<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:62540.wais]
OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES/MEXICO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-83
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-540 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
Carolina DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
LEE TERRY, Nebraska JIM TURNER, Texas
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California (Independent)
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert B. Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Sean Littlefield, Professional Staff Member
Amy Davenport, Clerk
Micheal Yeager, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 4, 1999.................................... 1
Statement of:
Constantine, Thomas A., Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice; and Rand Beers,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State.......... 7
Nelson, Benjamin, Director of International Relations and
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by
Ron Kushner, Assistant Director............................ 112
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Beers, Rand, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State:
Letters concerning decertification....................... 49
Prepared statement of.................................... 61
Constantine, Thomas A., Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared
statement of............................................... 14
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, article dated March 4, 1999......... 88
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 90
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 4
Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Hawaii:
Chart concerning Mexican extradition statistics.......... 57
Chart concerning Mexico eradication and seizure
statistics............................................. 54
Nelson, Benjamin, Director of International Relations and
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 114
OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES/MEXICO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:26 a.m., in room 2247 of the
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Mica, Gilman, Souder, Hutchinson,
Mink, Cummings, Kucinich, Blagojevich, and Turner.
Staff present: Robert B. Charles, staff director/chief
counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Rob
Mobley, congressional fellow; Amy Davenport, clerk; Earley
Green, minority staff consultant; and Michael Yeager, minority
counsel.
Mr. Mica. I will call the hearing of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order.
We have several other Members who are tied up in hearings
and will join us shortly, but I am pleased to welcome you this
morning to this hearing entitled the Oversight of the United
States/Mexico Counternarcotics Efforts.
This morning I will start our subcommittee proceedings by
making an opening statement and yield to other Members that are
here. We will then hear from our witnesses and will probably
defer other opening statements, since we have had a delay,
until after we have heard from our witnesses. I appreciate
their indulgence.
We did try to be tolerant of their other schedules this
morning, but we must proceed.
I would like to start with my opening comments, again a
very serious topic, a grave situation that we are dealing with,
particularly the problems of drugs coming in from Mexico.
Drug abuse in America, especially among our youth, is at
epidemic levels. The situation with international drug
trafficking, I believe, is becoming a threat to our national
security. Over 14,200 Americans lost their lives last year to
drugs and drug-related crime at a cost of billions and billions
of dollars, not to mention the cost to families and to
communities in distress.
Despite a long and productive relationship with our ally to
the south, Mexico, the hard river of drugs ending up on
America's streets is coming across the Mexican border. Not only
is Mexico the leading source of deadly hard drugs entering the
United States, according to DEA's signature program, Mexico has
now become a major producer of high purity heroin.
If you wouldn't mind, let's hold this up here. This is a
chart prepared on the source of heroin from 1997, and it shows
Mexico is not only the major trafficker but it shows that it is
now becoming a major producer of heroin. Of the heroin that is
coming into the United States, 75 percent is produced in South
America, and our DEA Administrator can elaborate on what is
happening.
Not only do we have the transiting of this deadly heroin
through South America, we also now have production, and we know
this is accurate by the signature program that can determine
the source of heroin.
Additionally, Mexico serves as the major source of foreign
methamphetamine that is ravaging our midwest communities, the
western part of the United States and is now spreading
throughout the country. Of the cocaine on America's streets, 50
to 70 percent crosses our southwest border. This is an
absolutely staggering figure and a staggering quantity of
drugs, again all entering through Mexico.
Additionally, Mexico is, as I said, one of the major
foreign sources of methamphetamine. A recent article in the
Minneapolis Star Tribune stated that about 85 percent of the
methamphetamine in Minnesota is smuggled through Mexico. This
is just a little quote from the Minneapolis Star Tribune in
September of last year. Drugs coming from Mexico undermine our
communities. They spread and finance gang violence and, in
fact, they are destroying young lives in America at a record
level. Heroin deaths among our young have nearly doubled in the
past few years. These are innocent, often unsuspecting youths.
In many cases, our young people are the greatest victims of
this devastation being imported in large quantities, as I said,
from Mexico. If nothing else, we should be concerned about
young people who are at the center of this whole issue.
Congress, and I believe the subcommittee, owe them our
leadership.
The statistics on drug use, particularly among our young
people, continue to be worrisome and should sober every
American and every Member of Congress. Heroin use is up a
staggering 875 percent among our teens. Today we should be
appalled by the trends. Drug overdose deaths continue to plague
our metropolitan areas and not just our inner cities, but,
today, suburbs and our schools and almost every street in our
communities.
Drug use is highest among our 12th graders with more than
50 percent of our 12th graders having tried an illicit drug and
more than 1 in 4 labeled as current users.
Today, our subcommittee will examine Mexico's role in the
fight against illegal drugs. Without question, no country in
the world possesses a more immediate drug threat and national
security danger to the United States.
In an effort to fully examine this issue, we will hear
testimony from our DEA Administrator Tom Constantine, and Randy
Beers from the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. They will be followed by
the General Accounting Office who will outline Mexico's
counternarcotics activities taken over the last year.
While some minor progress has been made against drug
trafficking in Mexico, that country has, in my estimation,
failed to live up to concerns expressed by Congress over 2
years ago. Despite some of the reports that progress has been
made against drug trafficking in Mexico, Mexico still has not
done the following things, and we talked about these and the
House passed a resolution 2 years outlining these things.
Mexico still has not signed a bilateral maritime agreement.
Corruption remains a major impediment. Additionally, U.S. drug
enforcement agents are not allowed to adequately protect or
defend themselves. Our agents still remain at risk. Mexico has
failed to extradite a single major drug trafficker. What is
even more troubling is that, for example, when money laundering
was discovered among Mexican banking officials last year,
rather than cooperate, Mexican officials threatened to indict
United States Customs officers.
Now, what is of great concern to me is that Mexico has lost
vast land areas, in fact, they have lost entire states and
regions to the control of narco-traffickers. We have only to
look at the Baja peninsula and the Yucatan peninsula for
examples of areas completely lost to narco-traffickers. Under
the reports we have received there are, again, complete areas
under the control of narco-traffickers.
If this trend continues, Mexico could be on the verge of
turning its sovereignty over to drug traffickers. It is
difficult for me to believe that this administration would
certify Mexico as fully cooperating if we just take a few
minutes to look at what has taken place in the statistics. The
statistics and facts are indeed troubling. Some of the
statistics from 1998 are absolutely startling. Boat seizures
were down last year in Mexico, 29 percent from 1997. On this
chart are the basic facts of what took place 1997 and 1998
relating to major seizures of hard drugs--opium, heroin and
cocaine. These statistics are mind boggling. A reduction in
heroin seizures of 56 percent, a reduction in cocaine seizures
of 35 percent.
These are issues that must really be faced and be at the
top of our agenda today as we attempt to find solutions to this
disastrous situation. We aren't here today to bash Mexico. We
are here in an effort to find out what went wrong? Does the
certification process work? And why is there such concern among
our law enforcement officials and people on both sides of the
aisle, Republican and Democrat?
I will close with the comments of our minority leader who
said, ``After reviewing the past year's record, I am compelled
to disagree with the President's decision to certify Mexico as
fully cooperating with our government in the fight against
drugs,'' and that was by Mr. Gephardt.
So there is major concern on both sides of the aisle that
this situation with Mexico may be out of control, that we may
indeed have erred in certifying Mexico and that we need to get
a real handle on what is going on and how we can work as
partners with Mexico to bring this situation under control.
So with those opening comments this morning, I would like
to yield to the ranking member of our subcommittee, Mrs. Mink,
the gentlelady from Hawaii. You are recognized.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2540.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2540.002
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to first note that Chairman Mica and six other
Members of Congress have just returned from a very rigorous
field trip to a number of countries, El Salvador, Panama,
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and ending up with a 3-day visit in
Mexico City before returning to the United States via El Paso.
We did make a brief stop initially in Miami, also.
This trip certainly revealed to me the enormity of the
traffic problem that we are faced with and the transit of drugs
through Mexico was clearly evidenced in all of our discussions
with our American officials and with the various country
officials with whom we had the opportunity to meet.
I come to this subject area rather new, perhaps naive in
many ways about the nature of the trafficking and the amounts
and the course through which they penetrate our borders. But it
certainly was not with any lack of understanding of the scourge
that this country faces in terms of the victims, mostly our
children and all of our communities who are affected by this
drug trafficking.
So we have a unique opportunity, I think, in this committee
and in the Congress to focus attention on both the matter that
is at hand today in this hearing, and that is the trafficking
problem through Mexico, and the debate that will ensue with
reference to the President's decision to certify, and others
who feel that they are in disagreement with that decision.
The other part of the triangle with which I am very much
concerned, is to what extent we, in the United States, are
mounting as vigorous as a battle as we can in the law
enforcement area. We have focused our attention on education
and treatment and other matters, but it seems to me that we
need to now turn, as we are doing, to other countries. We need
to determine exactly what we are doing with respect to other
countries in the areas of detection, eradication, and penalties
for the people that are responsible for the consumption of
drugs by our constituents.
So I look forward to the testimony this morning, Mr.
Constantine and Mr. Beers. You will certainly add light to the
information that we have at hand, and I look forward to the
opportunity to propound a number of questions.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentlelady, and I am pleased to
recognize the gentleman from Texas now, Mr. Turner, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the Chair having this hearing today. Coming
from the State of Texas, that shares a border with Mexico, we
are in Texas, of course, proud of our cultural and economic
ties to Mexico, but also uniquely aware of the law enforcement
burdens that come along with the problems of the narcotics
traffic across our border.
We know and understand that the certification process is an
awkward hammer and often difficult to use in a meaningful way.
And we also, I think, in Texas, appreciate the fact that it is
often important to understand that those who generate the
demand for drugs share equally in the burden of finding
solutions with those who generate the supply.
But I do think that as we have this hearing today it is
important for us to understand that as we pursue our mutual
goals of trying to eliminate drug use and abuse and of
increasing our law enforcement efforts along the border that we
must do so with an understanding of the other national
interests that we have with Mexico and the ties that have
existed for many years that we want to preserve.
So, Mr. Chairman, with that I appreciate, again, you
hosting this important hearing.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I am pleased now to
recognize our two witnesses on our first panel this morning.
We are privileged this morning to have one of the most
distinguished law enforcement officers of the United States,
Mr. Tom Constantine, who is our Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Agency. We are also privileged to have an Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement of the Department of State, the Honorable Randy
Beers, who has joined us.
As you may know, gentleman, in addition to having some
authorizing ability in the national drug policy area, we are
also an investigative and oversight subcommittee of Congress
and we do swear in our witnesses. So if you would please stand
up.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Again, I am pleased to welcome one of the most courageous
law enforcement officers, one of the most respected gentleman
that I have seen. He accompanied me right after I was named
Chair. We went together to a meeting in Europe in Baden, I
believe it was, Austria, and met with officials from throughout
the world, some of the drug czars, leaders, to begin my effort
and renew his effort and others in this international war
against illegal narcotics.
I was so impressed with his comments, his presentation, and
the respect that he has, not only in this country, but
throughout the world in this difficult battle. So I am
absolutely pleased and delighted that you are joining us today
and look forward to your testimony and comments. You are
recognized, sir.
STATEMENTS OF THOMAS A. CONSTANTINE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND
RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Constantine. Congressman, thank you very much for your
kind comments and to the other members of the committee.
I have submitted a fairly lengthy document detailing our
analysis of the organized crime drug problem and especially as
it impacts the United States and as the command and control is
in Mexico, and I would ask your forgiveness to have that as my
official submission.
Mr. Mica. Without objection that entire statement will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Constantine. OK, thank you. The central theme of that
presentation concerns really how major organized crime
syndicates are impacting the citizens of the United States and
how the organizations that are based in Mexico have become so
powerful in a relatively short period of time.
All of the information that is in that report and in this
presentation is based on a complete and very detailed analysis
of every major narcotics investigation conducted by the DEA,
which involves organized crime groups that are headquartered in
Mexico.
In addition to our own fact finding and analysis, we
consulted with each of the Federal agencies in the law
enforcement community and the intelligence community and we
have also reviewed and discussed our analysis with all the
major State, city, and local agencies throughout the United
States.
As a side comment, we have been watching with some degree
of concern over the last 2 or 3 years, a spread of the
narcotics problem out of the urban areas of the United States
into the rural mid-sized cities. As a result, we brought
together about 100 police chiefs, sheriffs and prosecutors a
little over a week ago to a hotel out by Dulles Airport. Prior
to bringing them there, we submitted a fairly detailed survey
form asking them to describe their narcotics situation in their
city, county, town, or State.
Sixty-eight percent of those who came and replied indicated
that the nexus of their drug trafficking outside of their
immediate area was organized criminal groups from Mexico. This
was later then played out in a series of workshops. And
eventually we will be putting together a report within the next
month explaining all of the problems that these smaller and
mid-sized areas that are suffering, often without the necessary
resources. By the way, that chart depicts kind of a spread, as
you can see, of these cities, villages, towns and counties.
Our analysis of the problem really has focused on how
sophisticated criminal organizations based in another country,
in this case Mexico, can commit massive criminal activity
within the United States. At present these syndicates, which
are based in Mexico, in our opinion and in my opinion, pose the
greatest drug trafficking threat to the citizens of the United
States.
As a result of some excellent investigations by Federal,
State and local law enforcement we now have a very clear
picture of how these drug lords ship tons of narcotics into the
United States, collect billions of dollars from United States
citizens, and then, at times, arrange for the assassinations of
either witnesses and/or public officials in both Mexico and the
United States.
We have identified and in many cases acquired sufficient
evidence to indict many of the key leaders of these
organizations.
But so far, they have been able to evade arrest and
prosecution. Like all organized crime systems throughout the
history of the modern world, they have been able to succeed
using traditional tools. Those tools are violence, intimidation
and corruption.
Unfortunately, as I said last week before the Senate, as I
testify on this issue of the problem and the impact on these
organizations that are based in Mexico on the citizens of the
United States, it has been interpreted by some as a criticism
of the people of Mexico or the Government of Mexico. Nothing
could be farther from the truth. I have great respect for the
citizens of Mexico, and I have met with a number of public
officials who I respect equally.
However, I have at several times in my law enforcement
career taken an oath of office. I also administer that oath of
office to new DEA graduates and at one time, State troopers.
And that oath requires that we protect the citizens of the
United States. I take that oath very seriously. I have
dedicated my life to it. At times I have risked my life for
those same principles.
So our analysis on this problem is not based on criticism
of Mexico as much as it is based on the fact that there are
criminal organizations and drug lords who live there who are
doing a great deal of damage within the United States. Their
operations are fairly traditional.
