Trans #	Acquiring	Acquired	Entities
	Transactions 0	Granted Early Termination—03/27/2003	
20030375	L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc	Goodrich Corporation	Goodrich Aerospace Component Over- haul & Repair, Inc. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. Goodrich FlightSystems, Inc.
	Transactions 0	Granted Early Termination—03/28/2003	
20030484 20030488	The Riverside Company	VS&A Communications Partners II, L.P Davis Industries, Inc	ExpoExchange, LLC. Davis Industries, Inc.
	Transactions 0	Granted Early Termination—04/01/2003	
20030471 20030475	Perry Ellis International, Inc	Salant Corporation	Salant Corporation. Worldspan, L.P
	Transactions 0	Granted Early Termination—04/02/2003	
20030452	Taylor & Francis Group plc	Information Holdings Inc	CRC Press (UK) LLC. CRC Press LLC. The Parthenon Publishing Group Inc.
20030459	Societe Wallonne de Gestion et de Participations, S.A.	Duferco Participation Holding Limited	Duferco U.S. Investment Corp.
20030464 20030472 20030476 20030480 20030481	Johnson & Johnson  CBRE Holding, Inc  Liz Claiborne, Inc  Blum Strategic Partners, L.P  Blum Strategic Partners II, L.P	Scios Inc Insignia Financial Group, Inc Pamela Skaist-Levy and Jeffrey Levy CBRE Holding, Inc CBRE Holding, Inc	Scios Inc. Insignia Financial Group, Inc. Travis Jeans, Inc. CBRE Holding, Inc. CBRE Holding, Inc.

For Further Information Contact: Sandra M. Peay, Contact Representative or Renee Hallman, Lea

Representative or Renee Hallman, Legal Technician, Federal Trade Commission, Premerger Notification Office, Bureau of Competition, Room H–303, Washington, DC 20580, (202) 326–3100.

By Direction of the Commission.

#### Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 03–9853 Filed 4–21–03; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6750–01–M

# FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 021 0192]

# Pfizer Inc. and Pharmacia Corporation; Analysis to Aid Public Comment

**AGENCY:** Federal Trade Commission. **ACTION:** Proposed Consent Agreement.

SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition. The attached Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes both the allegations in the complaint that accompanies the consent agreement and the terms of the consent order—embodied in the consent agreement—that would settle these allegations.

**DATES:** Comments must be received on or before May 14, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Comments filed in paper form should be directed to: FTC/Office of the Secretary, Room 159–H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580. Comments filed in electronic form should be directed to: consentagreement@ftc.gov, as prescribed below.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elizabeth Jex, FTC, Bureau of Competition, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580, (202) 326–3273.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant** to Section 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and Section 2.34 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 2.34, notice is hereby given that the above-captioned consent agreement containing a consent order to cease and desist, having been filed with and accepted, subject to final approval, by the Commission, has been placed on the public record for a period of thirty (30) days. The following Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes the terms of the consent agreement, and the allegations in the complaint. An electronic copy of the full text of the consent agreement package can be obtained from the FTC Home Page (for April 14, 2003), on the World Wide Web, at "http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 04/index.htm." A paper copy can be obtained from the FTC Public Reference Room, Room 130-H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580,

either in person or by calling (202) 326–2222.

Public comments are invited, and may be filed with the Commission in either paper or electronic form. Comments filed in paper form should be directed to: FTC/Office of the Secretary, Room 159-H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580. If a comment contains nonpublic information, it must be filed in paper form, and the first page of the document must be clearly labeled "confidential." Comments that do not contain any nonpublic information may instead be filed in electronic form (in ASCII format, WordPerfect, or Microsoft Word) as part of or as an attachment to email messages directed to the following email box: consentagreement@ftc.gov. Such comments will be considered by the Commission and will be available for inspection and copying at its principal office in accordance with Section 4.9(b)(6)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 4.9(b)(6)(ii)).

### Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") has accepted, subject to final approval, an Agreement Containing Consent Orders ("Consent Agreement") from Pfizer Inc. ("Pfizer") and Pharmacia Corporation ("Pharmacia") which is designed to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition of Pharmacia by Pfizer. Under the terms of the proposed

Consent Agreement, the companies would be required to: (1) divest all of Pfizer's worldwide rights and assets relating to its overactive bladder drug, darifenacin, to Novartis AG; (2) divest Pfizer's worldwide rights and assets relating to its combination hormone replacement therapy, fembrt, to Galen Holdings plc; (3) return to Nastech Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. all rights to make, use, and sell Nastech's intranasal apomorphine product ("IN APO") for the treatment of erectile dysfunction; (4) divest all of Pharmacia's rights and assets in the field of sexual dysfunction relating to its D2 dopamine receptor agonist, PNU-142,774, to Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc.; (5) renegotiate a 1999 license and supply agreement between Pharmacia and Novartis for Deramaxx, Novartis's canine arthritis drug, to enable Novartis to operate as an independent competitor, rather than a partner, of the merged entity; (6) divest all of Pfizer's U.S. rights and assets relating to its lactating cow and dry cow mastitis products to Schering-Plough Corporation; (7) divest all of Pharmacia's worldwide rights and assets relating to its over-the-counter hydrocortisone-based cream, Cortaid, to Johnson & Johnson ("J&J"); (8) divest all of Pfizer's U.S. and Puerto Rican rights and assets relating to its over-thecounter motion sickness product, Bonine, to Insight Pharmaceuticals Corporation; and (9) divest all of Pfizer's worldwide rights and assets relating to its Halls over-the-counter cough drop business to Cadbury Schweppes plc.

The proposed Consent Agreement has been placed on the public record for thirty days for receipt of comments by interested persons. Comments received during this period will become part of the public record. After thirty days, the Commission will again review the proposed Consent Agreement and the comments received, and will decide whether it should withdraw from the proposed Consent Agreement or make final the Decision and Order ("Order").

Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated July 13, 2002, between Pfizer and Pharmacia, Pfizer proposes to acquire 100 percent of the issued and outstanding shares of Pharmacia in a stock-for-stock transaction valued at approximately \$60 billion. The Commission's Complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition, if consummated, would constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45, in the markets for: (1) extended release treatments for overactive

bladder; (2) combination hormone replacement therapy products; (3) treatments for erectile dysfunction; (4) treatments for canine arthritis; (5) treatments for lactating cow mastitis; (6) treatments for dry cow mastitis; (7) overthe-counter hydrocortisone creams and ointments; (8) over-the-counter motion sickness medications; and (9) over-the-counter cough drops. The proposed Consent Agreement will remedy the alleged violations by replacing the lost competition that would result from the merger in each of these markets.

Extended Release Treatments for Overactive Bladder

Extended release drugs for the treatment of overactive bladder ("OAB") are used by over 2.4 million Americans. Extended release OAB drugs help to reduce or eliminate the three primary symptoms of OAB frequency, urgency, and urge incontinence to enable OAB patients to live normal, active lives. Extended release products, dosed at once or twice-a-day, offer a more convenient dosing schedule and fewer side effects than older, generic products that must be taken three-times-a-day. Annual sales of extended release OAB products total \$760 million in the United States, and the market is growing rapidly.

The U.S. market for extended release OAB products is a duopoly. Pharmacia markets Detrol and Detrol LA, twice and once-a-day products, respectively. J&J markets Ditropan XL, the only other extended release OAB product available in the United States. Pfizer is seeking approval from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to market its own extended release product, darifenacin, and is one of the two best-positioned firms seeking to enter the market.

Entry into the market for extended release OAB products is difficult, time-consuming, and costly. De novo entry is estimated to take at least eight years and cost upwards of \$375 million. Pfizer, along with one other company, Yamanouchi Pharma America ("Yamanouchi"), are the only two firms well-positioned to enter the market within the next two years. Other firms that have undertaken efforts to develop an extended release OAB product are well behind Pfizer and Yamanouchi.

The proposed acquisition would cause significant anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for extended release OAB products by eliminating potential competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia. With only two firms currently marketing extended release OAB products to customers in this market (Pharmacia and J&J), the entry of

Pfizer and Yamanouchi would likely increase competition and reduce prices for extended release OAB products. Accordingly, allowing Pfizer to control both the Pharmacia extended release OAB products and its own competing product would reduce the number of rivals in the future from four to three and likely force customers to pay higher prices for extended release OAB products. The proposed acquisition would also reduce competition in the research and development of extended release OAB products.

The proposed Consent Agreement therefore requires the parties to divest Pfizer's extended release OAB product, darifenacin, to Novartis AG no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Novartis is well-positioned to continue Pfizer's development efforts and poses no separate competitive concerns as an acquirer of the darifenacin assets. If the Commission determines that Novartis is not an acceptable purchaser, or if the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Pfizer and Pharmacia must divest the darifenacin assets to a Commission-approved buyer no later than six months from the date the Order becomes final. Should they fail to do so, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the darifenacin assets.

