
in  service  of  the  notice  of  deposition.    The  court  then  remanded  the  claim  for  a
determination   of   whether   objections   to   the   defective   notice   were   waived   because
Claimant’s   counsel   did   not   file   objections   in   writing.      The   court   cautioned   that
“[o]bviously, it is impossible to serve a written objection to a defective notice if, in fact,
no notice at all is provided.”  Thus, the court instructed that a determination be made as
to whether Claimant’s counsel’s objections were waived under the facts of the case. 2. Location of deposition; right of cross-examination             It was proper to apply FRCP 26(c) to the scheduling of depositions.  The Board
held that good cause was established for issuance of a protective order for Claimant, an
Ohio  resident,  from  having  to  incur  the  undue  expense  of  attending  a  deposition  of
Employer’s physician in New York, NY.  The Board noted that Employer declined the
ALJ’s  offer  to  permit  a  post-hearing  deposition  of  the  physician  by  telephone.    As  a
result, the Board held that “Employer will not now be heard to complain that it was not
given an opportunity to depose Dr. Kleinerman.”  Arnold v. Consolidation Coal Co., 7
B.L.R. 1-648 (1985).   3. Expert witness provisions at § 725.457 inapplicable Section  725.457  states,  in  part,  that  “[a]ny  party  who  intends  to  present  the testimony of an expert witness at a hearing shall so notify all other parties to the claim at
least 10 days before the hearing.”  The Board has held that § 725.457(a) applies only to
the appearance by an expert witness at the hearing, not to the introduction of deposition
testimony at the hearing.  A deposition taken five days before the hearing did not deny
due process to other parties who had receive       d adequate notice of the deposition pursuant
to § 725.458.    Tucker v. Eastern Coal Corp. , 6 B.L.R. 1-743 (1984). B. Submission of pre-hearing deposition 1. Generally             In ruling on the submission of deposition testimony, it is important to understand
the  distinction  between  submission  of  a  pre-hearing  deposition  before,  at,  or  after  the
hearing as opposed to the submission of a post-hearing deposition.  As long as 30 days’ Last Revised: 3/2/2005

18 notice is properly given, a pre-hearing deposition  is  admissible                                                                       before, during, or after
the hearing.  A pre-hearing deposition does not have to be exchanged in accordance with
the  20-day  rule  and  ten  days’ notice  of  a  party’s  intention  to  submit  expert  witness
testimony by deposition does not have to be provided in advance of the hearing date.  As
an  example,  a  deposition  conducted  within  five  days  of  the  date  of  the  hearing  was
admissible  post-hearing  where  the  opposing  parties  were  given  30  days’  notice  of  the
deposition. Tucker v. Eastern Coal Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-743 (1984).   On  the  other  hand,  as  is  discussed  later  in  this  Chapter,  it  is  within  the  ALJ’s discretion to permit and admit a post-hearing deposition.  Indeed, the Board has set forth
specific  factors  to  be  considered  in  determining  whether  to  permit  a  post-hearing
deposition, including whether the party has diligently tried to secure such evidence prior
to the hearing.  See Lee v. Drummond Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-544 (1983). 2.         Pre-hearing deposition submitted post-hearing     Although   20   C.F.R.   §   725.458   provides,   in   part,   that   “[n]o   post-hearing deposition or interrogatory shall be permitted unless authorized by the administrative law
judge upon the motion of a party to the claim,” these provisions are not applicable to the
post-hearing submission of a deposition taken  pre-hearing.  When adequate notice was
given and a deposition was taken five days prior to the hearing, the Board held that the
ALJ erred when he denied a request to admit the deposition post-hearing under § 725.458
of the regulations.  Tucker v. Eastern Coal Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-743 (1984).             Similarly, in another case, the Board held that it was error for the ALJ to exclude
pre-hearing deposition testimony from being       admitted post-hearing pursuant to § 725.458
of the regulations.  The Board noted that counsel had provided 30 days’ notice of the two
pre-hearing depositions, which it sought to admit within 10 days of the hearing (after the
depositions  were  transcribed).    In  response  to  the  30  days’  notice  of  depositions,
Claimant  was  evaluated  by  his  physician  and  sought  to  submit  the  resulting  medical
report  within  30  days  of  the  hearing.    Initially,  the  ALJ  granted  all  three  requests.  
However, when Employer then sought to de       pose Claimant’s physician after Claimant’s
medical report was submitted as evidence, the ALJ “reversed his earlier ruling and denied
all  motions  for  the  admission  of  evidence  post-hearing”  so  that  he  could  “close  these
cases on a date certain.” The Board held that this constituted an abuse of discretion.  With
regard to Employer’s post-hearing submission of two pre-hearing depositions, the Board
noted  that  Claimant  had  ample  notice  of  the  scheduled  depositions;  his  counsel  was
present to conduct cross-examination; and the transcripts of the depositions would not be
available until after the hearing through no fault of Employer.  The Board further held
that Claimant’s post-hearing submission of a medical report based upon the pre-hearing
examination by his physician must also be submitted in the interests of fairness and that
the record must then be left open for 30 days under § 725.456(b)(3) for the filing of any
responsive   evidence,   i.e.   Employer’s   cross-examination   of   Claimant’s   physician.  
Ference v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 5 B.L.R. 1-122 (1982). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

19             In  Hardisty  v.  Director,  OWCP,  7  B.L.R.  1-322  (1984),  aff’d  776  F.2d  129,  8
B.L.R.  2-72  (7^th  Cir.  1985),  the  Board  held  that  the  scheduling  of  depositions  shortly
before the hearing is permissible where opposing counsel received six weeks’ notice of
the deposition and he attended the deposition and cross-examined the witnesses. C. Submission of post-hearing deposition             Section   725.458   provides,   in   part,   that   “[n]o   post-hearing   deposition   or
interrogatory shall be permitted unless authorized by the administrative law judge upon
the motion of a party to the claim.”  20 C.F.R. § 725.458 (2001). 1. Factors to be considered Post-hearing   depositions   may   be   obtained   with   the   permission,   and   in   the discretion, of the ALJ pursuant to § 725.458.  The party taking the deposition “bears the
burden of establishing the necessity of such evidence.”  Among the factors to consider in
determining whether to admit post-hearing depositions are th                                                                                                       e following: (1) whether the
proffered deposition would be probative and not merely cumulative; (2) whether the party
taking the deposition took reasonable steps to secure the evidence before the hearing or it
is established that the evidence was unknown or unavailable at any earlier time; and (3)
whether the evidence is reasonably necessary to ensure a fair hearing.    Under the facts of Lee v. Drummond Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-544 (1983), the ALJ properly  refused  to  permit  a  post-hearing  deposition  of  a  physician  for  the  purpose  of clarifying his earlier report.  On the other hand, it was an abuse of discretion for the ALJ
to  refuse  the  physician’s  post-hearing  deposition  where  he  commented  on  additional
medical evidence, which was unknown prior to the hearing because the opposing party
failed to fully answer interrogatories.  Due process would be satisfied in permitting the
post-hearing  deposition  as  the  opposing  party  would  have  an  opportunity  to  cross-
examine the physician during the deposition.   2. Exclusion proper             In  Seese  v.  Keystone  Coal  Mining  Co.,  6  B.L.R.  1-149,  1-152  (1983),  the  ALJ
denied  Employer’s  request  to  submit  a  post-hearing  deposition  of  its  physician  for  the
purpose  of  explaining  shortcomings  in  the  physician’s  earlier testimony.    The  Board
upheld the ALJ’s decision because “[n]o proffer of evidence accompanied the request”
and  no  indication  was  given  that  the  denial  would  deprive  movant of  a  reasonable opportunity to present evidence. Last Revised: 3/2/2005

20 3. Exclusion improper a. ALJ admitted one party’s post-hearing evidence but did not admit opposing party’s post-hearing evidence             It  was  arbitrary  for  the  ALJ  to  deny  Employer’s  request  for  a  post-hearing
deposition  of  Claimant’s  physician,  while  granting  Claimant’s  request  to  admit  a  post-
hearing physical examination by the physician.  Schoenecker v. Allegheny River Mining Co., 5 B.L.R. 1-378 (1982). b. Party’s evidence submitted post-hearing subject to opposing party’s opportunity to cross-examine The ALJ abused his discretion in denying admission of a post-hearing deposition where  Claimant’s  medical  opinion  was  admitted  at  the  hearing  subject  to  Employer’s
opportunity to cross-examine the physician.  Claimant’s counsel was ordered to arrange
the deposition, but failed to do so prior to the closing of the record.  The Board directed
that, on remand, the ALJ must provide Employer an opportunity to subpoena and depose
the physician, or to specifically waive this right.  Jug v. Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co., 1 B.L.R. 1-628 (1978). c. Evidence submitted on eve of the 20-day deadline             For a medical report submitted on the eve of the 20-day deadline, a party must be
provided  an  opportunity  to  respond  to  the  medical  report  or  to  cross-examine  the
physician who prepared the report.   Because Claimant’s physician’s report wassent 20 days  prior  to  the  hearing,  depriving  Employer  of  the  opportunity  to  submit  rebuttal  in compliance with the 20-day rule, the court reasoned that it was incumbent upon the ALJ
to permit Employer the opportunity to (1) submit a post-hearing rebuttal opinion and (2)
cross-examine  Claimant’s  physician.    The  court  further  determined  that  permitting  the
rebuttal evidence would not result in the “spector of a never ending series of rebuttals”
because, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), the ALJ may exclude “irrelevant, immaterial or
unduly  repetitious  evidence.”    North  American  Coal  Co.  v.  Miller,  870  F.2d  114,  12
B.L.R. 2-222 (3^rd Cir. 1989). d. Evidence was unknown or unavailable prior to hearing due to opposing party’s failure to cooperate It  was  an  abuse  of  discretion  for  the  ALJ  to  refuse  a  physician’s  post-hearing deposition  wherein  he  commented  on  additional  medical  evidence  that  was  unknown
prior to the hearing.  In particular, the Board noted that the opposing party failed to fully
answer  interrogatories.    Due  process  would  be  satisfied  in  permitting  the  post-hearing
deposition because the opposing party would have an opportunity to cross-examine the
physician during the deposition.  Lee v. Drummond Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-544 (1983). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

21 VII.     Due process A. Notice required for transfer of case to another ALJ 1. On remand             A  de  novo  hearing  was  required  on  grounds  that  the  parties’  procedural  due
process rights were violated because: (1) notice that the case was reassigned on remand
was not given until the decision and order on remand was issued; and (2) the parties were not  given  an  opportunity  to  express  any  objections  about  the  transfer  of  the  case  or  to request a new hearing.  McRoy v. Peabody Coal Co., 11 B.L.R. 1-107 (1987).  However,
the Board limited McRoy to its facts and held that where credibility of witnesses is not at
issue, a substituted ALJ need not hold a de novo hearing on remand.  Edmiston v. F&R
Coal Co., 14 B.L.R. 1-65 (1990). In  Strantz  v.  Director,  OWCP,  3  B.LR.  1-431  (1981),  the  Board  held  that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), “the same administrative law judge who heard the case the
first  time  should  hear  the  case  on  remand  unless  he  is  unavailable.”    If  an  ALJ  is
unavailable, then the parties must be notified, and they should be given “an opportunity
to express any objections to the transfer of the case to another administrative law judge or
request  a  de  novo  hearing.”    A  new  hearing  should  be held  if  witness  credibility  is  at
issue. 2. On modification             In Cunningham v. Island Creek Coal Co., 144 F.3d 388 (6^th Cir. 1998), the court
held   that,   because   the   original   decidi       ng   ALJ   was   no   longer   with   the   agency,   a
modification case was properly reassigned to another ALJ after notice was provided to
the parties.  Claimant argued “that it was error to change the ALJ assigned to his case during  the  pendency  of  his  proceeding.”    The  court  cited  to  29  C.F.R.  §  18.30  which authorizes  the  Chief  ALJ  to  reassign  a  claim  where  the  original  deciding  judge  is  no
longer available.  It then concluded that “[a]s no party objected to the reassignment after
notice  and  because  the  proper  procedures       for  reassignment  were  followed,  we  find  no
merit in Cunningham’s argument.” B. Timely notice; opportunity to fully present case For   a   discussion   of   timely   notice   regarding   conducting   and   submitting depositions, see Part VI of this Chapter. 1. Presentation of evidence a. Copy of opposing party’s evidence Procedural due process requi res that interested parties be notified of the pendency of  an  action  and  afforded  the  opportunity  to  present  objections.    The  Board  held  that, Last Revised: 3/2/2005

