ARB CASE NO. 99-117 ALJ CASE NO. 98-DBA-17 DATE: November 22, 1999
In the Matter of:
Disputes concerning the payment of
prevailing wage rates by:
TRI-GEM'S BUILDERS, INC.,
Prime Contractor
and
Proposed debarment for labor
standards violations by:
TRI-GEM'S BUILDER, INC.,
Prime Contractor;
GOTHRIE SHORT, JR.
President;
and
JASON GRIFFIN,
Vice President
(with respect to laborers employed by
the Prime Contract on Contracts Nos.
DACA61-93-C-0056, F28609-94-C-0025
and F286609-93-C-022 and with respect
to laborers employed by the Subcontractor
Smith Plumbing and Heating, Inc. on
Contract No. DAHA28-93-D-0002 and
Subcontractor Dynamic Developers, Inc.
on Contract No. F28609-96-C-0003).
Appearances:
For the Petitioners: Thomas M. Keeley-Cain, Esq., Cherry Hill, New Jersey
For the Respondent:
Steven J. Mandel, Esq., Paul L. Frieden, Esq., Lois R. Zuckerman, Esq. U.S.
Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
ORDER ACCEPTING APPEAL
AND ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE
On July 14, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Daniel F. Sutton
("ALJ") issued a Summary Decision and Order ("ALJ D.& O.") in this matter
arising under the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended, 40
U.S.C. §276a et seq. The ALJ found against the three Respondents in the case: Tri-Gem's
Builders, Inc., Gothrie Short, Jr., and Jason Griffin (collectively, "Tri-Gem's"). The ALJ
ordered the payment of back wages to employees and debarment.
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On August 27, 1999, the Administrative Review Board ("ARB")
received from Tri-Gem's a document titled "Exceptions to Summary Decision and Order of July 14,
1999 by Administrative Law Judge Daniel F. Sutton." The Board noted an issue of timeliness, and
on September 7, 1999, issued a Notice of Appeal and Order to Show Cause directing Tri-Gem's to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a timely filing of an appeal of the ALJ decision.
The Department's regulations governing appeals of ALJ decisions under the Davis-
Bacon Act provide that:
Within 40 days after the dateof the
decision of the Administrative Law [J]udge (or such additional time
as is granted by the Administrative Review Board) any party
aggrieved thereby who desires review thereof shall file a
petition for review of the decision with supporting
reasons.
29 C.F.R. §6.34 (emphasis supplied). However, appended to the ALJ D.&O. was the following
variant language describing Tri-Gem's appeal rights:
Pursuant to the applicable regulations, which appear at 29
C.F.R. §6.34, any interested person may appeal,
within 40 days after receipt of this decision, by filing
exceptions thereto.
ALJ D.& O. at 5 (emphasis supplied). The ARB
received Tri-Gem's Exceptions on August 27, 1999, 44 days after the ALJ issued his decision. Tri-Gem's
mailed the document the prior day, August 26, 1999. The filing was untimely under the deadlines of the
29 C.F.R. §6.34 regulation.
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In response to our Order, Tri Gem's states that it timely filed for review because
1) the Administrative Law Judge's decision was issued on July 14, 1999, and "exceptions may be
filed within forty (40) days after receipt of the decision"; and 2) the Code of Federal
Regulations further provides that where service is accomplished by mail, five days shall be added to the
"waiting prescribed period for a responsive pleading or action. 29 C.F.R. Section 18.4(c)(3)."
Attorney Certification ¶¶ 3, 4.
The Deputy Administrator of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division
replied to Tri Gem's response and, citing our recent order in Superior Paving & Materials, ALJ
Case No. 98 DBA 11; Ord. Accept. Pet. for Rev. and Est. Brief. Sched., ARB Case No. 99-065 (Sept.
3, 1999), urged the ARB to modify 29 C.F.R. §6.34's limitations period in this case. The Deputy
Administrator observed that the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 18, cited by Tri Gem's are inapposite, given
that they apply to proceedings before the Department of Labor's Administrative Law Judges, not the
Administrative Review Board. Nevertheless, the Deputy Administrator argues that the ARB should relax
the limitations period because the ALJ erroneously stated in his decision that any interested person may file
exceptions within 40 days after receipt of the decision.
We agree with the Deputy Administrator that 29 C.F.R. Part 18, "Rules of
Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law
Judges," is not applicable to proceedings before the ARB. As 29 C.F.R. §18.1 provides,
"These rules of practice are generally applicable to adjudicatory proceedings before the Office of
Administrative Law Judges."
Furthermore, as quoted above, 29 C.F.R. §6.34 unambiguously provides that
petitions for review shall be filed within 40 days after the date of the ALJ's decision. Tri Gem's mailed
its Exceptions to the Summary Decision and Order on the 43rd day after the date of the ALJ's decision
and the ARB received it on the 44th day. Accordingly, it was neither mailed nor received within 40 days
after the date of the ALJ's decision.
In Gutierrez v. Regents of the University of California, ALJ Case No.