On any given day, probably as we are speaking here this
morning, drug lords in Colombia and Mexico are involved in
business transactions. The transactions that they are involved
with is that they communicate with criminal operatives they
have sent into the United States. These organizational
operatives then arrange for the shipment and storage of tons of
cocaine and hundreds of kilos of heroin and methamphetamine to
be sold to our citizens.
The criminal organizations based in Mexico have matured
from being merely a transportation agency for the Colombia
organizations to become the dominant threat to the citizens of
the United States. An example of one case on one organization
on one subset of that organization, it is a group led by the
Arellano-Felix brothers out of the Baja area of California,
Tijuana, and Mexicali. They ship tons of cocaine into Los
Angeles, Tucson, Chicago, Detroit, and Greensboro, NC.
We were fortunate enough in the investigation to see some
of their records. We found that this one group, in 90 days, had
shipped 10 tons of cocaine into the United States and taken $90
million in cash out of the United States back to their
headquarters in Tijuana.
Mention was made of methamphetamine. They not only control
50 percent of the distribution of cocaine, they found that they
had a drug that they could manufacture from the beginning, of
which they did not have to share the proceeds with the criminal
organizations from Colombia. We had a minuscule methamphetamine
problem in this country until it was wide scale distribution
developed from these criminal organizations.
To give you a sense of the growth and the explosion of
that, in 1991, emergency room admissions in this country for
methamphetamine were 4,900. By 1997, the emergency room
admissions had gone to 17,400. In 1992, the seizures along our
border with Mexico of methamphetamine were 7 kilos. In 1998,
there were 1,400 kilos seized. So we've moved from small
motorcycle gangs and relatively low level usage to widespread
distribution and manufacture from organized crime groups in the
distribution in the United States and it spread from California
to every State in the union except for, strangely enough, the
northeast quadrant exclusive of the Philadelphia area.
To give you an example of the impact in the middle part of
this country, in Des Moines, IA, there are now more
methamphetamine arrests than there are drunken driving arrests.
In Marshalltown, IA, last year, a set of elected officials and
teachers and police chiefs and sheriffs and county executives
came to my office looking for assistance anyplace they could
find it. A community that never had a drug problem now all of a
sudden had a major methamphetamine problem. And they have a
high school there. There's 1,600 students in that high school.
Over one-third of those students have now tried
methamphetamine.
We have, in the course of our investigation, found major
laboratories that are run by these criminal organizations that
are in and of themselves very dangerous. We find that they
build them and construct them in areas close to middle schools,
in equestrian centers where young people are taking riding
lessons, and all of them being driven by the heads of the
criminal groups that are based in Mexico.
There is an incredible amount of violence always associated
with organized crime. These groups, like all of their
predecessors, whether in the United States, Italy or Colombia,
rely on violence as an essential tool of their trade.
They use contract killers and brutal assassinations, and
that is done for one reason, to intimidate. To intimidate the
common citizen and to intimidate many public officials from
providing witness information that is essential to arrest or
prosecution. If these people are intimidated and do not provide
us information, investigations will never be successful.
It is not only limited to their activities as they occur in
Mexico. We also are increasing experience in violence and
threats by these same groups against U.S. citizens in law
enforcement along the border.
I mentioned in the beginning of my discussion the fact of
what we are really dealing with is a powerful organized crime
syndicate. And that is the key to understanding our
adversaries, and it becomes much clearer and our strategies for
dealing with it become more direct. For the first 70 years of
this century, the primary drug of abuse in the United States
was heroin and really heroin at a fairly low level of usage and
low purity.
Recently, in the presentation that Congressman Mica talked
about, we did some research in Baltimore in the mid 1950's. At
that point in time the population was 949,000 people and the
number of heroin addicts was 300 to 350. The population of
Baltimore is now 675,000 people and there are 39,000 heroin
addicts.
So the city of Baltimore, as for a heroin problem, has gone
from 1 heroin addict for every 3,161 people in the 1950's to 1
heroin addict for every 17 people in the 1990's. That heroin
traffic was driven by organized crime.
I have a chart up here of what it looked like then. The
nexus and the command and control was, for the most part, in
New York City. Those of you who have seen the movie the
Godfather or looked at some of the arts and entertainment
reconstruction of organized crime development in the United
States would be familiar with that.
The source of Europe was the so-called French connection.
The major crime families would then arrange for the
distribution of the heroin throughout the United States. And,
really, it was in the halls of Congress and in the Senate that
finally we became aware and moved from a state of denial on
organized crime to a recognition.
The hearings held in the late 1950's, especially by Senator
McClellan from Arkansas, were key in being able to explain to
the citizens of the United States how serious this problem was.
Interestingly enough, if you go over those transcripts, which I
have, you will find that the chief counsel for those hearings
was Bobby Kennedy. He then moved from there to become Attorney
General and implemented the types of investigative
prosecutorial strategies that were essential to dismantling
organized crime.
And we have done, I think, a tremendous job in reducing
organized crime to what it is today. I watched television the
other night. They depict organized crime as Skinny Joe Morleno
from Philadelphia as being the head of organized crime,
supposedly, in the United States, who will have little or no
impact on anybody outside of south Philadelphia.
But if you look, and we see a change, the change occurs
that despite those successes as we move from cocaine, we now
find out that the nexus for organized crime in the United
States is based in Colombia. They decided that they did not
need any criminal organizations in the United States to set up
their distribution or money collection. They established what
we call cell structures. They went to major cities. They
dispatched thousands of their own employees into the United
States. The high level were trusted people. The low level
people filled out work forms listing all of their biographic
data so that they dare not testify and they dare not cooperate.
From there they would collect the money and then they would
distribute the drugs throughout the United States. They are
still very powerful. They are still a great danger. But a great
credit to General Serrano and the head of the Colombia National
Police and his policemen, working with the DEA and other
governmental agencies, they have been able to arrest all of the
major organized crime figures and have now become very
aggressive in a proactive fashion despite major difficulties
that they face today.
The picture of organized crime has now changed again, and
the change is that the groups from Colombia originally entered
into what they thought was a business arrangement with the
organizations out of Mexico. And the groups from Mexico would
transport the drugs for Colombia into the United States and
turn it back over to Colombians for distribution in much like
the previous chart.
It wasn't long before that changed, and now we see two
parallel organizations in the United States for organized
crime, one based in Colombia, one based in Mexico. The group
from Mexico becoming increasingly stronger, the strength of the
Colombian groups tending to be diluted over a period of time.
So there are some parallels between our experience in the
United States with the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra and today's
syndicates in Colombia and Mexico. However, there are some
differences.
The amount of money that these organizations in Colombia
and Mexico make, the impact on the communities and citizens of
the United States, the violence and the corruption associated
with these groups that we see today are nothing like we could
have ever imagined in the 1950's and 1960's. They make the
traditional organized crime or Mafia in the United States look
like grade school children compared to what they do.
They have sophisticated intelligence systems. They have
mansions, safe houses, planes, armored cars, security teams,
encryption. Increasingly they use encryption to try to deflect
what we do in the investigation.
The one thing that is constant and will always be constant
in organized crime has been pointed out in every Presidential
commission and every congressional hearing. Organized crime
cannot and will not exist without the collaboration of
corrupted law enforcement individuals who protect the criminals
and condone criminal activity.
I have a very elaborate report on the major crime families
that are in charge of this narcotics trafficking in my
submission. Many of the key leaders that you see in that report
in these organizations have been investigated continually
within the United States, and we have been able to secure
sufficient evidence to indict them. All that we need to do is
to locate them and arrest them and bring them back to face
justice between a jury of their peers of the community and the
people they have injured.
I have privately and publicly thanked the Attorney General,
Mr. Medrosa, from Mexico and his staff for their arrest this
year of Jesus and Luis Amezcua. That was a very significant,
important arrest. Unfortunately, the judiciary in Mexico has
dismissed all of the criminal charges existing in Mexico. The
only remaining charges are charges of investigations conducted
in the United States and we are still waiting for the outcome
of the extradition process.
The ability to deal with organized crime is, believe it or
not, fairly direct. We have learned lessons over a period of
time that these groups are not invulnerable.
They can be dismantled. They are not held together by any
political or religious philosophy. They are only held together
by greed and corruption.
We know that honest, hard working law enforcement officers
and prosecutors can prevail. We have seen it in the United
States. We have seen it in Italy. And we have seen it in
Colombia. I also know from experience that if they are left
unchecked, these drug lords and organizations will only grow
more powerful and dangerous to the citizens of the United
States and Mexico. The level of corruption, the level of
violence that we see that they impact within Mexico will be the
same strategy that they use in the border States and
increasingly in the other States in the union.
Finally, we have to recognize this as a long, difficult
process. We have invested in the DEA millions of dollars and
tremendous efforts on the part of DEA agents to develop
cooperative relationships.
However, honestly, these have had only limited success at
present. Many of the joint ventures that we have established
and begun to start have really been impacted by the fact that
the traffickers are willing to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars to corrupt law enforcement systems.
In the past year, we have encountered a significant
setback. The setback was a unit that a great deal of money was
expended and energy into a special vetted unit so that we could
share information in a sensitive basis for high level targets.
We now have found out that significant people at senior levels
in that unit appear to have been corrupted, which is a major
disappointment to both the Government of Mexico and the United
States.
There are many varied opinions that you will hear on this,
as I do. However, I believe there is one fact that cannot be
challenged. That is that these major organizations, the leaders
of these organizations, are inflicting tremendous damage on the
citizens of the United States. I also have to tell you that
they have become more powerful each and every year that I have
held this job as head of DEA. And, unfortunately, very few of
them have been brought to justice.
I am often asked why I am so serious about this issue and
why I am so direct. I believe it is important to note and to
remember that every day and every night we are asking thousands
of young American law enforcement officers to go out and to
risk their lives to protect me, my family, and all of us from
the danger of these powerful groups.
Over the course of a 39-year career in law enforcement, I
have lost a number of friends, classmates, coworkers, and
subordinates who have been killed in the line of duty. Often
that requires you to sit down with the mother or father or
husband or wife and try to, in their trauma and grief, explain
the significance of the loss.
In the course of those conversations I am often asked,
especially if it is related to narcotics, am I serious about
this. Is the loss of their son, the loss of their daughter, the
loss of their husband or their wife, sometimes their mother or
father, has it been in vain or are we committed to somehow
continuing this battle against the individuals responsible? I
tell them I am serious.
We are serious. We will continue with all of our energy.
However, if there is a continued ability of the drug lords who
are really causing these deaths to evade arrest, extradition
and prosecution, I think it makes it very, very difficult to
reassure these families of our seriousness.
Thank you very much, Congressmen.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Constantine follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony, and I am pleased
now to recognize the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the
Department of State, Mr. Beers. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of this
committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you on
what is, as the chairman so correctly indicated initially and
Mr. Constantine has so much further indicated, a very, very
serious problem, both to the United States and to Mexico. I
have a longer presentation which I would like to have submitted
for the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered. It will be made a
part of the record.
Mr. Beers. Thank you very much, sir.
We have been through a process, our certification process,
which began in December and continued through until the
President's announcement on February 26th. We had 28 countries
to consider--4 were given national interest waivers and 2 were
decertified.
We had 14 interagency meetings on this process at various
levels. We had a unanimous recommendation of the four cabinet
officials recommending from State, Treasury, Justice and
Defense, as well as senior White House officials; and the
President then recorded their views and certified or
decertified or provided national interest waivers to the
countries in question.
The basis under which we made those decisions comes from a
law which you all have passed and it states that we should
determine that a country has fully cooperated with the United
States or taken steps on its own to achieve full compliance
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
With respect to this language and the decision which we are
asked to make under it, we have asked our lawyers to give us
their views on that statute; and while the statute says,
``fully cooperating,'' we have determined that this is not a
rigid or unrealistic standard.
First of all, achieving full compliance with all of the
goals and objectives of the 1988 drug convention is an
aspiration for all of our efforts, a goal that even the United
States continues to pursue each year.
As to fully cooperating, we look at several indications.
First of all, we review the challenges facing a country. Then
we ask ourself whether the government has the ability to meet
those challenges, whether the government is genuinely trying to
meet the bench marks that we jointly establish with them,
whether the country's attitude toward fighting narcotics
trafficking is adequate, and whether or not the government
performance, in light of the overall situation, is adequate.
It is on that basis that we make those decisions and on
that basis that the President determined that Mexico was fully
cooperating. He recognized that Mexico faces serious, very
serious problems. Drug trafficking, transshipment, production,
money laundering and corruption.
In addition to the President's decision, I would ask that
we submit for the record letters from the Governors of Texas,
Arizona, New Mexico, and California, all of whom state that it
is their belief that decertification would jeopardize existing
and future antidrug and law enforcement relations between these
two countries and indicating their full support for
certification. I ask that these two letters be inserted in the
record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, they will be made a part of
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir. This is not to say that we or
the Government of Mexico do not acknowledge, as Administrator
Constantine has indicated, the very serious problems that do
exist in Mexico. In a recent presentation--both governments
agreed on five major elements which very closely parallel
Administrator Constantine's point.
Serious crime in Mexico has nearly doubled in the past 7
years. That crime is more organized and more violent than ever
before. Law enforcement agencies within Mexico generally
proceed without adequate resources.
Those same law enforcement agencies also lack training,
equipment, adequate salaries, and are, as Administrator
Constantine indicated, extremely vulnerable to corruption. In
addition to that, the courts also represent a problem. Their
sentencing is inadequate to the crime, and there are not enough
courts to deal with this problem.
This is a presentation that was made to us by the
Government of Mexico as they presented to us their recent
counternarcotics initiative. So there is no difference between
our two countries. There is no denial in either country that
the problems in Mexico are serious.
But we still continue to believe that Mexico is, in fact,
fully cooperating. And let me try to indicate how we came to
that decision. First and foremost, and I think there has been
no disagreement among any of us, President Zedillo is fully
committed personally to fighting drugs and to a strong antidrug
alliance between the United States and Mexico. Senior officials
in his administration--Administrator Constantine indicated
Attorney General Medrosa as one. There are others as well--have
a serious, long-term commitment that is real, vital and
productive to cooperation with the United States and dedication
to deal with the drug problem within Mexico.
In addition to that, last year in February, the United
States and Mexico concluded a binational strategy which
represents the basis of an antidrug alliance between the two
countries. Following up on that alliance, over the course of
the last year, the Government of the United States and the
Government of Mexico have developed what we call performance
measures of effectiveness which were concluded this February
after approximately a year's worth of negotiation.