22 although Claimant failed to serve Employer with an autopsy report after the record was
reopened, the ALJ did send it to Employer.  The Board concluded that “service of the
autopsy report by the administrative law judge provided employer adequate notice of the
pending admission of the autopsy report.”  The Board further stated that “[a] party may
waive its right to cross-examine an opponent’s medical evidence by failure to object to
the  proffered  evidence”  and  it  was  acceptable  for  the  ALJ  to  conclude  that  Employer
waived its objection to admission of the autopsy report because Employer failed to object
before the ALJ issued a decision.  Gladden v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 7 B.L.R. 1-577,
1-579 (1984). b. Expert witness testimony             Although  Claimant  served  proper  notice  on  the  Director  that  Claimant  would
present the testimony of his treating physician, the Director objected, arguing that he did
not know the physician intended to testify regarding 1983 examinations of Claimant.  The
Board accepted an interlocutory appeal in the case and concluded that the ALJ properly
admitted the testimony of the physician.   Morgan v. Director, OWCP , 8 B.L.R. 1-491, 1- 494 (1986). Testimony of an expert witness presented at the hearing was stricken because of the  proponent’s  failure  to  give actual  notice  to  the  other  parties  at  least  ten  days  in
advance of the hearing pursuant to § 725.457(a).  Claimant presented expert physician
witness testimony at the hearing and the Director, who was not present at the hearing and
was not notified that the physician would be testifying, filed a motion to strike which the
ALJ should have sustained.  Hamric v. Director, OWCP, 6 B.L.R. 1-1091 (1984). c. Failure to notify representative of examination;
evidence excluded             The ALJ properly refused to admit a non-qualifying blood gas study offered by
Employer  because  the  study  was  scheduled  by  Carrier  without  notifying  Claimant’s
counsel.  Although Employer provided more than 20 days’ notice of its intent to proffer
the evidence at the hearing, the ALJ concluded “that the procuring of the blood gas study
without  first  notifying  claimant’s  attorney  effectively  circumvented  claimant’s  right  to
legal representation” in contravention of 20 C.F.R. § 725.364.  It was also proper for the
ALJ to deny Employer the opportunity to acquire another blood gas study because, under
§ 725.455, the ALJ was under no affirmative duty to seek out and receive all relevant
evidence.  McFarland v. Peabody Coal Co., 8 B.L.R. 1-163, 1-165 (1985).    2. Notice to carrier Due process requires that an insurance carrier be given written notice of a black lung  claim  prior  to  the  administrative  adjudication  of  the  claim  affecting  the  carrier’s
liability. Warner Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Warman], 804 F.2d 346, 11 B.L.R. 2-62 (6^th Cir. 1986).  See also Nat’l Mines Corp. v. Carroll, 64 F.3d 135 (3^rd Cir. 1995); Tazco, Last Revised: 3/2/2005

23 Inc. v. Director, OWCP , 895 F.2d 949 (4 th                                                                        Cir. 1990); Caudill Construction Co. v. Abner,
679 F.2d 1086, 12 B.L.R. 2-335, 2-338 (6^th Cir. 1989). 3. Delay in notice of liability Employer alleged that a five year delay in receiving notification of its potential liability  from  the  date  the  claim  was  filed  prevented  it  from  obtaining  a  physician’s
report.  The court held that the DOL followed its regulations in notifying Employer of its
liability and that Employer was not unduly prejudiced because the ALJ found the report
“unpersuasive.”  The court further held that “[t]he operator did have ample opportunity to
defend  against  the  claims  at  issue.”    Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Holskey,  888  F.2d  440,  13
B.L.R. 2-95 (6^th Cir. 1989).             For additional discussion of the consequences of a delay in notifying a potentially
responsible  operator  or  carrier  of  liability  or  losing  parts  of  a  record,  see  Chapter  7:   Designation of Responsible Operator. C. Issuance of decision and order             The Sixth Circuit held that, even though notice of an ALJ’s adverse decision had
not been sent to Claimant’s attorney, the attorney had actual notice of the decision and,
therefore,  the  defect  in  notice  would  not  toll  the  30-day  period  for  filing  an  appeal.  
Claimant was hospitalized when his wife signed for the certified letter and advised the
attorney of the decision.  Wellman v. Director, OWCP, 706 F.2d 191 and 193, 5 B.L.R. 2-
81, 2-83 (6^th Cir. 1983).    The Third Circuit also held that, where Employer’s counsel was not served with the district director’s award, but had actual knowledge of the decision and did not file a
controversion,   the   30-day   period   for   filing   such   a   controversion   was   not   tolled.  
Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d 1321, 1329, 12 B.L.R. 2-60, 2-72 and 2-73 (3d
Cir. 1988).  However, the Third Circuit concluded that, where an attorney was not served
with the ALJ’s decision and where he did not have actual notice of the decision, the 30-
day time period from the date the decision was filed with the district director was tolled.  
Patton v. Director, OWCP, 763 F.2d 553, 560, 7 B.L.R. 2-216, 2-227 and 2-228 (3d Cir.
1985).                For additional discussion of “actual receipt” of a decision, see the discussion on
circuit  court  jurisdiction  at  Chapter  1:    Introduction  to  the  Claims  Process  and
Research Tools. VIII.   Expert witness testimony Pursuant to § 725.457(a), “[a]ny party who intends to present the testimony of an expert witness at a hearing shall so notify all other parties to the claim at least 10 days
before  the  hearing.”    The  regulation  provides  that  “failure  to  give  notice  of  the
appearance  of  an  expert  witness  in  accordance  with  this  paragraph,  unless  notice  is Last Revised: 3/2/2005

24 waived  by  all  parties,  shall  preclude  the  presentation  of  testimony  by  such  expert
witness.”  20 C.F.R. § 725.457(a).  See Part VI of this Chapter for submission of expert
testimony by deposition. A. Actual notice of intent to present required             Testimony of an expert witness presented at the hearing was stricken because of
the  proponent’s  failure  to  give actual  notice  to  the  other  parties  at  least  ten  days  in
advance of the hearing pursuant to § 725.457(a) of the regulations.  Claimant presented
expert physician witness testimony at the hearing and the Director, who was not present
at the hearing and was not notified that the physician would be testifying, filed a motion
to strike which the ALJ should have sustained.  Hamric v. Director, OWCP, 6 B.L.R. 1- 1091 (1984). B. Expert witness provisions at § 725.457 inapplicable to expert   deposition testimony             Section  725.457  states,  in  part,  that  “[a]ny  party  who  intends  to  present  the
testimony of an expert witness at a hearing shall so notify all other parties to the claim at
least  10  days  before  the  hearing.”    The  Board  has  held  that  20  C.F.R.  §  725.457(a)
applies only to the appearance by an expert witness at the hearing, not to the introduction
of deposition testimony at the hearing.  A deposition taken five days before the hearing
did  not  deny  due  process  to  other  parties  who  had  received  adequate  notice  of  the
deposition pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.458.    Tucker v. Eastern Coal Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1- 743 (1984). IX.      Failure to attend hearing Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.461(b) and 725.465, the unexcused failure of a party to attend the hearing constitutes a waiver of the right to present evidence at the hearing
and  may  result  in  a  dismissal  of  the  claim.    Dismissal  is  proper  where  Claimant  and
Claimant’s representative fail to appear at the hearing absent a showing of “good cause.”  
The ALJ is required to issue an order to show cause prior to dismissing the claim.  See
e.g. Clevinger v. Regina Fuel Co., 8 B.L.R. 1-1 (1985) (no good cause established where:
(1) counsel stated that he had not received the notice of hearing ; (2) the ALJ noted that
counsel was present at prior hearings, which were scheduled in the same notice; and (3)
counsel failed to respond to the ALJ’s order to show cause). A. Physical ailment; ALJ to make every reasonable accommodation             If Claimant is physically unable to attend a hearing, the ALJ should make every
effort to obtain his or her testimony by deposition or by holding the hearing at a location
most  convenient  to  Claimant,  including  Claimant’s  home  if  s/he  is  bedridden.    In  this
vein, the Board held that it was improper for the ALJ to dismiss a claim as abandoned
where  Claimant’s  counsel  advised  him  that  Claimant  recently  underwent  a  cancer Last Revised: 3/2/2005

25 operation and was unable to attend the hearing.  Robertson v. Director, OWCP, 1 B.L.R.
1-932, 1-934 (1978).             The ALJ did not abuse his discretion in awarding benefits where Claimant failed
to attend the hearing because of a disabling stroke.  Claimant’s wife, who testified at the
hearing, stated that the miner’s speech was impaired and he was confined to a wheelchair.  
The  ALJ  then  denied  Employer’s  motion  that  the  claim  be  dismissed  or  denied.   Employer  argued  that  it  had  a  right  to  cross-examine  the  miner  “but  did  not  have  an affirmative  burden  to  obtain  his  deposition  or  testimony.”    The  Board  concluded
otherwise to find that the ALJ appropriately protected Employer’s interests by leaving the
record open for 45 days to allow Employer to secure Claimant’s testimony and develop
any further medical evidence.  Chaney v. Sahara Coal Co., 10 B.L.R. 1-8, 1-10 (1987). B.        Consideration of client’s age and illness before binding client to acts of counsel The Board concluded that the provisions at 20 C.F.R. § 725.461(b) are similar to FRCP  41(b).    It  held  that  the  “rules  reflect a  court’s  inherent  authority  to  control  its docket, via dismissal, to manage the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”  The
Board further held that a dismissal “may be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion”
and that a party is held to be responsible for the acts of its attorney.  However, the Board
did find abuse of discretion and reversed the dismissal of a claim because the ALJ did not
consider Claimant’s age and illness before binding her to the acts of her counsel, who
failed to appear at the hearing.  Moreover, the Board noted that Claimant forwarded the
notice of hearing to her attorney expecting him to act and Claimant’s immediate response
to  the  order  to  show  cause  demonstrated  that  she  was  not  attempting  to  delay  the
proceeding.  Howell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-259 (1984). C. ALJ properly proceeded with hearing despite claimant’s absence             The  ALJ  acted  within  his  discretion  in  proceeding  with  a  hearing  despite
Claimant’s absence.  Claimant’s right to participate fully at the hearing was adequately
protected where the ALJ allowed Claimant an opportunity to submit a sworn statement in
lieu of live testimony within 30 days of the hearing.  The Bo                                                                                                         ard also concluded that the
ALJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Claimant’s third request for a continuance.
Wagner v. Beltrami Enterprises, 16 B.L.R. 1-65 (1990).   D. Error to dismiss claim for failure to attend hearing where Director objected and payments were being made by Trust Fund             Neither  Claimant  nor  her  attorney  appeared  at  the  scheduled  hearing  and,  by
telephone, the ALJ was advised that Claimant did not wish to pursue her claim.  The ALJ
then issued an order to show cause why the claim should not be dismissed.  The Director
responded  that  it  should  be  decided  on  the  record  without  a  hearing.    Claimant  also
submitted a letter to state that she did not wish to withdraw her claim; that she had no
further evidence to submit; and that she did not object to the submission of evidence by Last Revised: 3/2/2005

