<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:62622.wais]
OVERSIGHT OF MEXICAN COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS: ARE WE GETTING FULL
COOPERATION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-85
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-622 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California (Independent)
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert B. Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gil Macklin, Professional Staff Member
Amy Davenport, Clerk
Micheal Yeager, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 24, 1999................................... 1
Statement of:
Bowman, Chief Theron, chief of police, Arlington, TX; and
Sheriff Ted G. Kamatchus, Marshall County, IA.............. 29
Weitzman, Jeff, Canine Enforcement Officer, U.S. Customs
Service, Orlando Field Division; and William F. Gately,
former Agent, U.S. Customs Service......................... 48
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, letter dated March 22, 1999......... 74
Gately, William F., former Agent, U.S. Customs Service,
prepared statement of...................................... 57
Kamatchus, Sheriff Ted G., Marshall County, IA, prepared
statement of............................................... 37
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 4
Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Hawaii:
Article dated March 16, 1999............................. 19
Letter dated March 23, 1999.............................. 10
Prepared statement of.................................... 12
Proposal to decertify Mexico's drug status............... 7
Weitzman, Jeff, Canine Enforcement Officer, U.S. Customs
Service, Orlando Field Division, prepared statement of..... 50
OVERSIGHT OF MEXICAN COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS: ARE WE GETTING FULL
COOPERATION?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee pet, pursuant to notice at 1:35 p.m., in
room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Gilman, Souder,
Hutchinson, Ose, Mink, Cummings, and Kucinich.
Staff present: Robert B. Charles, staff director/chief
counsel; Gil Macklin, professional staff member; Amy Davenport,
clerk; Michael Yeager, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa,
minority staff assistant.
Mr. Mica. Good afternoon. I'd like to call this meeting of
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources to order. Today, we are conducting a hearing
entitled, ``Oversight of Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts: Are
We Getting Full Cooperation?''
I would like to start today's proceedings with an opening
statement followed by our ranking member, and we will be joined
by other Members as they return from votes on the floor.
As I have stated many times, I believe that we cannot
tackle the problems of drug abuse and the concurrent social
problems of crime and significant cost to our country without
an approach that addresses, simultaneously, education,
treatment, prevention, enforcement, interdiction, and
eradication.
I believe this must be a comprehensive effort. That is why
this subcommittee has conducted five hearings on drug policy
this year, and today we will be conducting our sixth.
Combating illegal narcotics production and trafficking is
an absolutely critical element in reducing the supply of drugs.
With 60 to 70 percent of the hard drugs entering the United
States coming from Mexico, it is vital that the Congress
examine the question of Mexico's drug certification.
Today's hearing will serve as an analysis of what Mexico is
doing to combat that illegal drug trafficking. We have four
witnesses who currently serve, or who have served, on the front
line in the war on drugs.
Despite a long and productive relationship with our close
ally to the south, drugs coming from Mexico are ending up on
American streets. Mexican trafficking organizations continue to
be a major source for cocaine entering the United States.
Additionally, according to DEA's Heroin Signature Program,
Mexico has now become a major producer of high-purity heroin.
Mexico is now the source of 14 percent of all heroin seized in
the United States. Alarmingly, Mexico continues to serve as a
major source of foreign methamphetamine, as well as the major
source of foreign marijuana entering the United States.
An article last September in the Minneapolis Star Tribune
stated that about 85 percent of the methamphetamine in
Minnesota is smuggled from Mexico. As we will hear today, the
Mexican methamphetamine is ravishing communities in our
Midwest, and we will hear an example of Iowa here today.
Drugs coming from Mexico undermine our communities, spread
violence, and finance gang violence. In fact, it is destroying
young lives at a record level in the United States.
The statistics on drug use, particularly among our young
people, continue to be worrisome and sobering to every American
and every Member of Congress. Drug use is highest among our
12th graders, with more than 50 percent of them having tried an
illicit drug, and more than one in four labelled as current
users.
Today our subcommittee will examine Mexico's progress in
the fight against illegal drugs. Without question, no country
in the world poses a more immediate drug threat to the United
States than does Mexico.
Despite some of the reports that progress has been made
against drug trafficking, Mexico still has not complied with
several requests made by the Congress less than 2 years ago.
Mexico still has not signed a bilateral maritime agreement, and
corruption remains a major impediment. Additionally, our U.S.
law enforcement agents are not allowed to adequately protect or
defend themselves. The Government of Mexico still has failed to
extradite a single major drug trafficker.
Today, what is of great concern to me, is that Mexico has
lost vast areas, entire states and regions, to the control of
narco-traffickers. And from our reports, this has taken place
in both the Baja and Yucatan peninsulas as well as other areas
in Mexico. We have reports that these areas are now under
complete control of narco-traffickers. If this trend continues,
Mexico could be on the verge of turning over their sovereignty
to drug traffickers.
Based on facts and information we have learned so far--both
in open and closed hearings, meetings and briefings--it is
difficult for me to believe that this administration would
certify Mexico as fully cooperating. This action is most
troubling. Some of the statistics that we have learned from
1998, last year, are even more troubling. Boat seizures were
down 29 percent from 1997. Opium/heroin seizures were down 56
percent. Cocaine seizures were down 35 percent.
We have attempted to be fair and balanced in investigating
Mexico's progress. However, what we have found should concern
every Member of Congress. That is why today I am sponsoring,
along with the chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, Mr. Gilman, a resolution that proposes decertifying
Mexico with a national interest waiver. It is my belief that,
despite the fact that the 30-day provision of the Foreign
Assistance Act will technically run its course this week, we
need to continue considering and examining Mexico's lack of
progress and consider possible decertification.
This provision is intended to extend the 30-day window of
review so that this Congress may continue its deliberation and
consideration of this very vital national security issue. The
drug issue should not be limited to 30 days of attention every
year. It must remain at the top of our agenda. We owe at least
this much to the American people.
These are some of the issues that remain at the top of our
agenda, and today we hope to obtain a better understanding of
the disastrous situation that we face with these drugs coming
in from Mexico from the witnesses who will testify before our
subcommittee.
That concludes my opening comments, and I am pleased now to
yield at this time to our ranking member, the gentlelady from
Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
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Mrs. Mink. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for offering the
Congress and this subcommittee, in particular, an opportunity
to hear the other side of the picture, having to do with the
law enforcement activities within the United States.
I believe that this search for information, with respect to
our law enforcement efforts and the testimony of corruption and
deception and coverup that I understand is also going to be in
the testimony today, is a very important part of our full
understanding of the crisis which this country is facing.
I regret the actions that you and Mr. Gilman have taken
today, evidently--I just received your notice--that you are
filing a resolution calling for the extension of the period
which is contained in the statute limiting the issue of
decertification to 30 days from the date of notice by the
President.
[The information referred to follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.004
Mrs. Mink. I feel that the whole issue of drug policy, and
the scourge that it has become over the years within this
country, is a responsibility that all nations have to deal
with. It is properly addressed by this subcommittee and by the
full committee. I hope to be able to continue cooperating with
you, Mr. Chairman, on that very course, because I do think it
is an important area for our consideration. And I welcome the
opportunity to hear from the witnesses today.
I apologize, Mr. Chairman, as I may have to leave to
testify before the Rules Committee when my turn is called.
In that connection, I ask unanimous consent that a letter
from the Justice Department, from Dennis K. Burke, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, be placed into the record at this
point. It is merely calling to our attention the fact that some
of the matters relating to Operation Casablanca is in a trial
status with it commencing before the U.S. District Court in the
Central District of California on Monday, March 29. And they
are asking us to exercise caution and discretion in the
testimony and comments and questions that we might ask, with
reference to that investigation.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.005
Mrs. Mink. The second matter that I would like to have
placed into the record at this point relates, again, to
Operation Casablanca. And it is from the Commissioner of
Customs, Raymond W. Kelly, a letter dated March 23, addressed
to you, the Honorable John Mica, chairman of this subcommittee,
and goes to the matter of the March 16, 1999, New York Times
article, which he wishes to have clarified.
Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will also be made part--
--
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. Of the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink and the
information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Yes?
Mr. Souder. A parliamentary question--I just read Mr.
Kelly's letter. It seems that the New York Times article ought
to be inserted because it doesn't really make sense unless----
Mrs. Mink. Yes, with that addition----
Mr. Mica. Without----
Mrs. Mink. I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times'
article also be placed into the record.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. The New York Times' article by Mr.
Golden will also be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, and we understand you will be back and
forth--we appreciate it.
I would like to now recognize the Chair of the
International Relations Committee for an opening statement, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I want
to compliment Chairman Mica and our colleagues on this
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources for your important interest, sustained interest, in
this vital issue of Mexico's cooperation and our common fight
against illicit drugs.
Today's hearing to discuss Mexico's role in fighting drugs,
hopefully, will help us establish a record of performance that
few objective observers would call ``full cooperation,'' as
President Clinton certified on February 26.
Mr. Chairman, let there be no mistake; the annual drug
certification issue is still important. Earlier this week, as
you know, I joined with you, Mr. Chairman, as a chief co-
sponsor, introducing a resolution of disapproval of Mexico's
certification as ``fully cooperating.'' Our Committee on
International Relations will take a careful and considerable
examination on how we should next proceed, with regard to that
resolution.
The Mica-Gilman resolution, which has a waiver of sanctions
built in, will also extend the 30 calendar days we normally
have to act from the date of certification by the President.
The resolution's text states that, ``for construction purposes,
it shall be considered and acted within 30 days of the actual
certification of Mexico on February 26, 1999.'' Congress still
has time to consider disapproval, and we ought to give it very
serious consideration.
My concerns with Mexico's performance in our fight against
drugs are numerous. The record this committee and the
International Relations Committee have established over the
last several weeks earn Mexico a failing grade.
For example, no major drug pins have been extradited to the
United States. Seizures are down; the flow of cocaine, black
tar heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine into the United
States continues unabated. The DEA, unlike elsewhere in the
world where nations are fully cooperating with our fight
against drugs, still has not been given diplomatic immunity to
carry weapons. They must be able to protect themselves in this
dangerous and hostile environment, where the drug dealers are
often better armed and more powerful than the Government. And
in some instances, the police are openly protecting the drug
dealers. The corruption and penetration, by the cartels, of
elite Mexican anti-drug units we established together, has put
us back to square one in our common fight.
Three of our former Presidents have identified drugs as a
major national security issue facing the United States.
Today, most of those illicit drugs are entering our Nation
through our border with Mexico. We need the cooperation of our
neighbor to the south in this common struggle that threatens
everyone's national security.
So, again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank this
committee for its leadership and willingness to call it like it
is, without fear or favor. And I look forward to working with
you in this effort.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from New York.
I am pleased to recognize Mr. Souder, from Indiana.
Mr. Souder. I have no opening----
Mr. Mica. I am pleased then to recognize Mr. Ose, from
California.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am grateful for
the privilege of being here.
I want to harken back to our trip to South America. If I
could find one instance where the individuals that we have been
able to identify, and that have also been identified by our
neighbor to the south--if I could find an instance where the
heads of the cartels, such as those individuals, were to be
extradited to the United States, in response to our requests,
based on the evidence we have developed--if a single instance
of that could be shown to me, I would be far more receptive to
the idea of not going forward with this.
However, I know of five such individuals, as we learned on
our trip--they are listed in here somewhere--that we have
requested extradition on, that we have virtually irrefutable
evidence that they are involved in trafficking, and for which
we have had no positive response for our requests.
If this is the only way to get attention to this matter, I
am willing to do it.
I don't have anything further to add.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
If there are no further opening statements at this time, I
am pleased to welcome our first panel of witnesses. We have two
witnesses; one is Chief Theron Bowman, who is chief of police,
from Arlington, TX. The other is Sheriff Ted G. Kamatchus--
Kamatchus?
Mr. Kamatchus. ``Kamatchus.''
Mr. Mica. ``Kamatchus.''
Mr. Kamatchus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. And he is sheriff of Marshall County, IA.
Part of the purpose of this panel is to examine the impact
of drugs coming out of Mexico into our communities. There are
representatives from two areas--the Midwest and the South--here
to provide us with their background and information.
Gentlemen, this is an investigations and oversight
subcommittee of Congress. And, in that light, we do swear in
our witnesses. So if you wouldn't mind, please stand to be
sworn?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses, the record will reflect, answered
in the affirmative.
Since we only have two of you, we won't be as tight with
the timing, but normally we try to limit the time of oral
testimony to 5 minutes. If you have lengthy statements or
additional material you think would be pertinent to the record,
it will be, upon request, entered as part of the record of this
hearing.
With that, I am pleased to welcome you both, and I would
like to first recognize Chief Bowman, chief of police, from
Arlington, TX. You are welcomed, sir, and recognized.
STATEMENTS OF CHIEF THERON BOWMAN, CHIEF OF POLICE, ARLINGTON,
TX; AND SHERIFF TED G. KAMATCHUS, MARSHALL COUNTY, IA
Chief Bowman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee. I
appreciate this opportunity to come before you and testify.
First of all, my name is Theron Bowman. I am the chief of
police in the city of Arlington, TX. Arlington, TX, population
approximately 300,000, lies in the heart of north-central
Texas, equidistant from Dallas and Forth Worth. The Dallas/Fort
Worth metropolitan statistical area consists of 16 counties and
has a population of over 4\1/2\ million people. The area is
serviced by four major interstate highways. It is home to the
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and several local and
regional airports. In 1997, DFW Airport serviced 60 million
passengers. It recently became the world's busiest airport in
total aircraft operations.
Now, a well-developed infrastructure of commercial
enterprise, transportation networks, and international finance
attracts illicit activities into the north Texas area.
International air and highway corridors facilitate the
distribution of narcotics into the region where they are
distributed or shipped to other points in the East, the
Midwest, or the Northeast United States.
