

organ's Raid in Indiana.

IRON: I have long since felt a... I enlisted about the 14th of... soon after transferred to the cav-... after part of July or early August... nearly all the soldiers in... time were either raw recruits... The news spread... Morgan was expected to be on... It was said he would liber-... in Camp Morton, arm them, in... to destroy us... prevailed throughout all that... State. The citizens began to rub... rifles, shotguns, and pepper-... to death and destruction to... in his appearance. One... to master every enlisted... able to carry a gun, and supply... days' rations and 60 rounds of... was only a boy at that time, never... from home, and had scarcely... think what war meant; but all... set me to thinking, and the... over it the worse I felt, and... I had taken my mother's... at home. I was assigned to... mixed lot of new recruits who... as lousome as I did. About that... equipped and ordered to march... Depot, where we got aboard of the... The train was loaded inside... as could ride on top. If ever an... run like lightning that one... at North Vernon about 5... The news was that he would... a dispatch ahead that he would... on that night, and all the troops... gathered up was concentrated at... On leaving the train at North Ver-... on a forced march about... South Vernon—the great... background. We had not gone... till the boys began to fall... to road to blow, as we were all... blankets, two suits of clothes... knapsacks, 60 rounds of car-... and canteen filled. Old sol-... naturally feel like resting on a... or dog trot, for two miles. As... commander saw the boys giv-... like lizards, he ordered them... and threw them to one... and move on as rapidly as pos-... was about up that John was... Knapsacks, canteens, etc., flew in every direction, through... which we never expected to... if we got through the battle... the time we entered the town the... to fire on our right, which was... of the town that Morgan was... Now, if ever boys felt homesick... of us. On we went until we... on an elevated point in the edge of... line of battle. We were ordered... position with loaded guns un-... We relied on ourselves on the... palpitating hearts, expiring every... hour the yells and screams of old... marauding gang. We stayed in... the whole night, but, to our great... and relief, John did not call on... passed around, and was 40 miles... the Ohio line. Some of the boys... and some had been watching... A little after daylight we were... and the command was given, "march." As we moved off the... of the boys in front struck his foot... floor's sword, and I thought it was... der's sword, and that he had... accidentally; so I stooped down, for him, as I supposed, and carried... ecting he would be back every... ing for it. The first thing I knew... along calling for his sword, and... hand, accused me of stealing or... it. Well, it took me so by sur-... I did not know what to say. I... sword, and of course had to keep... and never got an opportunity... the great anticipated battle at... Ind., with John Morgan. If the... that sword should ever read... be pleased to learn from him.—... son, 71st (6th Cav.) Ind., Waverly, an.

STONE'S RIVER.