26 Employer.    The  ALJ  nevertheless  dismissed  the  claim.    An  appeal  was  taken  by  the
Director  who  argued  that  the  ALJ  was  without  authority  to  dismiss  the  case  over  the
Director’s  objection  where  payments  were  being  made  from  the  Fund.    The  Board
agreed.  The Board further held, however, that: The   employer’s   argument   that   failure   to   dismiss   the   claim   would circumvent  its  right  to  a  hearing  is  without  merit.    While  the  employer does   have   a   right   to   a   hearing,   20   C.F.R.   §   725.450,   there   is   no
requirement that the claimant be present at such a hearing.  Further, the
employer may seek a subpoena compelling the claimant to attend if it feels
that her testimony is necessary to protect its interests. Palovich v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 5 B.L.R. 1-70 (1982). E. Inadvertent delay; no waiver of appeal rights             Employer’s failure to attend the hearing did not result in a waiver of its appeal
rights to the Board where the attorney fully intended to appear, but car trouble precluded
his attendance.  Kimmel v. Diamond Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-288, 1-290, n.3 (1983). X.    Fair hearing Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.455(b), the ALJ is required to inquire fully into the matters  at  issue  and  to  receive,  on  motion,  all  relevant  and  material  testimony  and
documentary  evidence.    A  full  and  fair  hearing  includes  the  opportunity  to  present  a
claim  or  defense  by  way  of  argument,  proof,        and  cross-examination  of  witnesses.      5
U.S.C.   §   556(d).      Laughlin   v.   Director,   OWCP,   1   B.L.R.   1-488,   1-493   (1973).  
Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Parties must be
allowed to fairly respond to evidence and present their own case in full. Judicial  finality  “requires  that  claimants  continue  to  pursue  their  claims  or,  if appropriate, that the claims be unconditionally withdrawn or dismissed.”  As a result, the
Board  concluded  that  orders,  which  held  the  claims  in  abeyance,  were  invalid  because
they lacked judicial finality.  Slone v. Wolf Creek Collieries, Inc., 10 B.L.R. 1-66, 1-70
(1987).             The ALJ properly determined that Claimant was not entitled to benefits because
the claim was abandoned as a result of Claimant’s failure to request a hearing within 60
days of the district director’s denial or to petition for modification within one year of such
denial. Stephens v. Director, OWCP, 9 B.L.R. 1-227, 1-230 (1987).    Last Revised: 3/2/2005

27 A. Impartiality required 1. Conduct of the ALJ             Claimant was denied a fair hearing because “[a]t a number of points during the
hearing, the administrative law judge expressed disbelief regarding claimant’s testimony
and   substituted   his   own   personal   knowledge   and   experience   in   place   of   hearing
testimony.”  The Board further noted that the ALJ incorrectly accused Claimant’s counsel
of  asking  leading  questions  and  impeded  the  examination  of  witnesses.    Hutnick  v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-326, 1-328 (1984). 2. Treatment of witnesses Claimant received a fair hearing despite the contention that both attorneys did not stand an equal distance from Claimant while he testified.  Claimant had difficulty hearing
and,  as  a  result,  Director’s  counsel  was  allowed  to  move  closer  to  Claimant  during
questioning.    There  was  no  indication  from  the  record  that  Claimant  was  harassed,
intimidated, prejudiced. Casias v. Director, OWCP , 6 B.L.R. 1-438, 1-445 (1993). 3. Competency of witnesses             The  ALJ  did  not  err  in  failing  to  explore  a  witness’s  mental  capacity  despite
contention  that  his  speech  impairment  impeded  his  ability  to  testify  because  the  ALJ
afforded the lay representative great latitude, the transcript did not indicate any mental
infirmity, and no formal objections to the witness’s mental qualifications were raised.  In this  vein,  the  Board  held  that  the  fact-finder  is  in  a  better  position  than  an  appellate tribunal  to  determine  whether  a  witness  is  mentally  capable  of  testifying  and  that  the
ALJ’s determination will not be overturned unless it is “clearly erroneous.”  Elswick v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 2 B.L.R. 1-1016 (1980). Under  Shapell   v.   Director,   OWCP,  7  B.L.R.  1-304  (1984),  the  ALJ  must determine  the  complexity  of  the  legal  and  medical  problems  presented  in  the  case  and must assess Claimant’s ability to comprehend the issues and participate actively in their
resolution.    Factors  to  be  considered  include  physical  defects,  age,  formal  education,
apparent intelligence and general knowledge.    B. Right to oral hearing   1.         On remand a.    No oral hearing necessary; witness credibility not dispositive             A  motion  for  a  new  hearing  is  properly  denied  when  witness  credibility  is  not
dispositive.  Berka v. North American Coal Corp., 8 B.L.R. 1-183, 1-184 (1985).  See also  White  v.  Director,  OWCP,  7  B.L.R.  1-348  (1984);  Strantz  v.  Director,  OWCP,  3 Last Revised: 3/2/2005

28 B.LR. 1-431, 1-433 (1981);  Worrell v. Consolidation Coal Co., 8 B.L.R. 1-158, 1-160
(1985);  Meholovitch   v.   Oglebay   Norton   Co.,  Case  No.  85-3485  (6^th  Cir.  May  9,
1986)(unpub.). b. New hearing required; witness credibility at issue             A new hearing is required if the credibility of witnesses is a crucial, important, or
controlling factor in resolving a factual dispute.  Worrell, supra; White, supra; Strantz, supra. c. Notice to parties In  Strantz  v.  Director,  OWCP,  3  B.LR.  1-431  (1981),  the  Board  held  that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), “the same administrative law judge who heard the case the
first  time  should  hear  the  case  on  remand  unless  he  is  unavailable.”    If  an  ALJ  is
unavailable, then the parties must be notified and be given “an opportunity to express any
objections to the transfer of the case to another administrative law judge or request a de novo hearing.”    2. Multiple claims under § 725.309 Pursuant  to  Lukman  v.  Director,  OWCP,  896  F.2d  1248  (10^th  Cir.  1990)  and Dotson v. Director, OWCP, 14 B.L.R. 1-10 (1990)(en banc), the parties are entitled to an oral  hearing  in  a  subsequent  claim  filed  pursuant  to  20  C.F.R.  §  725.309  of  the
regulations. 3. Overpayment claims             Citing to Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), the Board held that, in cases
where the waiver of recovery is not at issue, the district director may begin recoupment
prior to a hearing and decision concerning the amount of the overpayment.   Burnette v. Director, OWCP, 14 B.L.R. 1-152 (1990). C. Waiver of hearing 1. Waiver must be voluntary, intentional, and in writing             Pursuant  to  20  C.F.R.  §  725.461  (2001),  “[i]f  all  parties  waive  their  right  to
appear before the administrative law judge, it shall not be necessary for the administrative
law judge to give notice of, or conduct, an oral hearing. A  request  for  waiver  of  an  oral  hearing    must  be  voluntary,  intentional,  and  in writing.  Morgan v. Carbon Fuel Co., 3 B.R.B.S. 302, 307 (1976). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

29 2. Withdrawal of waiver of hearing             A waiver may be withdrawn for “good cause” at any time prior to “mailing” of
the decision in the claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.461(a) (2001).  However, the ALJ
may conduct a hearing despite the fact that the parties have agreed to a waiver, if s/he
determines that the appearance and testimony of witnesses would be of value.  20 C.F.R.
§ 725.461(a). 3. Error to decide merits of claim where hearing not waived             The ALJ erred in awarding benefits on the record under 20 C.F.R. Part 727 where
neither the Director nor Claimant requested a waiver of their right to a hearing in writing
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.461.  The Board noted that, although Claimant advised the
ALJ in advance that he would not be able to attend, the “Director submits that Claimant’s
unjustified failure to attend the hearing prejudicially deprived the Director of the right to
examine, and that claimant’s testimony is cruc ial to the resolution of                                                                                                                      the contested issue
of total disability.”  The Board remanded the claim for issuance of an order to show cause
why  the  claim  should  not  be  dismissed  pursuant  to  20  C.F.R.  §  725.465(c),  which
provides, in part, that “[i]n any case where a dismissal of a claim, defense, or party is
sought, the administrative law j udge shall issue an order to                                                                                                    show cause why the dismissal
should not be granted and afford all parties a reasonable time to respond to such order.”  
Churpak v. Director, OWCP, 9 B.L.R. 1-71, 1-72 and 1-73 (1986).   D. Hearing limited to contested issues Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.421(b), the district director is required to submit to the ALJ a document setting forth the contested and uncontested issues in the claim, often
referred  to  as  the  “CM-1025.”    Moreover, 20  C.F.R.  §  725.463(a)  provides  that  the
hearing is confined to the issues listed as contested or any other issue raised in writing before  the  district  director.    The  purpose  of  these  regulatory  provisions  is  “to  expedite cases by ensuring that the parties are not surprised by new issues at the hearing, and to
force the parties to develop evidence prior to the hearing.”  Carpenter v. Eastern Assoc.
Coal Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-784, 1-786 (1984).  The Board has held that “[i]ntent and notice
are  important  criteria”  to  consider  in  applying  20  C.F.R.  §  725.463(a)  “to  permit  or
prevent consideration of substantive issues.”  Chaffins v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.LR. 1-431
(1984).   For  additional  discussion  of  the  issues  to  be  adjudicated,  see  Chapter  26:   Motions. Last Revised: 3/2/2005

30 XI.      Hearsay A. Medical reports and testing 1.      Elements of reliability Medical  reports  that  are ex  parte                                                                         may  constitute  substantial  evidence  provided
that certain safeguards are met.  In Perales, the Supreme Court held that: .  .  .  a  written  report  by  a  licensed  physician  who  has  examined  the
claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical findings in his area of
competence  may  be  received  as  evidence  in  a  disability  hearing  and,
despite  its  hearsay  character  and  an  absence  of  cross-examination,  and
despite the presence of opposing direct medical testimony and testimony
by the claimant himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of
a  finding  by  the  hearing  examiner  adverse  to  the  claimant,  when  the claimant  has  not  exercised  his  right  to  subpoena  the  reporting  physician and thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of
the physician.    Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).   The  following  factors  must  be  considered  in  determining  how  much  weight  to accord to a “hearsay” report:  (1) whether the out-of-court declarant has an interest in the
result of the case; (2) whether the opposing party could have obtained the report prior to
the hearing and could have subpoenaed the declarant; (3) whether the report is internally
consistent on its face; and (4) whether the report is inherently reliable.  See also U.S. Pipe
& Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 2 B.L.R. 2-7 (5^th Cir. 1979). 2.      Reports based on physical examinations             Properly authenticated reports written by a licensed physician who has examined
the miner may be received as evidence at a hearing and, despite their hearsay character,
may  constitute  substantial  evidence  supportive  of  a  finding.    Hogarty  v.  Honeybrook
Mines, Inc., 3 B.R.B.S. 485 (1976).    3.         Consultative reports In Evosevich v. Consolidation Coal Co., 789 F.2d 1021, 9 B.L.R. 2-10 (3^rd Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit held that a non-examining physician’s report is admissible and
may constitute “substantial evidence.” Last Revised: 3/2/2005