98-ERA-19; ARB Case No. 99-116, Ord. Accept. Pet. for Rev. and Est. Brief. Sched. (Nov. 8, 1999),
we held that it is within the ARB's discretion to relax or modify its procedural rules when such relaxation
or modification would serve the interests of justice. Accord American Farm Lines v. Black Ball
Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970); General Services Administration, Region 3,
ARB Case No. 97-052, Dec. & Ord. (Nov. 21, 1997), slip op. at 4 (The ARB may waive compliance
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with the Secretary of Labor's regulations governing
service and filing requirements "provided that such waiver did not impinge upon the ability of the
respective parties to participate in th[e] appeal."). The regulation establishing the 40-day limitations
period, 29 C.F.R. §6.34, is an internal procedural rule adopted to expedite the administrative
resolution of DBA cases, such as this one. Accordingly, under appropriate circumstances we will modify
the 29 C.F.R. §6.34 limitations period.
In determining whether to relax the limitations period in a particular case, we are
guided by the principles of equitable tolling that have been applied to cases with filing deadlines mandated
by statute. Gutierrez v. Regents of the University of California, supra, at 2. In
School District of the City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1981), the court
held that a statutory provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1976 &
Supp. III 1979), providing that a complaint must be filed with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days of the
alleged violation, is not jurisdictional and may therefore be subject to equitable tolling. However, the court
held that because Congress, not the courts or administrative agency, was entrusted with the responsibility
to determine the statutory time limitations, the restrictions on equitable tolling must be "scrupulously
observed." Id. at 19. The court recognized three principal situations in which tolling is
appropriate:
(1) [when] the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff
respecting the cause of action,
(2)the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from
asserting his rights, or
(3)the plaintiff has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has
mistakenly done so in the wrong forum.
Id. at 20 (citation omitted). The court did not decide, however, whether these three categories are
exclusive. Id.
In Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331 (1991), the Sixth Circuit held that
a similar statutory thirty-day limitations period for filing a complaint under the whistleblower provisions of
the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1988), is also subject to equitable tolling. In
determining whether the employee was entitled to such tolling, the court recognized five factors that must
be weighed: 1) whether the plaintiff lacked actual notice of the filing requirements; 2) whether the plaintiff
lacked constructive notice of the requirements; 3) whether the plaintiff diligently pursued his rights; 4)
whether the defendant's rights would be prejudiced by the tolling of the limitations period; and 5) the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's ignorance of his rights. 945 F.2d at 1335.
The ALJ's incorrect statement that Tri Gem's could file exceptions within 40 days
after it received the ALJ D. & O allegedly resulted in the untimely filing of Tri Gem's appeal. A party's
reliance on an ALJ's erroneous statement of review procedures does not fall squarely within the situations
in which tolling is appropriate, as enumerated in Allentown. Nevertheless, although it behooves
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an attorney to read and follow the regulations under
which he or she is taking action, we do not believe that Tri-Gem's should lose the opportunity for review
of the ALJ D. & O. because it relied upon the ALJ's erroneous statement of the applicable appeal
procedures. Therefore,because we find that Tri-Gem's reasonably relied upon the ALJ's
erroneous statement and the Deputy Administrator has not even alleged that the government's rights have
been prejudiced by the untimely filing, we ACCEPT this case for review.
In addition to misstating the applicable limitations period, the ALJ D.&O. also
erroneously characterizes the nature of the document that an aggrieved party must file pursuant to 29
C.F.R. §6.34 to invoke the ARB's review. Contrary to the plain language of the regulation, the
Decision and Order states that an "interested person" may appeal a decision by filing
"exceptions thereto." ALJ D. & O. at 5. The applicable regulation provides that any
aggrieved party who desires review of an ALJ's decision "shall file a petition for review of the
decision with supporting reasons." 29 C.F.R. §6.34. The regulation further provides:
The petition shall refer to the specific findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or order at issue. A Petition concerning the decision
on debarment shall also state the aggravated or willful violations and/or
disregard of obligations to employees and subcontractors, or lack thereof,
as appropriate.
Id. In accordance with the instructions in the Decision and Order, Tri-Gem's filed exceptions to
the ALJ's decision, but has not yet filed a petition for review as required by 29 C.F.R. §6.34.
Accordingly, we establish the following briefing schedule:
1. Tri-Gem's shall file a petition for review pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§6.34 not to exceed 30 double-spaced pages on or before December 22, 1999.
2. The Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, shall file a brief in
response not to exceed 30 double-spaced typed pages on or before January 21, 1999.
3. Petitioner and all other Parties and Interested Persons may file a reply
brief not to exceed 20 double-spaced typed pages on or before February 20, 1999.
4. All pleadings and briefs in this matter shall be filed with the Board
and served upon all Parties and Intervening Interested Persons.
5. All pleadings and briefs are expected to conform to the stated
page limitations unless prior approval of the Board has been granted and should be prepared in
Courier (or typographic scalable) 12 point, 10 character-per-inch type or larger, double-spaced,
withminimum one-inch left and right margins and minimum 1.25-inch top and bottom
margins, printed on 8 by 11-inch paper. An original and four copies of all pleadings and briefs
shall be filed with the Board under the requirements of 29 C.F.R. Part 7.
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6. Only Parties and Interested Persons filing a notice of intervention and
participation need be served with pleadings or briefs.
7. Docket entries for this matter shall be filed by directing submissions to:
Administrative Review Board
United States Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room S-4309
Washington, D.C. 20210
SO ORDERED.
PAUL GREENBERG Chair
E. COOPER BROWN Member
CYNTHIA L. ATTWOOD Member
Note: Questions regarding any case pending before the Board should be directed to the Board's staff assistant,
Ernestine Battle.