This commits both governments to looking at approximately
80 indicators of performance that both countries will collect
data on and then both countries will discuss how progress has
been made along these indicators, where shortcomings have
existed along these indicators, and how these performance
indicators might show better in the year ahead.
It is that embrace that countries who are both fully
committed to cooperation would take. Countries that are in
disagreement don't conclude this kind of agreement or don't
conclude this kind of alliance. This is unprecedented in terms
of cooperation between two countries, between the United States
and any other country.
In addition to that, the Government of Mexico, as I
indicated earlier, has just announced a major counternarcotics
initiative, approximately $400 to $500 million investment in
law enforcement and infrastructure over the next several years.
This is an announcement which was made public in February but
was actually heralded by both a budgetary decision which their
Congress passed in December and an earlier announcement in
August.
This particular effort includes, first and foremost, a
significant expansion of the anticorruption activities of the
Government of Mexico. They will expand the number of personnel
who will be vetted. They will fully screen officials who are
currently performing counternarcotics activities. They will
establish oversight mechanisms to insure the continuing
reliability of those engaged in counterdrug activities.
There is no misunderstanding on their part about how
serious the problem is. And as Administrator Constantine said,
this is an action that is going to require years of work and
they understand that and are not shying from that.
In addition to that, they have also added state-of-the-art
technology in airborne surveillance, high speed patrol boats,
helicopters and mobile x-ray units that will also be added to
enhance the capabilities of better paid, better equipped,
better trained and more professional law enforcement officials.
In addition to that, with that counternarcotics
enhancement, Mexico now spends approximately 1.4 percent of its
national budget on counternarcotics activities. That is, by way
of comparison, larger than the 1 percent which the United
States spends on its budget.
That is the heart of the argument in favor of full
cooperation. But in order that we talk about the full range of
performance, because it is not a perfect performance, I would
also ask your indulgence to go over the two charts which I gave
to you earlier.
First, we have this chart, which is an attempt to take our
international narcotics strategy control report data and extend
it back to 1986 so that you have 13 years of data. The first
two points that I would make are on opium----
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous extent that
that chart be inserted in the record at this point?
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Beers. Thank you. The first point that I would make
refers to opium and cannabis cultivation. As you can see with
respect to the 1998 column for opium, the amount of potentially
harvestable opium has gone up from 1997 to 1998.
I think it is important to look at this time series data
over the entire range. We are disappointed, the Mexicans are
disappointed, that the amount went up. It represents above the
mean but not far above the mean for the entire time data
series. Equally important to remember, because we are talking
about cooperation and effort, the eradication. The effective
eradication on the part of the Mexican Government, you can see,
has also gone up.
In fact, if you look at the time series data that effective
eradication--and that's not information that we have taken from
the Mexican Government. That is information which we have
obtained by our own intelligence collection. Potentially
harvestable crop has had effective eradication, which was 9,500
hectares this year.
In that context, it is important to remember that overall
field size, as we have determined, has generally gone down. The
amount of camouflage and intercropping has generally gone up.
In addition, if you look at the cannabis production you will
notice that that has generally come down over time. Eradication
is up and down over that point in time. But the overall
potential yield has come down, I think, significantly over that
long-term time series.
With respect to seizures, opium and heroin both are not
very favorable this year. The opium gum is down. The heroin is
up, but not significantly. This is an area that we and the
Mexican Government, I think, need to do better on. Cocaine, as
you correctly indicated, has come down significantly from last
year.
I think it is important to divide the time series into two
large chunks of time. If you will go back to the time period
from approximately 1989 to 1993, you will see quite large
seizures. Those are the result of a cooperative effort between
DEA and the Government of Mexico called the Northern Border
Response Force, where we and the Mexicans, using helicopters
that we generally provided, were able to interdict serious
small plane incursion into northern Mexico.
The traffickers changed their pattern of activity as a
result of that, and we and the Mexicans have not adapted
effectively to be able to seize the same levels.
But if you look at the next 5-year time period, you will
see, except for the spike in 1997, that we are talking about
roughly the same overall performance level of cocaine seizures.
With respect to cannabis, I think you can see that over the
longer-term trend we are basically talking about a rising
amount of cannabis seizures.
With respect to methamphetamine, which the Administrator
has described as an exceedingly serious problem for the United
States, while we had a modest increase in the amount of
methamphetamine seized this year, over the longer term time
series it is nothing to speak of. What has happened that is new
and different, and I believe important, is that Mexico has now
also criminalized precursor chemicals.
And for the 2-years of data that we have since they have
undertaken this you will see that overall there is a rise in
the amount of precursor chemicals that have been seized. With
respect to labs, they are down over the most recent years and
that is a cause for concern and something we should look at.
With respect to arrests of nationals and foreigners, it is
a relatively constant picture over time although there were
some periods in which there were very high peak years.
I would like to go from that data to the second chart which
I handed out, which refers to extraditions. This is a very
serious problem, a very serious issue, and one which I think it
is important that we all understand.
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the chart be entered
into the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that chart will be made a part
of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Beers. Thank you. As Administrator Constantine has
indicated and as our government has indicated, this is a
serious issue and one which we care about a great deal and talk
with the Mexican Government a great deal. It is important, I
believe, as we look at this process to consider that it is a
two-part process.
The process as a whole generally involves the Mexican
courts at a low level, first making a decision based on Mexican
law that a Mexican national cannot be extradited. That decision
by that lower court is then referred to the Foreign Ministry.
The Foreign Ministry has an extraordinary power with respect to
Mexican nationals to override that law and has done so in a
number of occasions.
What we have gathered here and what we are trying to depict
and what I will now explain is, first, the number of
extraditions that the Government of Mexico, the executive
branch, has authorized and the number of individuals that the
Mexican court system have allowed to be extradited, and the
number of deportations which the Government of Mexico
administratively has authorized to come to the United States.
First, with respect to those who were authorized for
extradition, I apologize we don't have data for 1995. We will
try to update that. But if you look at that time series, you
will see that the Government of Mexico as a whole has generally
increased the number of individuals who have been authorized,
and there have been Mexican nationals who have been authorized
for extradition, including, as Administrator Constantine said,
one of the Amezcua brothers.
The Mexican courts have not been as cooperative, shall we
say, or at least have been unwilling to extradite at the same
levels that the government has been willing to authorize
extraditions. And you see below, a lower level of extraditions
that were actually effected, individuals sent to the United
States.
And as has been correctly noted throughout, although there
are four Mexican nationals who have been extradited over the
past 4 years, none of those individuals are major drug
traffickers. There is one minor drug trafficker, but no major
drug trafficker of Mexican nationality has been authorized for
extradition. There was a major drug trafficker, Garcia Braggo,
who was a dual national. That is the indication in the 1996
column. Overall, there have been drug traffickers but they have
all been foreign citizens.
It is equally important, I believe, to also look at the
deportations, which, as you can see, these are not Mexican
nationals but they have risen over this timeframe. In addition
to that, it is also important to note that we have, this year
for the first time, two successful prosecutions under article
IV of the Mexican constitution in which an individual who was
denied extradition to the United States was successfully
prosecuted within the Mexican court system and brought to
justice.
So while we do not have what we believe to be an entirely
adequate system of extradition, we are at least seeing
cooperation with respect to the government in the prosecution
of some individuals who have not been extradited.
In addition to that, we have the first money laundering
prosecution after the money laundering laws have been
established. We have vetted units that are coming on line. But
that is not to say that this is a perfect record, and
Administrator Constantine, I think, has made that case quite
clearly.
Particularly, we are concerned about the corruption that
has been found in vetted units after they have been vetted.
That said, those individuals have been moved to other
assignments, perhaps not entirely adequate but at least out of
the picture of working with us in those vetted units. Moreover,
much of the information that we have is derived essentially
from Mexican Government and law enforcement officials.
We have two significant negative court decisions regarding
extradition of criminals to the United States. Having said
that, the Mexican Government has indicated to us that those
decisions will be appealed. And we have, as I indicated
earlier, the rising opium poppy cultivation, which expanded
despite an increased effort. These are issues and areas of
concern.
But let me also come back for a moment and talk very
briefly about the overall record in terms of trying to deal, on
the part of the Mexican Government, with the senior levels of
management of the various cartels which exist in Mexico.
First, the Juarez or Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the
chief of security, Noe Breto was rearrested this year. General
Jesus Gutierrez-Rebollo received 14 additional years making his
term of sentence 30 years for the corruption that he undertook
on behalf of this cartel.
Carlos Topillia, the reported founder of the cartel has
received 27 years in prison for the result of his actions.
Sixty-five members of the cartel have been indicted, although
not yet arrested. And 111 cartel properties have been seized in
1998.
With respect to the Tijuana cartel or the Arellano-Felix
organization, General Alfredo Navarro Larra received 20 years
for bribery on behalf of the cartel. The two Arellano-Felix
brothers have been formally indicted. Key security and money
launderers have been indicted. The key lieutenant, Paez
Martinez, has been approved for extradition. In the Sinaloa
[ph.sp.] cartel or the Miguel Caro-Quintero cartel we have two
key lieutenants arrested, R.C. Jucopo and Jose Soto-Soto.
We have two outstanding provisional arrest warrants for
Miguel and Rafael Caro-Quintero and the youngest brother, Jose,
remains in prison under arrest.
I think that in addition to that we have the Calima or the
Amezcua Conteres cartel. The two brothers are arrested and
remain in prison despite the dismissal by the Mexican courts of
the Mexican charges, basically on the charges that we have
brought against those individuals. Seventeen members have been
indicted. The Addon Amezcua-Quintero, another brother has also
been indicted for firearms violations.
In addition to that, a member of the Colombian Calle
cartel, who is a lawyer operating in Mexico, William Moran, has
also been arrested; and that was done at our request. This is a
mixed record, but we believe that in total, with respect to the
issue of fully cooperating, we have a Mexican Government that
is committed to cooperation with the United States.
We have indications by that government of serious intent to
do serious business and indications that they have done that
serious business. They are waging independently and in
cooperation with us, a serious counternarcotics effort. It will
require time. It will require effort. It will require
commitment, and it will require cooperation by the United
States with that government to develop the mutual trust that we
need to make over the time ahead.
That concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for
this opportunity to testify, and I would be happy to answer any
questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I have questions for both of our witnesses, but I
am going to yield for just a moment to the chairman of the
International Relations Committee, Mr. Ben Gilman, who has
joined us and who has a statement he would like to make. He has
left a meeting to come here. And without objection, if I may, I
would like to recognize him at this time.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Mica.
I regret that I was delayed in coming up and I am going to
have to return. We are conducting a mark up on several foreign
policy measures down on my committee. And I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in holding this important
hearing on the President's, what I consider, ill-advised full
certification of Mexico in our common fight against illicit
drugs.
And I thank you for bringing two top notch panelists before
us, Mr. Beers from our Department of State, and Tom
Constantine, our DEA Director, both of whom have been highly
instrumental in trying to formulate a more effective drug
policy for our Nation. And I appreciate your long-time efforts,
Chairman Mica, both in helping draft the original certification
statute and working with me and so many others here in the
Congress in trying to keep illicit drugs in the forefront of
our foreign policy and our national security agenda.
Several Presidents in the past have said drug trafficking
is a national security problem and too often we forget that
issue. Your understanding about how the annual drug
certification came about is important for those who wonder how
we got here in today's measuring of Mexico's performance. And
we in the Congress for far too long have heard many good words
and pledges about fighting drugs together.
But very often, little concrete action was ever forthcoming
for the major producer or source nations who often promise to
help us. These very same producers are transit nations but
also, of course, at the same time they enjoy the benefits of
our taxpayers' largesse in the way of economic assistance, in
the way of aid, trade, and multilateral loan guarantees and
other benefits that we often consider as part of our foreign
policy.
Congress in 1986, I think wisely, combined the need for
full cooperation in our efforts against drugs with the major
producer or transit nations' right to access some of American
taxpayers' largesse. The American people have overwhelmingly
supported certification since that time, and I also noted with
some astonishment just last April in a Wall Street Journal poll
that 65 percent of the people in Latin America agreed with the
American public in that approach.
They also favored U.S. imposed sanctions on countries not
doing enough to combat drug production and trafficking.
I remember at a recent, not too long ago, conference in
Atlanta arranged by former President Carter in which we were
debating the drug certification process. And there was some
question raised as to whether or not that was beneficial to our
policy. I happened to sit next to the former President of
Bolivia, who leaned over to me and he said, ``You know, if it
wasn't for the drug certification problem, despite all the
protests to the contrary, we wouldn't have passed very
significant legislation in our parliament on asset seizures and
money laundering.'' He said it has been a strong motivation and
I certainly agree with that.
The American people have been joined in support of
certification by important groups such as the National
Conference of Mayors and the National Narcotics Officers
Association Coalition, and other police officials who daily
face the brutal cost and the deadly consequences of the illicit
drugs from abroad on the streets of communities of our Nation.
Simple, straightforward, and most importantly, always
seeking our assurances from these producers and transit nations
like Mexico that besides words, the President would be able to
say to the Congress, we are getting full cooperation in our
drug war. No challenge, I don't think, is more important than
this vital fight against illicit drugs, especially in our own
hemisphere.
Mexico is a neighbor to the south, an important neighbor
and the gateway, regrettably, for nearly 60 percent--60 percent
of the illicit drugs entering our Nation. And as good neighbors
alone, never mind the multilateral loan guarantees they may
receive from us, I think we are entitled to full cooperation
and they to ours as well.
We are doing our share here at home with billions spent on
demand reduction and treatment as well as reducing supplies. We
have also provided assistance to the Mexican authorities in
many areas to help them do a better job in fighting drugs.
I led the way when Mexico wanted to get its military more
involved in fighting drugs in helping obtain 72 United States
Army Huey helicopters for Mexico and were pleased--
incidentally, Mr. Beers, we thank you for your help in the
recent initiative to provide Hueys for Colombia. The Colombian
narcotics police force that has been pleading for them for many
months now--and we welcome the opportunity that we are
providing to them to help them fight the war.
The ``fully cooperating,'' and that is in quotes,
certification decision of Mexico's dismal record for 1998
cannot and ought not stand unchallenged. The administration
itself is now in the business of giving us mere words, not any
evidence of any concrete deeds and action.
We understand a resolution of disapproval has already been
introduced and wisely, I note, with a national interest waiver
so we give Mexico the failing grade of F that they deserve for
performance in the war on drugs without any adverse economic
consequences.
I look forward to working closely with Chairman Mica in
this area of disapproval in the days and weeks ahead. We need
to sit down and we need to discuss our concerns with the
Mexican Government. They are not apparently hearing what they
need to hear from the administration.
It was very nice of them to say they have gotten some new
equipment, new radar instruments, that are going to help in
spending $400 million in that direction, but that's not the end
all and that's not the most effective thing they should be
doing.