31 4.       Results of objective testing             In Parsons v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-236 (1984), the Board held
that x-ray, blood gas and pulmonary studies, and physicians’ reports are admissible over
hearsay objections.  See also U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 2 B.L.R.
2-7 (5^th Cir. 1979) (ex-parte physicians’ reports and x-ray readings constitute probative
evidence in black lung claims).   B.     Affidavits An affidavit regarding the length of coal mine employment is admissible despite challenges based on its hearsay character. Williams v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. , 6 B.L.R. 1-188 (1983).  See also White v. Douglas Van Dyke Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-905,
1-908 n. 3 (1984). C.     Death of authoring physician             The  ALJ  erred  in  excluding  a  medical  report  as  “hearsay,”  where  the  deposed
physician was unavailable for cross-examination due to his death.  The Board concluded that  the  opposing  party  had  a  fair  opportunity  to  counter  the  physician’s  findings  and, therefore,  due  process  was  satisfied.    Fowler  v.  Freeman  United  Coal  Mining  Co.,  7
B.L.R.  1-495  (1984),  aff’d.  sub.  nom.,  Freeman  United  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Director,
OWCP [Fowler], Case No. 85-1013 (7^th Cir. June 24, 1986)(unpub.).   D.     Evidence that is lost or destroyed Lost,  destroyed,  or  “otherwise  unavailable”  x-ray  studies  of  a  deceased  miner should be handled under 20 C.F.R. § 718.102(d) (2001) as follows:    Where the chest X-ray of a deceased miner has been lost, destroyed, or is
otherwise unavailable, a report of the chest X-ray submitted by any party
shall be considered in conjunction with the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 718.102(d) (2001).             Where  a  miner’s  autopsy  slides  were  destroyed,  the  employer’s  right  to  cross-
examine the prosector by means of deposition or hearing testimony satisfies its right to
procedural  due  process.    Lewis  v.  Consolidation  Coal  Co.,  15  B.L.R.  1-37  (1991)
(autopsy slides were destroyed prior to the date on which Employer was named as the
potential  responsible  operator  but  a  “full  and  fair”  hearing  was  not  denied  where
Employer  could  have  deposed  the  prosector  or  had  his  report  reviewed  by  other
physicians); Peabody Coal Co. v. Holskey, 888 F.2d 440, 13 B.L.R. 2-95 (6^th Cir. 1989)
(Employer was not denied a fair hearing despite the fact that it was notified five years
after the miner’s death). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

32             An x-ray re-reading was properly admitted even though the x-ray film was lost
because  the  opposing  party  could  depose  the  reader,  thus  satisfying  its  right  to  cross-
examination.  Specifically, the Board noted that “employer was on notice for eight and
one-half months that the x-ray was missing and failed to avail itself of the opportunity to
depose  the  interpreting  physician.”    Pulliam  v.  Drummond  Coal  Co.,  7  B.L.R.  1-846
(1985). XII.     Judicial/Official notice A. Procedure used             In Pruitt v. Amax Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-544, 1-546 (1984), the Board delineated
the procedures for taking “official” notice and stated the following: The rules of official notice in administrative proceedings are more relaxed
than in common law courts.  The mere fact that the determining body has
looked  beyond  the  record  proper  does  not  invalidate  its  action  unless
substantial prejudice is shown to result.  (citation omitted).  Although the
administrative law judge erred in failing to cite the “B” reader list as the
source of his information regarding Dr. Morgan’s qualifications, and the
parties   should   have   been   afforded   a   full   opportunity   to   dispute   his
qualifications, Casias v. Director, OWCP, 2 B.L.R. 1-259 (1979), the error
is harmless because Dr. Morgan’s name does, in fact, appear on the “B”
reader list and a contrary finding cannot be made on remand.  (citations
omitted).  Claimant has not shown that he was substantially prejudiced by
the administrative law judge’s action. B. Taking official notice of one expert but not another expert constitutes error It is noteworthy that, in Simpson v. Director, OWCP, 9 B.L.R. 1-99 (1986), the record was silent with regard to the B-reader status of two                                                       physicians.  The ALJ erred in
taking official notice of the B-reader status of one of the physician’s appearing on the B-
reader list without taking official notice of the other physician’s name appearing on the list.      This   resulted   in   the   ALJ   improperly   according   more   weight   to   the   x-ray interpretation of one reader based upon his “superior” B-reader credentials which, as the
Board concluded, was substantially prejudicial to the opposing party. C. Examples of judicial/official notice 1. Medical opinion; no judicial notice             A medical opinion is not a fact of which judicial notice may be taken.  Grigg v.
Director, OWCP, 28 F.3d 416 (4^th Cir. 1994). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

33 2. Unreliability of early Social Security records             In Calfee v. Director, OWCP, 8 B.L.R. 1-7, 1-9 (1985), the Board held that it was
proper for the ALJ to note that early social security records were not wholly reliable in
weighing Claimant’s testimonial evidenceand affidavits against such records. 3. Dictionary of Occupational Titles             An ALJ may take judicial notice of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
provided s/he “does so in accord with principles concerning the taking of judicial notice.”  
Citing  to    29  C.F.R.  §  18.45,  20  C.F.R.  §  725.464,  Fed.  R.  Evid.  201,  and  Echo  v.
Director, OWCP, 744 F.2d 327, 6 B.L.R. 2-110 (3^rd Cir. 1986), it appears that the Board required  that  the  ALJ  give  the  parties  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  regarding taking judicial notice of the DOT. Onderko v. Director, OWCP, 14 B.L.R. 1-2 (1989) In Snorton v. Zeigler Coal Co., 9 B.L.R. 1-106, 1-108 (1986), the Board held that the ALJ erred in concluding that the miner engaged in heavy labor based upon the job
description   contained   in   the   DOT   because   the   ALJ   failed   to   comply   with   the
requirements for taking judicial notice. 4. Directory of Medical Specialists             In  Maddaleni  v.  The  Pittsburgh  &  Midway  Coal  Mining  Co.,  14  B.L.R.  1-135
(1990), the Board held that the ALJ properly took judicial notice of the qualifications of
physicians  as  stated  in  the  Directory  of  Medical  Specialists.    The  Board  noted  that
“[a]lthough claimant first became aware of the administrative law judge’s use of judicial
notice  upon  receipt  of  the  administrative  law  judge’s  Decision  and  Order  on  Remand,
claimant had an opportunity to contest the administrative law judge’s finding before the
Decision  and  Order  became  final  by  filing  a  motion  for  reconsideration  with  the
administrative  law  judge.”    The  Board  noted  that  Claimant  did  not  argue  that  the
credentials noticed by the ALJ were inaccurate. 5. Criminal conviction of a physician In Boyd v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 46 F.3d 1122, 1995 WL 10226 (4^th Cir. 1995) (table), the Fourth Circuit held that it was proper for the ALJ to take judicial notice of Dr.
Vinod Modi’s criminal conviction.  Moreover, citing to Adams v. Canada Coal Co., Case
No. 91-3706 (6^th Cir. July 13, 1992)(unpublished) (the ALJ “was obviously justified” in
not crediting the testimony of Dr. Modi because of his conviction), the court upheld the
ALJ’s  decision  to  accord  no  weight  to  Dr. Modi’s  medical  opinion  in  light  of  his
conviction  for  tax  evasion.    See  also  Chapter  3:    Principles  of  Weighing  Medical
Evidence. Last Revised: 3/2/2005

34 XIII.   Reassignment/transfer of cases A. Bias by original deciding judge             The Board holds that it has authority to order reassignment of a case to a different
ALJ on remand if it determines that the original deciding judge exhibited bias against one
of the parties.  Cochran v. Consolidation Coal Co. , 16 B.L.R. 1-101 (1992).             In Milburn Colliery Co. v. Director, OWCP [Hicks], 138 F.3d 524 (4^th Cir. 1998),
the   court   held   that,   considering   the   numerous   legal   errors   made   by   the   original
administrative law judge, the claim should be reassigned to another ALJ on remand as it
“requires a fresh look at the evidence, unprejudiced by the various out  comes of the ALJ’s
and Board’s orders below . . ..” B. Unavailability of original deciding judge 1. On remand The Chief Administrative Law Judge properly assigned a case on remand to a new ALJ without first giving Claimant notice.  In this vein, the court held that: This is not a case where the matter was simply referred to another ALJ.  
Here,  the  original  ALJ  had  left  the  agency,  leaving  remand  as  the  only
option.  As to the notice problem, 29 C.F.R. § 18.30 states that if an ALJ is
unavailable,  the  Chief  ALJ  ‘may  designate  another  administrative  law
judge  for  the  purposes  of  further  hearing  or  appropriate  action.’    No
notice,  so  as  to  allow  additional  hearings  or  submissions,  is  generally
required.      New   hearings   are   required   only   when   the   evaluation   of
credibility is crucial to resolving the factual disputes involved.  The Chief
ALJ, in his remand order in this case, stated that questions of credibility
were   not   controlling,   and   the   claimant   has   not   made   any   specific
arguments  as  to  why  such  questions  are  controlling.    The  new  ALJ,  in
order to address the errors made by the first ALJ, simply had to evaluate
the evidence under a different standard.  The Chief ALJ acted well within
his discretion when he appointed the new ALJ. Fife v. Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 365 (6^th  Cir. 1989).             In  Strantz  v.  Director,  OWCP,  3  B.L.R.  1-431  (1981),  the  Board  held  that,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), “the same administrative law judge who heard the case the
first  time  should  hear  the  case  on  remand  unless  he  is  unavailable.”    If  an  ALJ  is
unavailable, then the parties must be notified, and they should  be given “an opportunity
to express any objections to the transfer of the case to another administrative law judge or
request a de novo hearing.”  A new hearing should be held if credibility is at issue.    Last Revised: 3/2/2005

35 2. On modification             In Cunningham v. Island Creek Coal Co., 144 F.3d 388 (6^th Cir. 1998), the court
held   that,   because   the   original   deciding   ALJ   was   no   longer   with   the   agency,   a
modification case was properly reassigned to another ALJ after notice was provided to
the parties.  Claimant argued “that it was error to change the ALJ assigned to his case during  the  pendency  of  his  proceeding.”    The  court  cited  to  29  C.F.R.  §  18.30  which authorizes  the  Chief  ALJ  to  reassign  a  claim  where  the  original  deciding  judge  is  no
longer available.  It then concluded that “[a]s no party objected to the reassignment after
notice  and  because  the  proper  procedures       for  reassignment  were  followed,  we  find  no
merit in Cunningham’s argument.” XIV.    Representatives A. Right to representation The Board has held that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) and the regulations at 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.362-725.364, Claimant has the right to be represented by counsel at the
hearing.  Shapell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-304 (1984).  A party may waive its right
to be represented.  20 C.F.R. § 725.362(b).      1. The pro se claimant a. Informing claimant of his or her rights The ALJ must inform a pro se claimant of his or her right to be represented by counsel  of  choice  without  charge.    Moreover,  pursuant  to  §  725.362(b),  the  ALJ  must
determine  whether  a  claimant’s  lack  of  representation  is  knowing  and  voluntary.    If  a
claimant  elects  to  proceed  pro  se,  the  ALJ,  as  an  impartial  adjudicator,  has  no  special obligation to develop the evidence to enhance a claimant’s case.  Specifically, the Board
held that providing a full and fair hearing means that: the  administrative  law  judge  has  the  responsibility  to  inform  a  pro  se
claimant of his right to be represented by a representative of his choice, at
no cost to him, and to inquire whether claimant desires to proceed without
such representation.  If so, the administrative law judge must proceed to
inform claimant of the issues in the case; allow claimant the opportunity to
admit  evidence  and  to  object  to  admission  of  the  adversary’s  evidence;
and  allow  claimant  the  opportunity  to  provide  testimony  concerning
relevant issues. Shapell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-304 at 1-306 and 1-307 (1984).  In this vein, the
Board  noted  that  although  (1)  Claimant  agreed  when  the  ALJ  “presumed”  Claimant
wished to proceed without counsel and (2) the ALJ then “extensively questioned claimant
as to his coal mine employment and his medical problems,” the ALJ nevertheless denied
the miner a fair hearing because: Last Revised: 3/2/2005