Analysis of the U.S. drug seizure data indicates that
metham-phetamines, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin trafficking
into north Texas is on the increase. A large quantity of these
drugs are secreted in vehicle compartments and are smuggled
across the Mexican border from Laredo along I-35 or through
Houston along Interstate 45. According to the North Texas High-
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force, 40 Mexican drug
trafficking organizations constitute the major source of drug
trafficking into north Texas.
Heroin use in our area is an emerging threat throughout
north Texas, as demonstrated by a rash of recent, well-
publicized heroin overdoses in Plano, TX. Now, Plano is a
Dallas suburb. It ranks as the fifth fastest-growing city among
cities with populations of at least 100,000 people. During the
past 5 years, since 1994, 17 heroin-related deaths have been
reported in Plano; 13 of those deaths have occurred since
January 1, 1997, and all of those are--the juvenile deaths
are--the victims are a part of the juvenile population, the
deaths are believed to be the result of heroin's recent high-
purity level, which DEA lab tests revealed to be as high as 76
percent; traditional purity levels, on the other hand, are
between 1 and 6 percent.
So north Texas serves as a critical transshipment point for
heroin traffickers especially. Recent investigations reveal
that traffickers use north Texas as a primary distribution
point for Oklahoma, northwestern Louisiana, and southwestern
Arkansas. Dallas, for instance, was the point of origin for two
recent large narcotics seizures.
In August 1997, a Nashville, TN police department seized 16
kilograms of 96 percent pure Colombian heroin en route to New
York from Dallas. In June 1998, 17 kilograms of 92 to 94
percent pure heroin were seized at DFW Airport. Intelligence
identified a combination Colombian and Mexican smuggling
organization as moving heroin via commercial aircraft from
Bogota, Colombia, to Reynosa, Mexico, and then across the
Mexican/United States border to McAllen, TX. The heroin was
then moved from McAllen to New York City via DFW Airport.
On June 13, 1998, an individual was arrested with 5\1/2\
pounds of Mexican black tar heroin on a Greyhound bus en route
to Dallas from the Rio Grande Valley, and then in July 1998, 9
pounds of white heroin were found by a Memphis, TN, task force
officer in a suitcase on a Greyhound bus that originated in
Dallas.
These and other significant seizures suggest that north
Texas has become a strategic point for the movement of heroin,
as well as a national distribution center.
Now local law enforcement agencies in north Texas--and I
believe around the country--are losing the battle against
illegal drug trafficking. The Greater Dallas Council on Alcohol
and Drug Abuse last year had a 300-percent increase in reported
heroin addiction at their central intake system. The percentage
of youth seeking substance abuse treatment who cite heroin as
their drug of choice has increased 650 percent during the past
3 years. After a consistent 10-year decrease in youth substance
abuse, there is a disturbing 3-year trend now in increased use
of illegal drugs by adolescents. Drug and alcohol problems are
either primary or contributing factors in over 70 percent of
900 individuals served each month through the psychiatric
emergency room at Parkland Hospital in Dallas, TX. So for 1996
to 1997, in Dallas County, 63 percent of all males arrested for
any crime, and 55 percent of all females arrested for any
crime, tested positive for at least one drug in their system.
Metropolitan areas today are marginally impacting demand
through multi-agency narcotics task forces, but I believe that
there must be a sustained and focused effort on supply, or on
eradicating the supply, of drugs for local law enforcement
agencies to have any real effect on the drug problem.
Now, during my 16-year tenure as a law enforcement officer,
I spent part of that time working as a narcotics officer. And
as a narcotics officer, I had the opportunity to meet Glen.
Glen, when I met him, was married, had a job, a family, and
cared for his elderly mother. He also was one of the heroin
addicts that I met and made cases on. When I met Glen, he was
dealing Mexican brown heroin and marijuana. But within 2 weeks
of the time that I met him, he had started using $20-daily
quantities of heroin. A week later, the cost of this heroin
habit had increased to $100 a day. Glen subsequently lost his
job; he lost his family. He burglarized his mother's house; he
stole from his wife, and within 3 months, Glen was burglarizing
an estimated 10 houses per night, plus committing 3 to 5
robberies per week, just to support his $750 per day heroin
addiction. We looked for Glen; he had dropped out of sight. He
spent every waking moment he could supporting his heroin
addiction.
But Glen was lucky because we finally found him. We caught
up with him; we arrested him and placed him in jail. He did not
lose his life, but too often now we see in our neighborhoods
and communities kids who are not so lucky.
Kids are dying from overdosing, and primarily on heroin.
Such is the case with 20-year-old Todd, who injected at the
Dallas home of his older brother. Todd was transported to a
Dallas hospital and later pronounced dead.
After a night of drinking, popping pills, taking heroin and
cocaine, 13-year-old Derrick was found unconscious in his
bedroom. He was later pronounced dead at an area hospital from
an overdose of heroin.
Twenty-one-year-old Aaron was found in his apartment by his
18-year-old girlfriend and later pronounced dead at a hospital.
A plastic bag containing about 3 grams of a black substance was
found in the apartment. And Aaron had a baby son.
Eighteen-year-old Stephanie was found lying on her back on
the couch in the living room in her home. A neighbor
unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate her. She was pronounced
dead at the scene by the medical examiner. And she had had
problems with drugs throughout her life.
So the flow of illegal drugs, primarily through Mexico,
from the Mexican border into United States households, has cut
a giant swath right through north Texas, from working-class
neighborhoods to wealthy suburbs. In the words of the Fort
Worth Star Telegram, ``more and more young users, still
dangerously naive about the heroin drug, find it cheap,
plentiful, and powerfully addictive.'' Most law enforcement
officials would agree that narcotics abuse has reached an
epidemic level.
So the ongoing competition in north Texas between Mexican
and Colombian traffickers for the heroin market creates an
ideal climate for narcotics trafficking. This competitive
environment has increased supply, has raised purity levels, and
lowered prices for black tar heroin and other kinds of drugs in
north Texas and most of the other United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Chief Bowman, we thank you for your testimony.
I am pleased now to recognize Sheriff Kamatchus--Kamatchus?
Mr. Kamatchus. Kamatchus.
Mr. Mica. We have heard a little bit about what is going on
close to the Mexican/United States border and the northern part
of Texas. And we would like to hear your perspective coming
from the heart of America, Marshall County, IA.
Mr. Kamatchus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I am very honored to have an opportunity to come
before you today.
My name is Ted Kamatchus; I am the sheriff of Marshall
County, IA. It is a county of a little over 40,000 people. It
is in the center of the State of Iowa, center of the
``heartland of America,'' ``breadbasket of America,'' if you
will. It is a small, rural community of about 23,000 to 25,000
people. It is diverse; we have industry, we have agriculture,
and frankly, over the last 5 to 6 years, we have found that we
have methamphetamine trafficking at a very high level.
Today, I want to have a chance to talk to you about the
problem as we see it, the growth that we have seen, and to
leave here with a better understanding that the Federal
Government is going to do something to deal with the problem.
I have had the opportunity in my 22-plus years in law
enforcement to work the streets, to work undercover, kick
doors, to do a lot of the grunt work that we take for granted
sometimes in law enforcement. I have had a chance to lay in a
ditch and watch a meth lab on Christmas Eve. I have had a
chance to see people deteriorate.
You see, a sheriff in a rural part of a country, we are
very much involved in our community. We are elected by the
people; we serve the people, directly. Every day we see them,
whether it is on the street or in the coffee shops. We see
their kids. And I have had, time and time again in the last 5
years, a chance to see individuals that have become addicted to
this methamphetamine and see them deteriorate, wilt away and,
quite frankly, become a detriment to our society, feeding off
of our society.
In the 1980's, we saw cocaine become kind of the drug of
choice in Iowa. All the way through the 1960's, 1970's, and
1980's there has been marijuana. In the 1990's, heroin has
begun to pop up, but it was hard to really get. Marijuana still
was there. And I remember working hand in hand with the State
and the National Guard in the marijuana eradication programs
that were very, very popular then. It was at that time, that we
began the Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force in our area; it is a four-
county drug task force. It was funded by BYRNE, as it is
today--a very important program.
In the last 5 years, however, it has gone from marijuana to
methamphetamine as the drug of choice. It has gone so much
that, in the last year in our county--the small county it may
be--of the 2,500 inmates that were booked into our jail
facility, 92 percent of those had substance abuse problems. And
of that 92 percent, approximately 80 percent were directly tied
to methamphetamine.
I want to tell you about a problem that 5 years ago our
Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force seized a total of 3 ounces of
methamphetamine. Last year, we seized over 60 pounds--a
substantial increase. We began seeing this increase. We began
wondering, ``Where in the world is it coming from? What is
going on with it?'' We began to gather intelligence and work
with the State and Federal authorities. And what we found out
was, quite frankly, sickening.
We have had an influx of a Hispanic community of about
5,000 to 7,000 people into our area. These people are directly
related to working in the fields and to a packing plant which
is our largest employer in Marshalltown. The overwhelming
majority of this group are hardworking individuals that have
come across the border or come from the southern part of the
country to have a chance at building a good life for themselves
and their families. My parents are immigrants--my mother from
Germany, my father from Greece--and I respect the fact that
somebody wants to come here to make a good life for themselves.
But along with that group, came the prowl on
methamphetamine, not from the group as a whole, but from an
infiltration of individuals who have been actually filtered in
randomly amongst that group. And, frankly, as many of you
probably are very well aware of, it is very difficult to tell
the players without a program. We didn't have very many
Spanish-speaking people in our community, much less our law
enforcement agencies. Our jails--we would get people in and it
was very, very difficult. It has been a hurdle that we are
still attempting to overcome.
But what we began to understand was that these individuals
that were infiltrating this mass hiatus of individuals that
have come into our community, actually were individuals who
were financed from south of the border. They were people who
were deliberately put into our area.
Marshalltown is in the center of the State of Iowa. It is
25 miles east of Highway 35--Interstate 35. It is 25 miles
north of Interstate 80. It is in the middle of the country. It
is almost directly equal between Des Moines and that area of
about 350,000 people, Waterloo/Cedar Falls, with a population
of about 140,000, and slightly more than 60 miles from the
Cedar Rapids/Iowa City area. It puts us very, very centrally
located, not just in our State, but in the country.
And what we began seeing, through our intelligence
gathering, from the Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force, and through our
increased efforts in working with the State and Federal
Government, was that this infiltration that was beginning to
occur was coming not just from within Iowa, not just from the
southwestern part of the country or from Texas, but actually
from south of the border.
About a year and a half ago now--about 15 months I guess it
has been actually--I was approached by a gentleman by the name
of Dan McGraw, from U.S. News and World Report. He came to
interview me about the methamphetamine trouble that we have in
Marshalltown, IA, and in Iowa, in general. I was a little
baffled about why he would come to Marshalltown to talk to me.
I am on the Board of Directors of the National Sheriff's
Association, and I serve very proudly representing them--the
over 3,000 sheriffs in this country. I didn't know if it was
driven by that or if there really was a problem. Obviously, we
had seen a problem, but we weren't sure that it was any
different than it was elsewhere in the country.
What he told me was a story that has been confirmed by the
Administrator of the DEA, Thomas Constantine, when we met with
him about 11 months ago in his office with a group of citizens
from Marshalltown. That is, there are no less than three direct
fingers from the Mexican drug cartels into Marshalltown, IA--
three people, or three direct lines, from south of the border.
The DEA is aware of it, and in the last several months, the
last approximately year, we have been very lucky to have been
granted High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area status and began
to work more intensely on a broader level than what BYRNE or
our drug task force granted us. We are HIDTA now, and we have
been able to work more intensely with the Federal Government.
All that working together has brought us an enormous amount
of intelligence, and it has allowed us to do a better job at
policing our area. But it is very scary when you think that in
rural Iowa, where people don't lock their doors, without fear
of--at least if somebody burglarizes your house, you know who
it is going to be and you can go to their door. I have been in
this almost 23 years now, and the time that I have spent in
Marshalltown as a police officer, and as a sheriff now in my
12th year, we usually have been able to know who those people
are. But with this new infiltration of individuals from south
of the border it makes it very difficult to track.
What we found out was, Mr. McGraw indicated, there were
these three drug cartels that had direct pipelines to us--one
of those being the Enisqua cartel. Working with the State,
other local agencies, the State agency, and the DEA, we are
very happy and very honored to have an opportunity to work with
them and to see that the Enisqua's were actually put aside. I
believe though, however, that they still are in Mexico, and I
believe the Mexican Government--and correct me if I am wrong,
and you will have better testimony than from me, as mine is
third-hand on this--but the Mexican Government refuses to turn
them over to the United States.
You know the problem is not just border-oriented. If we
think that we are going to be able to stop this stuff as it
comes across the border, all of it, it is impossible to do
that. We have to make a very broad effort. We have to make an
effort that is going to involve dealing with the addicts. Our
community has 27 agencies that deal with substance abuse,
domestic violence, and youth violence. See, it is a necessity
now in Marshalltown, IA, because we are seeing that these
groups are coming in, and they are utilizing our youth. I can
think of several teenagers in the last year that we have gone
ahead and apprehended, no less than seven in our small
community, that have been involved with drug trafficking.
There are three families that have come to mind--Rosales,
Costellanos, and Hernandez. And I say these names, not because
all people with that name are bad, because that is not the case
in Marshalltown, and I am sure it is not the case elsewhere in
this country. But in Marshalltown, IA, there were over three
distinct families that, at one time, our intelligence indicated
were bringing anywhere from 50 to as much as 150 pounds of meth
through our community a week.
Mr. Hernandez, the elder brother, we apprehended off on a
4-pound buy. Along with it, we got weapons. He later turned
State's evidence; it is a well-known fact. He was put out on
probation and, ultimately, is now doing Federal time for
violation of that probation.
We thought we had a big effort, that this was a big dealer,
4 pounds of meth in little Marshalltown, IA. Little did we know
that 10 months later, we would have an individual who was an
informant for us, a white--with my guys in the street--
[laughter]--with all due respect, would like to think of
someone of a drug, mopey-type of person, a guy that you would
not trust very well, go, while he was wired, to another
Hernandez, a brother, and have fronted to him, 10 pounds of
methamphetamine. No money exchanged hands, just a front. That
is over $100,000 given to this person that you would not trust
in this room with all the rest of us here--10 pounds, $100,000.
