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Yost v. Cross Dock, Inc., 87-STA-10 (Dep. Sec'y Dec. 9, 1987)


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20210

Date: December 9, 1987
Case No. 87-STA-10

IN THE MATTER OF

EDWIN C. YOST,
    COMPLAINANT,

    v.

CROSS DOCK, INC.,
    RESPONDENT.

BEFORE: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF LABOR1

DECISION AND ORDER

    Before me for review is the Recommended Decision and Order (R.D. and O.) issued, on August 14, 1987, by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) James W. Kerr, Jr., in the above-captioned case which arises under the employee protection provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1982).

    Complainant, a dock manager2 employed by Respondent, alleged that he was discharged from his employment in retaliation for having engaged in the protected activity of refusing to load shipments of poison and shipments of food products on the same trailers. Respondent moved for dismissal of the complaint claiming that the delay of over a year and a half between notice of the complaint and receipt of the written findings of the Assistant Secretary for Occuptional Safety and Health (OSHA) violated Respondent's right to due process. Furthermore, Respondent contended that it had discharged Complainant because of his managerial deficiencies in handling the loading and unloading of trucks at the dock.

    The ALJ denied Respondent's Motion to Dismiss relying primarily on 29 C.F.R. § 1978.114 (1987), which provides that the time requirements imposed by the Secretary in the implementing regulations 'are directory in nature" and failure to observe them does not invalidate action by either the Assistant Secretary or the Secretary, and on the failure of Respondent to show that it was prejudiced by the delay. R. D. and O. at 2. The ALJ


[Page 2]

then went on to find that, although Complainant established that he had engaged in protected activity and had experienced an adverse action (discharge), he had failed to estabish a "causal link", R. D. and O. at 7, between the two. Absent this link, Complainant did not meet his burden for making a prima facie case. The ALJ reviewed all of the evidence, however, and found that, assuming arguendo a prima facie case, Respondent's stated reasons for discharge were not pretextual, R. D. and O. at 8-10, and he concluded that Respondent would have discharged Complainant even if Complainant had not engaged in a protected activity. Id. at 10. The ALJ thereupon recommended that the complaint in this case be dismissed.

    Based on a thorough review of the record, I conclude that the ALJ's findings, except as indicated in note 2 supra, and his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are in accordance with law. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3). Accordingly, I adopt and append to this order ALJ Kerr's R. D. and O. of August 14, 1987. Complainant Yost's complaint is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED.

    SO ORDERED.

       DENNIS E. WHITFIELD
       Deputy Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.

[ENDNOTES]

1There is presently a vacancy in the office of Secretary of Labor. The Deputy Secretary is authorized to "perform the duties of the Secretary until a successor is appointed...." 29 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); Department of Labor Executive Level Conforming Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-619 (November 6, 1986).

2The ALJ erroneously found that Complainant was employed "as the terminal manager at the Tampa facility." R. D. and O. at 3, # 3. Complainant actually was the dock manager. Transcript of May 7, 1987, hearing (T.), at 29, 130. Harold Jerkins was the terminal manager. T. at 36, 130.



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