action and the potential remedy afforded thereunder, although counsel could not recall whether he gained such knowledge prior to filing his answer in the district court action on October 26, 1987. T. 13. The answer did not specifically mention the STAA. During a telephone conversation concerning discovery in March or April 1988, Respondent's counsel mentioned the STAA cause of action to Complainant's counsel. On May 10, 1988, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the civil action based on Complainant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedy under the STAA. This motion was granted by the district court on August 5, 1988, deferring the issue of tolling of the limitations period to the Secretary of Labor. On August 2, 1988, Complainant filed a complaint with the Secretary under the STAA. Complainant did not appeal the district court's decision and, several months after its issuance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held for the first time that a common law right of action exists under state law for violations of the STAA. Todd v. Frank's Tong Service. Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okra. 1989).

   On review, Complainant first argues that the 180-day limitations period, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(c)(1), 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(1), from the date of discriminatory discharge for filing a complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but is subject to equitable principles. In this latter regard, Complainant notes that the limitations period is, under the regulations, principally intended to prevent the Secretary's consideration of "stale" complaints, 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(2). Since the present complaint has been fully developed in the district court civil action and in the administrative hearing below, Complainant argues that it is not stale and should therefore be heard.

   Complainant is correct that the 180-day limitations period is not jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Hicks v. Colonial Motor Freight Lines, Case No. 84-STA-20, Sec. Order, December 10, 1985; accord School District of the City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1981). However, it is not for the Secretary to casually ignore the legislated statutory limitation, even if it may bar what may be an otherwise meritorious cause. School District of the City of Allentown, 657 F.2d at 20.

   As stated in Hicks, slip op. at 8, there are three situations where equitable tolling might be appropriate: 1) where the defendant has actively misled plaintiff respecting the cause of action; 2) where the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights; or 3) where plaintiff has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has mistakenly done so in the wrong forum. Complainant's assertion of the absence of staleness fits none of the foregoing criteria, and I see no reason to upset the statutory and regulatory scheme on this basis.

   Similarly, Complainant's contention that the limitations period should be tolled in the interest of fairness and justice, lest Complainant lose all opportunity for a remedy, must also be rejected. Again, none of the recognized criteria identified above is implicated by Complainant's argument. Even if the interest of justice might be served by permitting the claim to be heard, "in the long run experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislation is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law." School District of the City of Allentown, 657 F.2d at 20 quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).

   Finally, Complainant contends on review that Respondent knew of the STAA cause of action and the potential protections afforded thereunder and intended to use it as a defense in the district court civil action, but failed to raise or disclose the defense at or near the end of the filing period. The ALJ properly disposed of this issue, noting that it had not been established that counsel for Respondent withheld any information from Complainant during the critical 180-day period, and, in any event, it is not Respondent's burden to supply an employee's remedies. R.D. and O. at 3. I note further that the ALJ's finding that Complainant's failure to show that Respondent withheld any information prevents any contention, as a ground for equitable tolling, that Respondent actively misled Complainant respecting the STAA cause of action. Hicks, slip op. at 8.