``Here take it. Don't forget, by the way,'' he said, ``you
still owe me $10,000, too.''
When you start to see drugs change hands like this, you
have to really wonder, ``What kind of money is involved here,
that a person can do that without being too concerned?'' Later
on, search warrants were levied, and we found an additional 20
pounds of meth in this individual's home, and $266,000 in cash.
The Costellanos' family is another family. With this
family, we took 1\1/2\ pound of meth on a delivery off of their
16-year-old brother. And we began to find out that his young
friends were lookouts for these groups--they ride around on
their bicycles, and give warnings. As a matter of fact, we went
in and we bought from Costellanos. And we raided this
particular house three individual times within the last 8
months--I might say without finding anything out during our
raids, other than just basic scale on occasion and some very
minor things. We were going to do an 8-pound buy from
Costellanos. All he could come up with was 4 pounds of
methamphetamine. We had $100,000 worth of cash on hand. We told
him we wanted to buy more. He went to an arch rival group of
his--the Rosales family--to get 4 more pounds for us. We found
out that the Rosales--who we had really no indication was even
involved with it at that point--was actually a bigger than any
of the other two I have mentioned to you today. This is the
type of thing that is continuously going on.
I have listened to the testimony from Arlington, which is a
large city by Dallas/Fort Worth, and I have had a chance to sit
in, as a board member of the National Sheriffs, and hear
sheriffs in much larger counties than Marshall County talk
about large quantities. And we read all the time about
multiple-kilo buys. But when we start to see this type of
poison coming into the heartland of America, when we start to
see our increases go up, anywhere from 40 to 50 percent just on
our methamphetamine substance abuse committals. When I can sit
as sheriff and see individuals deteriorate before my eyes,
people I have known that were from good families--it needs
more--it needs to be addressed harsher.
And more emphatically, I guess the last thing is that it is
very difficult, when you have five people that work on a drug
task force, and the overtime that goes out, the taking people
away from their families, their wives, their kids. Case in
point--on Christmas Eve, we raided a meth lab in our county,
and then to turn around and have them see that favorite status
is given to the Mexican Government--that they are helping us
fight, stand by side-by-side in this fight, and knowing what we
know, and seeing what we see. And, quite frankly, I am not
afraid to say it turns my stomach, as it does those other
people in Marshall County, IA. There is no purpose in that.
Until those people can show you, the Congress of this United
States, that they are willing to work with you--I cannot see
that occurring.
Basically, my point to the committee is simple. I would
like to just read this closing statement, and then we will call
it--America's heartland should be free of drugs, and Mexico is
not a friend of the United States in drug enforcement and
counter drug policies. My experience has shown that Mexico
provides safe havens for gangs and cartels that terrorize
Marshall County, the heartland of America, and all the United
States.
Mexico sends the vast majority of crank across the border,
either as refined meth all ready for sale or as precursor
chemicals ready for a lab. Our experience in labs in Iowa and
the Midwest has shown that these labs actually supplement the
addiction problem that has been garnered and brought forth
originally by the Mexican sales. When our agency begins to
knock down Mexican sales, and they begin to go down in quantity
and purity, the labs fire up, because it is addicts, as a rule,
that make enough for themselves in a sale to survive. That is
the type of labs we are seeing in Iowa. Either way, the result
is the same--strung-out kids doped up on methamphetamine, teeth
deteriorating, bodies deteriorating, athletes no longer good
athletes.
We need a Federal commitment, not just words, not just what
we have heard for the last--this administration and
administrations before about the war on drugs, but a legitimate
commitment to make this a war, to put the money forth that is
necessary. We cannot simply hope to interdict every pound of
meth at the borders; that is an unrealistic hope. It is too
broad of a border. Instead, we should focus our efforts on
keeping our kids safe in their homes and communities, allowing
them to grow up healthy and drug free. That means we must have
Mexico as a faithful partner, a true partner, in the fight
against drugs.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to working with the committee to resolve this problem--
not just in Marshall County, because it is not just in Marshall
County, IA; we are just seeing it, and that is why I brought it
before you today--but the rest of this country. And I will be
open to any questions you might have. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kamatchus follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.021
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Sheriff. Thank you, Chief, also.
Let me just ask a couple of quick questions. Chief Bowman,
we have heard you talk about the problem you have experienced
in your community and, as the sheriff said, you are a larger
community. Can you tell me--for the record and for this
committee--where the source of most of the heroin is coming
from, into your community?
Chief Bowman. Right. DEA records, seizure records, indicate
that the majority of the heroin is either Mexican brown or
Mexican black tar heroin, so the predominant source of illegal
heroin in our community is coming across the Mexican border.
Mr. Mica. All right.
And in the last 2 or 3 years, are you seeing more or less?
Chief Bowman. There has been an alarming increase in the
amount of narcotics seen coming into the community.
Mr. Mica. Illegal narcotics, including heroin, metham-
phetamines, cocaine?
Chief Bowman. Yes, all of the above, and marijuana, as
well.
Mr. Mica. Sheriff, what is the source of most of the
methamphetamine? You have already stated it; would you state it
again for the record?
Mr. Kamatchus. It is indicated to us by intelligence, and
by factual evidence that we have gathered at our local, State,
and Federal level, all confirming each other, that well over--
it is over 90 percent--approximately 92 percent, I believe it
is, of the methamphetamine that comes into our area comes from
south of the border. It comes from Mexico. We see the----
Mr. Mica. Sir, are you seeing over the last 2 or 3 years
less or more of that illegal narcotic coming into Iowa? Less or
more?
Mr. Kamatchus. Far more.
Mr. Mica. Far more.
I really don't have any more questions. I will yield to the
ranking member.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And both, Chief Bowman and Sheriff Kamatchus, I certainly
want to express my very deep gratitude for the commitment that
you have demonstrated in your testimony, with respect to, not
only the appreciation of this terrible crisis in your
communities, but your own personal involvement and commitment
to safeguard your communities, particularly, our young people.
That is certainly the issue which drives this subcommittee
and the Congress. We want to find ways with which to deal with
this issue. Only one aspect of our consideration is the matter
of what to do to create a greater will in the Mexican
Government to help us meet this crisis within the United
States. I recognize that that is a legitimate issue.
My concern since coming to this subcommittee, which is just
this year, is to try to understand from the perspective of
yourselves, as law enforcement officers, and from people who
are knowledgeable about this issue in their communities, to
what extent, greater efforts on the part of the Federal
Government would help you interdict this narco-traffic that is
coming into your community from wherever it is coming?
What, if you could just describe--the both of you--one
specific area where Federal assistance would help you in your
law enforcement responsibilities, that you would ask the
Congress to do something about. What would be that area of
support that you would be seeking from the Federal Government?
Chief Bowman, first.
Chief Bowman. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
Without any question, I would like to see us target and
eradicate the supply, the point of origin of these drugs. We
are helpless, in many instances, when we focus on the demand,
on the individual user level. And in many instances, all of our
best efforts have only minimal impact. So I think if the
Federal Government could really focus on eradicating the supply
of the drugs, that would be of substantial assistance to us.
Mrs. Mink. Now when--following that argument, because that
is the big issue----
Chief Bowman. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. And one which troubles me a great
deal. When we talk about the supply, as a law enforcement
officer in all these myriad--thousands of communities where we
have all of the officers that are engaged in this drug issue,
concentrating their efforts, we talk about the supply in their
communities. To what extent do you have the technical ability,
the resource, to know, to establish, to identify the sources
within your community? And are you able to dislodge them, at
least from your community, not to say the country, but are you
able to target your efforts, with the Federal Government's
assistance, to eliminate, eradicate, arrest these individuals
who are the sources of supply within your community?
Chief Bowman. Our experience in Arlington is every time we
arrest a local dealer, someone else pops up to replace him or
her. There is a constant supply of dealers--there is a constant
supply of people willing to take on the profit motive in order
to keep the drugs flowing into the community and into
communities around the country.
We are able to successfully identify those people one at a
time, but because of the overwhelming supply of drugs
continuing to come into the community, we can't make any
significant progress in totally eradicating the problem.
Mrs. Mink. So the arrest of these individuals is sort of a
futile effort because they keep coming with new faces? Is that
generally the problem?
Chief Bowman. Well, I don't want to say it is a futile
effort, because we feel that every time we take one off the
street, that is one fewer person out there that is dealing
drugs. But we can't, and we have not to this day been able to
arrest everybody. What we----
Mrs. Mink. How many of these king-pins in your area have
you arrested and are now serving time?
Chief Bowman. Me, personally, or my department?
Mrs. Mink. No, I mean your whole establishment.
Chief Bowman. OK, I don't have the exact numbers on all of
the king-pins in my area that we have arrested. I have
indicated some of the large quantities that we have seized. We
have tracked some of the points of origin back into Mexico. In
the Dallas/Fort Worth area, we are continually arresting people
who are deeply connected with the organizations, but I don't
have an exact number for you.
Mrs. Mink. Could you get a number to supply to the
committee?
Chief Bowman. I certainly can.
Mrs. Mink. I thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you very
much.
Chief Bowman. Would you like over 3 years or 5 years or----
Mrs. Mink. Whatever is readily available.
Chief Bowman. OK.
Mrs. Mink. Three years would be great.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentlelady.
Now I am pleased to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Then I will recognize the gentleman who is also
the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Barr, the gentleman
from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank both the chief and the sheriff
for being here today. I have somewhat of a connection with
Iowa; both my wife and I were born in Iowa, so it is a pleasure
to see you here.
One of the jobs that brings me, to some extent here today,
is those of a U.S. Attorney; I served as a U.S. Attorney in
Atlanta, from 1986 to about 1990. When I took over as U.S.
Attorney after being appointed by President Reagan in 1986, one
of the major cases that that office was handling at the time
out of Atlanta was a very unique case, a very unusual case. It
was a case involving Mexican heroin. It garnered a lot of media
attention at the time for several reasons; one, because it was
a very large case, but, second, because it was so unusual back
in the 1980's to see Mexican heroin. It was ``gumball heroin''
back then or ``brown heroin.'' Nowadays, it is not at all
unusual to see these cases. And the fact that you all are here,
bears testament to the changing character of both the drug war,
as well as the prevalence of certain types of drugs, and I
think it is very disturbing that we are seeing this direct
pipeline--not necessarily limited anymore to major
international transshipment points such as Atlanta, but to
communities, as you say, all across the heartland of America,
including our border regions as well. And I appreciate you
all's efforts to assist with the problem, both in your
communities and by being here today to assist us on the
national level.
I did notice, Sheriff, that you mentioned Tom Constantine,
the head of DEA. I have tremendous regard for him and for the
men and women of DEA. And one of the things that the chairman
and the rest of us are trying to do up here, federally, is to
provide him more resources that he needs and the authorities
that he needs. Despite some of the political problems that
fester up here in Washington that prevent some of these things
from being implemented, we are constantly trying to work with
them because they are doing a tremendous job.
You make the statement, Sheriff, in your prepared remarks,
``Mexico is not a friend to the United States in drug
enforcement and counter drug policies.'' That is a pretty
direct and fairly profound statement, with which I happen to
agree, not only based on what I know, serving as a Member of
Congress, and serving on this subcommittee and on the Judiciary
Committee, as well, but also based on classified briefings that
we have had recently which, obviously, we can't go into here.
But those classified briefings have made it crystal clear to me
that the problems with the Mexican Government are even more
problematic. The corruption reaches, I believe, to the very
highest levels, and the highest levels of our Government are
not taking steps--even basic, elementary steps--to impress on
the Mexican Government how seriously we take this. We are
moving in the opposite direction, certifying them, not as
somebody that is not only not cooperating, but making it more
difficult for our DEA agents, for example, and our sheriffs and
police chiefs in this country to deal with the problem of
trying to stem the tide of drugs coming in from Mexico. But
they are making it harder for you to do that; they are making
it harder for DEA to do its job by failing to even raise this
to the level of an important foreign policy matter in our
diplomatic negotiations with Mexico.
So I appreciate very much your forthrightness in putting
your finger on this problem.
Would you, Chief Bowman, agree with that statement, that
Mexico is not a friend to the United States in drug enforcement
and counter drug policies?
Chief Bowman. Yes. My experience as a police chief and a
police officer seeing all of the drugs coming into our area
across the Mexican border, I would have to agree with that
statement regarding the narcotics. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. One of the things that you talked about--and
perhaps both of you did--was the percentage of drug-related
activity, or the prevalence of drugs being involved in folks
that are arrested for crimes and that are in your jails and
prisons. If you could, briefly, just summarize those
percentages for me, both, Chief, and then the sheriff.
Mr. Kamatchus. OK. Well, as I mentioned before, the arrests
that we see coming into our jail facility, about 92 percent of
those individuals are directly related to substance abuse of
some sort. Burglars are trying to take care of a habit, to feed
a habit.
Mr. Barr. Have you noticed an increase in that over the
past 10 years or so?
Mr. Kamatchus. I definitely have. There are two things that
we have seen, though. Not only have we have seen an increase
from around 60 percent to the 92 percent range in our area, not
just the substance abuse, but we have seen a complete flip-
flop. When I first took over as sheriff 12 years ago, alcohol
was actually the substance abuse of choice. People came in
there because they drank too much, and that was a problem.
Domestic violence was related to that.
Now, all of a sudden, we are starting to see more and more
of it that is coming up, these individuals are on
methamphetamine, tied to methamphetamine, not necessarily as
addicts, but somebody who maybe goes out and tries it, can't
handle the addiction, maybe wastes their money away trying to
buy it, those types of problems. And they try to fund it
through theft, through burglary. And, quite frankly, they are
involved in domestic violence, and they are involved with child
abuse. There is a whole plethora of things that this drug
actually brings on to them. But that is what we are seeing, and
about 92 percent and I think it is 86 percent, roughly of that
group that is actually methamphetamine.