36 The  administrative  law  judge  merely  inquired  as  to  whether  claimant
wished  to  proceed  pro  se  without  informing  him  that  he  had  a  right  to representation  and  that  he  would  suffer  no  economic  loss  as  a  result  of representation.    The  administrative  law  judge  also  failed  to  determine
whether claimant’s lack ofrepresentation was voluntary. Id.  at  1-307. It  is  import ant  to  note,  however,  that  th e  Board  remanded  the  case  for consideration of pending motions and for a he aring but “reject[ed] th e parties’ requests for  a  de  novo  hearing  because  the  administrative  law  judge  fully  performed  his  duties with respect to the conduct of the hearing itself” and “no party has asserted that a de novo
hearing is necessary to further develop any testimonial evidence.”  Id. at 1-308.               In Young v. Director, OWCP, BRB No. 97-1411 BLA (June 24, 1998)(unpub.),
the Board held, in a case arising in the Sixth Circuit involving a modification petition by
a  pro  se  claimant,  that  it  was  error  for  the  ALJ  to  deny  Claimant  a  hearing  and  to
conclude  that  Claimant  woul d  proceed  without  counsel.    Sp ecifically,  the  Board  stated the following: Section 6(a) of the Administrative procedure Act . . . grants claimant the
right to be represented at the hearing.  (Citations omitted).    . . . In  order  to  conduct  a  full  and  fair  hearing,  the  Board  has  held  that  the administrative law judge must inform a pro se claimant of his or her right
to be represented by a representative of his choice without cost to him and
inquire   whether   claimant   desires   to   proceed   without   representation.  
(Citations  omitted).    Furthermore,  Section  725.362(b)  requires  that  the
administrative law judge determine whether claimant has made a knowing
and   voluntary   waiver   of   his   or   her   right   to   presentation.      The
administrative  law  judge  must  then  proceed  to  inform  claimant  of  the
issues in the case, allow claimant the opportunity to admit evidence and to
object  to  the  admission  of  the  adversary’s  evidence,  and  allow  claimant
the    opportunity    to    provide    testimony    concerning    relevant    issues.  
(Citations omitted). The Board concluded that, because the ALJ denied the parties a hearing on modification
after  determining  that  there  were  no  issues  involving  witness  credibility,  he  could  not
adequately determine whether Claimant intended to voluntarily proceed with her claim in pro se status.   Moreover, the Board determined                 that, because the ALJ issued an order to
show cause why a hearing was necessary to which Claimant failed to respond, the ALJ
“improperly  placed  the  burden  on  claimant  to  establish  the  necessity  of  a  hearing.”  
Citing to 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.450 and 725.461(a) and  Cunningham v. Island Creek Coal Co., 144 F.3d 388 (6^th Cir. 1998), the Board concluded that there had not been “a valid waiver of claimant’s rightto a hearing on modification.” Last Revised: 3/2/2005

37 b. Claimant’s counsel fails to appear at hearing;   whether to proceed · Proceeding is not per se error.  In Laughlin v. Director. OWCP                                                                       , 1 B.L.R. 1-488,
1-490 (1978), the Board held that, under the circumstances of that case, it was proper for
the ALJ to conduct the hearing where Claimant was unrepresented: While  denial  of  the  right  to  be  represented  by  retained  counsel
would clearly be error, the fact that an administrative hearing was
conducted  at  a  time  when  the  claimant  was  unrepresented  is  not
error per se.  Absent a clear showing of prejudice or unfairness in
the proceedings, the lack of counsel is not grounds for remand if
the claimant was fully informed of his right to be represented by
counsel and subsequently elects to proceed without representation. · Inquiring whether claimant wants to proceed.  The ALJ acted properly, where Claimant  appeared  for  hearing  but  his  counsel  did  not,  in  inquiring  whether  Claimant
wished to proceed after informing him of his rights with respect to the presentation of his case.    The  ALJ  left  the  record  open  for  20  days  to  permit  Claimant’s  counsel  to  offer evidence, which he did not do.  The ALJ, in deciding to proceed with the hearing, noted
that Claimant had: (1) traveled 400 miles to get to the hearing; (2) waited approximately
five years for the hearing to take place; and (3) agreed to proceed without counsel after
being asked on two occasions.  Prater v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-121, 1-123
(1989). · Determining whether claimant has capacity to proceed.   It must be determined that the pro se party has the capacity to represent himself or herself.  The Board noted that, upon review of the hearing transcript, “[t]he claimant either attempted to object to
the introduction of some evidence, or did not understand what was being asked of him.”  
As a result, the Board determined that the ALJ committed error in proceeding with the
hearing.    York  v.  Director,  OWCP,  5  B.L.R.  1-833,  1-837  (1983),  overruled  on  other
grounds, Shapell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-304 (1984).                Indeed, under Shapell v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-304 (1984), the ALJ must  
determine  the  complexity  of  the  legal  and  medical  problems  presented  in  the  case  and
must assess Claimant’s ability to comprehend the issues and  participate actively in their
resolution.    Factors  to  be  considered  include  physical  defects,  age,  formal  education,
apparent intelligence and general knowledge.    · Leaving  record  open  for  post-hearing  submissions.    It  is  within  the  ALJ’s discretion to proceed with a hearing despite the absence of Claimant’s counsel.  The ALJ
acted  properly  by  inquiring  whether  Claimant        wished  to  proceed  without  counsel  after
fully informing Claimant of his rights with respect to the presentation of his case.  The
ALJ  also  left  the  record  open  for  the  submission  of  post-hearing  evidence  by  counsel.  
The Board concluded that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 724.454(a), counsel failed to provide
ten days’ notice of his request for continuance and that his “scheduling conflict” did not Last Revised: 3/2/2005

38 constitute “good cause” to grant a continuance.  In particular, counsel notified the ALJ of
a  scheduling  conflict  20  minutes  after  the  hearing  was  to  start.    In  denying  the
continuance,  the  ALJ  noted  that  Claimant  had:  (1)  traveled  400  miles  to  the  hearing
location;  (2)  waited  five  hours  for  the  hearing  to  commence;  and  (3)  chose  to  proceed
without counsel when asked on two occasions.  Prater v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 12 B.L.R.
1-121 (1989). 2. Claimant fails to appear at hearing             The ALJ erred in awarding benefits on the record under 20 C.F.R. Part 727 where
neither the Director nor Claimant requested a waiver of their right to a hearing in writing
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.461.  The Board noted that, although Claimant advised the
ALJ  in  advance  of  the  hearing  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  attend,  the  “Director
submit(ted) that Claimant’s unjustified failure to attend the hearing prejudicially deprived
the Director of the right to examine, and that claimant’s testimony (was) crucial to the
resolution of the contested issue of total disability.”  The Board remanded the claim for
issuance  of  an  order  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be  dismissed  pursuant  to  §
725.465(c)  which  provides,  in  part,  that  “[i]n  any  case  where  a  dismissal  of  a  claim,
defense,  or  party  is  sought,  the  administrative  law  judge  shall  issue  an  order  to  show
cause why the dismissal should not be granted and afford all parties a reasonable time to
respond  to  such  order.”    Churpak  v.  Director,  OWCP,  9  B.L.R.  1-71,  1-72  and  1-73
(1986).   B. Disqualification of representative; appearance of impropriety Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.34(g)(3)       nd 18.36, an administrative law judge may
disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest or conduct prohibited by the applicable rules of
professional conduct.  Baroumes v. Eagle Marine Services, 23 B.R.B.S. 80 (1989).  See also   Smiley   v.   Director,   OWCP,   984   F.2d   278   (9^th   Cir.   1993)   (attorney’s   dual representation  of  claimant  and,  in  an  unrelated  matter,  the  carrier  who  would  pay
judgment  in  claimant’s  favor).    These  regulations  require  the  ALJ  to  give  the  parties
notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the disqualification of a representative. It gave appearance of impropriety wh        ere Claimant was represented by his son,
a DOL-ESA-OWCP employee.  However, the Board did not conclude that it was error
for  the  ALJ  to  permit  the  representation  where  the  son’s  supervisor  approved  of  the
representation  and  directed  that  no  fees  could  be  awarded  to  him  in  the  event  that
Claimant prevailed.  Hayes v. Director, OWCP, 11 B.L.R. 1-20, 1-22 (1987). C. Party bound by acts of representative Generally, a party is bound by the acts of its attorney.  Where Employer’s counsel failed  to  timely  comply  with  the  Board’s filing  requirements,  Employer’s  appeal  was
properly  dismissed  with  prejudice.    The  Sixth  Circuit  stated  that  the  fact  that  “counsel
may have been engaged in four thousand similar black lung cases and error-free in forty
previous  appeals  is  not  persuasive.”    The  court  found  that  Employer  had  received  due Last Revised: 3/2/2005

39 process  in  so  far  as  both  the  district  director  and  the  administrative  law  judge  had
reviewed  the  claim.    Consolidation  Coal  Co.  v.  Gooding,  703  F.2d  230,  233  (6^th  Cir.
1983).             Claimant’s argument that the inadequate performance of his counsel deprived him
of the right to participate fully in the hearing was rejected.  The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that: (1) Claimant freely selected his attorney; (2)  the attorney appeared with him at the
hearing; (3) the ALJ appeared impartial; and (4) the record did not support a finding that
the performance of counsel at the hearing was inadequate.  Collins v. Director, OWCP,
795 F.2d 368, 375, 9 B.L.R. 2-58, 2-63 (4^th Cir. 1986). On  the  other  hand,  the  extreme  sanction  of  dismissal  with  prejudice  is  not appropriate without consideration of the client’s conduct before binding him or her to the
attorney’s  misfeasance.    In  this  vein,  the  Board  concluded  that  the  ALJ  erred  in
dismissing a claim where Claimant did not attend the hearing due to illness.  Claimant
advised her counsel who, in turn, failed to request a continuance or provide reasons for
Claimant’s failure to appear.  The Board concluded that a rule permitting dismissal for
want of prosecution: . . . cannot be mechanically applied to punish a party for the acts of his
attorney.      Dismissal   with   prejudice   is   an   extreme   sanction,   and   is
warranted only if ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff  exist(s)  .  .  .  and  a  lesser  sanction  would  not  better  serve  the
interest of justice.’ (citation omitted). Howell  v.  Director,  OWCP,  7  B.L.R.  1-259,  1-262  (1983).    The  Board  concluded  that dismissal was not proper  because Claimant forwarded the hearing notice to her former
counsel expecting appropriate action to be taken.  Further, Claimant’s prompt action in
responding to the show cause order by obtaining a new attorney and her overall pursuit of
her claim did not indicate an intent to delay.  The Board further noted that the Director
“made no claim of prejudice from the delay.”  Id. at 1-262 and 1-263.  See also Link v. Wabash,  370  U.S.  626,  630-31  (1962);  McCargo  v.  Hedrick,  545  F.2d  393  (7^th  Cir. 1976);  Reizakis  v.  Coy,  490  F.2d  1132  (4^th  Cir.  1974);  Flaska  v.  Little  River  Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5^th Cir. 1968). XV.     Right of cross-examination A. Generally             In  accordance  with  Richardson  v.  Perales,  402  U.S.  389,  401  (1971)  and  the
statutory provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), administrative proceedings must conform to the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment.  Section 556(d) provides that “[a] party is entitled
to  present  his  case  or  defense  by  oral  or  documentary  evidence,  to  submit  rebuttal
evidence and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.” Last Revised: 3/2/2005