And I welcome the statement this week of the minority
leader, Mr. Gephardt, that he felt compelled--compelled to
disagree with the President's certification of Mexico. This
isn't partisan politics. It is about our young people. It is
about our communities. It is about our national security.
As I said yesterday at our own International Relations
Committee hearing, the high level working groups that our
Nation and the Mexican Government now routinely convene on
cooperating and fighting drugs, and we are pleased they are
doing that, are avoiding the reality and the poor record that
is obvious to all of us. Perhaps the high attitudes of those
working groups affected the judgment of the administration
officials who recommended to the President--and they made a
strong recommendation to the President and the President
apparently relied on it--the totally unjustified decision to
certify Mexico as fully cooperating in our common war on drugs.
And I will try to be brief in closing. The facts are very
different in Mexico. Drug seizures are down. No major kingpins
have been extradited to our Nation. The administration admitted
as much yesterday, even with all the charts and graphs in
trying to paint the best picture. In addition, the Mexican
Government has yet to permit our courageous, dedicated DEA
agents that Mr. Constantine has been seeking to carry sidearms
with full diplomatic immunity in the dangerous drug war,
permission that virtually every other cooperating government
has provided. The head of the DEA, our lead drug fighting
agency--and I am pleased he is here--Mr. Constantine, and we
call him a cop's cop, has called the corruption in Mexico the
worst criminal threat to our Nation that he has ever seen in
nearly 40 years of law enforcement.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record, Mr.
Chairman, include a column from today's Washington Post by Bob
Novak. Mr. Novak has examined the DEA's Administrator's
outstanding law enforcement record and is clear of unambiguous
analysis of the situation in Mexico today, and he has
concluded, as many have here in the Congress on both sides of
the aisle, that the administration is also corrupting the
certification process with this kind of full passing grade that
it has provided to Mexico.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, that will be made a part of
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2540.065
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And in closing, let me say much more needs to be done.
Congress is going to have to help lead the way. And I look
forward to today's testimony and I will have an opportunity to
examine it on the conclusion.
I regret I am going to have to return to my International
Relations Committee. But I want to thank you for this
opportunity to appear and for giving me the opportunity to add
my words to your important hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank Chairman Gilman and look forward to
cooperation of our two committees--subcommittees in this
effort.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. If I may, Mrs. Mink has a unanimous consent
request.
Mrs. Mink. Congressman Dennis Kucinich asked unanimous
consent to have his opening statement inserted.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, his statement will be made
part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2540.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2540.067
Mr. Mica. If I may, I would like to proceed with questions.
We can get right into it, and if Members have a comment or
opening statement we would be glad to insert them in the
record.
First of all, Administrator Constantine, Congress passed--
the House of Representatives did--several years ago, a number
of requests of Mexico. I think six very specific requests, that
we wanted to see some cooperation on. I think it is almost
exactly 2 years ago, in March. Can you tell me, as I go over
these, whether anything has been done or not, to your
knowledge.
First of all, a maritime agreement?
Mr. Constantine. You probably have to ask the Coast Guard
or the State Department.
Mr. Mica. But to your knowledge, is there any progress in a
maritime agreement?
Mr. Constantine. I couldn't say one way or the other,
Congressman. I am not familiar with the progress on that.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Beers.
Mr. Beers. We have begun over the course of the last year
a----
Mr. Mica. Has a maritime agreement been signed between
Mexico and the United States?
Mr. Beers. No, sir. We are in the process of----
Mr. Mica. Thank you. Mr. Constantine, we asked for
protection of DEA agents, another one. Has that been addressed?
Mr. Constantine. Well, I have always publicly tried to
avoid the levels of protection so that I don't increase the
threat to any of the agents. But the issues involve the----
Mr. Mica. Are they the same?
Mr. Constantine [continuing]. The safety of our agents has
not been resolved as of yet.
Mr. Mica. Have we extradited one major drug trafficker?
That was the third. You said no. Mr. Beers.
Mr. Beers. Garcia Braggo, sir.
Mr. Mica. One--Mr. Constantine, one major Mexican?
Mr. Beers. He is a dual national, sir. Excuse me, I don't
mean to mislead.
Mr. Constantine. Not to my knowledge, Congressman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. We had also requested not only
enactment of money laundering and corruption laws which were
done at that time of our request. I think these were already in
place. But we asked for cooperation on money laundering. Mr.
Constantine, have they been cooperating?
Mr. Constantine. It is my understanding that the law has
been passed. We have not had any major investigations at the
DEA.
Mr. Mica. Casablanca, what did they do with Casablanca?
Mr. Constantine. Casablanca was a Customs case, and I am
not familiar with all the details with it, but I am aware of
the issue.
Mr. Mica. Did they threaten to indict our officials?
Mr. Constantine. That is the report that I read, yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Radar in the South, has there been any progress
on radar? Putting radar in the South was another thing that was
specifically mentioned.
Mr. Constantine. I am not familiar with that or what
progress has been made.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Beers, is there radar in the South?
Mr. Beers. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. So in each of these areas we have seen
almost no progress.
Mr. Constantine, are the figures that we have, are the
seizures down on heroin? Are the seizures down on cocaine?
Mr. Constantine. The seizures, as reported by the
Government of Mexico, on both heroin and cocaine are down, yes,
sir.
Mr. Mica. Now, you gave me this chart that I held up on
production. Is the production of heroin up or down?
Mr. Constantine. That's the signature analysis program.
Mr. Mica. That is, I should say, production. And you are
seizing this, and this is what you can identify in the United
States seized and its source?
Mr. Constantine. Let me give a little bit of context to
that. There are three primary ways that we try to assess the
source of heroin in the United States.
One is the signature analysis program. The signature
analysis program is, as you said, seizures usually at ports of
entry. The drug is then sent to our special testing laboratory
and we get the results that way.
The second is what we call a domestic monitoring program,
where we actually go out and buy heroin in selected cities in
the United States and send that in for analysis.
Mr. Mica. Are we seeing more Mexican produced heroin or
less?
Mr. Constantine. Yes, sir. That figure----
Mr. Mica. More or less, sir?
Mr. Constantine. More, sir.
Mr. Mica. OK.
Mr. Constantine. But to give you a sense----
Mr. Mica. Methamphetamine, you said that they are
explosive?
Mr. Constantine. Well, there has been--in the United States
we moved, in a 5 or 6 year period of time, from a very low
level drug problem of the use and manufacture of
methamphetamine to a substantial abuse problem. Within the
United States there has been a change in the manufacture and
the distribution system from the low level motorcycle gangs to
major organized crime systems based out of Mexico.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Constantine, is there a single Government of
Mexico law enforcement agency which your DEA agency has
complete trust and confidence in?
Mr. Constantine. I would say, in working with the key
people that I have worked with, Mr. Medrosa, Mr. Riberole, and
Mr. Horan, I find them to be honest and trustworthy. The
problem that they have and we have is that every major criminal
investigation that we have conducted and that I know of,
somewhere in the investigation involves a corrupt law
enforcement official or systemic corruption.
So it's--we limited our information to a very select group
of people that we think we can trust.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Constantine, am I correct that we have moved
from corruption to a form of narco-terrorism? You cited the
Baja peninsula. I also understand the Yucatan peninsula. Are
these controlled by drug interests at this point and are there
other areas controlled by drug interests?
Mr. Constantine. I wouldn't define either of those areas as
narco-terrorism. What I would say in both of the areas that you
have defined is that the level of drug trafficking, the power
of the organizations, and the corruption that is occurring
within the systems makes it difficult, and obviously by virtue
of the fact that none of them have been arrested, virtually
impossible to apprehend.
Mr. Mica. The situation has been reported out of control in
the Yucatan peninsula particularly with the reports that the
Governor there is closely linked to drug traffickers and
because of connections with the government he may not even be
subject to arrest. What is your take on that situation?
Mr. Constantine. I believe you are talking about the former
Governor who leaves office.
Mr. Mica. Right.
Mr. Constantine. I think there was an election that was
held. That is an investigation that was conducted--is being
conducted by the Government of Mexico. I would not comment in a
public forum about elected officials in an ongoing criminal
investigation.
Mr. Mica. We will have an opportunity next Thursday. We are
planning a closed briefing by you and others from the
intelligence community on the situation. I just alerted the
Members. Mrs. Mink and I had requested that and we are pleased
that you are complying with that.
Mr. Constantine, based on your knowledge of the law--and
the law is pretty simple. I helped draft it back in the 1980's,
a certification law--it says a country must be certified as
fully cooperating. Based on your knowledge of the law--and I
don't want a political answer. I don't want a diplomatic
answer. You are a chief law enforcement--you are the chief law
enforcement officer we have to rely on in this entire illegal
narcotics area.
Would you recommend certification or decertification of
Mexico as fully cooperating?
Mr. Constantine. Congressman--and this is not a diplomatic
or political answer, but it is the answer that I have
articulated ever since I have been in Washington. I don't think
it is the role of a law enforcement official to evaluate
somebody for a public or political policy decision like
certification. So all that I do is I provide the policymakers
who make those decisions with what the picture looks like, how
the criminal organizations operate, and how we respond to them.
And I have very carefully avoided that----
Mr. Mica. Is the picture one of fully cooperating?
Mr. Constantine. No.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I would like to yield now to the
ranking member, Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The testimony that you
have provided this morning linking up the major organized crime
families in Mexico with a distribution system within the United
States is very terrifying and places a dual responsibility in
your agency to not only help us understand the source issues
within Mexico and how they are coming into the United States
and where the control and corruption and trafficking is within
Mexico, but also how that distribution system impacts our
metropolitan areas and our cities and communities all over the
country.
So I see this as a dual challenge to your agency. And you
have very, very accurately described the dilemma of trying to
indict or arrest or apprehend these foreign connections that
are within our cities.
You indicated that many of them have been indicted but have
fled and, therefore, the criminal justice system has not been
able to bring them to trial and to so-called fulfill the
justice responsibility; and that is very disappointing.
I have a very strong interest in this field. Because I
believe that the frustration of the American public is that
they are not aware of the great efforts of your agency, because
we don't see the whole picture and the connection with the
source and with this whole discussion about certification,
which I believe is interconnected.
Now, following on the chairman's question, which you felt
disinclined to respond to because the decision is not yours. It
is something that all factors have to be put together and then
the President makes his decision. But if the Congress were to
decertify Mexico, may I ask you the question. What would be the
impact of that decertification on the work of your agency?
Mr. Constantine. It would be difficult to predict. It would
be based in part, I suspect, on the reaction of the Government
of Mexico. I couldn't predict--those places where we have
looked at this historically, at least since I have been in the
city, Colombia, I think, is the classic example.
It resulted in increased cooperation and results and
sharing of assets because of the reaction. That does not
guarantee that there would not be a completely different
reaction from the Government of Mexico. That, I think, is a
question that we best ask to someone other than myself. I am
not clairvoyant.
By the way, you are very perceptive for a new person who
has read this, as you explained, to understand our problem. Our
problem is exactly that organized crime situation. Because we
invest a tremendous effort and amount of money in seizing drugs
and arresting key individuals, but where we wind up,
Congresswoman, is we wind up with mid-level people who we can
find as operatives in the United States but their bosses hardly
ever come here for fear of being arrested or indicted.
So whereas when Attorney General Kennedy had this approach
of going after the leadership as the ultimate goal and we were
successful, we are frustrated by the fact that the people we
know are directing these operations literally, so far, are
immune from sanction generally. So you have a very good grasp
of what our problem is.
Mrs. Mink. Now when you talk about having indicted some of
these traffickers, you are not then talking about the top of
the rung but the middle level?
Mr. Constantine. No. We have arrested the middle level. We
have indicted them and arrested them when we can find them in
the United States. We have indicted the key leaders in the top
of the organizations based on the things that they do. The acts
they commit are part of a conspiracy within the United States.
Those are the individuals who so far have been immune from
sanction.
Mrs. Mink. Now is it possible for you to submit to the
committee a list of these high level traffickers that you have
indicted?
Mr. Constantine. I could give them to you by name and by
rote. I know them. We all know them. They are written on our
minds indelibly.
Mrs. Mink. If the committee would indulge me, we have that
in the record right now. It is something that I am very, very
much interested in having in the record.
Mr. Constantine. The two key people from the Arellano-Felix
organization that control the whole Tijuana, Mexicali
distribution system up into the West Coast have both been
indicted.
Ramon Arellano-Felix is a top 10 fugitive in this country
for the last 2 years. You have Rafael Caro-Quintero. He is in
prison in Mexico in relationship to the murder of a DEA agent
in the mid 1980's but he is still wanted here for crimes.
Miguel Caro-Quintero, who Mr. Beers mentioned, of the Sinaloa
group--to give you a sense of our frustration, he has been
indicted again and again.
And when I mentioned his name as a potential target in
Mexico City a little over 2\1/2\ years ago, he called a radio
station to accuse me of slandering his reputation and said that
he had routinely driven through police roadblocks and military
roadblocks and was never challenged despite my comments. He
then, a year later, gave an interview with the Washington Post
about the same issue. He is a leader of a major organization.
We have Vicente Carvillo-Fuentes, the brother of the famous
Carvillo-Fuentes organization, Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, Oscar
Majerbe. Arturo Paez-Martinez, who Mr. Beers mentioned, has
been arrested but we are awaiting extradition. Jaime Gonzales-
Castro, Jaime Ladino-Avila, Jose Gerardo Alvarez, William Brian
Martin, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez.
These are all key figures, including the two Amezcua
brothers, who are key. And I give great credit to the
Government of Mexico for their arrest. But their extradition
and return to the United States would be a major asset for us
in these investigations. And there are a number of others and I
will submit them on the record for you.
Mrs. Mink. You spoke in your testimony about the personal
danger that many of the DEA agents are constantly under. I
would like to ask you what personal dangers are you under as
the person leading this agency?
Mr. Constantine. Well, I don't know. From time to time,
obviously, there are people who would say it is dangerous. But
I have been doing this for 39 years. Perhaps I am fatalistic
and don't play the threats too low. I carry my own firearm and
protect myself, as I have for all of those years.
I suspect the more I testify about these people, the more I
explain who they are and the bigger danger they are to the
United States, the greater danger perhaps I raise for myself.
But I am more concerned about the people who work for me and
who, as I mentioned in my conclusion, night and day are willing
to protect us.
And many of them get killed in the line of duty, and the
seriousness of that, and how serious we have to be to go after
the leadership. I have two sons of mine who are in law
enforcement. I probably worry about them more than I worry
about myself.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I am pleased now to recognize for questions the
gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
both Mr. Constantine's and Mr. Beers' testimony today.