The proposed Consent Agreement contains several provisions designed to ensure that the divestiture is successful. Pfizer and Pharmacia are required to provide transitional services to the darifenacin buyer relating to regulatory approvals and manufacturing of darifenacin. Pfizer is required to continue contract manufacturing darifenacin until Novartis obtains the FDA approvals necessary to manufacture darifenacin independently from Pfizer. The proposed Consent Agreement also requires Pfizer and Pharmacia to provide incentives to certain employees to continue in their positions until the divestiture is accomplished. For a period of 18 months from the date the assets are divested, Pfizer and Pharmacia will provide the darifenacin buyer an opportunity to enter into employment contracts with individuals who have experience relating to darifenacin. Pfizer and Pharmacia are also required to provide incentives to these individuals to accept employment with the darifenacin acquirer. For a period of one year following the divestiture date, Pfizer and Pharmacia are prohibited from hiring any employees of the acquirer of the darifenacin assets who have responsibility related to darifenacin. Finally, Pfizer and Pharmacia must take steps to maintain

the confidentiality of certain information related to darifenacin.

Combination Hormone Replacement Therapies

Combination hormone replacement therapies ("HRT"), which consist of both estrogen and progestin, are used by women with intact uteri to control moderate to severe menopausal symptoms. Although recent safety concerns have been raised by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") about long term use of HRT, there are no effective substitute products available to control menopausal symptoms. Total sales of combination HRT products in the United States in 2002 were approximately \$807 million.

The market for combination HRT is highly concentrated. There are three significant competitors in the combination HRT market: Wyeth, Pfizer, and Pharmacia. Post-acquisition, the top two competitors Wyeth and Pfizer would control almost 94 percent of the combination HRT market.

Entry into the market for combination HRT products is difficult, time-consuming, and costly. Additionally, because of the safety concerns raised by the NIH's Women's Health Initiative study, a new entrant into the combination HRT market may need to meet higher standards to receive FDA approval. The expected entry of generic competitors for combination HRT products is more than two years away.

The proposed acquisition would further concentrate the market for combination HRT products and eliminate competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia. The loss of Pharmacia as an independent competitor in the combination HRT market would likely result in higher prices and fewer product choices for consumers.

The proposed Consent Agreement preserves competition in the combination HRT market by requiring the parties to divest Pfizer's combination HRT product, femhrt, to Galen Holdings plc no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Galen is well-positioned to market femhrt because it is a company that specializes in marketing women's health products, including an oral contraceptive and an estrogen-only HRT product. However, if the Commission determines that Galen is not an acceptable purchaser, or if the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Pfizer and Pharmacia must divest the femhrt assets to a Commission-approved buyer no later than six months from the date the Order becomes final. Should they fail to do so, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the femhrt assets.

The proposed Consent Agreement contains several provisions designed to ensure that the divestiture of femhrt is successful by requiring the parties to divest all of Pfizer's rights and assets relating to femhrt, including all historical research and development data, sales and marketing materials, and intellectual property. For a period of six months from the date the assets are divested, Pfizer and Pharmacia will provide the femhrt buyer an opportunity to enter into employment contracts with individuals who have experience relating to femhrt. For a period of one year following the divestiture date, Pfizer and Pharmacia are prohibited from hiring any employees of the acquirer of the femhrt assets who have responsibility related to fembrt. Pfizer and Pharmacia must also take steps to maintain the confidentiality of certain information related to fembrt. Finally, Pfizer would continue to package fembrt at its Puerto Rico facility until another packager is brought online by the acquirer of the femhrt assets.

Treatments for Erectile Dysfunction

Erectile dysfunction ("ED") affects 30 million men in the United States and half of the male population between the ages of 40 and 70. Approximately 4 million men take prescription drugs to treat ED. The U.S. market for drugs to treat ED is valued at over \$1 billion today and is expected to exceed \$1.5 billion by 2005 as the population ages and as awareness of the condition increases.

Pfizer dominates the ED market with its well-known product, Viagra. Pfizer has a market share in the United States in excess of 95 percent. Pfizer also has a second-generation Viagra-like product in development for ED. Pharmacia currently has two products in clinical development for ED: IN APO and PNU–142,774.