Chief Bowman. And, of course, my numbers come from Dallas
County, 1996 and 1997, 63 percent of all males and 55 percent
of all females arrested in Dallas County during that period all
tested positively for at least one drug.
Mr. Barr. And can I ask unanimous consent just to ask one
quick, followup question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Mica. Go right ahead.
Mr. Barr. Is methamphetamine a serious and increasingly
serious problem for you, Chief? And for both of you--again, you
may have discussed this already but I think it is important--do
you see a direct pipeline from Mexico to your communities
involving methamphetamine?
Chief Bowman. Absolutely. Methamphetamine is a very, very
serious problem in our community as well. The abuse of that
drug is apparent, although there are not as many deaths related
to methamphetamine abuse. We do believe that methamphetamine
and amphetamine abuse is the No. 1 drug abuse problem in our
area.
Mr. Kamatchus. In our area, obviously, methamphetamine
leads the way, as far as the abuse of drugs. We recently
received funding from HIDTA--we are part of the Midwestern
HIDTA--and through that funding, along with BYRNE and through
our Governor's Alliance on Substance Abuse, with that money as
it comes from those two organizations, we have not only been
able to put manpower on and study it, but we have been able to
track back and develop the intelligence that is necessary to
track this type of stuff.
Basically, methamphetamine is the most abusive drug that we
are seeing. Through our connections with the DEA, through
indications or things that I have mentioned before like through
the news media that came to Marshalltown to interview us, we
see a direct pipeline back to those groups. And through, like I
said before, Administrator Constantine, himself--their
indication was that there were actually three fingers of drug
cartels that had reached into Marshall County and the middle
part of Iowa, in general.
Mr. Barr. From Mexico?
Mr. Kamatchus. From Mexico, sir; yes.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Kamatchus. Directly from south of the border.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank the gentleman.
I would like to yield now to the gentleman, Mr. Hutchinson,
from Arkansas.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I missed all of your oral testimony, but I have read your
testimony, Sheriff, and I appreciate what you had to say.
And I have been briefed, Chief, on your responses. I hail
from the State of Arkansas, a rural area, and that has been
mentioned as one of the areas where methamphetamine is headed,
as it leaves your area, Chief. We have had problems with
methamphetamine for some time.
I wanted to ask a couple of questions of the sheriff. How
large is your county?
Mr. Kamatchus. My county is approximately 45,000 people. We
have had an influx of Hispanics between 5,000 and 7,000 in the
last 5 years, so it is hard to say, but around 45,000 people.
Mr. Hutchinson. What is the reason for the influx of
Hispanics?
Mr. Kamatchus. Primarily due to our packing plant. We have
a meat-packing plant that employs right around 2,000 people.
But not only that, the northern half of my county is very--
well, I have been told at least--some of the best agricultural
land in this part of the country.
Mr. Hutchinson. All right. Sheriff, back in the 1980's--I,
like Bob Barr--was in Federal prosecution and methamphetamine
was an increasing problem in Arkansas in the rural areas. We
were getting the methamphetamine from the Bandita motorcycle
gang--that was one of the cases I handled. It wasn't coming
from Mexico. It was a different supply source. And we had our
own methamphetamine that was manufactured in homemade labs. And
so it was a problem before there was a pipeline from Mexico.
Did you have that experience in your county, that you had a
methamphetamine problem before this pipeline existed from
Mexico? And, how has that complicated it?
Mr. Kamatchus. Well, basically, the methamphetamine problem
has been around, like you said, for years. It took a backseat
in the old days, if you would, to marijuana, then to cocaine,
and even heroin began to pop up in our area. It was
predominantly from bikers. We had the same situation. But most
of the methamphetamine that we confiscated in those days was in
grams and in ounces. It was a much smaller amount. And the
purity of it that we saw at that point was not very high. It
was usually in the 20 to 30 percent on the high side, mind you.
Now what we are finding is some of the Mexican
methamphetamine that is coming in, that we know is tracked
directly back--and I might add that we track this because we
see them sending money south of the border, which is another
thing that we are finding. Most of the methamphetamine that is
coming to us has been in the 60-plus, actually as high as 78
percent methamphetamine. It is much higher.
Mr. Hutchinson. The purity is higher?
Mr. Kamatchus. It is higher, that is right.
Mr. Hutchinson. And the precursor chemicals are not coming
in, it is the finished product that is coming in?
Mr. Kamatchus. You are exactly right.
Now I might add one more thing here about the precursors
and the labs. Iowa had over 300 labs last year that they took
off in the State of Iowa. But predominantly, those labs are
ounce labs to half a pound; they are small amounts. And all the
intelligence that has been gathered from the arrests and the
confiscation of those labs, has indicated that those are
predominantly abuser labs. These are individuals who,
basically, have developed a lab to take care of their own
problem and maybe sell an ounce or two to make a buck.
Mr. Hutchinson. Going back to the pipeline to Mexico, what
is the distribution network that the Mexican drug dealers rely
upon in your area?
Mr. Kamatchus. In my area?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kamatchus. Predominantly, it is, frankly, the
individuals that have been like migrated to us, the Hispanic
individuals who migrated to us. We have had some of those that
have been ``mules,'' going back and forth south of the border.
They have come up to work in the packing plants. They store it
in their vehicles. We have had some that have been shipped in
to us by common carrier, but more often than not, it is just
motor vehicle.
Mr. Hutchinson. Is it confined--the sales and distribution
and the network of methamphetamine distribution--to the
Hispanics that have come up from Mexico to work in the packing
plants, or does it go into the schools? Does it impact the
whole community?
Mr. Kamatchus. Yes. What I have talked to you about has
been the bulk amounts. Beyond that, once it starts to filter
out into the community, for street sales, then it goes in all
segments, regardless of wealth, or schools. It spreads out
throughout the whole community.
Mr. Hutchinson. And I am sort of cutting you off a little
bit because I want to come----
Mr. Kamatchus. Yes.
Mr. Hutchinson. Back to the chief. Would you describe the
distribution network that you see from the Mexican pipeline?
Chief Bowman. Right. I would describe our network as being
a diverse network of people. We see distributors across every
demographic or demographically represented type of individual.
It is not confined to Hispanic. We have African-Americans; we
have Caucasians. We have the wealthy, as well as
socioeconomically depressed individuals within the population
along the distribution chain. There are some gang-affiliated
distributions going on, as well. Some motorcycle gangs are part
of the distribution chain.
But we, too, primarily see a lot of vehicle shipments, a
lot of the drugs hidden in compartments of cars, of trains, of
trucks, of airplanes, to get the large quantities to the
individuals who are, then, distributing it into the schools,
into the neighborhoods, into the general population.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Mica. I would like to yield. I think the gentleman from
Georgia had an additional question.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Sheriff, I think you were mentioning being able
to trace the money from your communities going back down to
Mexico. How were you able to do that?
Mr. Kamatchus. Well, the only way that we can do it, and
sadly enough, it is a very abrupt wall. We see the money
transfer. When we do search warrants on many of our raids that
we have been able to do in the last years, time and time again
from these drug dealers, we see transfers to other bank
accounts and down to wire transfers into Mexico.
It is my understanding--because, of course, Marshall County
Sheriff's Office isn't going down there to investigate it--but
my understanding from the DEA is that there really is no help
from the Mexican Government in following up on those transfers.
So, where it goes to, we know at least some money went somehow,
and that is where we hit the wall with it.
Mr. Barr. Chief, with regard to your community, would it be
accurate for purposes of these drugs coming into Arlington, to
consider it a forward basing location? I mean all of the drugs
that come in, don't stay in your community, do they?
Chief Bowman. Right. Right.
Mr. Barr. Where do they go? And how do they leave your
community to reach these other locations? And what would some
of those locations be?
Chief Bowman. Right. We know for certain that the Dallas/
Fort Worth, north Texas area is predominantly a transshipment
point for narcotics going into New York and to Chicago and to
other areas on the East Coast, into this area, to the Midwest,
and to the Kansas area, to the Iowa area. We are a major
transshipment point. A small amount of the drugs into our area
is distributed within the area, but the majority of it is
shipped out into various other regions of the country,
primarily, north and east of us.
Mr. Barr. Do you all work with INS in your communities?
Chief Bowman. Yes, we do.
Mr. Barr. Sheriff, do you work with INS?
Mr. Kamatchus. Yes. My chief of police has actually
testified before Congress on that issue, working with INS, in
the past, and we do work with them. The police department more
than my sheriff's office, actually.
Mr. Barr. One of the problems that we have seen that we are
looking into up here is a gap between what Congress is
directing through appropriations, for example, for interior
enforcement through INS, and their support of local police and
local sheriffs. We are seeing a gap between what we think is
happening and have directed up here through funding and what
happens actually in communities and districts and regions. And
they are being told to cut back. In some instances, that we
understand--I understand that they are being told not to move
forward with certain operations involving Mexican
methamphetamine and illegal aliens, for political reasons.
Do you sense any of that in your communities? Or is the
relationship with DEA as robust as it has always been? Do you
see more of the resources in your communities through INS and
their ability to help you, which would reflect the fact that
we, in Congress, have appropriated more money for that? Or do
you see something different?
Chief Bowman. My experience and our agencies' experience
with INS has been positive. We have an excellent working
relationship with INS, and I think sometimes the INS officers
are frustrated by the laws or the policies or the restrictions
placed upon them, because they, too, have problems finally
resolving the immigration problems that they are faced with on
a daily basis. But, in terms of cooperation, there is a great
deal of cooperation, not only with the INS, but with the DEA
and ATF and many other Federal agencies as well.
Mr. Barr. I was talking primarily about their resources. We
find, and I find, that there is always very, very good
cooperation and a willingness to help out. But in terms of the
resources that they have available, have you noticed any
change?
Chief Bowman. I personally have not noticed any change. I
can say in our area, our INS division trys to accommodate
whatever request that we have. If they are facing resource
problems, it is an internal problem that they don't discuss
with me or with us.
Mr. Barr. Sheriff.
Mr. Kamatchus. I guess we have seen an increase in INS in
Iowa. We have seen an increase in agents. But an increase in
agents and building that working relationship, which we are,
isn't really where it is all at. It goes beyond that point. We
have seen a huge cutback in the U.S. Marshals, for instance,
where they aren't receiving the cap funding and the funding for
housing of inmates. And the policy that came out of INS at the
top levels, my understanding--and correct me if I am wrong in
this--was that they were no longer going to put emphasis on
illegal immigration, which I don't have a problem with,
frankly. I have a greater problem, though, when they won't deal
with an individual until they are found guilty, and they are
taken through the court system. And with a bottleneck at the
Marshals, with them not being able to take them through the
Federal court system because of the lack of funding to them, I
am a little concerned about that.
Frankly, the funding for BYRNE and for HIDTA, the funding
for the Marshals--those are all things that are very important
when you are talking about dollars and cents. And they trickle
down to us, and those are very important pipelines that we
can't lose at our level. And we have to keep those things up.
Immigration, yes; we have seen more agents, but if they
don't have any place to put them, what good does it do?
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I want to take this opportunity to thank both of
you for providing this testimony today and giving us a glimpse
of what is going on in the heartland of America, and also in
Texas, so close to the Mexican/United States border. We could
probably call 100 of your colleagues from around the country
and get a similar response, unfortunately.
But we do thank you for your dedication to law enforcement
and also for your cooperation with our subcommittee.
We will excuse you at this time.
Mr. Kamatchus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Bowman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barr. I would like to, Mr. Chairman, before, if I
could----
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Barr. The witnesses have mentioned BYRNE grants. It is
my understanding, and I would like to confirm this with the
chairman, that the administration has zeroed out BYRNE grant
moneys in this budget request. Is that correct?
Mr. Mica. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Barr. That might be something that you all could help
with.
Mr. Kamatchus. Well, if I might have----
Mr. Barr. We are going to, also.
Mr. Kamatchus. If I might have the liberty, sir, that will
destroy our task force. We are funded by BYRNE; we don't have
the assets in rural America, in our county. If we don't have
BYRNE and HIDTA, you might just as well forget about it, and
then I hate to see where that is going to go. I know it is not
just Marshalltown; it is rural America.
I don't know about the chief in Larger, but I know it has a
definite effect on us, not just enforcement, but education and
all across the board.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, we thank you for your testimony,
both of you. We will excuse you at this time.
I would like to call our second panel. We have Mr. Jeff
Weitzman, who is a Canine Enforcement Officer with the U.S.
Customs Service, in the Orlando Field Division. We also have a
former, recently former Agent of the U.S. Customs Service, Mr.
William F. Gately.
As I explained, gentlemen, to the other panelists in our
first panel, that this is an investigations and oversight
subcommittee of Congress. So if you would stand and raise your
right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. The witnesses both answered in the affirmative.
We will let the record reflect that.
I would like to welcome you both now, and I think you both
have unique perspectives on what you have seen relating to the
narcotics problems. In particular, we are interested in the
question of Mexico today.
I recognize first, Mr. Jeff Weitzman, for your testimony.
STATEMENTS OF JEFF WEITZMAN, CANINE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, U.S.
CUSTOMS SERVICE, ORLANDO FIELD DIVISION; AND WILLIAM F. GATELY,
FORMER AGENT, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Weitzman. Hello, and thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this subcommittee.
My name is Jeffrey Weitzman, and I am a Canine Enforcement
Officer for the U.S. Customs Service.
I am not going to give a long opening statement because I
would rather spend the valuable time answering questions for
the subcommittee.
For those of you who are not aware of who I am, I was the
canine officer depicted on ``60 Minutes'' in 1997. I was called
into my supervisor's office at U.S. Customs in San Diego and
told to sign a propane gas truck loaded with approximately 4.3
tons of cocaine to the streets of our country. This incident
happened in October 1990.