Let me followup with a very important line of questions
that have been asked, which relate to extradition. It is
probably the most critical weapon that we have in dealing with
the foreign nationals who impact our drug importation into the
United States in such a heavy degree.
As has been pointed out, the Government of Mexico has
approved extradition in a number of cases but it has been
blocked to this point by the judiciary.
First of all, Mr. Constantine, what is the impression of
the judiciary? There has been corruption in the mid-level law
enforcement branch in Mexico. How does the judiciary handle the
potential of corruption? Is bribery a problem in the area of
the judiciary?
Mr. Constantine. I'm not an expert, Congressman, on the
judiciary or their corruption issue. There have been
significant cases where certain traffickers have been released
and there have been serious allegations of corruption on the
part of the judiciary and significant bribes that were
supposedly paid for their release. But that's all second-hand
information for me.
Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Beers, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir, I do. I would support what
Administrator Constantine said. There have certainly been
reports of bribes. The Mexican Government has expressed concern
to us about this particular issue. Whether or not there was a
specific bribe associated with a specific extradition case, I
do not have hard evidence to that.
But I think there is general agreement that it is a
problem. The Mexican Government has recognized this problem,
also, as I have said; and it has created the National Judicial
Council, which is trying to reform the court system. But they
have a long way to go.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I have traveled to some of the South
American countries and listened to some of their leaders, and
unless you have an honest judiciary you cannot maintain the
integrity of any law enforcement system. And it is important
that the Government of Mexico take steps in that direction.
Extradition is very, very important. And it is one thing
for the government to approve it, and it is another thing for
the judiciary to block it where the laws are in place to
accomplish that.
Mr. Beers, you have mentioned the letters from the
Governors that you put in the record, and I have respect for
all those Governors. But are they not addressing the stability
issue--in regard to our relationships with Mexico? And that
really does not bear on the issue of whether the government is
fully cooperating in the drug war, is that correct?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I think the letter discusses stability as
well.
Mr. Hutchinson. That is my point. The letters do address
the stability issue. And for that reason, to me, that goes to a
national security waiver. To me, the issue surrounding the
certification process is whether they are fully cooperating. It
is an objective standard that could be measured. You have put
attitude in there as an important part of it, but to me it is
more of an objective issue.
And if they are not meeting that objective standard, then
we should grant them a national security waiver for the purpose
of stability. And I think that might be the point that the
Governors are making.
I know that in reference to Colombia, you know, they were
denied certification and they worked extraordinarily hard in
order to be granted some assistance the next year and were
granted a national security waiver. Was that not beneficial the
way that we handled this with Colombia, Mr. Beers?
Mr. Beers. I would agree with Administrator Constantine. I
believe that the initial decertification of Colombia based on
the corruption at the highest levels of the Government of
Colombia, in fact, was appropriately determined and I think
beneficial in overall terms, in terms of that government's, in
particular that police force of that government, taking
extraordinary efforts on behalf of that country and the world.
As with Administrator Constantine, I also believe that that
is not necessarily a predictor of what the Mexican Government
reaction would be, and I can't tell you either what exactly the
Mexican Government reaction would be.
Mr. Hutchinson. Certainly that would be the case. But, you
know, we should first follow the law very carefully and trust
the wisdom of that law and respect that. And then, I think that
even though it might not be protectorate, certainly I think it
worked very well in regard to Colombia.
And I think that they are moving in the right direction
because of the stand that we took and the compliance with the
law.
Let me ask the question, again, to Director Constantine. In
justifying the certification of Mexico, the administration has
touted the Mexican Government's arrest of the Amezcua
brothers----
Mr. Constantine. Amezcua.
Mr. Hutchinson. Known as the kingpins of methamphetamine.
It is my understanding that all the drug charges against those
three have been dropped and they remain in prison pending the
resolution of the U.S. extradition warrants. Was there a trial
for these men?
Mr. Constantine. I don't know what the judicial proceeding
was, but it was found that they were not prosecutable in Mexico
on the violations. Whether it was a lack of evidence or it was
how the evidence was gained, the charges were all dismissed.
Mr. Hutchinson. Are they still in custody?
Mr. Constantine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hutchinson. Pending the disposition?
Mr. Constantine. Pending the--one of them, I think it is.
Jesus, is pending extradition to the United States. But both
Jesus and Luis have pending charges in San Diego.
Mr. Hutchinson. Is there any evidence that these
traffickers continue to operate from their jail cells?
Mr. Constantine. Not to my knowledge, Congressman.
Mr. Hutchinson. Is the prison system becoming more stable
in terms of reducing the amount of corruption?
Mr. Constantine. I'm not an expert on their penal system. I
just couldn't comment on it, to tell you the truth.
Mr. Hutchinson. And finally, because I know we have a vote
that is going on, are there any mandatory minimum sentences in
Mexico for drug traffickers or for possession of drug
substances like we have in the United States? That has had such
a beneficial impact in our country.
Mr. Constantine. I'd have to get back with you. I'm not
aware of that myself.
Mr. Hutchinson. Do you know, Mr. Beers?
Mr. Beers. Nor am I, sir.
Mr. Hutchinson. So, I mean, you recited somebody got 20
years. Do we know what that means? Does that mean they get out
in one-sixth the time? Is there a mandatory period of time? Do
they serve 20 years? What does that mean?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I have to get back to you. I don't have the
precise answer on that. But I would acknowledge, as did the
Government of Mexico, that their sentencing system is
inadequate with respect to the crimes. They have told us that,
and they are looking to try to deal with that problem
themselves.
Mr. Hutchinson. I think we ought to look into that, because
it is not just sentencing but also how long they serve and what
happens after that and whether we should encourage, you know,
the use of mandatory minimums, more control over the sentencing
process, more direction in that regard. And I thank the
chairman.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas.
I would ask our witnesses to remain, if they can. What I am
going to do is recess the subcommittee for 15 minutes,
approximately. We will try to reconvene at 12:50 and I will
give you a quick break. We do have Members that have additional
questions and we will try to expedite those upon our return.
With that, this subcommittee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Mica. I would like to call the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources back to order.
I am pleased at this time to recognize a gentleman who I
have had the pleasure of working with as ranking member of the
Subcommittee on the Civil Service when I chaired that
subcommittee, and a gentleman who has very eloquently stated
how the narcotics problem affects not only the Nation but
specifically the area that he represents and that we have heard
references to today, Baltimore. The gentleman from Maryland,
Mr. Cummings, you are recognized, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comments, also. I must tell
you, Mr. Constantine, your answer to a question a few moments
ago really touched me when you talked about your life and your
concern about the men and women who work for you. And I can
only say that I am sure everybody up here feels the same way.
We really do care about the men and women who put their
lives on the line every day to make our world a safer place,
and I hope that you will express that to them on behalf of our
committee, that we do appreciate what you do and what they do.
Mr. Constantine. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. I must tell you that I have a lot of concerns
about whether Mexico should have been certified. Because as the
chairman said, drugs affect my community probably as much as or
more than any community or district in the United States. When
I go home, I literally sleep in fear; because I am surrounded.
My block is surrounded by folks who seem to deal in drugs 24
hours a day. So this is a very personal thing for me. And I
wish everybody had cable TV so they could hear some of this
testimony.
A lot of people, I don't even think they comprehend--I'm
talking about good people, good, hard working people. The
question that we get constantly is, well, what is the
government doing about the drug problem? There are no boats or
planes that the people in our neighborhood own. So how are
these drugs getting in the country? And I wish they could hear
and understand how massive and difficult these problems are.
When we talk about corruption, I think it is very difficult
to penetrate it. But I think someone--I think it was Mr.
Hutchinson or the chairman said something that I agree with. I
can't think of too many other methods to get deep into
effective corruption fighting than certification. And that
leads me to my first question to both of you.
I mean, it seems as if the certification process--and I
understand everything you have said about opinions, about
governments. I understand that, and I respect that. And if I
cross that line with my question, just let me know; because I
certainly don't intend to.
But I am wondering, here we are. We sit, of course, as a
Congress to the United States representing the people, and we
have this problem which affects so many Americans. And I think
we are always trying to figure out how we can be most
effective.
I was just wondering of both of you, do you--I mean, the
certification process is one thing. Can you think of any other
ways we can kind of force governments or push them into greater
cooperation? Without even--I am not even getting into whether
Mexico is cooperating fully. I have my opinion on that--but I
am just wondering if you all can see any way?
Because when I think about the corruption process, when you
have threats of death and violence and then you have money, big
money, being used, those are two very significant forces.
So I was just wondering if you all had any opinions as to
other things that either the Congress could do with regard to
making the certification process even stronger or more
effective? Or is there something else that we can do?
Mr. Constantine. I think probably Mr. Beers would be better
to talk about the process.
But let me explain to you a little bit about something that
I think is important to note and I did earlier. These
organizations that we deal with are not invulnerable. I have
seen this again and again. They can be broken down. They can be
brought to justice, and you can change the situation. There is
not an infinite number of them.
In those countries who have experienced this before, the
United States being one of them, Italy, Thailand, Colombia, a
select group--and it doesn't have to be an army of them--of
very honest, courageous people in law enforcement leadership
positions, with support, start to make the appropriate arrests
of the key individuals, which sends a signal to the citizens
that law enforcement can be trusted and that they can then
provide information and witness information to honest,
aggressive law enforcement officials.
In some cases--and you can kind of picture this in your
life--those honest law enforcement officials appreciate some
type of pressure from an external source to help change the
situation. Now whether that is certification or decertification
or what other processes are out there--I don't know,
Congressman, I think it is one--trying to support those people
or individuals who are in there in a cooperative or bilateral
fashion for as long as you possibly can.
And if at the end of all of that effort that is not
effective, then I think, speaking as a citizen rather than the
head of DEA, that we have to do something as a Nation to insure
these people are brought to justice.
I spent 8 years working for Governor Cuomo at the height of
the crack problem in New York City and New York State. I can
remember his speeches to this day, and everybody knows that he
is a great speaker. But this one I remember. He would say,
``They don't grow coca in the Bronx. They don't grow opium
poppies in Brooklyn. These drugs are manufactured from
someplace else and distributed from someplace else,'' and that
we needed assistance at that time from the Federal Government
in dealing with these issues external to the United States.
Now what that process would look like, there's a lot of
people with better experience than I have in this and may know
of previous negotiations. But I think there comes a point in
time where crime leaders or leaders of these drug gangs who
visit tremendous devastation to Baltimore or New York or to
Newark or Boston, or whatever the city or town might be, have
to pay a price for what they have done, or else the law
enforcement system has virtually broken down completely. But I
think Mr. Beers might be better able than I to talk about
certification and alternatives.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Tom. I generally agree with what Tom
said, and we were talking about this over the break, that both
of us would agree that there is no single silver bullet
solution to this.
But I think we also both agree that a system which will
allow a government or governments to go after the leadership of
trafficking organizations represents one of the premier policy
choices in terms of dismantling and disrupting the largest
trafficking organizations, and that it doesn't have to be a
large army that does it. A small unit can do it.
But, then, that country has to have, also, I think, a
criminal justice system that can also take the product of the
work of that unit and turn it into the completion of the
process. Which is to incarcerate those individuals and to take
away their ill-gotten gains and give them back to the people
who were hurt or the law enforcement officials who are paid to
protect them.
I would add to what Tom said, and I don't think he would
disagree with this, that in addition to that--and that's a
national solution--we are absolutely dependent upon
international cooperation. These criminals don't honor
international boundaries. They move across them. We are
sometimes thwarted in our ability to be able to respond
effectively, because we all still exist in a world as
government officials in which borders do have meaning. And DEA
and other organizations, just in this country, are looking at
those problems. We are not by any means there, yet.
The third thing I would say in that--and it is in support
of the international cooperation. And I spoke about it with
respect to Mexico, but it is also not unique. And that is, in
that form of international cooperation, the ability to sit down
with one's counterpart, look at the problem, describe the
problem accurately, look at the policy options for solutions,
talk about what the objectives are, talk about what progress
has been made, and then talk about where deficiencies were and
where other things might be done better.
We are starting that process with Mexico. We are a little
further behind in the hemisphere, but that is also an effort
that has come out of the Summit of Americas in the Hemisphere.
None of this is going to solve the problem overnight. The
corruption that Tom talked about is very serious. And Italy's
ability to deal with that took how many years, Tom?
Mr. Constantine. Ten or fifteen years.
Mr. Beers. So Mexico is at least indicating to us how much
they recognize the problem and that they are committed to doing
something about it. Now we have to allow them to get on with
doing it and support them in doing it, and hopefully we'll have
the same results and hopefully in a shorter amount of time.
Mr. Cummings. Just one other question. You know, I was
listening to you and Mr. Beers talk about extradition. You
know, I couldn't help but think about this case in Maryland
that upset so many of us with Israel, the young man who
allegedly committed murder in Montgomery County, which is not
very far from here. And we were very upset about that.
But when I thought about it, I thought about the five-judge
panel that said in a 3 to 2 vote that the laws just would not
allow them to grant the request of the United States. I said to
myself, I said, ``Well, those are the laws of that country and
I guess we just have to live with them.''
Do you in this situation--I mean, do you feel that when it
comes to extradition that there is some unfairness with regard
to Mexico? I mean, I'm just curious. In other words, do you
think that it is weighted against--either one of you--against
the United States?
Mr. Constantine. Let me say, and I have to make this clear,
that the biggest problem for us is the key figures are never
arrested. I mean, it never gets to an extradition question.
Mr. Cummings. They don't even get to that point?
Mr. Cummings. Because the key leaders in these
organizations are very seldom ever arrested. And the reason
they are not arrested is that they have either intimidated the
witnesses or they corrupted the public officials.
Then once arrested, and if their charge is pending in the
United States, as there are for many of them, then there would
be a test of the extradition process. And there is one key
individual who begins that process over the last several
months, one of the Amezcua brothers. We will see how that works
out.
But more important to me as a law enforcement official
trying to deal with a major crime organization, when the
leaders can continually, year after year after year, despite
their names being mentioned, identified every place in the
world, can avoid even a simple arrest by virtue of the fact
that they drive around, Congressman, in a convoy of 50 to 80
heavily armed people.
A significant number of those heavily armed people are
policemen, which means that a small group of honest law
enforcement officials who try to make an apprehension are
placed in great jeopardy.
We had in the Tijuana area this year, where a courageous
captain from the city police department tried to make an arrest
of a major marijuana shipment and was shot and killed, and two
of the people who were involved in the convoy for the load of
marijuana, who were involved in the killing of the captain,
were highway patrol or State police officers from that area.