With the exception of Pharmacia's two products in development, entry into the market for drugs to treat ED is unlikely. Pfizer owns an extensive patent portfolio which protects Viagra. Patent litigation initiated by Pfizer with the most significant potential entrants is likely to prevent entry in the next two years.

The proposed acquisition would cause significant anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for drugs to treat ED by eliminating potential competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia. Given Pfizer's position as a monopolist in the ED market, entry by Pharmacia would increase competition and reduce prices in the market. Accordingly, allowing

Pfizer to acquire Pharmacia's two ED products in development would preserve Pfizer's monopoly in the ED market in the future.

The proposed Consent Agreement therefore requires Pharmacia to return all of its rights in one of its products, IN APO, to Nastech Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. and to divest all of its rights and interests in its other product, PNU–142,774, for the field of human sexual dysfunction to Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc., within ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Both Nastech and Neurocrine have sufficient research and development expertise to continue development of the products that each is obtaining from Pharmacia.

The proposed Consent Agreement requires Pfizer and Pharmacia to ensure that the divestitures to Nastech and Neurocrine are successful. Pfizer and Pharmacia are required to provide Nastech and Neurocrine the opportunity to enter into employment contracts with individuals who have experience relating to IN APO or PNU-142,774. For a period of one year following the divestiture date, Pfizer and Pharmacia are prohibited from hiring any employees of the acquirers of the IN APO or PNU-142,774 assets who have responsibility related to the products. Pfizer and Pharmacia must also take steps to maintain the confidentiality of certain information related to IN APO or PNU-142-774.

Treatments for Canine Arthritis

Canine arthritis affects an estimated 8.5 million of all dogs in the United States. Approximately 1.8 million arthritic dogs are treated with prescription canine arthritis drugs. Sales for prescription canine arthritis drugs in the United States in 2001 totaled approximately \$81 million, and the U.S. market is expected to grow to over \$110 million by the end of 2003.

The market for prescription canine arthritis drugs is highly concentrated. Pfizer markets Rimadyl, the leading product in the U.S. market that held a 70 percent market share in 2001. Wyeth, through its Fort Dodge Animal Health division, markets EtoGesic. Through a license and supply agreement with Pharmacia, Novartis launched its own canine arthritis product, Deramaxx, in February 2003.

Entry into the market of drugs to treat canine arthritis is difficult, costly, and time-consuming. Besides the safety and efficacy testing required for FDA approval of canine arthritis drugs, firms entering the market must develop palatable dosing formulations for use at home. Achieving a palatable delivery

mechanism for dogs is a difficult task and, if not done successfully, can compromise the success of a new drug.

Likely and timely entry is only possible by companies already in late stages of clinical development or awaiting regulatory approval. There are only two entities, Schering-Plough Corporation and a joint venture of Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH and Merial, that have prescription canine products approved in Europe and in late clinical development in the United States and are expected to enter in the U.S. market in the near future. Customers have stated that entry by these firms within the next year will not be sufficient to counter the anticompetitive effects posed by the acquisition of Pharmacia by Pfizer.

The proposed acquisition is likely to result in anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for drugs to control the pain and inflammation associated with canine arthritis. Because of the license and supply agreement with Novartis, Pfizer, the leading company in the market, would have undue control over the supply of product needed by Novartis, and access to the competitively sensitive information of its competitor. As a result, Pfizer would be in a position to undermine the competitive position of one of only two competitors in the market for prescription drugs to treat canine

The proposed Consent Agreement preserves competition in the market for prescription canine arthritis drugs by requiring Pharmacia to renegotiate its pre-existing license and supply agreement with Novartis to allow Novartis to operate as an independent competitor rather than a business partner. Specifically, the proposed Consent Agreement: (1) eliminates the control that Pfizer would have over Novartis's product; (2) restricts the type of information Pfizer would be able to obtain about Deramaxx; and (3) allows Novartis to compete with Pfizer in the development of a second generation canine arthritis product.

Treatments for Lactating Cow and Dry Cow Mastitis

Bovine mastitis, an infection of the udder of the cow, costs the U.S. dairy industry \$2 billion annually. There are two different types of contagious bovine mastitis: (1) lactating cow mastitis; and (2) dry cow mastitis. Lactating cow mastitis occurs when the cow is producing milk, while dry cow mastitis occurs when the cow is not producing milk. Antibiotics used to treat lactating cow mastitis are different from those used to treat dry cow mastitis, and strict

FDA regulations preclude the use of one product to treat the other type of infection. In the United States, \$27 million worth of lactating cow mastitis antibiotic products and \$25.5 million worth of dry cow mastitis antibiotic products are sold annually.