The seizure of coke was the largest in the history of the
United States border with Mexico and is directly linked to a
seizure of 21.4 tons of cocaine seized in the community of
Sylmar, CA, in 1989. This massive load crossed the U.S. border
via Texas in numerous vehicles.
These two intertwined loads expose the border's role as a
conduit for illegal substances entering the United States.
Today the situation has worsened. The price of cocaine has
dropped significantly since my bust in 1990, and today we face
a greater challenge. Our resources are failing to meet the
threat.
The border has become a dam with leaks from California to
Texas, and before the dam explodes, we had better act, and we
had better act now.
I open the floor to any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weitzman follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I thank you for your statement. What we are going
to do is, is that we will hear from Mr. Gately next, and then
we will get into questions.
Mr. Gately, we have read a little bit about some of your
public testimony, at least as far as what has been published to
date, and we are pleased to welcome you, and thank you for
volunteering as a witness and providing us with your testimony
today.
You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Gately. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I am here at your invitation. I have provided your
staff with a resume of my Federal service which contains an
overview of my experience----
Mr. Mica. Mr. Gately, would you mind just pulling that up a
little bit closer?
Mr. Gately. No, sir--which contains an overview of my
experience as a U.S. Marine and as a law enforcement officer.
My career began in Washington, DC, as a second-generation
police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in 1971.
In 1978, I transferred to U.S. Customs as a Special Agent and
served 21 years in major field offices in Washington State,
California, Florida, and Arizona. In August 1992, I was
transferred to the Special Agent in Charge Office in Los
Angeles and assigned as the Assistant Director of the HIDTA
Task Force. In April 1993, I was reassigned as the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge of the Financial and Drug Smuggling
Investigations Division of the Los Angeles Field Office. In
that capacity, I also assumed the directorship of the Omega
Task Force, a dedicated undercover investigative unit of U.S.
Customs.
It was as the Director of the Omega Task Force, that I
formulated the operational plan and later led the
investigations which comprised Operation Casablanca.
I want to state now that at no time during the planning,
operational, or prosecutorial phase of Operation Casablanca
have I sought any forum to obtain publicity for myself or the
investigation. Up until the March 16, 1999, story published by
the New York Times, I have not, although approached many times
by journalists and a writer, agreed to an interview. Mr. Golden
of the New York Times made several attempts to interview me on
or off the record more than 9 months ago. It was not until I
retired from Federal service, did I agree to meet with him.
I told Mr. Golden then, and I tell the committee today,
that everything I share with you about Operation Casablanca can
be verified by the record and by the evidence. In addition,
there are Special Agents, auditors, contract forensic
accountants, task force officers of the Customs Service,
Federal prosecutors, Treasury, Justice, and Federal Reserve
officials who can, in part, corroborate what I tell you.
In this regard, I will get to the point which I believe
brings me here today as a witness. There are no less than 15
audio and video tapes of meetings and conversations, all of
which have been transcribed, regarding the offer, as well as
the subsequent negotiations, by potential targets of the
investigation to engage in a transaction, the substance of
which was to move $1.15 billion in illicit proceeds. These
tapes contain the communications between four defendant
bankers, two Mafia members of the Juarez drug cartel, and the
U.S. Customs Service confidential informant who engaged in
extensive discussions regarding the movement of this money. Of
course, the confidential informant engaged in these discussions
at the direction of the U.S. Customs Service.
As an example of the evidence contained in these tapes, it
is indisputable that the Secretary of Defense for Mexico was
identified as one of the owners of the money on several
occasions during the course of these meetings and
conversations. It is in these tapes that you will find the
evidence that would have led any reasonable person to conclude,
as I did, that there was compelling evidence to continue the
investigation.
Let me relate to you, in some more specificity, why I
believe these communications constituted credible evidence that
deserved further investigation.
Excuse me a second.
Some have stated that the $1.15 billion offered to launder
as illicit proceeds was nothing more than bravado by unreliable
crooks. However, Operation Casablanca was always about the
laundering of drug proceeds by the Colombian and Mexican
cartels through Mexican financial institutions and profiting
from such activities.
The individuals who presented the offer to launder the
$1.15 billion had already engaged in illicit activity connected
to Operation Casablanca by laundering substantial amounts of
drug proceeds and profiting substantially from the laundering
activities to fuel their insatiable greed.
One of the individuals, now a defendant, Victor Alcala-
Navarro, had been associated with the operation since November
1995. He not only delivered the first banker to the operation,
but he introduced the confidential informant to members of the
leaders of the Juarez cartel, including Jose Alverez-Tostado,
the heir apparent to the cartel boss following the reported
death of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes. These introductions were not
done for the purpose of impressing the confidential informant
or undercover agents, but rather for the purpose of creating
and expanding business alliances in an effort to make more
money from illicit activity.
One of Alcala-Navarro's associates and also one of the
Mafia members who engaged in negotiations regarding the $1.15
billion transaction was Ernesto Martin. Martin was motivated by
the same factors as Alcala-Navarro--the need to make money, or
the desire to make money, from the laundering of drug proceeds.
He had also delivered a number of bankers to the operation who
were ready, willing, and able to launder drug proceeds. And I
will add, not in my statement, very instructive about it.
It was these individuals who first brought to our attention
the idea of laundering $1.15 billion, and who first made any
mention of the ownership of that money. During the time the
operation was engaged with Alcala-Navarro, Martin, and their
boss, Jose Alverez-Tostado, there was never any indication that
the information they were providing was false, misleading, or
exaggerated. It is for these reasons that I concluded at the
time, and still believe, that there was evidence sufficient to
justify pursuing the transaction related to the $1.15 billion.
There has been a great deal said in defense of the Mexican
Government's integrity and their level of cooperation in
investigations such as Operation Casablanca. At the same time,
I have been criticized for expressing my opinion to the
contrary.
In my opinion, Mexico and the word ``corruption'' are
synonymous. In Mexico, there is no line which can be drawn to
separate the police and the prosecutors from the Mafia, the
politicians from the Mafia, the government from the financial
institutions, or any combination of these entities.
The general population is helpless to change the system. A
myriad of stories printed in every major news publication in
Latin America can be counted on a daily basis refuting the
truth of their alleged efforts. The most prevalent theme of all
the stories during the mid-1990's was Mexico's emergence as the
laundering center for billions in drug profits. But the most
disturbing element of the stories was the complicity of their
financial institutions--institutions regulated by the Salinas
and now the Zedillo government.
There was never a time in my 21 years as a Customs Special
Agent where I believed that I could trust the safety and
security of an investigation or place the lives of our agents
in the domain of any member of the Mexican Government. Unlike
politicians and diplomats, my experiences with the Mexican law
enforcement officials has occurred in the field--where the
stakes are measured in life and death. This is not drama, it is
reality. There has been no event or experience I have had, or
know to have occurred with my peers, which instills in me a
sense of trust in their ability to keep a confidence.
Operation Casablanca was no exception. The banks in Mexico
are regulated by the government. In that regard, our activity
should have been ferreted out and exposed by the regulators who
supervise these institutions. The paper-thin contracts we
established with each of these institutions were a sham. Even a
cursory examination of the transactions related to our
relationship reeked of money laundering.
What is even more shocking to me is that above my
objections, prior to the initiation of this operation, I was
required to brief Mexican officials at the Deputy Attorney
General and the Assistant Secretary level in the Hacienda, or
the equivalent of our Treasury Department. During these
briefings, I offered them the evidence we had, which at the
time indicated seven Mexican banks actively laundering drug
proceeds for Cali cartel traffickers. I supplied these
officials with the same presentation I gave our Ambassador
James Jones, as well as actual copies of bank drafts issued by
the Mexican banks which were directed to our undercover
operation as part of the laundering process.
As a criminal investigator with more than 29 years of
experience, a success record in my field that is recognized by
my peers and my superiors--despite what they may say behind
closed doors--it was my recommendation that we continue the
operation until we could gain sufficient evidence to develop a
case against the conspirators identified in those tapes.
I do not believe that until the article in the New York
Times was published that anyone who remained in charge of
Operation Casablanca subsequent to my removal, had reviewed or
evaluated these tapes and transcripts for their evidentiary
value. In fact, I had transcripts of these conversations
prepared at the time the conversations took place for the
explicit purpose of informing the chain of command of the
events surrounding the $1.15-billion transaction, and I
personally briefed the chain of command on these events as they
occurred.
In my opinion--and I believe the facts and circumstances
that are available will support such an opinion--this
investigation was not pursued because of the numerous problems
that developed and persisted during the course of Operation
Casablanca. This is not my tale of woe. If I am at the center
of these conflicts and accusations, it is only because I was
performing my job to the best of my abilities. I take full
responsibility for all of my actions during the course of
Operation Casablanca. I never believed it would be a task
without great risks and problems--nothing in Government is,
especially undercover investigative operations.
I will now summarize for you the various reasons, as I
believe them to have occurred.
One, during the planning and operational phases of
Operation Casablanca, beginning in 1994 through May 18, 1998, I
was confronted with a gauntlet of critics, disbelievers, and
obstructionists. These individuals held positions in Customs,
DEA, the FBI, and the Justice Department. The issues raised by
them ranged from skepticism about our ability to deal on the
levels outlined in the operational plan, to issues surrounding
the political and economic impact of our investigation on
Mexico. In their individual and sometimes collaborative efforts
to serve an agenda that opposed the operation plan, they sought
to block the initiation, limit the scope, and obstruct the
progress of Operation Casablanca. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that some of the disbelievers, and even an
obstructionist, became supporters of the operation. Regardless,
the negative energy produced by the remaining opposing forces
was always present and had to be fought back at every stage of
the investigation.
Two, for approximately 1 year prior to the May 1998 take-
down of Operation Casablanca, John Hensley, the Special Agent
in Charge in Los Angeles, continually leveled criminal
accusations against me. Those accusations involved the alleged
loss, misappropriation, and theft of millions of dollars in
drug proceeds and Government funds related to the ongoing
investigation. Although each accusation was thoroughly
investigated and found to be baseless, he persisted in
reinventing his spurious stories in order to discredit the
operation and me.
Beginning in the fall of 1997, Mr. Hensley leaked
information about Operation Casablanca. At a law enforcement
conference in Tampa, FL, Mr. Hensley provided information about
the operation to a network news executive. Later in the
investigation, Mr. Hensley invited several congressional staff
representatives to Los Angeles to be briefed on a major
undercover money-laundering investigation. Upon their arrival,
he not only paraded them through the undercover offsite which
housed the Omega Task Force, he took them to the audio and
video monitoring station of the undercover storefront, Emerald
Empire. At this location, they were allowed to view through the
monitors the interior of the offices and the warehouse.
Four, subsequent to a briefing regarding Operation
Casablanca that I presented to, then, Under Secretary of the
Treasury, Raymond W. Kelly, in late 1997, Mr. Kelly stated to
all present that he would seek out and punish anyone leaking
information to the media regarding the operation. A short time
later, I believe Mr. Hensley, who was present at that meeting,
and others he manipulated, provided Mr. Kelly with a copy of a
book I authored in 1994. According to witnesses present, Mr.
Kelly was told that I was not only the leak, but that I was
dramatizing the facts about the investigation, as well as the
take-down plan in order to write a book.
Five, there were two deliberate acts which I believe were
intended to shut down our operations in Chicago and New York. I
am convinced both occurred at the direction of Mr. Hensley and
Mr. John Varrone, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York
Field Office. On both occasions, orders issued by me were
disregarded, and enforcement actions were taken. The arrests
and seizures which occurred contrary to the agreed plan of
action--and I will add without the knowledge of the undercover
agents or their cover team--endangered the continued safety and
credibility of our undercover agents and confidential
informant. In addition, it had a serious debilitating effect on
a relationship our undercover agents and the informant shared
with the Juarez and Cali cartels' organizational structures in
Chicago and New York. It also seriously damaged the
relationship we had worked so hard to establish with the
Colombian and Mexican Mafia members at the highest level.
Despite the severity of these actions, we were able to convince
our criminal partners that our undercover agents and the
informant were not at fault for these events. But the fact
remained that the cartels shut down their operations to search
out the mole in their organization.
Based upon these facts and events, I believe Mr. Kelly had
lost faith in me and was not willing to risk going forward with
any aspect of the investigation, regardless of the violation or
the violator. Mr. Kelly, I am certain, believes he did the
right thing. I believe that the combination of misinformation,
spurious accusations, and the politics infused into this
operation from its inception skewed his judgment. At no time
was I given an opportunity to know that he had received this
bogus information, nor was I given an opportunity by Mr. Kelly
or anyone else to defend myself.
Immediately after the extremely successful take down of
Operation Casablanca, a take-down plan which was never accepted
in its entirety by anyone, I requested a meeting with Mr. Kelly
to resolve the issues which I now believe to have been the
reasons for his actions. My purpose was to regain his
confidence and to end the attacks on my integrity and the
integrity of the investigations.
Within 5 weeks of the covert phase of the operation closing
and the formulation of the security for the confidential
informant, I was ``temporarily and indefinitely'' reassigned to
Customs headquarters. This reassignment came via a telephone
call the day before I was scheduled to return to Los Angeles.
At no time during the next 7 months was I provided with an
official explanation for this action. There is no document
issued by the agency which chronicles this action outside of a
travel authorization. During my time in Customs headquarters, I
was never given a specific or even a general assignment. When I
did anything, it was of my own volition. In that regard, I was
effectively removed from the operational command of the Omega
Task Force and all aspects of Operation Casablanca's
investigations.
During the time I remained in this TDY position, I
continued my quest to seek an audience with Mr. Kelly, who had
now become the Customs Commissioner. I remained steadfast in my
efforts in the hope that I could regain my position in Los
Angeles. In late December, approximately 7 months after my
first request and after I had announced plans to retire, I was
afforded this audience. As a requisite to my appearance in his
office, I was required by his staff to put in writing the
reasons for my request. I was informed that Mr. Kelly would not
entertain any discussions related to Mr. Hensley and would only
address operational issues.