And that's kind of the sense of the difficulty of the
apprehension.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman from Maryland. I am pleased
to recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
It is good to see you both again, and I want to thank you
both for your efforts. I have a number of questions. I know the
corruption issue is very difficult. In fact, it is not even
clear that in the United States we don't have more cabinet
members and former cabinet members under investigation right
now than Mexico, which is a troubling figure, not for
narcotics, however.
One of the questions that I have regards directly this
question of the impact of decertification. I thought I'd ask
Mr. Beers first. Do you know of any country that we have
actually decertified where there has been less cooperation
after that? In other words, some haven't cooperated. If they
were uncooperative, they continued to be uncooperative. They
didn't all become more cooperative. But is there anybody who
has become less cooperative after we have decertified?
Mr. Beers. I don't think it is fair to say that Burma has
been any more cooperative since they have been decertified over
the process. We had formerly a good cooperative relationship
with previous governments in Burma. But since they have been
decertified, they have shown no indication of a greater
willingness to cooperate.
Mr. Souder. Any country other than Burma? Because we
decertify anywhere from three to six in given cycles.
Mr. Beers. I would also add that Nigeria has not shown any
further cooperation during the period in which they were----
Mr. Souder. Were they cooperating prior to that?
Mr. Beers. Excuse me?
Mr. Souder. Was Nigeria cooperating prior to that?
Mr. Beers. I am sorry. I just don't have the information
about that.
Mr. Souder. Because it doesn't always have a positive
benefit. But in trying to anticipate whether it has a negative
benefit as well--or a negative result.
Mr. Constantine, I know from having talked with some of
your agents in Southeast Asia that they, too, are concerned
that Burma, which was human rights certification not narcotics
cooperation decertification said--do you know any other case
other than--I guess it is Myanmar rather than Burma--besides
that country where we have actually gone backward if we
decertified? In other words, what is the risk here based on
past experience that decertifying Mexico would have a negative?
Mr. Constantine. The only country that I think that has had
a direct impact on drug trafficking within the United States
and was decertified was Colombia. The reaction in Colombia as a
result of the decertification was positive. And in my sense of
talking with people in law enforcement and other aspects of the
community, they saw the pressure from the United States as
supportive when they were in a difficult situation. But that's
the only--I take, first of all, the nexus of a country that
impacts us greatly. I have only been here 5 years and that is
the one that stands out significantly.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Constantine, didn't decertification not
long ago result in one of your brave DEA agents, in fact, being
released as part of the pressures of this process? I didn't say
a country or anywhere but, in fact, there was a very practical
impact on your agency?
Mr. Constantine. Well, there were a lot of people who
played a major role in that. I think his name is Interforth,
from the State Department, was fantastic, as well as the
Ambassador, in fighting for us.
Congressman Gilman was special in that he very early took a
very public stand and was very, very supportive of us. And I
think combining that, the comments that I heard that it would
be difficult to say that they are fully cooperative on a
certification process if a DEA employee, a national, who was
doing a drug investigation, was incarcerated for their efforts.
And that is kind of my memory of how it all played out. And
thank God from everybody's efforts it was successful and he has
been released and is in the United States.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Souder, if I could intervene for just a
moment. I am asked to chair another committee hearing right
now. I have additional questions for both of the gentlemen. I
will ask them in writing and also will direct some questions to
Mr. Constantine next week in a closed session. I turn the chair
over to you and I will try to return as quickly as possible.
If you would introduce our second panel when you conclude
and recognize anyone from either side, I would appreciate it.
Thank you.
Mr. Souder. OK, thank you.
Mr. Beers, one of the things as we go through the
decertification debate that--I am sorry. I missed both of your
testimony and I am not sure if you gave this verbally. But in
the written document there are a lot of things that trouble me.
Because we just spent 3 days down in Mexico, met with a lot of
the leaders.
I think that at the top, just like 4 years ago when I was
there and met with President Zedillo, I think at the top there
is a commitment. And one of the fundamental questions of this
commitment is, are we strengthening those who are trying to
clean up the system or weakening those who are trying to clean
up the system?
Let me first ask the question. When we decertified Colombia
they, in fact, continued to ship flowers and coffee into our
country. Don't they? In other words, it doesn't end all trade.
Mr. Beers. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Souder. And we continued to ship antinarcotics things
to the Colombian national police, in other words, vetted units
and so on. It isn't like it suddenly stopped?
Mr. Beers. Counternarcotics assistance and humanitarian aid
are not cutoff by decertification, yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. And it doesn't end all trade?
Mr. Beers. No, sir, it does not. Although there is a
provision which could be implemented which could have some
trade impact. It is a separate provision by another law.
Mr. Souder. And while many in Congress who are not
necessarily big boosters of NAFTA might like that, that is not
likely to be a result. This isn't a straight NAFTA question of,
if all of a sudden Mexico were decertified that NAFTA is over?
Mr. Beers. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Souder. It would be optional whether you did
additional?
Mr. Beers. That is correct, sir. It is a separate decision.
Mr. Souder. One of the things that bothers me, because I am
listening to the Foreign Minister, the Attorney General, the
Interior Ministry, as well as the President seem to be
committed. We have met with Members of Congress and the Senate.
But in your document here you have a whole series of things.
For example, there are a lot of laws that they submitted to
Congress but none become final. The Attorney General, I know,
told us that part of the process that he is trying to follow
the law but now it takes a number of years to pursue the
extraditions. But in your document you also point out that they
have this problem with the lifetime imprisonment clear, so it
is not clear how extradition is going to actually work.
We, in our House decertification in the past, have had the
maritime agreement, but they told us that we have never
actually made an official request to them to sign the maritime
agreement.
In here, you say in 1998, they uncovered evidence of
corruption in special vetted units that were specially created
to avoid corruption, which we didn't even have in Colombia.
This is a new variable. Why wouldn't we at least, in an interim
basis, not restricting the trade portions necessarily, say we
appreciate that in February of this year you have some more
initiatives.
We appreciate that you started some initiatives last year,
but some minimum criteria here, like we go a year without your
special vetted units being compromised.
There was one line in here that says, ``to fight against
corruption a new national registry of public security personnel
was used to match active duty police against those persons who
had judicial proceedings pending against them.'' Boy, that is a
pretty basic thing that should have been being checked about,
oh, 30 years ago.
Why wouldn't we have--not implying that they don't have
their motives correct--but use this as a leverage, like we did
in Colombia and like the administration did in Colombia, to say
we want to see specific progress in your courts, specific
progress in your legislature that you are actually moving
things, that we are seeing specific progress on the actual
extraditions as opposed to your starting the process.
Mr. Beers. Sir, we do that and we have made some progress,
and we believe that this year's certification decision is based
on some of that progress made. And we also believe that we have
set up mechanisms that will allow that process to increase
further over time. I spoke briefly at the beginning about these
performance measures of effectiveness.
One of the purposes of this particular process is for both
countries to develop an awareness of what is going on in each
country, to talk about the objectives, to talk about the
milestones to achieve those objectives, and then come back
after a time period. We will come back at this in September and
see what progress has been made and talk about a constructive
criticism or cooperation which can improve that even further.
So I take your point to heart, sir, and we are trying to do
that. And I do believe that is why we have made this decision
this year in order to fully certify them.
Mr. Souder. I believe--I mean, I heard the presentation of
that document and I do believe that not only Mexico but other
countries are recognizing that they have a domestic problem as
well as an international one, just like we have to do more on
demand reduction.
At the same time, we clearly heard last week from the
Foreign Minister this frustration that they aren't being given
specifically the things on the decertification. And my other
point regarding your comments is that a lot of what is in that
document is regarding process.
In other words, if you introduce a bill rather than
standards that the bill has been done, and because I agree with
you one sign of good will is that a process starts. Another
sign is actual results.
I also want to take--I will ask the chairman briefly
whether this is in order--yes, it is. I am the chairman right
now--and since I raised Colombia I actually have a question
regarding Colombia. You and I have talked about Black Hawks
until we are both blue in the face and Huey helicopters until
we are blue in the face. And we are happy that we actually have
six Black Hawks going to the Colombia National Police. I think
we are starting to see the progress on the Huey upgrades.
When we met with people from your department and elsewhere
in Colombia, I was concerned because I raised this question of
the guns on the Black Hawks and making sure that they had the
best they got, 19's rather than the M-60's, and would like to
continue to point out that when we have spent this amount of
money on the Black Hawks, and I heard the explanations that,
yes, you are under cost pressure. Yes, there are ammunition
questions.
But the practical matter is that my understanding is that
the M-134's are from 1964 and they are having trouble getting
spare parts, whereas the new guns are 1992. We have been told
in Colombia that, for example, a Black Hawk helicopter that the
military was using that had an M-60 on one side and a GAL-19 on
the other, all the battlefield damage has been on the M-60 side
because, in fact, even the narco-terrorists are figuring which
side they don't want to go to. There is a substantive
difference in the two types of guns.
And when we have invested this amount of money in the Black
Hawks I would argue strongly and would like to hear any
convinc- ing evidence to the contrary that the amount of money
that we are talking in the differential between these guns once
we are this far along is not worth the argument we are having.
Let's get them down there. Let's get them armed the best
way, because long term and the relationship to Mexico is unless
we can get control of the problems in Colombia, Mexico is going
to continue to be a conduit. The United States is under direct
pressure and, in my opinion, there is no more critical area of
the world right now. Peru and Bolivia have made progress.
Mexico and the Colombian Government are trying to make some
inroads.
We have a war going on down there. We can talk about being
a cancer to the United States. But there is an actual war. And
if we don't arm them in the absolute best ways, the pressure is
they are going to come to us like the people in Kosovo, the
people in Bosnia, the people all over the world and say, hey,
America, how are you going to help?
Because we have oil on the one side in Venezuela. We have
drugs pouring in from Colombia. We have the canal on the other
side. This is clearly a compelling national interest, and I
don't understand the constant pressure with your funds not to
impact Peru here and Boliva here and Mexico here and how are we
going to keep the Caribbean front up?
But I would argue that this is potentially penny-wise and
pound-foolish if we don't get them the best guns on the Black
Hawks.
Do you have any comments you would like to make?
Mr. Beers. I would, sir. I agree with you that what we want
to do is to give them the best weapons systems in association
with the mission that they are asked to undertake. We have
looked at this issue. We have favored the Mark-44. They have
initially favored the Mark-44. They are looking at the issue
again. It is not firmly and finally decided.
I spoke to General Serrano the day before yesterday on this
very issue, and we have agreed to continue this subject under
discussion.
But if I may make a simple point, and there is a lot more
we could talk about. The simplest point from which we started,
sir, was that with respect to the use of these two systems
within the U.S. military, our special operations units used the
Mark-44 on their Black Hawk helicopters and our army regular
forces used the GAL-19 on their helicopters.
We have asked. We have talked. We have tried to understand
why one unit, a highly specialized, elite set of units, have
chosen to use the Mark-44, and we have asked why the army has
chosen to use the GAL-19. The Mark-44 rate of fire is higher,
almost twice as high as the rate of fire of the GAL-19. The
GAL-19 shoots further. The GAL-19 round is heavier. Those are
both indications that would seem to favor it.
They also mean that on a vessel--on a platform you cannot
take as much ammunition of the heavier variety as you can of
the lighter variety. So if you are talking about sustained fire
power, I am told by our military that that is an argument in
favor of the Mark-44. We haven't settled this finally. We will
continue to discuss this. And I would be happy to give you a
final report when we come to final solution on this, sir.
Mr. Souder. OK, I would like to continue to work with you,
because General Serrano continues to request that the Colombia
air force have that. And when we particularly go up to the
higher elevations where the heroin is, as we make actual
progress, the firing and the counterfire power is going to get
greater, not less. I am confident that General Wilhelm is
getting a handle on both the defense side and the Colombia
National Police and they both need to be there. I am hopeful
that we can make progress.
But at the same time, I want to make sure it is not a
budgetary driven question, that it is in fact substantive, what
is the best way to win this war? Because the price of us
marginally making decisions is being slightly behind all the
time. We don't want another Vietnam where we are always behind.
Mr. Beers. You notice, sir, I did not argue the budget
issue. I can make that argument, but I am starting from where
you are starting, sir. What is the mission? What is the
requirement?
Mr. Souder. And also not only what the current is, is that,
I mean, we keep hearing about the potentiality and we know it
is coming, the Stinger missiles and much more fire power in the
hands of the FARC than we have seen. Because if we start to
making inroads, it will become greater, not less. We need to
prepare for the next step, not just where we currently are.
Mr. Cummings had some additional questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Beers, when you were answering a question of the
chairman, I guess over an hour ago now, he had asked you about
a maritime agreement and you gave your answer and said there
was no maritime agreement. It appeared that you wanted to say
something else, and I want to give you that opportunity,
whatever it may be, so that the record is clear.
Mr. Beers. Thank you very much, sir. What I was intending
to say is that we began last summer to negotiate a multi-
lateral maritime agreement with Caribbean states of which
Mexico is one. Mexico is a full participant in these maritime
negotiations and our negotiator prognosticates that they expect
to resolve this maritime agreement over the course of the next
year. That is where we are today. We will continue to work on
it and we are happy to report to Congress on any progress.
Mr. Cummings. How important is that agreement?
Mr. Beers. Sir, the agreement allows, in its most general
sense, navies and coast guards around the world or in any water
to fully cooperate across international boundaries.
That is the heart of it, which is if we see a problem and
we are in pursuit and we are in international waters, we have a
mechanism whereby we can communicate with a coastal State into
whose waters those vessels may be proceeding. They will then
activate their own law enforcement officials in order to
respond to that, or if they are unable then there is a
provision in which the coast guard, the international state,
could pursue that vessel into territorial waters, always with
the approval of the host nation, but a much easier process than
otherwise. We have found this works very well with the
Government of Colombia, where in almost every case the
Government of Colombia, as a result of the cooperation
mechanisms that have been set up, actually make the arrests.
They come out. They pursue. They arrest.
Mr. Cummings. Are our agents receiving adequate protection
when they are in Mexico?
Mr. Constantine. What I have commented before, and there is
a closed session next week, I tried to avoid talking about all
of the security issues for agents in open sessions.
However, there has been a lot of dialog going back and
forth and both the diplomatic and physical security of our
agents has not been resolved and I believe is insufficient for
the task we are giving to them presently.
Mr. Cummings. Overall would you say we have less
cooperation than, say, a year or more or about the same?
Mr. Constantine. Well, as I mentioned before, I try to stay
out of the cooperation issue because I think as a law
enforcement official that is far afield. The one thing I will
say----
Mr. Cummings. Well, wait a minute. Wait a minute.