The 101st Ohio Claims All the Glory of Capturing the Guns. TO THE EDITOR: I have been an interested reader of Gen. Carlin's "Military Memoirs," as I had the honor of belonging to his command. Noticing a slight inaccuracy in his statement in your issue of March 19, relative to the captured guns at Knob Gap, Dec. 20, 1862, I had thought of correcting; but supposing that an abler pen than mine would, no doubt, set matters in their proper light, I refrained. In your issue of July 30, a short communication from Serg't York, Co. A, 21st Ill., entitled "The Captured Cannon at Stone's River," places the 101st Ohio under everlasting obligations to Co. A, 21st Ill., who so kindly took that gun for us, and disdaining such small matters, hastened afoot after Wharton's cavalry. No doubt the recent effort of Wade Hampton, claiming to have turned the tide of battle at first Bull Run, where, almost single-handed, he withstood two divisions of Union troops, has afforded our friend of Co. A an illustrious precedent. As "one who was there," I most emphatically deny that the 101st Ohio had any assistance in capturing that gun either from Co's. Alexander or Heg, or from Co. A, 21st Ill. Allow me as briefly as possible to say that the 101st Ohio, in common with other troops raised about the same time, had committed the unpardonable crime of receiving \$40 from Uncle Sam as advance pay and bounty, and when we reached Louisville late in September, at the time the army of Buell had retreated from Battle Creek hungry, weary, footsore and ragged, our bright new uniforms acted upon them somewhat as a red rag is supposed to do with a Spanish bull, and we were "mercenaries," to whom the \$40 was the chief attraction, while they had enlisted solely from patriotism, and they took especial pains to let us hear frequently that we were "forty-dollar men," who would run at the first volley, etc. Col. Starn, the soul of honor and courage, and withal as gentle as a woman, felt keenly the imputation upon the character of his regiment; and when opportunity offered at Knob Gap, instead of waiting for the skirmishers of the 21st Ill. (who were on our right) to go ahead, as Serg't York says, had the audacity to order a charge, and as the result we captured a brass six-pounder marked "Shiloh," a mason, five good horses and three or four prisoners. Now, in conversation with these same prisoners, they also forgot to mention that they had been captured by the 21st Ill., but said, having given us the best they had on hand until we were less than a hundred yards away, they tried their level best to escape, and, perhaps, would have succeeded had it not been for a few scattering shots which some of the boys, in defiance of previous orders, sent in that direction, which killed one of the horses and, while cutting loose from the wreck, gave us time to reach them. Try again, 21st. We always liked you, even if you did abuse us when "groceries," for you afterwards made amends like men. When the smoke of battle cleared away from Stone's River, where we left both of our Colonels and 212 officers and men out of a total present of 400, you acknowledged that we would fight, even if that \$40 was a black mark against us. So we afterward played "draw poker" with you on many a well-contested field; we "chuck-a-lucked"; we drank from the same canteen; we skirmished in glad fraternity along the sons of our clothing for the immortal gray, black, and with the same degree of freedom with which you ruined our character by foraging on our credit during that memorable march through Kentucky in pursuit of Bragg, you afterwards got more than even. Nothing would give us more pleasure than to meet you in friendly reunion and talk about "days lang syne." If memory serve me right, there were two guns captured at Knob Gap by Carlin's Brigade, but this is the first intimation I ever heard that the 101st Ohio made a charge in rear of the skirmish-line of the 21st Ill.—J. A. STEWART, Co. F, 101st Ohio, Nevada, O.

The 7th New York Vols.

TO THE EDITOR: Reading frequently THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, the columns of which are devoted to the publishing of the records of our late war and to fight for the rights of the veter-... I find in the columns of "Fighting Them Over" reports of all descriptions of nearly all organizations which have been in the field dur-... the rebellion. I am astonished not to have found any mentioning about the gallant 7th N.Y., (Steuben Rifles, two-years' regiment.) Are the surviving members afraid to step to the front and inform the public about their deeds during their term of service, to enable our his-... torians to engrave their services in the annals of history? I guess the 7th is just as well con-... tilled to have their records accounted for as any

DE GRASSE'S BATTERY.

