• To reduce the former combatants' ability and desire to become political spoilers, engage in criminal violence, or otherwise derail the peace and recovery processes.
• To prepare ex-combatants and their families for civilian life.
• To promote reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilian populations.

• Support construction of infrastructure for quartering, civic training, and education for ex-combatants.
• Provide temporary jobs such as repairing roads and refurbishing schools and clinics.
• Fund education and vocational training for ex-combatants and their families.
• Provide funding for income-generation activities.
• Provide remedial schooling, trauma counseling, and family reintegration for child soldiers.

In Mindanao, Philippines, OTI worked with the Government of the Philippines to re-integrate ex-combatants from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). OTI addressed the problem on a village-by-village basis, working with ex-combatants in their efforts to become productive and self-sufficient. Assistance took the form of agricultural machinery, such as rice threshers and solar dryers. Both the government and the communities themselves were asked to contribute with labor, basic materials, training or funds. The program was successful because it offered the opportunity not only to make a living, but also to learn new and profitable skills to increase their productivity, expand incomes, and most importantly, bring communities together. An evaluation of the program found that a significant outcome was the extent to which ex-combatants perceived their futures as hopeful, and were therefore less likely to re-arm. This was borne out during the ensuing conflict between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MNLF ex-combatants stay out of the conflict and acted as buffers between the fighters and their communities.

OTI's Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) program in Sierra Leone created a nationwide, non-formal and remedial education network for ex-combatant and non-combatant young adults, many of whom had not had any schooling for nearly ten years. From March 2000 until the close of OTI's program in March 2002, approximately 46,480 individuals participated at over two thousand sites, developing new skills and attitudes that would enable them to lead peaceful and productive lives. During the year-long training, YRTEP participants learned literacy and math skills along with self-reliance, conflict resolution, agriculture, health, and civic participation. The program was quickly broadened to include a second track designed for public and private sector leaders.

Also in Sierra Leone, OTI's Skills Training and Employment Promotion (STEP) and its Skills Training and Employment Generation (STEG) programs built on the gains of YRTEP. OTI supported a program to provide job skills and generate employment for those who had completed the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process. Through community-based strategies of skills development, employment in public works projects, dialogue and psycho-social support, the program strengthened life skills, promoted social reintegration, created temporary employment, and stimulated cooperation between ex-combatants and community members.

Lessons Learned about Reintegration of Ex-combatant Programs

A learning circle meets in York, Sierra Leone. From March 2000 until the close of OTI's program, approximately 46,000 war-affected youth and ex-combatants at over two thousand sites participated in peace building, community-awareness, and basic literacy training in their communities.

• Fostering closer relationships between governments and communities improves mutual understanding of the long-term prospects for peace. It also means greater sustainability of programs and begins to address root causes of violence. These root causes range from neglect of local infrastructure, lack of accountability on the part of government institutions, and inequitable distribution of resources.
  
  
• Despite the active involvement of government offices, former combatants may not be willing to give the government credit for the assistance they provide. Additional work may be needed to educate the community on the extent of the government's support.
  
  
• Basic education should be the first step in capacity building. Technical training, such as bookkeeping and use of equipment, may be insufficient, if communities lack basic education.
  
  
• Reintegration programs should not be limited exclusively to ex-combatants to avoid creating a new class of privileged citizens and rewarding people who resorted to violence.
  
  
• Cash payments to demobilized soldiers do not work as a method of (or substitute for) reintegration assistance. However, family stipends provided during formal training periods while the ex-combatant is unable to work may be justified (e.g., Haiti).