It was at this meeting that I informed Mr. Kelly that I
believed there had been no investigative efforts, subsequent to
the May 1998 take-down, directed at developing any of the
information acquired in Operation Casablanca. I also informed
him that above my objections, I had been directed to Los
Angeles to interrogate one of the major Cali-based defendants.
I informed Mr. Kelly that, based upon my meeting in Los Angeles
during this interrogation, I believed the Omega Task Force
lacked leadership and was no longer an effective and productive
investigative unit. During my meeting with Mr. Kelly, I also
requested an official document which reports the findings of
the Internal Affairs investigations related to Mr. Hensley's
false and malicious accusations. To this day, I have not
received an official response from any Customs Service officer
in regard to any of the topics I had discussed with Mr. Kelly.
In closing, I must protest any assertion that I regard
myself as a ``lone crusader.'' I am what you see--nothing more,
nothing less. However, I do regard myself as a former Federal
law enforcement officer who showed up everyday to perform an
honest day's work. My only motivation was to honorably serve as
my oath and the mission dictated, a culture passed on to me by
my parents and aspired to by me since I earned the title, U.S.
Marine.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gately follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Gately, and also, Mr. Weitzman,
for your testimony.
I would like to start off by asking Mr. Gately a couple of
questions.
Mr. Gately, for the first time today, I heard of the
existence of 15--I think you said--audio and video tapes. Was
that figure correct? That monitored----
Mr. Gately. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. Some of the activity that you
observed?
Mr. Gately. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mica. And did you also say that you made transcripts of
these tapes?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir. There were transcripts of the tapes.
Initially five, as they came in, were transcribed as we
received the tapes. And that information was passed immediately
to the chain of command.
Mr. Mica. And where are the audio and video tapes at this
point?
Mr. Gately. They are in evidence in Los Angeles.
Mr. Mica. In evidence.
Would these also be used in this Operation Casablanca case?
Mr. Gately. The one going to trial on Monday, sir?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Gately. I do not believe they would be.
Mr. Mica. You do not?
Can you think of any reason why the subcommittee wouldn't
have access? Is there any ongoing criminal investigation--you
have seen the tapes--or anything that would prohibit us from
obtaining a copy of the tapes?
Mr. Gately. I don't see any specific reason because it is
my understanding there is, ``no case,'' or no continuing
investigation regarding the nature of those tapes.
Mr. Mica. And within these tapes, you believe there is
substantial evidence or enough hard material that would link
trafficking and corruption to certain individuals who you have
said have been, you know, involved at the highest levels?
Mr. Gately. The information in those tapes is an offer and
the communications related to negotiations about laundering
$1.15 billion, sir. It identifies, in two or three of those
tapes or more, the owners of the money, not by name, but by
position within the Mexican Government, official position
within the Mexican Government.
Mr. Mica. And how far up would those individuals be in the
Mexican Government?
Mr. Gately. The highest position identified in those tapes,
as an owner of the money, in the Mexican Government, was the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Mica. Secretary of Defense. Something that disturbs me
about your testimony is it seemed that at, not just one
juncture, but many junctures, you testified that it was almost
an effort to close down these investigations. And do you
believe that is because they indicated people at the highest
levels of the Mexican Government were involved?
Mr. Gately. As I stated, sir, it was a combination of a
series of problems, where they did not want the investigation
to even begin. But throughout the investigation, the planning
and operational stages, politics was always infused into the
process. I have no clear understanding why policemen or law
enforcement officials seem to think that they need to take on
the moniker of diplomats and politicians. If we target drug
traffickers and money launders, the fallout should be whatever
the fallout is. If, in fact, we are targeting the financial
institutions of Mexico--and we were--if the fallout is that
there is corruption that stems from that, then that is just
part of the ongoing investigation. The corruption is in Mexico,
not in the United States. We shouldn't be worried about who the
defendant is, or the potential defendant is.
Mr. Mica. But you--it appears that you got the feeling that
this did lead to the highest levels of the Mexican Government,
and that when you said ``politics entered,'' was it that this,
diplomatically, would be very unsettling? Or this, politically,
on an international level, or national level, would be
embarrassing?
Mr. Gately. All that, sir. That somehow----
Mr. Mica. I don't want to put words in your mouth.
Mr. Gately. Well, you are not. But you said--it is all of
what you said and conjecture beyond that. There was a lot of
conjecture, statements to the effect, ``Well, what is the
financial or economic impact on the country of Mexico, or their
stability as an economic entity if we do this?'' Things that I
think law enforcement should not pay much attention to. That is
for people in this body to worry about, not for police
officials or law enforcement officials to infuse into operation
plans and prosecutions.
Mr. Mica. But as a professional, and if you had your say,
you would have pursued this no matter where it led? Is that
correct?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir; given the opportunity, I would have.
Mr. Mica. At some point, there was an indication that this
corruption might lead as far as--or the source of some of this
money might lead--as far as the Office of the President of
Mexico. Is there any evidence on tape of that? Or, comments to
that----
Mr. Gately. There is one statement on tape to that effect.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. There is?
I don't have any further questions at this time. If I may,
I would like to divide the time that is left--you have been
here for the whole testimony. Would you like to ask questions
at this point?
Mr. Barr. That will be appropriate. I don't know about our
colleague on the minority side, though. I don't want to use up
his time.
Mr. Mica. We can split the time. We will give you five, and
five--I think we have got a 5-minute warning.
Mr. Barr. OK.
Mr. Mica. If staff will keep us warned.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gately, you are here today voluntarily, is that
correct?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Barr. And were your colleagues and former colleagues
delighted with your being here and encouraged you to attend
this hearing and testify?
Mr. Gately. No, sir. I can categorically say that they are
not very happy about it.
Mr. Barr. In fact, were you not pressured not to testify?
Mr. Gately. I received no direct statement to that effect,
but I did receive faxes at my home outlining Treasury
regulations, giving guidance on testifying before this
committee. Even though those Treasury regulations apply to
current employees of the Treasury Department, I was provided
with a copy of them. Today, I received a copy of the memorandum
that categorically states that references that were made in the
New York Times are blatantly false.
I don't think they are very happy with me, sir; no.
Mr. Barr. And you take these communications with you as
pressure from the Department to have you not testify today?
Mr. Gately. I think they would----
Mr. Barr. I know I don't want to put words in your mouth.
Mr. Gately. You are not, sir. I think--my take on it is,
they would be very happy if I didn't show up here today.
Mr. Barr. It is my understanding--and I know it is not your
purpose here today, to disclose classified information; it is
not my purpose, either. But if I were to tell you that recent
classified briefings that we have received confirm, beyond any
reasonable doubt in my mind, that the corruption that you have
been discussing today and that we have heard other witnesses
discuss, does indeed extend to the very highest levels of the
Mexican Government. And that is borne out by extensive
classified information from various Federal agencies. Would
that comport with your views as well, based on your career,
handling these matters, and the work that you have done on
behalf of the U.S. Government?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. Barr. It is also my understanding that the work that
you have done, specifically, not necessarily limited to,
Operation Casablanca, involving the, as you say, ``the
laundering of drug proceeds by the Colombian and Mexican
cartels,'' that there is independently verifiable information
that bears that out. And I state that for the record today,
with regard to the Colombian angle, as well as the Mexican. I
presume that would not surprise you, either?
Mr. Gately. Not in the least, sir.
Mr. Barr. The tape that you mentioned, in response to the
chairman's question, about whether or not there is any evidence
on tape directly linking high-Mexican Government officials to
the operation and to the laundering; could you provide us any
more details on that here today, since we don't have the tape?
Mr. Gately. I can tell you that there is direct discussion
about the ownership of the money. And it came about, not as a
braggart's statement. It was in the conversations during the
second or third state of negotiation.
There was one occasion where one of the bankers, based on
his communications with his client, whom he later identified as
the Secretary of Defense, brought it up because he was
describing one of the locations in New York City which
contained a half billion dollars in cash. And during the course
of that conversation, he described visiting that location,
stating that it had----
Mr. Barr. Is that an American bank?
Mr. Gately. No, it is not a bank, sir. It was a home. It
was a private residence that he was describing--saying that he
had been there and removed as much as $10 million from the
location.
Mr. Barr. So this----
Mr. Gately. That is how the conversation came up.
Mr. Barr. The conversation was not just sort of a general
conversation about high-government officials being involved? It
was very specific, very creditable, very particular?
Mr. Gately. Like all their conversations with us, there was
never any indication that what they told us was misleading,
false, or even exaggerated. They were there to do business with
us.
Mr. Barr. Is that based, not only on your experience,
specifically with regard to Operation Casablanca, but also on
the entire 21 years of your very distinguished career, as an
U.S. Marine, and as an law enforcement officer for this
Government?
Mr. Gately. It is more like 31 years, but, yes, sir, that
is exactly right.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. And I am sorry that time doesn't
permit additional questions, but I thank you very much, and Mr.
Weitzman very much, for your courage in being here today and
for helping out in this effort.
Mr. Mica. We do have additional questions. We have a vote
going on now; that will take approximately 15-20 minutes. Why
don't we recess until about 10 minutes of. If you gentlemen
wouldn't mind, give us time to go over and vote and come back.
You might be able to get some refreshments.
We will stand in recess until 10 minutes of the hour.
[Recess.]
Mr. Mica. I would like to call the subcommittee back to
order, if I may. And we will continue questioning. I had some
additional questions, both to Mr. Weitzman and to Mr. Gately.
Mr. Gately, if I could continue, sir, to ask you a couple
of questions. From your testimony, I think you are telling the
subcommittee that you don't believe there was a specific
coverup by Customs or other personnel in any of these
investigations; is that correct? This was not an overt----
Mr. Gately. No, sir; it was not a coverup. It was exactly
what I say in my statement--an accumulation of problems, people
who did not want the investigation to begin, people who always,
from the beginning, once it started, wanted to know when it was
going to end. Many people will tell you today that they knew
about Operation Casablanca, or they can attempt to brief you on
it. I suggest to you now that is not true. There are just a
couple of people who know the full breadth of that
investigation or those three investigations which made the
operation. One of those people is me. The other is the
confidential informant. If you want to put all that information
into one person, it is either that person or myself. Anyone who
tells you that they know the whole thing, or they were part of
the planning of that operation, they are just not being genuine
with you.
Mr. Mica. And so we have two principals--you and the
primary informant. How did you determine the credibility of the
informant and the credibility of the accusations that are made?
Because you are not making the accusations on the tape about
how high up this money was linked to, it is someone else. How
can you say, or how can you believe that that was a credible
and knowledgeable source?
Mr. Gately. The credibility of the informant is not in
question, sir. First of all, he is not a criminal who was
turned to work for the Government. He volunteered his services
at our request or bidding. We put him in the position of
meeting with and developing these investigations because he
knew the individuals or some of the individuals involved in the
Cali operation because of his legitimate business connections.
Based on that and his ability to communicate with any sort of
individuals and to follow directions better than any individual
I have ever encountered, who had to act in the capacity that he
did, he did a marvelous job. He was scripted when he met these
people. He was briefed and debriefed, over and over again. No
meeting took place without the informant meeting with myself
and other agents involved in the investigation to determine
what should be brought out in the next meeting with whatever
banker was there. None of this was ad hoc or ad libbed. It was
all prepared questioning that didn't appear to be that when he
made the meetings.
There were several times that we intended to draw out more
information about the ownership of the money or the ability to
make this transaction come about in the short period of time we
had before the closeout date had been----
Mr. Mica. You keep saying ``we.'' Was there someone else?
Mr. Gately. Other than myself?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Gately. The agents that were conducting the operation,
sir.
Mr. Mica. So they can verify----
Mr. Gately. As I say in my statement, it all can be
verified.
Mr. Mica. So we have other agents who can verify--would
they also be visible in the tapes?
Mr. Gately. They are.
Mr. Mica. They are. And are they identified in the
transcripts?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir, they are.
Mr. Mica. OK. And you said there was other evidence. What
type of other evidence, other than individuals? You have
referred to money, too, in large quantities. Of course, the
$1.15 billion total and half a billion in cash in a----
Mr. Gately. Do you want me to sum up what the $1.15 billion
represents, sir? I can do that for you.
Mr. Mica. If you could. And then, what I would like to try
to find out, too, is what other evidence exists or that we
could look to that might substantiate the allegations that have
been made, or verify some of the claims that have been made.
Mr. Gately. If I could get to the first part, the $1.15
billion represented $500 million in New York; $500 million----
Mr. Mica. You said, ``kept in cash in a house.''
Mr. Gately. That is correct, according----
Mr. Mica. Was that----
Mr. Gately [continuing]. According to the banker that gave
us the information, that is correct.
Another $500 million in cash kept somewhere in the
Netherlands, then $150 million in cash in Mexico City.
That is how it was described to us, and that is how we came
up with $1.15 billion.
Mr. Mica. Did you ever get to verify the existence of any
of those funds?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely not, sir.
Mr. Mica. You didn't? You were never able to take it to
that level?
Mr. Gately. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. But the individuals who were involved--now I
don't want to get into revealing anything at Casablanca that
may be under prosecution or coming up for trial--but are we
talking about the same kinds or same sources of money?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. We are?
Mr. Gately. Yes, we are.
Mr. Mica. Is there any other hard evidence, other than the
statements of these individuals, the tapes that would show
others involved with you when you--again, you said, ``we''--the
statements of money? What other information or----
Mr. Gately. I can only address the credibility of the
information we received. And based on our past experiences, and
during the duration of the investigation, the entire operation,
these people had not misled us; they had not lied to us; and
they had not exaggerated anything to us. So, all we could do
was go forward with an investigation in an undercover capacity
until the end of the operation, the end of the covert phase of
the operation.
What is very unfortunate is that there was no action taken
subsequent to the closeout of the undercover operation. No one
did anything else to determine whether or not what was said in
that meeting could now be investigated in an overt way.
Mr. Mica. You made specific requests to take it to the next
step?
Mr. Gately. I did.
Mr. Mica. To whom?