The Part the 11th Ill. Took in Its Recapture. TO THE EDITOR: Please allow me, through THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, to tell the comrades what I know about the 23d of July and De Grasse's battery, and to correct some statements of Comrade Coulter, of the same regiment, and state the plain facts as I saw them. On the 21st we marched into Decatur, about (I believe) six miles east of Atlanta; had some lively skirmishing, tore up the railroad for a short distance, and went into camp for the night. The next morning we struck out for Atlanta, with the report that the Johnnies had gone. We marched some distance, I think about four miles, and came to a line of works that had been evacuated by the Johnnies. Here we halted and formed a line in these rebel works. I think all of the Fifteenth Corps moved up at the same time—the Second Division south of the railroad and right up to the deep cut, and then De Grasse's battery right on the north bank of railroad cut; next came, as I understood, the First Division, Fifteenth Corps. So, you see, the two divisions had the battery between them, with a gap on the south of it, in the railroad, nearly 200 feet, and, as I understood, one on the north of the battery. When the line was formed skirmishers were thrown out. In a few minutes the whole 11th Ill. was ordered out on the skirmish-line,—not, as Comrade Pink, of the 55th Ill., says, as a reserve, but we were put on the very advance skirmish-line. We were armed with muskets and spears. We were soon set to work throwing up works to plant a battery. We worked away for some time with a royal good will, and all the time the Johnnies were sending solid shot at us from one gun in the city. One man would stand guard, and when he would see the smoke from the gun he would say "Jay down," and every one would drop as if shot. When the ball struck in the ground near us with a thud, every man would jump to his feet and go to work. About this time we heard a tremendous cannonading in our rear, and stopped to listen. In a very short time the news came to us that the noble Gen. McPherson was killed. It made the cold chills run over me to think we had lost such a valuable officer in such a desperate struggle as we were having. We went on throwing up our works. After the firing had ceased on the rear and left of us (which lasted several hours) we did not have to wait long till it came our turn to try our hand in front. Some one of the boys said, "Look yonder; they are coming for us!" Shots of little began to rebel in front of us. It looked like the whole rebel army was coming at once. With their bayonets gleaming in the sun on they came with a rush. They were soon on us. The 11th and the skirmish-line stood bravely to their works fighting, and held the first line till the second line came up. At this time the rebels were on one side of our works and the 11th on the other, not more than 10 feet apart. Then they began to flank us both right and left. About this time the Major in command of the regiment was wounded, (not, as Comrade Coulter says, on the retreat, near the lumber pile,) and ordered us to retreat. I heard him give the order. He was at this time in rear of the company of which I was a member. We started for the rear. All this time the Johnnies were killing, wounding and taking prisoners. We had not gone far till Lieut. A. J. Larimore, of Co. H, ordered a halt, saying that the whole regiment would be captured if we did not. The center of the regiment did not give way as soon as the flanks. Myself, with two other privates, halted with the Lieut-... tenant, and gave them one volley. They gave us one in return, and the Lieutenant fell with both legs broken, one private a ball through the leg, the other shot through the left breast. I alone of the four escaped without a scratch. I made for the rear, you bet. When I got to the main line all was excitement,—all were anxious for the fray. In a very short time they came pouncing down on the main line. They were held for a very short time. When they came fling in the gaps left in the lines by the Division Commander, Gen. Morgan L. Smith, the whole line had to give way. Now for the charge. The 11th Ill. being scattered, as it were, to the four winds of the earth, I could not find the regiment till after the charge. I saw the line formed by Gen. John A. Logan. I heard him give them their orders. The line he was at the head of was north of and right up to the railroad. He formed a double line; the front line had 16-shooter (Henry) rifles. He told them he wanted them to do the shooting and the rear regiment to bellow with all their might, and then he said, "Johnnies! double-quick, march!" and the Johnnies were driven back to Atlanta quicker than you can say "Jack Robinson." The troops that John A. Logan led to the charge on that day was the First Brigade, Second Division, Fifteenth Corps, on the north of the railroad. The balance of the division charged on the south of

