finding
[Page 2]
that "Complainant
was discharged for legimate reasons completely unrelated to
his filing of the initial OSHA claim." R.D. and O. at 11.
Subsequent to transmittal of this case for my review,
the parties each filed briefs in support of their respective
positions. In addition, Complainant, who appears pro se before
me, filed a Motion to Reopen the Record so that twenty-one
(21) exhibits not presented at the hearing might be entered
in the record before me for review. These exhibits are characterized
by Complainant as exhibits which were not presented at the
hearing "because, Complainant's attorney chose not to present
them, even though Complainant had given them to his attorney
for the purpose of using them at the hearing" and exhibits
which were "not presented because, Complainant did not have
them at the time of the hearing." Complainant's Motion To
Reopen the Record at 1. Respondent opposes Complainant's motion
arguing, among other things, that "[a]ll of the documents were
apparently known to Complainant prior to the May 5 hearing,
and be concedes that many of them were actually in his possession
at that time. In fact, a number of the documents were produced
by Respondent prior to the hearing pursuant to the discovery
requests of Complainant's former counsel." Respondent Belcher
Oil Company's Brief in Opposition to Complainant's motion to Reopen
the Record at 3.
Complainant's Motion to Reopen the Record is denied.
My review of this case must be based on the record made before
the ALJ and on the ALJ's decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109
(c)(1) (1987). Reliance, during my review, on exhibits not
already in the record is, therefore, not permitted.
Nevertheless, and particularly since Complainant appears
pro se , I have examined the exhibits he submits to determine
whether this case should be remanded to the ALJ for reopening
of the record and acceptance of the exhibits, and I have concluded
that it should not. It is clear from Complainant's own statements
that these exhibits do not constitute "newly discovered evidence"
which would warrant a new hearing before the ALJ.
Newly discovered evidence must be evidence in
existence of which a party was excusably ignorant,
discovered after trial. In addition facts implying
reasonable diligence must be provided by the
movant.
[Page 3]
United States v. 41 Cases More or Less , 420 F.2d 1126, 1132
(5th Cir. 1970). Accord Shook & Fletcher Insulation v. Central
Rigging , 684 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982). Moreover, Complainant
seeks to offer each of these exhibits for the sole purpose of
discrediting the testimony of certain witnesses and contradicting
the ALJ's conclusion that Respondent did not retaliate against
Complainant for filing an OSHA complaint. It has already been
held in McDaniel v. Boyd Brothers Transportation , Case No.
86-STA-6, Final Order of Dismissal, issued March 16, 1987, slip
op. at 5-6, that evidence offered to contradict or impeach
witnesses so as to overcome the ALJ's findings of fact does
not afford a basis for a new hearing. Accordingly I have limited
my review of this case solely to the record before the ALJ.
Based on a thorough review of the r cord, I conclude that
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
ALJ's conclusion that Respondent discharged Complainant because
of Complainant's attitude and behavior on the job. In view
of this, I accept the recommendation of the ALJ3 and conclude
that Respondent's discharge of Complainant was not in violation
of Section 2305 of the STAA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3).
Accordingly, Complainant's complaint is DENIED and this case
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DENNIS E. WHITFIELD
Deputy Secretary of Labor
Washington, D.C.
[ENDNOTES]
1 There is presently a vacancy in the
office of Secretary
of Labor. The Deputy Secretary is authorized to "perform the
duties of the Secretary until a successor is appointed ......"
29 U.S.C. SS 552 (1982); Department of Labor Executive Level
Conforming Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-619
(November 6, 1986).
2 The hearing before the ALJ was
held on May 5, 1987, not
on May 5, 1979, as stated by the ALJ. See R.D. and O. at 1.
3 I do not agree with the ALJ that
the OSHA regulations at
29 C.F.R Part 1977 (1986) are ipso facto applicable to cases
arising under Section 2305 of the STAA. See R.D. and O. at
7. While certain discrimination complaints are deemed to be
complaints filed under both statues, see 29 C.F.R § 1978.102(e),
and while analogies may be drawn from OSHA precedents, there
is decisional law as how a violation of Section 2305 is established.
See Hufstetler v. Roadway Express , Case No. 85-STA-8, Final
Decision and Order, slip op. at 21-24, issued August 21, 1986,
aff'd sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Brock , 830 F. 2d 179,
181 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987).