Mr. Gately. I made those requests as----
Mr. Mica. How high did you----
Mr. Gately. In my new role, TDY in headquarters, I brought
it to the attention of the Director of the Financial
Investigations Division, who brought it to----
Mr. Mica. Who was that?
Mr. Gately. Allen Duty.
Mr. Mica. I am sorry. Allen----
Mr. Gately. Duty.
Mr. Mica. Duty.
Mr. Gately. I brought it to the attention of the Assistant
Commissioner for Investigations.
Mr. Mica. And who was that?
Mr. Gately. Bonnie Tischler.
And I brought it----
Mr. Mica. Was this oral or written?
Mr. Gately. Oral, sir.
Mr. Mica. OK. And who else?
Mr. Gately. And to the Director of Operations, Connie
Finchel.
Mr. Mica. And no response or no pursuit from any party?
Mr. Gately. There was no pursuit by Los Angeles, or the Los
Angeles office, which had the sole responsibility to pursue it.
Mr. Mica. When did----
Mr. Gately. I think, if I could----
Mr. Mica. Go ahead.
Mr. Gately [continuing]. Just expand on that, just for a
second. I think you have to understand the environment and the
nature of the relationship between myself and Mr. Hensley
during about 14 months of this investigation. I was constantly
under scrutiny that I had not experienced at any time in my
career. I was being audited, sometimes on a daily basis. I was
being accused of losing enormous amounts of money, or
misappropriating it, or even stealing it. This does not foster
a good relationship between myself and the person I have to
brief on the progress of an investigation every day. And
nothing was going to happen, based on what I said, sir, whether
I was in charge or TDY and completely disassociated from the
investigation.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Hensley seems to indicate he thought you were
under investigation for some unaccounted funds before he came
on the job.
Mr. Gately. Mr. Hensley is probably the most disingenuous
person I have known in my entire life. If he says anything, I
hold it suspect, sir. I have never known a liar quite like him.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think that is at who is telling the
truth----
Mr. Gately. That has always been the question.
Mr. Mica. And under oath here, before the subcommittee, you
have not misappropriated any funds in your charge.
Mr. Gately. I have not, nor have I stolen any funds in my
charge.
Mr. Mica. When did you retire?
Mr. Gately. December 31, sir.
Mr. Mica. Did you follow Operation Casablanca during the
period in which the Mexican Government threatened to go after
our agents?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Mica. Was that--in your estimation, was that an example
of full cooperation?
Mr. Gately. I think it is a clear----
Mr. Mica. Cooperating fully?
Mr. Gately [continuing]. A clear and convincing example of
how they don't cooperate. I think it is also a very showing
indication of how much we hurt their operations by exposing
their banks as money launders.
Mr. Mica. When this operation was first reported, I think
the reports actually came out that the operation was conducted
with the knowledge of Mexican officials. And I think we had a
briefing by Customs that told us that Mexican officials had
been briefed in advance, the ones they felt they could trust
about the operation. Do you know if that was the case?
Mr. Gately. I conducted the briefing myself, sir.
Mr. Mica. To the Mexican officials?
Mr. Gately. To Ambassador Jones, and to the then-Deputy
Attorney General of Mexico, and the Assistant Secretary of
Hacienda for Enforcement.
Mr. Mica. And you conducted that prior to----
Mr. Gately. Initiating any aspect of the operation.
Mr. Mica. So the Mexicans were fully appraised at a high
enough level? What was the identity, a Deputy Attorney General?
Mr. Gately. That is a very good question. I don't have his
name here with me, but it is well-documented----
Mr. Mica. OK.
Mr. Gately [continuing]. That it occurred.
Mr. Mica. Well, that was my understanding, too. Then, the
Mexicans suddenly took a turn and came after us and threatened
to arrest or indict our agents; is that correct?
Mr. Gately. That is my understanding. And I also understand
that that has persisted off and on up until a few weeks ago.
Mr. Mica. Until just prior to the question of
decertification, it remained in limbo, as I understand it.
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir. That is how I understand it.
Mr. Mica. What turned on the spigot to come after us, with
our agents--including you--having briefed the Mexicans on what
we were doing? Was it the knowledge of how far this had reached
in the banking circles? Or do you think it was concern about
how high up it might go if all of these sources of money were
revealed?
Mr. Gately. I think, referring to the financial
institutions in Mexico in their entirety as corrupt and money
launders was enough to rankle all of the Mexican officials
related to, not only the regulation of those banks, but any
lobby that the banks had with their Congress. And that would
also, I think, apply to any lobby they had within the executive
branch because, as I understand it, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, as well as the President, spoke out--the President of
Mexico spoke out against Operation Casablanca.
Mr. Mica. As an infringement upon their sovereignty? Was
that the excuse or----
Mr. Gately. That is the excuse I heard, sir.
Mr. Mica. There have been reports that vast amounts of
money from drug profits are filtered through the executive
branch of the Mexican Government, through the military, and
through the police. Is that your understanding, and at what
levels? Again, is this sort of spotty, or how would you
describe, again, the executive branch penetration of illegal
profits?
Mr. Gately. I can speak to my knowledge of the past
administration, that it obviously permeated every level,
including the Office of the President.
Mr. Mica. The military--same thing?
Mr. Gately. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. And, of course, the police I guess is a given.
Is there any other evidence this subcommittee could seek
that would verify what you are saying and document how high the
penetration of corrupt money is filtering? Any suggestions you
can have as to what rock we might--we have a problem, because
we have learned things behind closed doors, we are not free to
talk about.
Mr. Gately. As----
Mr. Mica. But if you can give us suggestions as to what
rock we can uncover, publicly, we may be able to go a little
bit further with----
Mr. Gately. I couldn't talk about--like yourself, sir--I
couldn't talk about it, publicly. I could tell you where to
look, but I couldn't tell you publicly, nor do I think that the
Customs Service would allow me to tell you in any capacity.
Mr. Mica. We may call you back in a private session.
We have already had a closed-door session with the CIA, the
DEA, intelligence, and others, and we may have to go further in
that regard, then.
I would like to yield to Mr. Cummings at this time.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Gately, thank you very much for being
here. I think that it does take quite a bit of courage for you
to be here. You have said a lot, and I do believe you to be an
honorable man. And I believe very strongly in our Customs
Agents. It is a very reputable organization, and I think that
anybody sitting in this audience would have to be concerned--
and I think if someone made the kind of statements--and I have
no reason to disbelieve you--that you made about you, and you
did not have opportunity to defend yourself, I think you would
be very upset. Would you--you would be concerned.
Mr. Gately. Well, sir, this is my first opportunity to tell
anyone----
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Gately [continuing]. That cares to listen, what
happened.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I have listened intently, and I guess I
just want to make sure that--we don't have Mr. Hensley here. We
don't have the head of Customs here.
Mr. Gately. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And that is not your fault.
Mr. Gately. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And so--but we do have some letters.
Mr. Gately. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Cummings. And, you know, we have got--I don't know who
this is--television cameras, and you have got people writing,
and we are getting one side of the story--we have a letter from
Mr. Hensley, dated March 22, 1999, which I have asked to be--
suggest to Mr. Mica be submitted to be part of the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]62622.032
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
I would just like to just, first of all, start with the
last paragraph of his letter and work backward. It says Mr.
Gately--and this letter is dated, I think I already said, March
22, 1999. ``Mr. Gately has stated to numerous people that he is
writing a book and a screenplay on Operation Casablanca. I find
it sad that Mr. Gately has to malign so many people with
misstatements and factual errors to enhance his own
marketability and detract from what is a great operation and
investigation of international money laundering. I hope that
this sets the record straight.''
With that, let me just ask you a few questions.
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You said that you put your concerns to
several people who were above you. Is that correct?
Mr. Gately. Throughout the entire operation; yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. But you named a few, a few moments
ago; did you not?
Mr. Gately. Yes, I did.
Mr. Cummings. And would you give us those names again?
Mr. Gately. The Director of Financial Investigations, who
is now the Special Agent in Charge in Boston, Allen Duty; the
Director of Operations, Connie Finchel; and the Assistant
Commissioner for Investigations, Bonnie Tischler.
Mr. Cummings. I take it that there came a time when they
decided to end this operation. Is that correct?
Mr. Gately. There were two scheduled--or more than two
scheduled take downs of this operation; that is correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. And you objected to both of those?
Mr. Gately. I was not alone in my objection. I will add to
that.
Mr. Cummings. All right. But you did object to both?
Mr. Gately. Yes, I did.
Mr. Cummings. I am just trying to get a balance here. I
mean you made some strong allegations, and I just want to make
sure I understand both sides of the story.
Mr. Gately. I am here and open----
Mr. Cummings. Because you are saying one thing and Mr.
Hensley is saying another thing, and consistent with Mr.
Hensley, is Raymond Kelly, the Commissioner of Customs. And I
go back to what I said from the beginning.
Mr. Gately. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. These people are sworn to enforce the law,
too. And they, of course, are out there beating the bushes
trying to make sure that we rid our country of drugs and doing,
I hope, what they are supposed to do. And so I am just trying
to get some balance here.
Mr. Gately. Sir, are you suggesting I wasn't?
Mr. Cummings. Oh, no, no.
Mr. Gately. Oh, OK.
Mr. Cummings. As a matter of fact, what I am saying to you
is you have given your side, but what we also have to look at,
is the fact that we have got these two gentlemen who are, for
all we know, honorable people, just as we assume you are an
honorable man. And we don't have them here.
And right now, we got the press writing things, and they
are getting one side of it, and we have got letters that say
just the opposite to what you are saying.
Mr. Gately. Of course.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, I am just wondering, when you
said there were two scheduled times when the operation was
supposed to end. Is that right?
Mr. Gately. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Did a meeting take place? Let's say the first
time, did a meeting take place with regard to the ending of it?
Mr. Gately. Several times.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Gately. Several meetings in regard to the end of it.
Mr. Cummings. And who would normally be in those meetings?
Mr. Gately. Local and Los Angeles--the senior officials,
Mr. Hensley, his associate, Zack, or Deputy Steve Woody,
myself. Sometimes the group supervisor within the operation;
occasionally, the case agent; sometimes one or more of the
prosecutors who were part of the operation.
Mr. Cummings. And would these meetings go on a consensus,
or was it basically one person's decision no matter what
anybody said, or was it a vote, or what?
Mr. Gately. There was no voting, sir. It was typically a
consensus of opinion, whether we could end it, or we needed
more time to develop the case, or the prosecutors needed more
time to develop the documents, or the information they had to
develop the documents so that they could file those documents
with the court, so when the case ended, we could do things
necessary to the take-down, such as make arrests or search
warrants, seizure warrants, et cetera.
Mr. Cummings. So, when you had the meetings around the
first scheduled ending----
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings [continuing]. You were in disagreement that it
should end. You didn't feel that it should end; is that right?
Mr. Gately. I--yes; I thought we should go on.
Mr. Cummings. And did you go on?
Mr. Gately. We did, but not for that reason.
Mr. Cummings. Well, why did you go on?
Mr. Gately. Because the prosecution said they weren't
ready, so we went on because they weren't ready.
Mr. Cummings. OK. Was there any difference of opinion
coming from Hensley at that time?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. I am sorry?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir, there was.
Mr. Cummings. And what was that?
Mr. Gately. He wanted to have a 30-day period of darkness.
Mr. Cummings. And what does that mean?
Mr. Gately. I bet you want to know what that means.
Mr. Cummings. Suspended, suspend?
Mr. Gately. Suspend all operations for 30 days to allow the
prosecution to catch up.
Mr. Cummings. OK. But what happened?
Mr. Gately. We continued on, sir, because to suspend
operations for even a few days would damage our creditability
with our partner criminals. That would be the fallout from not
communicating with them or conducting business with them.
Mr. Cummings. So you proceeded on?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Were there others, other than Mr. Hensley,
that had a difference of opinion about you?
Mr. Gately. With me?
Mr. Cummings. With you; yes.
Mr. Gately. Steve Woody and his associate, Zack. One of the
three prosecutors, Dwayne Lyons, disagreed with me. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So one of the prosecutors disagreed with you?
Mr. Gately. Two agreed, but one disagreed.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, why don't we move to the
second. So the process continued, the operation continued.
Mr. Gately. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. Now let's move on to the second----
Mr. Gately. Take-down date.
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Gately. OK.
Mr. Cummings. Was there another meeting, or meetings?
Mr. Gately. There was meetings.
Mr. Cummings. Same people?
Mr. Gately. Same people; same situation. Exactly the same
situation. Now infuse the new information about the $1.15
billion.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now you know, Mr. Gately,
Commissioner Kelly stated in his letter----
Mr. Gately. Yes.
Mr. Cummings [continuing]. Which I understand is a part of
the record, is that ``while assertions of money laundering by
high-ranking Mexican Government officials surfaced, at no time
was there any evidence developed that could substantiate these
allegations.''
I take it you disagree with that?
Mr. Gately. No, I agree with it wholeheartedly.
Mr. Cummings. Now let me ask you this, going back to Mr.
Hensley's letter, he said some very interesting things, too.
And I just have a few more questions, Mr. Chairman.
On the second page, it says, ``Mr. Gately, also alleges
that I accused him of stealing millions in dollars and
traveling without authorization. I never accused Mr. Gately of
stealing money. Following the takedown of the case, allegations
were brought to my attention by Customs Special Agents that Mr.
Gately asked them to, quote `unseize,' end of quote, millions
of dollars in foreign bank accounts belonging to the
informants, an issue that seemed highly unusual and not
reported previously in any report or to Mr. Gately's
supervisors. This information was reported, as required, to
Customs Office of Internal Affairs, for whatever action was
deemed necessary.''
Mr. Gately. My comments, sir?
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Gately. Prevarication.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Gately. A twisting of the truth, something that Mr.
Hensley is so accomplished at. He should take up a cottage
industry in that. This man can twist anything. If you care to
hear the truth, I will explain exactly what I did.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Gately. I am under oath; Mr. Hensley is not.