The U.S. market for bovine mastitis treatments is highly concentrated. There are only three significant competitors in the markets for lactating cow and dry cow mastitis antibiotics products
Pharmacia, Wyeth, and Pfizer. Postacquisition, Pfizer would account for 50 percent of the sales of lactating cow mastitis products and 55 percent of the sales of dry cow mastitis products.
Wyeth would be the only other significant competitor in the markets for bovine mastitis treatments.

Entry into the markets for treatments for bovine mastitis is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. Besides FDA approval of the drug, successful entry requires: (1) the ability to offer both lactating cow and dry cow products; (2) a dedicated veterinarian sales force experienced in selling and supporting dairy products; (3) a broad line of bovine health products other than mastitis treatments, such as parasiticides, vaccines, reproductive products, and antibiotics to treat other infections; and (4) a good reputation within the dairy community. Consequently, successful new entry into the market for bovine mastitis antibiotics treatments is not likely to occur in a timely fashion, if at all.

The proposed acquisition would further concentrate the market for antibiotics for the treatment of bovine mastitis in the United States. Postacquisition, Pfizer and Wyeth would be the only significant suppliers. This is likely to lead to higher prices for drugs used to treat bovine mastitis.

The proposed Consent Agreement preserves competition in the market for antibiotics for the treatment of bovine mastitis by requiring Pfizer to divest all of its U.S. rights to its bovine mastitis antibiotic products to Schering-Plough Corporation no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Schering-Plough is wellpositioned to replace Pfizer in the bovine mastitis treatment market because it is the fifth largest animal health company in the United States, has a veterinarian sales and support system, and already has established a good reputation in the dairy community. However, if the Commission determines that Schering-Plough is not an acceptable purchaser, or if the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Pfizer and Pharmacia must divest Pfizer's bovine mastitis assets to

a Commission-approved buyer no later than six months from the date the Order becomes final. Should they fail to do so, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the assets.

Over-the-Counter Hydrocortisone Creams and Ointments

Creams and ointments containing the active ingredient hydrocortisone are used to treat a variety of skin conditions, including chronic dry skin, seborrheic dermatitis, eczema, and psoriasis. Annual sales of over-the-counter ("OTC") hydrocortisone creams and ointments in the United States are approximately \$160 million.

The U.S. market for OTC hydrocortisone creams and ointments is highly concentrated. There are only two branded competitors in the market: (1) Pfizer, with its Cortizone brand; and (2) Pharmacia, with its Cortaid brand. Although private label OTC hydrocortisone creams and ointments also account for a significant share of the market, these products have limited competitive significance and virtually no impact on the pricing of the products sold by Pfizer and Pharmacia. Postacquisition, Pfizer would account for 55 percent of the OTC sales of hydrocortisone creams and ointments, and would be left with no significant branded competitor in this market.

Entry into the market for OTC hydrocortisone creams and ointments is unlikely to deter or counteract the effects the proposed transaction will have on competition. A new entrant would have to invest a significant amount of time and money to achieve any meaningful competitive presence in this market. Because of the limited sales opportunities and the difficult task of convincing retailers to take shelf space away from established brands, it is unlikely that a new entrant could enter the market and achieve any significant market impact within two years.

The proposed acquisition would cause significant anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for OTC hydrocortisone creams and ointments by eliminating competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia. The loss of Pharmacia as an independent competitor in this market would likely result in higher prices for consumers.

The proposed Consent Agreement preserves competition in the market for OTC hydrocortisone creams and ointments by requiring Pharmacia to divest its Cortaid business to J&J no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. J&J is a well-positioned purchaser because it currently markets many other well-known OTC products and has

established relationships with customers. However, if the Commission determines that J&J is not an acceptable purchaser, or if the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Pfizer and Pharmacia must divest Pharmacia's Cortaid business to a Commission-approved buyer no later than six months from the date the Order becomes final. Should they fail to do so, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the assets.

#### Over-the-Counter Motion Sickness Medications

Motion sickness is an ailment that occurs when the components of the brain that gauge motion, such as the inner ear and the eyes, send conflicting messages to the brain. When this occurs, symptoms such as dizziness, headache, sweating, and vomiting can occur. OTC motion sickness medications treat this ailment by using certain antihistamines to block the conflicting messages sent to the brain. Annual sales of OTC motion sickness medications total approximately \$45 million in the United States.