40 B. Waiver of right of cross-examination             The   Director   waived   its   right   to   present   evidence   challenging   Claimant’s
entitlement to benefits when the Director did not contest entitlement at the hearing or on
reconsideration,  but  raised  the  issue  for  the  first  time  before  the  Board.    Kincell  v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 9 B.L.R. 1-221, 1-223 (1986). Employer waived its right to “cross-examine the author of Claimant’s Exhibit 1 and its right to access to the chest x-ray in question both by its failure to request issuance of  a  subpoena  prior  to  or  during  the  hearing  and  by  its  failure  to  object  to  the  x-ray’s submission into evidence at the hearing.”  The ALJ acted properly not only in admitting
Claimant’s   Exhibit   1   into   evidence,   but   also   in   denying   Employer’s   motion   for
reconsideration and in refusing to reopen the hearing record.  Hoffman v. Peabody Coal
Co., 4 B.L.R. 1-52 (1981) (it is noteworthy, that Claimant’s Exhibit 1 contained a report
diagnosing complicated pneumoconiosis based upon an x-ray study that was available at
the time the case was pending before the district director and the exhibit was offered for dmission into evidence in violation of the 20-day rule).   a C. Improper denial of right of cross-examination 1.    Delay in notifying em ployer of potential liability             In Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Lockhart], 137 F.3d 799 (4^th Cir.
1998), the Fourth Circuit held that Employer was dismissed from the case and relieved of liability   for   the   payment   of   benefits   where   “the   extraordinary   delay   in   notifying [Employer]  of  its  potential  liability  deprived  it  of  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  defend
itself  in  violation  of  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.”    The  court  set
forth the lengthy procedural history of the claim and found that “[Employer] was finally
notified of the claim on April 6, 1992, seventeen years after notice could have been given
and eleven years after the regulations command that it be given.”  The court further noted
the following:    The  problem  here  is  not  so  much  that  Claimant  died  before  notice  to
[Employer], but rather that he died many years after such notice could and
should have been given.  The government       ’s grossly inefficient handling of
the  matter–and  not  the  random  timing  of  death–denied  [Employer]  the
opportunity to examine [Claimant]. (emphasis in original). 2.    Party’s failure to cooperate during discovery             Employer  was  denied  a  full  and  fair  hearing  where  it  was  deprived  of  the
opportunity  to  have  x-rays  re-read  or  physicians  deposed  due  to  Claimant’s  lack  of
consent.  Kislak v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 2 B.L.R. 1-249 (1979). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

41 D.    The 20-day rule for exchanging evidence and “good cause” Central  to  providing  a  fair  hearing  is  that  each  party  must  have  notice  and  an opportunity  to  be  heard,  which  includes  an  opportunity  to  conduct  cross  examination.  
The 20-day rule is the centerpiece requirement for submission of evidence in black lung claims.    The  regulations  at  20  C.F.R.  §  725.456(b)(1)  (2000)  and  (2001)  provide  that evidence,  which  has  not  been  submitted  to  the  district  director,  “may  be  received  in
evidence subject to the objection of any party, if such evidence is sent to all other parties
at least 20 days before a hearing is held in connection with the claim.”¹  See Amorose v.
Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-899 (1985) (a medical report submitted more than 20 days
prior  to  the  hearing  did  not  violate  20  C.F.R.  §  725.446(b)(1)).      This  regulation  is
designed to eliminate surprise and to afford the parties adequate time to prepare its case.    The  ALJ  has  discretion  to  admit  evidence  that  is  not  exchanged  in  compliance with the 20-day rule if (1) the parties waive the 20-day requirement, or (2) “good cause”
is demonstrated as to why such evidence was not timely exchanged.                This  section  contains  a  discussion  of  the  “good  cause”  standard  as  it  relates  to
exchanging evidence in compliance with the 20-day rule.  For a discussion of the “good
cause”  standard  as  it  relates  to  admitting       evidence  in  excess  of  the  limitations  at  20
C.F.R. § 725.414 (2001), see Chapter 4:  Limitations on Admission of Evidence.    1. Requiring exchange of evidence more than 20 days
in advance of the hearing is permitted             In  Dempsey  v.  Sewell  Coal  Co.,  23  B.L.R.  1-53  (2004)  (en  banc),  the  Board
concluded that it was proper for the ALJ to “rule on claimant’s motions to exclude and order  employer  to  identify  which  items  of  evidence  it  would  rely  on  as  its  affirmative case pursuant to Section 725.414(a)(3)(i)” more than 20 days in advance of the hearing
“because  claimant  explained  that  he  was  unable  to  proceed  with  development  of
admissible evidence under Section 725.414 until his motions to exclude excess evidence
were  decided.”    The  Board  noted  that  the  ALJ  left  the  record  open  for  45  days  for
Employer to respond and he “admitted two of the four items of post-hearing evidence that
employer submitted in response to claimant’s late evidence.” 2.    Exchange of evidence less than 20 days prior to hearing             The regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 725.456(b)(2) direct that waiver or “good cause”
be established prior to admitting evidence not exchanged at least 20 days prior to hearing.  
Specifically,  the  ALJ  is  required  to  make  a  finding  that  “good  cause”  exists  under  §
725.456(b)(2) before admitting late evidence.  Jennings v. Brown Badgett, Inc., 9 B.L.R.                                                  1    It is noteworthy that the ALJ is not considered a “party.”  Specifically, the Board held that an ALJ misapplied the 20-day rule when he excluded a physician’s deposition that was properly exchanged
between Claimant and the Director solely because the ALJ had not received a copy of it 20 days prior to the
hearing.  Luketich v. Director, OWCP, 8 B.L.R. 1-477 (1986).       Last Revised: 3/2/2005

42 1-94 (1986), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom., Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899 (6^th Cir. 1988).             The  Board  similarly  held  that  20  C.F.R.  §  725.456(b)(3)  requires  a  preliminary
determination of whether “good cause” exists for a party’s failure to comply with the 20
day  rule.    Conn  v.  White  Deer  Coal  Co.,  6  B.L.R.  1-979  (1984)  (the  ALJ  improperly
admitted a medical report and deposition not exchanged in accordance with the 20-day
rule;  error  not  corrected  by  offering  to  leave  the  record  open  where  opposing  party
continued to object to admission of report and did not accept alternative of leaving the
record open).    If  there  is  no  waiver  and  “good  cause” is  not  established,  the  ALJ  may  either exclude the evidence from the record, Farber v. Island Creek Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-428
(1984), or remand the case to the district director for further development of the evidence. Trull v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-615 (1984). a.    “Good cause” not established · Unreasonable delay.  Delay in obtaining evidence that was readily available does not support a finding of “good cause” to allow the untimely evidence.  Some examples
are: - Medical  report  properly     excluded  where  the  employer  failed  to  explain
why it waited more than two and one-half years to secure a review of a
pulmonary function study.  Newland v. Consolidation Coal Co., 6 B.L.R.
1-1286 (1984); - Proper   to   disregard   a   medical   opinion   that   was   not   exchanged   in
accordance with the 20-day rule where counsel failed to submit while the
record  was  kept  open.    Kuchwara  v   Director,  OWCP ,  7  B.L.R.  1-167 (1984); - In a similar vein, Employer’s request for a continuance to obtain autopsy
slides  for  an  independent  review  properly  denied  where  Employer  had
access to the slides for one year, but failed to secure them.  Witt v. Dean Jones Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-21 (1984). · Knowledge  of  contents  of  late  evidence  not  determinative.    A  case  was remanded for a determination of whether Employer established “good cause” as to why
an affidavit had not been timely exchanged pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.456(b)(2).  The
Board  held  that  the  fact  that  Claimant  would  not  be  surprised  by  the  contents  of  the
affidavit does not satisfy the “good cause” standard.  White v. Douglas Van Dyke Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-905, 1-907 and 1-908 (1984). · Relevancy of late evidence not determinative.  “Good cause” is not established by mere reference to the relevancy of the evidence.  The ALJ erred in admitting evidence
which was mailed to the opposing party less than 20 days before the hearing on grounds
that  it  was  his  intention  “to  consider  all  relevant  medical  evidence.”    While  the  ALJ Last Revised: 3/2/2005

43 acknowledged   that   the   opposing   party’s   objection   was   “technically   correct,”   he
erroneously overruled it.  Conn v. White Deer Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-979 (1984).    b. “Good cause” established · Evidence exchanged in connection with earlier state claim.                                                                                  Good cause was
established where evidence not exchanged 20 days prior to the hearing was nevertheless
admitted on grounds that the evidence was sent to the opposing party “three years earlier
in connection with a state claim (which) gave claimant’s counsel reason to believe that
employer’s counsel already had a copy of the report.”  The Board noted that the ALJ left
the record open for 30 days but the opposing party failed to respond to admission of the
report.  The Board held that it was proper to admit the report but cautioned that: Affirmance of the administrative law judge’s exercise of discretion in this
case  .  .  .  should  not  be  construed  as  an  endorsement  of  the  view  that
documents exchanged in connection with an earlier state claim uniformly
satisfy   the   20-day   rule.      Documents,   generally   speaking,   must   be
exchanged  during  the  course  of  proceedings  before  the  Department  of
Labor in order to satisfy the 20-day rule . . .. Buttermore v. Duquesne Light Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-604, 1-607 (1984), modified on recon., 8
B.L.R. 1-36 (1985). · Evidence  to  be  used  for  impeachment  purposes.    Pursuant  to  20  C.F.R.  § 725.456(b)(4) evidence is admissible, notwithstanding a violation of the 20-day rule if it
is used for impeachment purposes.  The Board remanded a case for the ALJ to consider
whether a tape recording, which was not exchanged at least 20 days prior to the hearing,
was admissible for impeachment purposes unde        r § 725.456(b)(4).  Claimant argued that
the  recording  was  of  his  conversation  with  a  physician  who  stated  that  Claimant  had
“black  lung,”  contrary  to  the  diagnosis  contained  in  the  physician’s  written  report.  
Bowman v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 15 B.L.R. 1-22 (1991). · Examination  more  than  20  days  before  hearing;  report  not  available  until after hearing.  Where Claimant was examined shortly before the 20-day deadline and the medical report was not available for submission until after the hearing, “good cause” was
established for its submission.  However, the Board also noted that “[b]ecause employer
never received a copy of the report and because the administrative law judge appears to
have been unaware of this fact when employer moved to close the record, . . . due process
requires that the case be remanded and the record be reopened for 60 days.  Pendleton v.
U.S. Steel Corp. , 6 B.L.R. 1-815 (1984). 3.    Admission of late evidence; must allow responsive evidence If   late   evidence   is   admitted,   the   regulatory   provisions   at   20   C.F.R.   § 725.456(b)(3)  require  that  the  record  be  left  open  for  30  days  to  permit  the  filing  of responsive evidence.   Last Revised: 3/2/2005

