1This is emphasized by the fact that an
earlier draft of the bill required such hearings. See Senate Comparative Print, June 1945, P. 13 (Sen.
Doc. p. 158).
2Since section 7(b) itself vests these
powers (including the subpena power) in in hearing officers. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland,
315 U.S. 367 (1942), and Fleming v.MohawkCo.. 331 U.S. 111
(1947), dealing with the authority of agencies to delegate such powers, have no application here.
3Thus, in Sen. Rep. p. 22 (Sen. Doc.
p. 208), it is stated: "That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof means not
only that the party initiating the proceeding has the general burden of coming forward with a prime
facie case but that other parties, who are proponents of some different result, also for that purpose
have a burden to maintain." See also H.R. Rep. p. 36 (Sen. Doc. p. 270).
4For example. section 20(d) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. 920(d)). provides that "in
any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim for compensation it shall be presumed, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary-- (d) that the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention
of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another." See Del Vecchio v.
Bowers, 296, U.S. 280 (1935). See also section 2(a)9 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(15 U.S.C. 80a-2(9)).
5"Where agencies take such
notice they must so state on the record or in their decisions and then afford the parties an opportunity
to show the contrary." Sen. Rep. P. 23. H.R. Rep. pp. 37-38 (Sen. Doc. pp. 209. 271). If
official notice is taken of facts in the course of the final decision, the proceeding need not be
reopened automatically. but the parties will be entitled to request reopening for the purpose of
contesting the facts thus officially noticed by the agency.