The U.S. market for OTC motion sickness medications is highly concentrated. Pfizer, with its Bonine product, and Pharmacia, with its Dramamine product, are the two leading suppliers in this market, with a combined market share of 77 percent. Even after several years on the market, the third leading brand name product, Marezine, has less than 5 percent of the market. The remainder of the market is accounted for by private label products that do not constrain the pricing of the branded products.

New entry into the market for OTC motion sickness medications is unlikely to be sufficient to counteract the anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition. The small size of the market, coupled with the significant investment needed to market and sell the products, make it unlikely that a new competitor will enter the market in the next two years.

Pfizer's proposed acquisition of Pharmacia would cause significant anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for OTC motion sickness medications. The combined entity would account for 77 percent of all sales of OTC motion sickness medications, and the proposed acquisition is likely to lead to higher prices in this market.

The proposed Consent Agreement effectively remedies the proposed acquisition's anticompetitive harm in the U.S. market for OTC motion sickness medications by requiring Pfizer to divest its U.S. and Puerto Rican Bonine assets to Insight Pharmaceuticals

Corporation no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Insight is a wellpositioned purchaser of the Bonine assets because it already has a portfolio of more than fifteen OTC consumer healthcare products, including Allerest, Sucrets, Cepastat, Caldecort, Fiberall, N'Ice, and Nostrilla. Through these other brands, Insight already has significant experience in selling OTC medications and has strong relationships with drugstores, food stores, and mass merchandisers. However, if the Commission determines that Insight is not an acceptable purchaser, or if the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Pfizer and Pharmacia must divest the Bonine assets to a Commission-approved buyer no later than six months from the date the Order becomes final. Should they fail to do so, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the Bonine assets.

## Over-the-Counter Cough Drops

Millions of people in the United States use cough drops to treat the coughing associated with colds or other ailments. Cough drops are hard, candylike confectionary products that contain medications such as menthol or dextromethorphan. Annual sales of cough drops in the United States are about \$240 million.

The OTC cough drop market is highly concentrated, with only two significant competitors with brand name products: (1) Pfizer, with its Halls brand; and (2) Pharmacia, with its Ludens brand. Private label products, once again, have little competitive significance and do not constrain the pricing of the branded products. After the acquisition, Pfizer would account for approximately 63 percent of the OTC cough drop market.

Entry into the market for the manufacture and sale of OTC cough drops is unlikely to occur. Entry requires the investment of extremely high sunk costs which would be difficult to justify given the relatively limited sales opportunities. Thus, entry is not likely to deter or counteract the effect of the proposed acquisition.

The proposed acquisition would eliminate competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia in the U.S. market for OTC cough drops. The loss of Pharmacia as an independent competitor in the OTC cough drop market is likely to lead to higher prices for consumers.

The proposed Consent Agreement effectively remedies the acquisition's anticompetitive effects in the U.S. market for OTC cough drops by requiring Pfizer to divest its Halls cough drop business to Cadbury Schweppes no later than ten business days after the Pharmacia acquisition is consummated. Cadbury is acquiring Pfizer's entire Adams Division, which markets Halls cough drops, as well as many other confectionary products. Cadbury is one of the world's leading beverage and confectionary companies and as such, is well-positioned to market the Halls brand of cough drops.

#### Interim Monitor

The Commission has appointed Francis J. Civille as Interim Monitor to oversee the asset transfers and to ensure Pfizer and Pharmacia's compliance with all of the provisions of the proposed Consent Agreement. Mr. Civille has over 33 years of experience in the pharmaceutical industry and is wellrespected in the industry. In order to ensure that the Commission remains informed about the status of the proposed divestitures and the transfers of assets, the proposed Consent Agreement requires Pfizer and Pharmacia to file reports with the Commission periodically until the divestitures and transfers are accomplished.

The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the proposed Consent Agreement, and it is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the proposed Consent Agreement or to modify its terms in any way.

By direction of the Commission.

## Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 03–9855 Filed 4–21–03; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6750–01–S

#### FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 022 3247]

# Snore Formula, Inc., et al.; Analysis to Aid Public Comment

**AGENCY:** Federal Trade Commission. **ACTION:** Proposed Consent Agreement.

**SUMMARY:** The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition. The attached Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes both the allegations in the draft complaint that accompanies the consent agreement and the terms of the consent order—embodied in the consent agreement—that would settle these allegations.

**DATES:** Comments must be received on or before May 15, 2003.