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Does Not Think Gen. Howard to Blame for the Defeat. TO THE EDITOR: There have been of late in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE several contributions to the Chancellorsville campaign,—notably one by Private Kellogg, of the 65th Ohio, and one by Dr. Coe, of the 147th N. Y. Both these comrades are disposed to lay all the blame for the failure on Gen. Howard, who commanded the right wing of the army, and on whose flank Jackson's terrible and unexpected charge fell. Comrade Kellogg also produces a copy of a cautionary order, issued by Gen. Hooker on the Saturday morning before Jackson's flank movement, directed to Gen. Howard, which he says did not see the light until two months after the battle, which fact he thinks is very suspicious. We should think if Howard designed to withhold this dispatch, as the writer intimates he might have done, he would never have had it placed on file at all. We know that corps and army commanders often receive dispatches—sometimes of a private nature—which are their own property, and they are not obliged to turn them into the Adjutant-General's Office. The fact about Gen. Hooker is, that he was really defeated on Thursday evening, when he withdrew his lines to a perilous defensive position about Chancellorsville instead of pushing out and assuming the offensive and dividing Lee's army before the re-enforcements arrive. The plan of this movement across the Rappahannock was a brilliant one on the part of Hooker; was most admirably executed up to the above date, and no doubt had he pushed forward, as was supposed he intended, he could have whipped the enemy in detail and accomplished one of the most brilliant victories of the war, and Grant, in such a contingency, would not have been called from the West to annihilate the Army of Northern Virginia. But at the critical point, at the time when success was not only possible, but probable, Hooker seems to have become paralyzed or, perhaps, overcome by his success in crossing the Rappahannock so easily, and his mind seemed incompetent to grasp the situation. Therefore, he immediately assumed the defensive, and remained in that condition until his ignominious retreat five days afterwards. If the crossing of the Rappahannock meant anything, in accordance with the science of war it meant an offensive campaign, and Hooker had a fine army, well equipped for the work in hand, while Lee's army was small and had to wait for re-enforcements to meet this unexpected movement. Hooker, with most wonderful consideration to his enemy, waited patiently in his little circle of intrenchments in the bend of the river until Lee could receive the expected re-enforcements and mobilize his army, after which the Army of the Potomac began and completed a most masterly retreat. As to breaking of our right,—the panic of a portion of Howard's Corps,—it seems wrong to blame the result of this movement to that disaster, as without Howard's Corps Hooker had enough men to have whipped his antagonist. Howard's Corps was now to the Army of the Potomac, and no soldier in our army considered the rout of a portion of it as of any great consequence, even though one of its Dutchmen ran down to the ford of the river, throw off his knapsack, his arms and accoutrements, and cried out in his agony, "Mine Gott, what will become of us?" Reynolds's Corps had also arrived on Saturday evening, and was fresh and ready for battle. Half the troops were not engaged at all, and as for Hooker's complaint about Sedgwick not joining him, he was certainly in the best position to strike the enemy had Hooker only cooperated at Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed the genius and push necessary for that campaign, he might have occupied the place in military history, and in the affections of the people, which Gen. Grant now holds.—J. C. HARRIS, 11d'g's Fifth Corps, A. P.

LITTLE ROCK.

A Member of the 1st Iowa Cav. Has His Say. TO THE EDITOR: We have waited patiently to hear a few more facts from other comrades who participated in that engagement, but of the thousands there but very few respond after 21 years. It is only another illustration of the truth, that no two persons can state the same facts or occurrences alike. We must differ from all the other comrades. Brig.-Gen. J. W. Davidson, Major of the Regular Army, com-... manded the Cavalry Division that left Pilot Knob, Mo., in June, 1863, for the capture of Little Rock, Ark. After moving through Southeast Missouri, crossing the St. Francis River in Arkansas, where we met hundreds of paroled prisoners from Vicksburg and first learned the news of its capture and surrender, we moved to Clarendon, on the White River,

have done them; for into the space, an arm of the move are easily Cav., Dub To THE recollecti foraging reached obliged to owing to corps of 8 at the fro if we exp the 13th: the Third tenth Co. On the about 30 command our picket our break At the horses as we had a went the cause up comanec and duple junction vanced as about a n contested suddenly swamp s up a bris the swam through were wo the grou the colur lin, who role up parties a thought there was could jud Orders who com- fied to be parallel ordered the left scarcely told us t with the as well a and took tell by falling b were left battle, w alive positi when we found it where w morning broadtwo up. We were mornng untly. they wer and driv pressed i the crest of rifle-p up in mus- ton's ar more gal our army The lo it must wounded Iroquois, To TH 1878, Mr Kansas - Fort Sco L. L. & t yard, the velope of Mrs. Bri- ville, Pa William in lieu c Paymast for \$200 Devitt s and other Departm