Mr. Constantine. The traffickers are much more powerful
than they were 5 years ago and they have grown more powerful
every year. And they have more wealth at their disposal to
corrupt law enforcement officials, and they use violence. That
is the experience that I see as a law enforcement official.
Mr. Cummings. I still want to stay on this side of the
line, because I don't want--I'm not trying to get you over
across this line that you don't want to cross. But have you
come to some conclusions as to why what you just said has
happened?
Mr. Constantine. Well, the conclusions I draw is the people
that I meet with, that I have respect for, the Attorney General
of Mexico and his staff, want to do the right thing. But the
machinery under them has been so badly infected by both
corruption and intimidation it is difficult for them to achieve
the things that they want and we want them to achieve. And I
think that is the present situation as I see it in Mexico
today.
Mr. Cummings. When you have an opportunity to interact--I
guess you do--with the Mexican people day to day, do you get
the impression that they want to--and I know this may be a
difficult question, but do you get the impression that they
want to rid Mexico of this whole drug situation?
Mr. Constantine. I am not an expert on the culture of
Mexico. The one thing I will notice is that the reaction to
crimes of violence, police misconduct, crimes by policemen, and
police corruption has received a great deal of attention in the
way of public demonstrations, public outcry, concern by the
citizens of Mexico concern the quality of law enforcement
services that they have within the country. That I pick up from
newspapers and translations.
Mr. Cummings. When the General was arrested and convicted,
there was some restructuring. Am I right?
Mr. Constantine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Do you think it is better now? And I know we
have taken this one person out, removed him. But, then when you
restructure, I guess the restructuring could be better or it
could be worse. I mean, have you come to any conclusions on
that?
Mr. Constantine. That is about the third or fourth
restructuring that I have seen since I have been head of DEA. A
lot of the responsibility in Mexico was taken away from
civilian law enforcement because of the problems and given to
the military.
We are hopeful that these new vetted units--in other words,
we work with the Government of Mexico. We spend our money to
make sure that these people have, as best as we can see, a very
clean background and are not compromised. We bring them to a
training facility in northern Virginia. The Justice Department,
the DEA, and the FBI train them and return them so that we can
have a unit that we can share very critical information with.
That received a major setback this year--I have to be
honest with you--in which senior level people within those
units by all indications and everything I could see had been
seriously compromised by the traffickers. So we can't give up.
We are going back and trying to rebuild a new and better
system. But that was a sense of major frustration to us this
summer.
Mr. Cummings. I would imagine that when you have a
situation like the one you just described or you have someone
who has been working honestly and courageously, and the next
thing you know harm is done to them, I imagine that that must
be--those kind of events must really set back any kind of
legitimate operation quite a bit. Was that a fair conclusion?
Mr. Constantine. No, that's a fair conclusion. There are a
number of police officials and prosecutors in Mexico who have
been assassinated by all that we can see as a result of a
contract assassination by the major drug organizations.
And until those leaders are brought to the bar of justice
and held responsible for that, I can just tell you as a
policeman in the United States if I looked around and I saw my
leadership core being regularly assassinated and bodies found
in the fields, I would wonder how far will I go before I place
myself or my family in the same jeopardy. And in my comments
that is the very purpose of this violence. It is what the Mafia
did in the United States. They never killed police officers,
but they killed witnesses. And for a long time they had a code
of silence until Attorney General Kennedy, I think, as I have
said, turned that around.
But that violence is not always random. That has a purpose.
And the purpose is so that nobody is willing to testify. The
policemen, if they don't take a bribe and they want to be
honest, then, are assassinated. I mean, at one time the police
chief of Tijuana, back in 1995 or 1996, set out on a major
strategy to go after the Arellano-Felix organization in
Tijuana. He was, by all of the reports, approached by the
trafficking organizations and offered substantial sums of money
to stop doing that. He refused to do that. He was told you only
get one chance, and what happened to him next, he was led to a
phoney complaint and assassinated.
When that happens to a police chief, that has a serious
damaging effect to other people at other levels of the
organization. There is no doubt about it.
Mr. Cummings. I was just curious--as you were talking, I
have just two more questions. As you were talking, I couldn't
help think about in Baltimore the police funerals that I have
gone to and think about all of the--I mean, we see it all over
the country. Police officers come from everywhere, and it is
such a--I mean, it is taken very seriously. I mean, the
citizens take it very seriously. I guess it is because it is
truly a thin, blue line, a very thin, blue line.
I am just wondering when damage to the police officers come
in Mexico do you see the same kind of reaction. Do you know?
Mr. Constantine. I am not familiar with their system. I
have been, as you have said, to far too many. Since I have had
these two jobs, the Superintendent of State Police in New York
and head of DEA, I have had 25 people killed in the line of
duty and have gone to 25 funerals and met with 25 families. My
roommate in State police school was shot and killed. I was
lieutenant in charge of recruit training at the State police. I
had one class of 120 kids. Three of them were shot and killed
within 8 years.
All of those things have had an impact on me, and that is
why I take this so seriously. I mean, that is why I find the
Arellano-Felix brothers, Vicente Carvillo-Fuentes, Juan
Aspergo, I find these to be despicable, evil people who have to
be brought to justice and have to be penalized for that
activity if we are going to have any sense of fulfilling the
sacrifice that has been made by these individuals involved.
Mr. Cummings. The last question, I am just wondering, when
the Mexican--when you talk to higher ups and folks in the
Mexican Government, I mean, do they know the lay of the land
and what the problems are? I mean, do they say to you, look,
you know, you have got to help us get around all of this.
We are just in fear. We are in fear for our families, for
ourselves. The United States is probably the most significant
law enforcement agency in the world. You know, help us. Do you
get that or is it already assumed that you are going to do
that?
Mr. Constantine. The individuals that I mentioned I am
involved with, yes, you have those conversations, try to find
help. I usually pay a big price every time I testify on this
issue for months afterwards in that I think the relationship
chills and then becomes cool for awhile, and I take a
responsibility for that. But that is part of the job.
Yes, we talk about those things. I find them to be--the
individuals that I have dealt with really want to do the right
thing. I mean, but our frustrations are their frustrations. But
eventually--I think somebody mentioned that somewhere down the
line--I don't know when the year is. I don't know when the date
is, and we talk about this for a lot of years--there is going
to have to be an actual demonstration of the results, similar
to that which we saw in the United States, similar to that
which we saw in Italy, similar to that which we saw in
Colombia. And then I think we will be making major progress and
improvements.
Mr. Cummings. I want to just thank both of you for your
testimony and want to thank you for all that you are trying to
do to make our streets safer and our lives better. I really
appreciate it. I am sure I speak for all of us.
Mr. Souder. I will also thank you for how long you have
been here and for taking the different questions. We have
worked with both of you for a long period of time and not just
on behalf of our citizens but also those in Fort Wayne, where
we now have a DEA task force starting up. And, also, in the DEA
and in the State Department employees as we have been in
Central and South America and around the world, those people
are right on the front lines. They have been very helpful, very
forthcoming. I really appreciate the commitment.
We may have disagreements from time to time on how to do
different things, how to balance all the financial things. But
what we need to do is have a united American front, and I
really appreciate the efforts of DEA around the world as well
as domestically and in the State Department, not only in
directly fighting narcotics but in helping with crop
eradication and crop substitution where we are actually making
progress in some countries.
And if we continue to make that progress and get the
pressure on the transit zone and in Mexico and win the battle
in Colombia, we will at least have moved it all to
methamphetamine or something else. But it is a matter of this
constant, and we thank you both for your leadership.
If the second panel could come forward, at this time I
would like to recognize from the General Accounting Office Mr.
Ben Nelson, the Director of International Relations, Foreign
Trade, National Security, International Affairs Divisions. He
is joined by his Assistant Director, Mr. Ron Kushner. And
before you sit down, we need to swear in all of our witnesses.
So would you raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that the witnesses answered
in the affirmative.
Mr. Nelson, would you commence with your remarks when you
are ready.
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN NELSON, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED
BY RON KUSHNER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Mr. Nelson. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to be here to discuss our work on the
counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico.
My prepared statement, which I will veer away from a little
bit in the interest of time, will highlight the findings from
our ongoing effort to update our June 1998, report on this
matter. This was requested by former Chairman Hastert and
Senator Grassley.
My statement covers two broad issues, Mexico's efforts to
address the drug threat and United States counternarcotics
assistance provided to Mexico. You just heard administration
witnesses provide their perspective on the drug problem facing
our two countries. You heard about the threat.
Let me recount. Mexico is one of the largest centers for
narcotics-related business in the world. Mexico is still the
principal transit country for cocaine entering the United
States. Mexico is either a producer, refiner or transit point
for cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and heroin. It is also
a major hub for the recycling of drug proceeds. Mexico's Juarez
drug trafficking organization is as powerful and dangerous as
Colombia's Medellin and Cali cartels used to be.
Mexico's poorest border and the daunting volume of
legitimate cross-border traffic, some 86 million cars and 4
million trucks, provide near limitless opportunities for the
smuggling of illicit drugs and the proceeds of the sales of
those drugs.
You also heard discussion about the level of progress that
has actually been made. You also were told by administration
witnesses of the problem of corruption. Our own work indicates
that drug traffickers spend approximately $6 billion a year to
suborn various law enforcement and public officials. You have
also heard today about the new initiatives that the Mexican
Government plans to undertake to better address the problem.
What you have not heard was much discussion on United
States assistance to Mexico.
In light of the fact that many of the key factors, the
progress or lack thereof, have been well established, I would
like to focus briefly on U.S. assistance, the usefulness of
it--the nature of it, the usefulness, and trends in the
provision of assistance. Since 1997, the Departments of State
and Defense have provided the Government of Mexico with over
$112 million worth of equipment, training and aviation spare
parts for counternarcotics purposes. The major assistance
included helicopters, aircraft and two Knox class frigates
which were purchased by the Mexican Government through our
foreign military sales program.
Last year, I testified that some of the assistance provided
to the Mexican military was of limited usefulness due to
operational and logistical support problems. In the past year,
the two frigates have become operational. Unfortunately, the
situation with the helicopters has gotten worse. All 72 of the
helicopters provided to the Mexican military have been grounded
because of air worthiness concerns. In addition, the four C-26
aircraft provided have not been used for counternarcotics
operations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I or Mr.
Kushner will be happy to respond to any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I want to ask an initial question. I will go to
Mr. Cummings and then come back. You just alluded to these
helicopters.
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. I have visited Colombia, actually four times
now, and have been to their facilities where they are repairing
these things. If they think they can get it off the ground, the
helicopter goes up. They borrow parts from all sorts of things
to get their helicopters flying. You have a statement here that
says, in addition, four C-26 aircraft are not being used for
counternarcotics operations. Right before that you said all of
their Hueys are grounded because of air worthiness concerns,
which is an American problem as well in trying to get that up.
What about these four C-26. Could they fly?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. The problem with the C-26's--and Mr.
Kushner can add to my statement since he has been down to
Mexico. But the problem is not a mechanical problem. It is the
mission. It is whether those aircraft can be suited for a
counternarcotics mission in their current state.
Mr. Kushner. So they are not configured for surveillance
type operations. It would cost about $3 million per aircraft to
reconfigure those so the Mexicans could use them for
surveillance type operations. They received four of them, as we
testified. One of them is completely down. I understand that
the nose gear is collapsed and has not been repaired. And the
three other ones, they are operational. They may fly them for
transport purposes, but no counternarcotics missions are being
flown.
Mr. Souder. Have they requested funds for these or have
they done anything in their own government to try to get them
ready? They are just letting them sit there? Why did we give
them to them if they are just going to sit there?
Mr. Kushner. That is a good question. It is negative to
both your questions. As far as we know, the Mexicans have not
specifically requested funds to fly the C-26's nor has the
United States Government provided funds to maintain and get
those things operational. It is another thing, you can fly
those aircraft but they also have to be maintained. It is kind
of a complex aircraft and normally it would have a contractor
come in and do the maintenance of them. There is no contractor
down there maintaining those aircraft.
Mr. Souder. Did they request these?
Mr. Kushner. As far as I know, sir, no.
Mr. Souder. So will you----
Mr. Kushner. We have four aircraft down there, sir, that
are just basically not being used for counternarcotics
purposes. As we reported last year and we made a recommendation
to the Department of Defense and Department of State, that
better planning and coordination is needed when you are
considering the type of packages you are going to provide for
counternarcotics purposes.
Mr. Souder. Were they ever even consulted about these?
Mr. Kushner. I can't answer that, sir. I do not know
whether the Mexicans were consulted about their need for a C-26
or not.
Mr. Souder. The bottom line is that it looked good for us
to send the stuff down there like there was an antinarcotics
effort going on, but they didn't request it. There is no money
in their budget for it. There is no money in our budget to get
them up to speed. They are sitting on the ground and they are
not being used for counternarcotics. Is your general
impression--have you looked at Colombia as well as Mexico in
other research? Do you think that Colombians would have these
things sitting on the ground?
Mr. Kushner. I have not looked at Colombia personally, but
Mr. Nelson knows a little bit more about that than I do.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Nelson, do you think the Colombians would
have these sitting on the ground without a request in? I mean,
do you know of any case where there is a Colombian helicopter
sitting on the ground that can fly?
Mr. Nelson. Well, to your first question, I can't answer
whether, you know, this would be the case in Colombia. But I do
not know of any helicopters that are sitting on the ground in
Colombia that are not being used.
Mr. Souder. And when we were just in Mexico we were told
that they were going for more go-fast boats. They were looking
for different surveillance equipment, and they were putting
certain things in their budget. Now all this happened 10 days
before certification was due.
Mr. Nelson. Correct.
Mr. Souder. But that they had, because they are concerned
about being able to control these coasts, wouldn't these four
C-26 help with that?
Mr. Nelson. If they were fitted with the----
Mr. Souder. In other words, if these were fitted properly,
would these help with those efforts?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. I would agree.
Mr. Souder. I will yield to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I only have a couple of questions. I
understand these gentlemen have to get over to the Senate. Is
that right?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this. Why is the organized
crime unit short of fully screened staff? Do you know what the
hold-up is?
Mr. Kushner. I think it revolves around having personnel to
do the final screening of them. Those questions have come up
over the last 6 or 7 months. With the rescreening of some of
the individuals within the organized crime unit who actually
failed the rescreening process, there are questions about how
they are going to proceed again. So it has been slowed down
somewhat. But 50 percent of the OCU staff are not fully
screened.
Mr. Cummings. Also in the report it talks about how you
think that Mexico needs a sufficiently screened, better paid
core of judges to hear drug cases. And I take it that this is
not an idea that is brand new. What is the hold-up there?