44 a. Record must be left open for both parties                It is important to note that the record must remain open for both parties to submit
evidence.    In  Baggett  v.  Island  Creek  Coal  Co.,  6  B.L.R.  1-1311  (1984),  the  ALJ
admitted  an  x-ray  re-reading  by  Employer  on  the  grounds  that  Employer  established
“good cause” as to why the reading was not exchanged in compliance with the 20-day
rule.  The ALJ left the record open to permit the parties an opportunity to submit any
further evidence.  Claimant was subsequently granted two extensions of time to submit
evidence, but Employer was denied an extension of time.  The Board concluded that this
was error because § 725.456(b)(2) requires that the record be left open for both parties. b. Failure to timely submit responsive evidence–
waiver of right of cross-examination    Employer was afforded due process where the ALJ reopened the record to admit an  autopsy  report,  provided  Employer  with  a  copy,  and  waited  more  than  30  days  for Employer  to  respond  before  issuing  a  decision.    In  failing  to  submit  rebuttal  evidence
while  the  record  was  left  open,  Employer  “waived”  its  right  to  cross-examination.   Gladden v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 7 B.L.R. 1-577, 1-579 (1984). The  Director,  who  was  absent  at  a  hearing,  was  precluded  from  objecting  to admission of new evidence at the hearing.  The ALJ properly left the record open for 30
days after the hearing pursuant to § 725.456(b)(3) for the Director to respond.  However,
the Director: (1) did not request notification of the newly submitted evidence; (2) made no  attempt  to  ascertain  what  had  transpired  during  the  hearing;  and  (3)  did  not  submit rebuttal  during  the  30  days  in  which  the  record  was  left  open.    DeLara  v.  Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-110 (1984). 4.    Admission of post-hearing evidence a.    Evidence submitted after the hearing                While the ALJ has broad discretion in procedural matters and may properly refuse
to admit medical evidence submitted post-hearing, Itell v. Ritchey Trucking Co., 8 B.L.R.
1-356 (1985) (the ALJ properly refused to reopen the record for post-hearing evidence
“absent  compelling  circumstances  or  a  showing  of  good  cause”),  s/he  must  provide
rationale  prior  to  issuing  a  decision  for  accepting  or  rejecting  post-hearing  evidence.   Covert v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-1111 (1984). For the propriety of conducting post-hearing medical examinations or submitting reports  post-hearing,  see  Chapter  26:    Motions.    For  submission  of  depositions  post-
hearing, see Part VI of this Chapter. - “Good cause” established; responsive evidence.   Where    evidence    is admitted   post-hearing,   then   the   ALJ   must   allow   submission   of   responsive Last Revised: 3/2/2005

45 evidence.  In Coughlin v. Director, OWCP, 757 F.2d 966, 7 B.L.R. 2-177 (8^th Cir.
1983), the court held that it was error for the ALJ to permit the Director to obtain
a  post-hearing  re-reading  of  an  x-ray  study  without  providing  Claimant  with  a
copy of the re-reading or permitting him th       e opportunity to rebut the new reading.  
The  court  held  that  “fundamental  concepts of  fairness  require  that  litigants  be
given equal opportunities to present their respective positions.”  Id. at 969. Similarly,  the  Board  concluded  that,  if  the  ALJ  determines  that  a  post- hearing affidavit regarding Claimant’s work history was properly admitted, then
Employer  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  “depose  and  cross-examine  the
affiant.”  Lane v. Harmon Mining Corp., 5 B.L.R. 1-87, 1-89 (1982).             The  ALJ  reasonably  concluded  that  “fairness”  required  the  post-hearing
admission of x-ray evidence and that “good       cause” was implicitly found to exist.  
Specifically, Claimant’s reading of an x-ray study was submitted in compliance
with  the  20-day  rule  “by  only  a  few  days”  such  that  Employer  was  properly
permitted  to  submit  responsive  evidence  post-hearing.    Clark  v.  Karst-Robbins
Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-149, 1-153 (1989)(en banc). In  Shedlock  v.  Bethlehem  Mines  Corp.,  9  B.L.R.  1-195,  1-200  (1986), Claimant  submitted  the  report  of  his  physician  immediately  prior  to  the  20-day
deadline and objected to admission of a rebuttal report based upon an examination
conducted 18 days prior to the hearing.  The Board held that the ALJ generally
has broad discretion in dealing with the conduct of the hearing, but remanded the
case to state that: Claimant’s  submission  of  Dr.  Mastine’s  report  just  prior  to  the
deadline imposed by the 20-day rule for submitting documentary
evidence  into  the  record,  coupled  with  the  administrative  law
judge’s  refusal  to  allow  employer  the  opportunity  to  respond  to
claimant’s  introduction  of  the  ‘surprise’  evidence,  constituted  a
denial of employer’s due process right to a fair hearing. However,  in  Owens  v.  Jewell  Smokeless  Coal  Corp.,  14  B.LR.  1-47  (1990)(en
banc), the Board concluded that an employer’s opportunity to respond does not
automatically include having Claimant re-examined.             The  Board  has  held  that,  even  though  Claimant  was  examined  shortly
before the 20-day deadline and the report was not available for submission until
after the hearing, “good cause” was established for its submission.  However, the
Board also noted that “[b]ecause employer never received a copy of the report and
because the administrative law judge appears to have been unaware of this fact
when employer moved to close the record, we hold that due pr                                                                             ocess requires that
the case be remanded and the record be reopened for 60 days.  Pendleton v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 6 B.L.R. 1-815 (1984). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

46 -             “Good  cause”  not  established.    Generally,  “good  cause”  to  submit
evidence after the hearing will not be established if there was a delay in obtaining
the  evidence.    In  Wagner  v.  Beltrami  Enterprises,  16  B.L.R.  1-65  (1990),  the
ALJ’s denial of Claimant’s request to develop and submit post-hearing evidence
was proper where Claimant had received a continuance of a prior hearing for this
purpose  and  where  the  evidence  sought  was  not  in  Employer’s  possession  as
Claimant had argued. The ALJ properly denied the Director’s motion to keep the record open for submission  of  additional  evidence  when  the  Director  sought                                                                              to  obtain  medical
records from the VA Hospital where Claimant retired due to a medical disability.  
The ALJ concluded that the Director had notice prior to the hearing that Claimant
retired because of a disability and that medical records existed for the disability.  
Moreover,  the  Board  concluded  that  20  C.F.R.  §  725.456(b)(2),  requiring  that
evidence not exchanged at least 20 days prior to the hearing be excluded absent a
showing of good cause or waiver, is applicable to the submission of post-hearing
evidence as well as to evidence offered during the hearing.  The ALJ is under “no
affirmative duty to secure all material and probative evidence . . ..”  Stephenson v.
Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-212 (1984). In Shertzer v. McNally Pittsburgh Manufacturing Co., BRB No. 97-1121 BLA  (June  26,  1998)  (unpub.),  the  Board  held  that  the  ALJ  erred  in  admitting evidence  submitted  on  modification  where  the  evidence  was  in  existence  at  the
time the ALJ issued his original decision.  Specifically, the Board concluded that
certain   Director’s   Exhibits   should   not   have   been   admitted   as   evidence   on
modification because “this evidence was in existence but was not made available
to the administrative law judge the time the administ                                                     rative law judge issued his
1994  Decision  and  Order.”    The  Board  stated  that  20  C.F.R.  §  725.456(d)  and Wilkes  v.  F&R  Coal  Co.,  12  B.L.R.  1-1  (1988)  “mandate  the  exclusion  of
withheld evidence in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.”   In Thomas v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 6 B.L.R. 1-739 (1984), the ALJ properly denied Claimant’s request to submit a physician’s affidavit on
reconsideration regarding his cooperation and comprehension during a pulmonary
function  study  conducted  five  years  earlier.    The  ALJ  concluded  that  Claimant
failed to establish “good cause” as to why the evidence was not obtained earlier
and submitted in compliance with the 20-day rule.  The Board noted that, rather
than  timely  requesting  that  the  record  remain  open  for  submission  of  such
evidence,  “claimant  did  not  obtain  and  attempt  to  submit  (the  physician’s)
affidavit  until  after  issuance  of  the  administrative  law  judge’s  decision  denying
benefits.” Last Revised: 3/2/2005

47 b.    Evidence submitted on reconsideration                Admissibility  of  evidence  submitted  on  reconsideration  must  be  considered
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.456(b)(2), i.e. “good cause” must be established for failure to
submit it prior to the hearing in compliance with the 20-day rule.  Hensley v. Grays Knob
Coal Co., 10 B.L.R. 1-88 (1987). c.    Reopening the record for submission of evidence It  is  within  the  judge’s discretion  to  reopen  the  record  for  the  submission  of evidence.  20 C.F.R. § 725.456(e).  See also Lynn v. Island Creek Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-
146 (1988), aff’d on recon., 13 B.L.R. 1-57 (1989)(en banc); Tackett v. Benefits Review
Board, 806 F.2d 640 (6^th  Cir. 1986); Clark v. Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-149
(1989)(en banc).  In particular, the ALJ must determine whether “manifest injustice” will
result  against  either  party  in  refusing  to  admit  evidence  on  remand.    Cochran  v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 16 B.L.R. 1-101 (1992).    - “Good cause” established.  One example where “good cause” to reopen the record on remand is established involves a change in the legal standard.  The
Board has held that the law in effect at the time a decision                                                                                                        is rendered must be
applied by the ALJ.  Berka v. North American Coal Corp., 8 B.L.R. 1-183 (1985);
Rapavi v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 7 B.L.R. 1-435 (1984). In Toler v. Associated Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-49 (1989)(en banc on recon.) the  Board  concluded  that ALJ  may       reopen  the  record  on  remand  to  accept
evidence addressing a new legal standard. The Sixth Circuit has held that a substantive change in the law during the pendency of a claim warrants reopening the record at the earliest possible time for
admission of evidence addressing the new standard.  In Harlan Coal, the claim
was  heard  by  an  ALJ  and,  after  the  record  closed,  but  before  issuance  of  a
decision,  the  court  issued  York  v.  Benefits  Review  Bd.,  819  F.2d  134  (6^th  Cir.
1987),  which  significantly  changed  the  rebuttal  standard  at  §  727.302(b)(2).  
Thus,  the  court  held  that  “[f]undamental  fairness  requires  that  Harlan  Bell  be
granted  an  opportunity  to  address  comprehensively  the  post-York  standards.”
Harlan Coal Co. v. Lemar, 904 F.2d 1042, 14 B.L.R. 2-1, 2-9 (6^th Cir. 1990).             Similarly, in Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP [Ferguson], 140 F.3d
634  (6^th  Cir.  1998),  the  court  held  that  the  ALJ  erred  in  failing  to  consider
evidence  submitted  by  Employer  on  remand  in  support  of  §  727.203(b)(3)
rebuttal.  Specifically, the ALJ declined to reopen the record and reconsider his
findings   under   subsection   (b)(3)   on   remand   because   the   Board   “explicitly
affirmed (his) finding and that there was no rebuttal under § 727.203(b)(3) of the
regulations.”  The Board agreed.  The Sixth Circuit, however, reasoned that the
change  in  legal  standard  under  subsection  (b)(2)  shifted  emphasis  to  subsection Last Revised: 3/2/2005