Mr. Cummings. Well he is not in here, so----
Mr. Gately. Well, I suggest that the next time he provides
you with any information, place him under oath; see if he
doesn't dance.
Mr. Cummings. All right. I hope we will get a chance to do
that.
Mr. Gately. Well, that is very unfortunate.
Mr. Cummings. I am just asking you some questions. I am
just trying to see what the whole story this.
Mr. Gately. Well, I am about to tell you.
Mr. Cummings. As they say, I just want to hear the rest of
the story. He goes on to say, ``Mr. Gately makes reference to
my getting a Presidential level, SES award. However, he fails
to mention that I was nominated for the award in July 1997,
nearly a year before the takedown of Casablanca. The award was
for sustained managerial excellence, with only one reference to
Casablanca, but not by name. Numerous other managerial
successes were outlined in the award nomination spanning
several years of my career.''
Mr. Gately. What is the question, sir?
Mr. Cummings. Do you think he lied his way through his
career?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely, without question. If you want me to
bring witnesses to that effect, I can arrange it.
Mr. Cummings. I am just reading his letter. [Laughter.]
Just one other thing, on page 1, he says, ``Mr. Gately
alleges that the name of Mexico's Defense Minister, Mr.
Cervantes, came up in conversations with other Mexican
defendants in relation to the movement of moneys in the $1
billion to $1\1/2\ billion range. This is not factual. Mr.
Cervantes' name was never referred to, but rather a Mexican
general later described as the Defense Minister. Both
defendants acknowledged that they had never met the Defense
Minister. Numerous attempts by the undercover agents to push
for a meeting with this alleged General Minister were
unsuccessful.''
That is a lie, too.
Mr. Gately. A lot of it is a big, fat lie; that is right.
That is absolutely correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. OK. OK. You just said something.
Mr. Gately. Do you want me to pick it apart for you? I
will.
Mr. Cummings. No, no. You said a lot of it is a big, fat
lie. Can you tell me which part isn't?
Mr. Gately. The fact that he says that I said that Mr.
Cervantes' name was mentioned is a big, fat lie.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Gately. I never said that. There is no reference to
that anywhere.
Mr. Cummings. He said one thing that I didn't ask you
about. Are you going to write a book?
Mr. Gately. Which part is that?
Mr. Cummings. Are you going to write a book?
Mr. Gately. Am I going to write a book, sir?
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Gately. I have no contract to write a book. I have made
no attempt to get an agent, to find a publisher, or do anything
of that sort. But if I do write a book, sir, it would be the
absolute unabridged truth.
Mr. Cummings. I just have one more question. You allege
that Customs Service prematurely shut down this operation to
protect the General; is that right?
Mr. Gately. I did not.
Mr. Cummings. You didn't?
Mr. Gately. I did not.
Mr. Cummings. Why do you think they prematurely shut it
down?
Mr. Gately. I give you five specific reasons in my
statement why they prematurely shut it down.
Mr. Cummings. You don't think it had anything to do with
the General?
Mr. Gately. It didn't necessarily have to do with the
General. It did have to do with what I believed to be the
infusion of politics into the process of investigating
criminals who were laundering money. That is what I said, and
that is what I have always said.
Mr. Cummings. Do you allege that the General was a part of
that?
Mr. Gately. I don't know, sir. I couldn't investigate it. I
was not allowed to. It was over. I was removed from my
position, so I couldn't take it on as a project, a post-covert
operation.
Mr. Cummings. When Commissioner Kelly says that he was
worried that his personnel; lives might be compromised, and
that is one of the main reasons why the operation was shut
down; did he ever say that to you?
Mr. Gately. He did not.
Mr. Cummings. Do you believe that?
Mr. Gately. Do I believe----
Mr. Cummings [continuing]. That his concern that----
Mr. Gately. Yes, I believe that he is always concerned for
his agents, as was I, because I was their supervisor. I was the
one seen with them. I was there with them everyday. If I
thought for 1 minute, 1 second, even a fragment of a second,
that there was danger to them, I would not allow them to
proceed. Any undue danger, I would never have allowed them to
proceed at any phase of this undercover operation.
Mr. Cummings. So let me make sure I understand this. If he
said that he was concerned, and you said you believe him when--
you believe he has a history of being concerned about his
people.
Mr. Gately. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cummings. And if he says that this is one of the main
reasons why he shut down the operation, you have no reason to
disbelieve that; do you?
Mr. Gately. Absolutely not.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Thank you.
Mr. Gately. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Barr, from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gately.
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. We have talked a lot about Mr. Cervantes. What is
his relationship with the Government and, in particular, the
President of Mexico?
Mr. Gately. He is a member of Mr. Zedillo's cabinet, he is
the Defense Minister, or the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Barr. Would that presume that he is somewhat close to
the President?
Mr. Gately. I would presume that, yes----
Mr. Barr. OK.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. As in all cases in governments that
have a structure of that nature.
Mr. Barr. And as I understand your testimony today, you are
not testifying that you have firsthand knowledge that he has
been involved in this money laundering, simply that there are
indications of that, and that there are indications, very clear
indications, through your investigation and through the
evidence that you all turned up as a result of that
investigation, that there is involvement at the highest-levels
of the Mexican Government in the money laundering. Is that sort
of a fair characterization of your testimony?
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Barr. And is it also your testimony today that, in your
professional judgment, this operation was prematurely shut
down?
Mr. Gately. In my professional judgment, yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. And at least in part because of what appear to be
political reasons not directly related to the operation,
itself?
Mr. Gately. Reasons that I say were infused into the
operation before it became operational, and talked about
throughout the operation.
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gately. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Weitzman, you have a little bit different
perspective. You----
Mr. Weitzman. I was enjoying listening to the other half.
[Laughter.]
It is far easier.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think you served on the Mexican border
some years ago, and are now an agent in Orlando?
Mr. Weitzman. I work in narcotics in Orlando; yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Yes. And could you tell the panel what you see as
far as trafficking at your level and the source of the drugs?
Mr. Weitzman. The best picture I could draw for you is the
one I went through, the one depicted on ``60 Minutes,'' where I
stopped a propane gas truck that we later found out to be
holding 4.3 tons of cocaine. And my supervisor that day--and I
don't need to mention names--called me in behind closed doors
and handed me the referral slip and asked me to sign it to the
streets of the country, and I refused. And following that
incident, life hasn't been real pleasant, let's put it that
way.
Mr. Mica. So, because you have come forward, you feel you
have been--I don't know if I want to say ``harassed,'' but
maybe that is the only term. Do you feel some sense of
harassment?
Mr. Weitzman. I think when you get phone calls at your home
making comments like calling you a ``f''-ing kike and take your
``f''-ing kike baby with you, or when you have supervisors come
out to the field to confront your spouse and tell your spouse
how they masturbate the narcotics dog, in an attempt to get you
to take a swing at one of them or try to undermine your
creditability, yes, I would pretty much call that harassment.
I think when one of your supervisors admits to upper
management that he is going to be hassling information out of a
grand jury witness, that pretty much covers it.
Mr. Mica. Well, I was going to ask you----
Mr. Weitzman. And to go further----
Mr. Mica [continuing]. For examples--[laughter]--but I
don't have to. [Laughter.]
You had a very brief opening statement--[laughter]--and a
brief questioning period.
Well, I think we would like to pursue some of the matters
that have been discussed here today. We are going to do that in
two ways.
First of all, Mr. Gilman and I have introduced a
resolution, and others will be joining us which will extend the
period for review of decertification for another 30 days. In
that time, we hope to see how far this particular trail leads
us concerning the problem of corruption in Mexico and the
question of ``full cooperation.''
We will be taking some additional steps tomorrow to ensure
this matter is raised to an even higher level, based on, not
only the testimony that we had from witnesses today, but
information that Mr. Barr has referred to that we have received
in closed briefings.
He may also, with the cooperation of friends on the other
side of the aisle, seek to find some additional information,
either voluntarily or with subpoenas to see, again, how far
this trail leads.
But I appreciate both of our witnesses coming forward today
and providing our subcommittee with testimony.
There being no further business, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Can I just ask one followup question?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Weitzman, is the treatment that you have
received basically for refusing to sign a piece of paper
allowing a huge amount of cocaine voluntarily into this
country? Is that the only such incident that you are aware of?
Mr. Weitzman. Listening to my colleague to my left is like
reliving a horror story because I went through what he went
through a few years earlier with the sniping, the comments that
are made to you, just like I told all of you earlier. It brings
up so many sore and really angry feelings inside me because it
took me 9 years to get to this point where I had an opportunity
to come before all of you and tell you that these things really
do happen, that people really do get hurt out there, that
people like Mr. Gately and myself do suffer reprisals, because
you are just doing your job.
The job is to interdict narcotics, and it just so happened
that a load of narcotics that I interdicted could be directly
linked to 21 tons found in a warehouse in Sylmar, and that is
not a game anymore. Now it is the real deal. And that 21 tons
is part of a 250-ton shipment that crossed the border in the
late-1980's, all of which are tied to the same cartel that my
friend is telling you about now.
Mr. Barr. The Mexican cartel?
Mr. Weitzman. The Juarez cartel.
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much.
Mr. Weitzman. My pleasure, sir.
Mr. Barr. I very much appreciate your courage and Mr.
Gately's courage in being here today.
Mr. Weitzman. Let's hope I have a job when I get home.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Let us know if you don't.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, I hope you have a job when you get home,
too. I really do.
Mr. Weitzman. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. I think all of us have a common goal and that
is to make sure that drugs don't enter our country and to do
everything in our power to get them out, and make sure those
who are responsible for trying to bring them in, or are
bringing them in, are dealt with properly.
Both of you have raised some very strong allegations, and
it concerns me. I mean the examples that you just gave, Mr.
Weitzman, about your wife, talking about----
Mr. Weitzman. Well, actually, what--just so you
understand--while we were being transferred from Nogales, AZ,
over to Miami, FL, we had received a call at our home. And I
picked up the call, and it said, ``You better move, you `f'-ing
kike and take your `f'-ing kike baby with you.'' I reported it
to Internal Affairs, and it is the typical Customs mentality
of, ``How do you know it came from within Customs?''
Well, you know, it is simple--and maybe it isn't fair to
say that--but how did anybody know I was moving and being
transferred? And how did somebody get my unlisted number? Why
were people--why was the supervisor going out discussing
blatant acts of bestiality to my wife? I mean, this is just
unimaginable that these things go on.
Why was my report regarding the tanker, the truth of what I
have just told you now and a lot of what we discussed--the
counsels and I have discussed in private--why was it deleted,
with everything my supervisor did taken out of it and rewritten
and submitted as fact?
This is the story; this is what has gone on, and it has
gone on too long, and it is time for it to come to an end.
Mr. Cummings. What is your biggest fear? I mean right now
you just said a moment ago, you hope you still have a job, but
I mean----
Mr. Weitzman. Honestly?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weitzman. I feel far more comfortable now that we have
a guy like Ray Kelly in there because he does seem to genuinely
care about his people, but I worry more about my colleagues on
the operations on Customs that I am hearing these days with
their retaliatory strikes, their ability to listen to Internal
Affairs tapes that are so damning. Much of which I discussed on
the tapes that I have just told all of you now, where I get
letters back saying that, in no uncertain terms, I am full of
crap. And I am not full of crap; it is not a game. It is real
life, and it happened, and this is what they do to people. They
don't just--it starts out with the small little shots at your
integrity, and then it's like a seek and destroy mission to
completely undermine ones credibility, and I am not going to
have it done.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I don't find myself agreeing with Mr.
Barr too often--[laughter]--friendly disagreements, that is.
But I agree with him on the point that, you know, if you have
those kind of problems, you need to let us know, because we are
very concerned about that. And the fact that if you can come
and provide testimony, you under oath, and if there is some
type of retaliatory actions as a result of you coming here,
that flies in the face of everything we stand for--everything.
Mr. Weitzman. If I could interject for 1 second. Mr. Mica
and I had a discussion the other night, and they were concerned
about me--they wanted me to go behind a screen, and I explained
to him, I never ran from anybody in my whole life, and I am not
about to hide behind a screen and tell some story that could
be, ``Oh, he went behind a screen to do it.''
No, the time is now to get the whole truth out. And there
are a lot of things that we cannot sit here in this forum and
discuss, because it is my belief that they are so deeply
national security sensitive, that the--for choice of a better
set of words--the storm it would cause wouldn't be pleasant.
But I have talked about it with counsel on both sides. They
know what I am talking about, and it is true, and it happened,
and the documentation is there to prove it.
And I will cut the same deal with all of you that I did
with my supervisor that day in San Diego. If I am lying, I will
put my badge on the desk and I will never come back again. You
have my word on that.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gately, we talked at some length, going back to the
substance of what we were talking about earlier, with regard to
the involvement of the Mexican Government and the Colombian
cartel. But one thing we didn't touch on, and I don't want to
go into a lot of detail here, but was there any evidence in
Casablanca of any involvement of United States banks in the
Mexican drug money case?
Mr. Gately. As knowledgeable that they were moving drug
money, sir?
Mr. Barr. I am sorry?
Mr. Gately. Every United States----
Mr. Mica. Knowledgeably moving drugs.
Mr. Barr. Yes.
Mr. Gately. Is your question, were they knowledgeable?
Mr. Barr. Well, I didn't use that term, but----
Mr. Gately. U.S. banks were involved in every transaction.
There was no evidence obtained during the investigation which
could then induce to determine that they were knowledgeable
that they were dealing with drug money.
Mr. Barr. OK.
Mr. Gately. But with every transaction, U.S. banks were
involved.
Mr. Barr. Yes, I mean the wire transfers and so forth,
but----
Mr. Gately. Every instrument issued in the case of the
Mexican bank drafts were eventually paid at the account of the
Mexican bank at the United States bank.
Mr. Barr. Right. Thank you.
Mr. Gately. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. There being no further business to come before
this subcommittee, this meeting is adjourned. And I thank our
witnesses again.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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