Mr. Kushner. That hasn't been really pursued by anyone as
far as we know within the Government of Mexico. The screening
process the Government of Mexico has instituted down there, it
is staffed but it is a limited staff and it has limited
equipment availability, meaning polygraph-type machines. And
these people have to be trained on the use of those machines.
So I would say it is a resource constraint as well as just
prioritizing the people within Mexico and the law enforcement
community and the judicial community that you are going to
screen. They elected to go with the law enforcement and the
specialized units initially.
Mr. Cummings. So you said initially. And then what happened
when it got past the initially?
Mr. Kushner. The intent, as far as we know, is to continue
this screening process certainly within the Attorney General's
office. Now, the specialized units make up just a small part of
the Attorney General's office. I believe the total staffing
within the Attorney General's office is upwards of 17,000
people. We have been told that their goal is certainly to
screen all those individuals and they will move on.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Nelson, did you have something to add?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. I believe you raised a very important
issue there with respect to the judges and not having a cadre
of professional judges. First of all, I think the screening
process--some judges may not have to, or it doesn't cover
judges. The issue with the judges is critical in that other law
enforcement actions, their effectiveness is reduced if, in
fact, you capture the drug traffickers and bring them before a
judge who will not mete out the proper sentence or that the
traffickers are basically not convicted. And corruption in the
judicial branch is a critical issue in Mexico.
Mr. Cummings. So you said judges aren't screened?
Mr. Nelson. No. The judges are not screened.
Mr. Cummings. You know, you would think that with all the
problems that they have had and all the corruption that it
might move to that level. How do you define screening?
Mr. Nelson. Basically, it is a test to determine whether an
individual is connected with a trafficking organization or
whether they have something in their past that would raise
questions about their trustworthiness. As Mr. Kushner said, it
involves lie detector tests and some other steps.
Mr. Kushner. Psychological profiles, social and financial
background checks, medical and physical history. Those are the
types of areas that they cover during the screening process, as
well as the polygraph.
Mr. Cummings. So how are judges elected, then? I mean, do
they have to go through a process like Federal judges do here,
for example?
Mr. Kushner. I am not too familiar with the process of
selecting judges in Mexico, but I believe a good number of them
are appointed.
Mr. Cummings. OK, I don't have anything else. Thank you all
very much.
Mr. Nelson. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Nelson. I have a response from staff back there on your
question regarding helicopters in Colombia. I guess there is a
big problem with the Hueys.
Mr. Souder. Yes. That is universal in our military, too.
Mr. Nelson. Right. Only a third of those in Colombia were
fully operational last year.
Mr. Souder. The reason I moved to the C-26's is that even
our military, our guard units, all have a problem right now
getting them--we've grounded. So some countries have continued
to fly those but against our own advice.
I have a couple of additional questions, just to review the
summary of your testimony here.
In your testimony, both written and much of what you gave,
you said in 1998, no major Mexican drug trafficker was
surrendered to the United States on drug charges.
You said the heroin threat from Mexico appears to be
increasing. The cultivation of opium in Mexico producing
poppies increased by 3,000 hectares in 1998.
You said that corruption remains widespread within the
Mexican Government institutions including the criminal justice
system. You said that a number of senior military and screening
personnel were found to either be involved in or suspected of
drug-related activities.
You said that the helicopters weren't in the air,
particularly the C-26's. The Mexican narcotics trafficking
organizations facilitate the movement of between 50 and 60
percent of almost 300 metric tons of cocaine consumed in the
United States.
You said that drugs are still flowing across the border at
the same rate approximately as 1997. You said there have been
no significant increases in drug eradication and seizures. I
think the statistics we were given even by the Mexican
Government said that cocaine and opium gum seizures declined.
In their statistics they gave us maritime interdiction also
declined.
You said that money laundering prosecutions and convictions
have been minimal. You said that corruption remains the major
impediment to Mexican counternarcotics efforts. And you said
that most drug trafficking leaders continue to operate with
impunity.
As far as results, have you seen any good results or any
signs that they are fully cooperating from a results side?
Mr. Nelson. Well, there were some results last year. And
the witnesses here have pointed out the situation in Cancun,
where the property of drug traffickers was confiscated. And, of
course, there was another initiative--what was the second one?
Mr. Kushner. Well, I think one of the major accomplishments
that happened in Mexico this year, as was pointed out by Mr.
Constantine this morning, was the arrest of Jesus and Luis
Amezcua, and previously they arrested his brother Rodon. That
is considered, I think, certainly within the law enforcement
community, a major accomplishment. The operation in Cancun was
a major undertaking this past fall, where about $200 million
worth of property has been seized, including 4 hotels, a number
of restaurants, a number of yachts, and about 22 residences.
Mr. Souder. Anybody arrested?
Mr. Kushner. Pardon me, sir?
Mr. Souder. Anybody arrested, government or political
officials?
Mr. Kushner. No, sir. As far as we know, there has been no
major arrest made in the Cancun operation. That doesn't mean
that there haven't been any small operators arrested. I don't
think there have been any major operatives in Cancun or in the
Yucatan that have been arrested.
Mr. Nelson. I might add, though, that the arrests could be
viewed as a positive. It has been established here that the
charges against both have been basically dropped and it is only
the U.S. request that is holding them in jail at this point.
Mr. Souder. I mean, it is a problem for those of us in
Congress who represent districts where--in my district there
has been a shift in where the drugs are coming from. They are
mostly coming from Mexico. And as we see particularly heroin
pouring into our country that is native to Mexico, it isn't
even just a transit zone. And that, in effect, what you are
telling us is that the heroin threats increase and the cocaine
threats are increasing. They are not doing the helicopters.
They are having problems screening their people. Corruption is
widespread in their courts. They have actually gone down or at
least not had any increases in eradication and seizures. They
are plowing across the border. They are threatening to sue us
over a money laundering prosecution that--their drug leaders
continue to operate in impunity. And the two good signs are
that in Cancun they started a process, although they haven't
arrested anybody. And in the other place they have started a
process but we don't know whether they are going to be
prosecuted. And furthermore, in their constitution they don't
have life imprisonment.
You know, looking at it as an official here, this
politically isn't that hard that, in fact, when we were just
down on the Texas border I was told by an official, which is
broad enough to cover all the departments so they can't find
the person, that they refer to it as the North American Free
Drug Trading Act. Because they don't know how to control the
border, because it is so massive and the cooperation is there.
Do you have any suggestions about our ability to monitor
both the southwest border as well as the Pacific and Atlantic
Coasts unless we can get a higher rate of cooperation?
Mr. Nelson. Well, I believe that certainly you can't tackle
the problem without a lot of cooperation. But there are
barriers to that cooperation, and they are on both sides. On
our side it is how much information can we share at the
operational level without compromising our activities.
I think you will hear statements of cooperation at the
highest level of government but you must translate that down to
the operational level to attack the traffickers, the
organizations, to carry out seizures and so forth. And that is
problematic. I am very familiar with the situation on the
southwest border, and we have a major conflict there between
our goals of facilitating the free movement of goods across the
border and consistent with both our objectives for economic
development. At the same time, it provides limitless
opportunities for drug smuggling.
I have been down to the border area and you can see the
various means that people use to get the drugs into the
commercial traffic and across the border.
Mr. Souder. What you are saying is very troubling, because
are you saying that the two goals are mutually exclusive?
Mr. Nelson. I am not saying that they are mutually
exclusive, but I do think that it represents a situation where
they can come into conflict, but I don't think the country can
back away from either of those goals and it is going to require
much greater cooperation between the two countries to address
it.
Mr. Souder. Because in Fort Wayne I don't want the choice
of whether to have kids die, people shot in streets, gangs
selling drugs, for a few additional jobs. In actuality, we
probably lose in net jobs.
But even from a national American perspective, these are
tough tradeoffs. I mean, some of this, when we were at the
Juarez-El Paso border and you see there is one free bridge
backed up for hours, the pressure on those people to expedite
the cars through when you don't see the lines at the bridges
that have a fee, but then the pressure that goes on those
agents to accelerate or the confusion that occurs, as we've
heard in other border crossings where they will send somebody
who is, in effect, a decoy with a light load to then slip it in
because it backs up and the pressure gets on and people get
upset in their cars. It's human nature, then, and it limits our
ability to do that.
We have to have the will, I believe, which is what is
lacking in your tradeoff, to say either we are going to have
more border crossing places with more equipment. Because you
have almost set up a, oh, this is a trade or drugs. But aren't
there some things that we could aggressively do that could
potentially get at the drugs more, even if we were going to
allow the border crossings?
Mr. Nelson. I agree with you. The situation along the
border is very daunting. One only has to be there to see the
trucks backed up for miles to see the hard work of the drug
enforcement agents and the Customs people trying to make sure
that drugs are not getting into the country. One only has to go
there to understand the task at hand.
I think a preliminary kind of effort would be to enhance,
through more technology and other means, the ability of our
people on the border to do their job of detecting illicit
drugs. There are other steps that I believe can be taken
including increasing cooperation with United States
counterparts in Mexico. There are a number of steps that I
think can be taken that would tend to ameliorate the problem,
but I don't think they will fully eliminate the problem of
trying to facilitate the movement of goods while at the same
time trying to protect this country from the scourge of drugs.
Mr. Souder. Do you see any signs on the Mexican side of the
border that they are doing things? For example, when we--I
mean, anybody driving down the highway can see we have places
where trucks go over to get checked for weight. Do you see any
signs that before any of their vehicles are heading toward
America that they are doing any antidrug screening? Is there
anything on the other side of the border crossings that show
that they are committed to trying to reduce the number of
narcotics coming into our side?
Mr. Nelson. I am personally not aware of any effort on the
parts of the Mexican Government. I do know that the United
States has a proposal or is considering some type of system of
preclearance for trucks and drivers that have been precleared
in Mexico to ease the inspection at the border. I am not sure
of the status of that. I was told that that is one of the
proposals being considered and that they are testing certain
technology to try to see if this will, in fact, be practical.
Mr. Souder. If you were looking at this, in your opinion,
are they full cooperating?
Mr. Nelson. I am not in a position to answer that question.
What I can do is say when you look at tangible results in terms
of seizures, law enforcement activities, people who have gone
to jail, there are not many very firm, tangible results that
you can point to over the last couple of years.
Mr. Souder. If I may ask one last question that we
constantly heard in almost every meeting when we were just
recently in Mexico and we hear this--we have heard this
before--is let's don't talk about what has happened in the
past. We are committed to change.
Now as Mr. Constantine said, this is the fourth round of
this. And you made an allusion, Mr. Nelson, just a few minutes
ago, that we have to know that our information isn't being
compromised. But, in fact, when they had a drug czar who was in
an apartment owned by a cartel owner and they didn't know that
and we didn't know that and we heard it in front of this
committee before that our administration is concerned that
every single piece of material had been compromised, every
potential witness, every potential informant, all of our
uncover agents had been compromised and, that, in fact, history
sometimes can be a projection and sometimes it isn't a
projection of what is going to happen next.
But wouldn't you recommend, based on what you have seen,
that to some degree history says that we should be cautious
before we do too many exchanges and build on some record of
success here, and it is not completely irrelevant?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. I would agree with you that you have to be
cautious. But I think that the U.S. law enforcement community
is very much aware of the problem and that they tend to factor
this into the level of cooperation, what they share and what
they do not share and so forth.
I think the issue of corruption runs through all of the
processes, all of the steps and all of the institutions that
you have to use to attack the problem.
Mr. Souder. As an auditor, if you were looking at them, and
let's say we shared all of our information sources with them
this year and then had problems, wouldn't you come back here as
GAO and say why did you share all of that information given the
past history?
Mr. Nelson. It's a choice between making some progress and
having basically an arm's length relationship. I think both
countries have to work together.
The endemic corruption in the institutions, I think, is
going to be there. It is going to take awhile. And we have to
basically work to achieve what we can, but we need to stay on a
course of showing some progress. I think that is where we need
to establish a good game plan for attacking the problem,
including giving them equipment and assistance that works and
holding the government accountable for achieving some positive
outcomes as the only way of dealing with what is a long-term
problem that is going to require sustained effort on the part
of both governments.
Mr. Souder. Well, I thank you for your comments, and Mr.
Kushner's. Because there is no question what you say is true. I
mean, Mexico is not going to disappear.
It is clear in North America and Central and South America
unless we work together in this hemisphere in trade questions
and in our people moving back and forth across the borders, we
have to learn how to get along. It is more a question of how
fast, in what way.
Mr. Nelson. At the General Accounting Office, I have
responsibility for a lot of issues where U.S. objectives can
only be achieved through cooperation and coordination with
either multilateral institutions or other countries. And when
you look at the range of issues we have with Mexico, I think
that cooperation, sincere cooperation, at all levels is going
to be required to address some of the fundamental issues that
go to trade, to immigration, law enforcement. Just a number of
key United States policy objectives play out on the Mexican
border, including environmental issues, labor issues, and so
forth.
Mr. Souder. Well, once again, I thank you for your
testimony. There is no question from what we have heard both in
the first panel and the second panel that we have a very
difficult decision facing us in the House, because while we can
agree that there have been attempts to make progress, the
results haven't been particularly impressive. And we need to
sort through this decertification process, not because it is
fun to go through but because we are very concerned about the
drug problem in this country facing our kids, facing our
families, what it has done to our country, what it has done in
corrupting Mexico, what it is doing and has corrupted Colombia
in the past. We have seen success stories in Peru and Bolivia.
There is no doubt that as those governments have gone after
it, we have seen changes in those countries. We have seen when
we have put up efforts at interdiction we can actually reduce
the flood into our country and drive the prices up, which by
driving those prices up and what they can pay by forcing them
into river traffic as opposed to air traffic, we then result in
the people on the ground being paid less, which means that they
look for alternative crops.
There are successes. We need to do more in demand reduction
in our country, and we are working on that, on treatment and
prevention programs. Enforcement, drug testing in a variety of
different forms.
These are very difficult issues. But one of the fundamental
questions we have to ask is if we have a drug certification
process, as I favor and as Chairman Mica originally put in as a
staffer when he was over in the Senate, if we favor this and
you never implement it even when there aren't results, do you
lose the effectiveness of the whole process, a process that has
served us, in my opinion, well as a country, especially when,
as we heard earlier in this hearing, that, in fact, it wouldn't
cutoff all trade. It doesn't cutoff all assistance. And if you
aren't willing to make some steps, are we really ever going to
get the results?
So we appreciate your participation in the hearing today
and the report that you gave us. We will leave the record open
for 2 weeks for additional questions in written form and
additional comments from our members. And with that, our
hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon the committee was adjourned at 1:43 p.m.,
subject to the call of the Chair.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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