48 (b)(3)  rebuttal.    Indeed,  the  court  noted  that  subsection  (b)(3)  became  the  less
stringent rebuttal provision of the two subsections and stated the following: In the case at hand, Peabody presented new evidence as to (b)(2)
and (b)(3), however, the ALJ refused to consider the new evidence
as  to  (b)(3),  and  thus,  only  considered  (b)(2)  rebuttal.    This  was
error.  It is clear that Peabody was entitled to reconsideration as to
both (b)(2) and (b)(3).  (footnote omitted).  Thus, in accord with
(Cal-Glo Coal Co. v. Yeager, 104 F.3d 827, 832 (6^th Cir. 1997)),
the Board committed a manifest injustice by denying Peabody full
consideration.             In  Cal-Glo  Coal  Co.  v.  Yeager,  104  F.3d  827  (6^th  Cir.  1997),  the  court
reiterated that the administrative law judge must reopen the record to permit the
introduction of evidence where there is a change in legal standard.  Specifically,
the court held that “when an employer rebuts the interim presumption under the
pre-York  standard  applicable  to  §  727.203(b)(2),  but  not  under  the  post-York
standard, the BRB commits a manifest injustice if it refuses to allow the employer
to  present  new  evidence  to  the  ALJ  that  the  employer  believes  will  establish
rebuttal  either  under  the  post-York  standards  applicable  to  §  727.203(b)(2)  or
another regulatory subsection.”  (emphasis added).    -                        “Good cause” not established.  “Good cause” to reopen the record is not
established where the proffered evidence is “vague and unreliable.”  Borgeson v. Kaiser
Steel Coal Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-169 (1989)(en banc) (“good cause” to reopen the record was
not  established  where  the  ALJ  found  that  the  proffered  evidence  was  “vague  and
unreliable”).    Moreover,  “good  cause”  is  not established  based  on  a  premise  that  the miner’s condition is worsening.  White v. Director, OWCP, 7 B.L.R. 1-348, 1-351 (1988)
(although  Claimant  offered  evidence  on  remand  to  demonstrate  a  worsening  of  his
pulmonary condition, the ALJ was not bound to accept it, and the ALJ provided reasons
for not doing so; the Board noted that the evidence could be submitted on modification
before the district director). XVI.    Settlements and withdrawals of claims A. Settlement of black lung claim prohibited             Settlement  of  claims  under  the  Black  Lung  Benefits  Reform  Act  is  prohibited.  
Lodigan v. Central Industries, Inc., 7 B.L.R. 1-192 (1984). Moreover, 20 C.F.R. § 725.365 states that no fee charged for services rendered to a  claimant  shall  be  valid  unless  approved  by  the  appropriate  adjudication  officer.  
Moreover, no contract or agreement for a fee shall be valid.  Goodloe v. Peabody Coal
Co.,  19  B.L.R.  1-91  (1995).    In  this  vein,  the  Board  has  held  that  contingent  and
stipulated fee agreements are invalid.  Wells v. Director, OWCP, 9 B.L.R. 1-63 (1986). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

49             In Eifler v. Peabody Coal Co., 13 F.3d 236, 18 B.L.R. 2-86 (7^th Cir. 1993), the
Seventh Circuit held that, even though attorney’s fees may not be awarded before a final
compensation award is entered, a settlement of attorney’s fees may be approved before
such a final award.  Under the facts of Eifler, Claimant’s counsel withdrew her petition
for fees before the court stating that the parties had settled the claim for attorney’s fees
for $13,000.  The court examined the terms of the settlement and noted, in approving the
fee settlement, that “[a]s for the amount of compensation, the settlement provides that not
a  penny  will  come  out  of  any  award  of  compensation  to  Eifler.    So  he  has  nothing  to
lose.”    B. Contingent withdrawal of controversion illegal An   agreement,   stating   that   Employer   will   withdraw   its   controversion   of Claimant’s  eligibility  for  medical  benefits  in  return  for  Claimant’s  agreement  to  first
submit all future medical expenses to alternative health carriers is illegal.  The agreement
would deprive Claimant of protection afforded him under the regulations.  20 C.F.R. §§
725.701-725.707.  Gerzarowski v. Lehigh Valley Anthracite, Inc., 12 B.L.R. 1-62 (1988). C. Remand for payment of benefits proper; withdrawal of controversion of issues             It  is  proper  to  accept  the  “Director’s  Motion  to  Remand  for  the  Payment  of
Benefits” as a withdrawal of controversion of all issues.  Pendley v. Director, OWCP, 13
B.L.R. 1-23 (1989)(en banc).   D.          Withdrawal of claim The regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 725.306 (2001) provide that the ALJ may grant a motion to withdraw a claim if it is in the best interests of the claimant.  The following
factors should be considered:  (1) whether the Trust Fund has made payments to Claimant
that have not been reimbursed (§ 725.306(a)(3) prohibits withdrawal if money is owed to
the Trust Fund); (2) whether the ALJ has authority to enter an order granting withdrawal
of the claim under Clevenger v. Mary Helen Coal Co., 22 B.L.R. 1-193 (2002)(en banc)
and Lester v. Peabody Coal Co., 22 B.L.R. 1-183 (2002)(en banc); (3) whether granting a
withdrawal of the claim could jeopardize a claimant’s rights under 20 C.F.R. § 725.308
(2001)  (the  three  year  statute  of  limitations);  and  (4)  whether  granting  a  withdrawal
would be in the best interests of the claimant overall.                Example  where  withdrawal  was  not  in  claimant’s  best  interests.    In  Jonida
Trucking,  Inc.  v.  Hunt,  124  F.3d  739  (6^th  Cir.  1997),  Claimant  was  found  entitled  to benefits,  but  refused  payments  from  Employer,  who  was  Claimant’s  long-time  friend.  
Instead, Claimant sought payments from the Trust Fund.  Employer stated that it failed to
contest the claim “because it had relied on information from (Claimant) that any award
would  run  against  the  Trust  Fund  and  not  against  (Employer).”    When  Claimant  was
informed  that  he  could  not  receive  benefits  from  the  Trust  Fund,  he  requested  a
withdrawal of his claim, which was denied by the Board.  Because Claimant did not join Last Revised: 3/2/2005

50 Employer in its appeal of the Board’s denial, the court held that Employer did not have
“standing  to  appeal  the  withdrawal  issue.”    The  court  stated  that  “it  is  clear  that  an
employer is not the proper party to argue that its employee’s best in                                                                                 terests are served by
allowing  him  to  forfeit  payments  from  the  employer.”    The  court  further  held  that
Employer could not be relieved of its liability for failure to timely controvert on grounds that  it  relied  on  Claimant’s  mistaken  representation  that  the  Trust  Fund  would  be  held liable for benefits.  As a result, the court concluded that Employer failed to demonstrate
“good cause” for its failure to timely controvert both the claim and its designation as the
responsible operator.  The court then upheld an order directing that Employer, a trucking
company, secure the payment of $150,000 in benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.606. For further discussion of withdrawals of claims, see Chapter 26:  Motions. XVII.   Stipulations A. Stipulation of fact   1. Binding when received into evidence             Stipulations of fact are binding when received into evidence.  Grigg v. Director,
OWCP, 28 F.3d 416 (4^th Cir. 1994). A stipulation of fact is binding upon the parties and upon the trier-of-fact.  Nippes v. Florence Mining Co., 12 B.L.R. 1-108 (1985). 2. Stipulation against pro se Claimant’s interest; not binding             In Wilson v. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co., 8 B.L.R. 1-73 (1985), the Board
held that it was proper for the district director to list “total disability” as a contested issue
notwithstanding the fact that the pro se Claimant stated that he was not totally disabled.  
In so holding, the Board reasoned that it was proper for the district director to implicitly
find that the stipulation was not in Claimant’s best interests. B. Parties cannot stipulate to legal effect of stipulated facts The  Board  holds  that  “[i]t  is  well-settled  that  the  stipulations  of  parties  with respect to the legal effect of admitted facts are not binding on a court.”  An ALJ “is not
bound by any agreement of counsel on a question of law.”  Casias v. Director, OWCP, 6
B.L.R. 1-438, 1-443 n. 7 (1983). Last Revised: 3/2/2005

51 XVIII.    Subpoenas A. ALJ has subpoena power when case pending before district director             In  Maine v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 18 B.R.B.S. 129 (1986), the Board
held that district directors do not possess the authority to issue subpoenas.  The Board
stated that, “[i]f a case is pending at the (district director’s) level, and the issuance of a subpoena  becomes  necessary,  the  parties  may  simply  apply  to  the  Office  of  the  Chief Administrative  Law  Judge  for  the  proper  adjudicatory  officer  to  issue  the  appropriate
subpoena.” B. Party’s due process right limited to requesting subpoena The ALJ did not violate Claimant’s right to due process by denying his request for subpoenas.  Claimant’s due process right to a subpoena is limited to a right to request the
subpoena.    The  ultimate  issuance  of  the  subpoena  is  a  matter  of  the  ALJ’s  discretion.  
Specifically, the ALJ concluded that the reasons for requesting the subpoenas, including
obtaining the testimony of physicians who interpreted certain x-ray studies of record as
negative, were insufficient.  Claimant had argued that the physician’s attendance at the
hearing  was  necessary  because  responses  to  interrogatories  would  have  been  “‘too
extensive.’”    The  Board  held  that  the  ALJ  was  not  required  to  provide  any  further
explanation for his denial of Claimant’s subpoena request.  Bowman v. Clinchfield Coal
Co., 15 B.L.R. 1-22 (1991).  See also Souch v. Califano, 599 F.2d 577, 580 n. 5 (4^th Cir.
1979). C. Party may be subpoenaed to attend hearing Claimant  has  a  right  to  a  hearing,  but  s/he  is  not  required  to  be  present.    The opposing  party  may  subpoena  Claimant  to  appear  where  the  opposing  party  deems
Claimant’s testimony necessary.  Palovich v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 5 B.L.R. 1-70, 1-
72 and 1-73 (1982). XIX.    Summary judgment A. Sua sponte authority to render summary judgment 1. ALJ has authority The ALJ has authority to issue orders of summary judgment sua sponte where the parties  have  been  given  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  respond.    In  this  vein,  the  Board concluded  that  FRCP  56,  permitting  sua  sponte  summary  judgment  orders  by  a  judge,
applies  to  black  lung  proceedings  because  it  is  “not  inconsistent”  with  20  C.F.R.  §
725.452(c).    Under  the  facts  of  this  case,  the  ALJ  provided  100  days’  notice  of  the
hearings to be conducted and requested that the parties exchange evidence 40 days prior
to the hearing.  Thirty days before the hearing the ALJ sua sponte issued an order to show
cause why the claims should not be denied based on the evidence received.  The Board Last Revised: 3/2/2005

52 held  that  the  ALJ  had  authority  to  issue  the  order.    However,  it  warned  that  such
deviation from standard procedures was “strongly discouraged” because of the “negative” affect  on  the  process.    Smith  v.  Westmoreland  Coal  Co.,  12  B.L.R.  1-39,  1-43  (1988), aff’d. sub nom., Henshew v. Royal Coal Co. , 871 F.2d 417 (4^th Cir. 1989)(table). 2. ALJ does not have authority             In  Robbins  v.  Cyprus  Cumberland  Coal  Co.,  146  F.3d  425  (6^th  Cir.  1998),  the
Sixth Circuit reiterated its position in Cunningham v. Island Creek Coal Co., 144 F.3d
388 (6^th Cir. 1998) that an ALJ is required to hold an oral hearing on modification upon
request of a party.  The Robbins court held the following: A hearing is not necessary if all parties give written waiver of their rights
to a hearing and request a decision on the documentary record.  (citation
and footnote omitted).  The only other instance in the regulations which
permits  a  decision  without  holding  a  requested  hearing  is  when  a  party
moves  for  summary  judgment,  and  the  ALJ  determines  that  there  is  no
genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and  that  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to
judgment as a matter of law.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(c).  As the Director
points  out,  ‘[t]here  is no  regulatory  provision  which  would  permit  an
administrative  law  judge  to  initiate  summary  judgment  proceedings  sua
sponte.’ (citation omitted).   B. Unresolved factual issues; summary judgment inappropriate Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the ALJ must deny a motion  for  summary  judgment  if  there  are  unresolved  factual  issues.    Specifically,  the
ALJ  may  not  decide  whether  a  prior  or  successor  operator  is  the  responsible  operator
where there is a factual issue of whether the successor operator actually gained control of
the mine.  Montoya v. National King Coal Co., 10 B.L.R. 1-59, 1-61 (1986).   Last Revised: 3/2/2005