The Complainant testified that the union never responded to his inquiries.
(TR2 at 155). He further testified that both the union and the company have to agree to the
voluntary layoff. (TR2 at 165). The voluntary layoff was never awarded to the Complainant.
(TR2 at 166). The layoff would have preserved the Complainant's seniority. (TR3 at 329).
The Complainant testified that he sought a leave pursuant to the union
contract so that he "could get representation from [his] union."20 (TR2 at 86).
The United States Supreme Court has summarized the three-prong
burden-shifting analysis applicable to employment discrimination cases, such as the STAA,22 in the following manner:
[Page 13]
The Respondent asserts that its removal of the Complainant from its
employment and seniority list was done for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons. The
Respondent asserts that it terminated the Complainant for business reasons relating to both the B
& H lease termination and the Complainant's failure to make himself available to the
Respondent for three consecutive days. The Respondent has met its limited burden of rebuttal
by proffering legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the Complainant's termination. Either
one of these reasons is sufficient to sustain the Respondent's burden of production.
PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION
The Complainant may prevail on his complaint of discriminatory
termination upon a showing that the reasons for termination proffered by the Respondent were a
mere pretext for discriminatory animus. A pretext is defined as an "[o]stensible reason or
motive assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive; false appearance,
pretense." Black's Law Dictionary 1187 (6th ed. 1991). The Supreme Court has
recognized the tendency of a proffered reason for termination to camouflage discriminatory
animus.28Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
2 Furthermore, Congress
enacted the STAA to combat the "increasing number of deaths, injuries, and property
damage due to commercial motor vehicle accidents" on the nation's highways. Brock
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) (quoting remarks of Sen. Danforth and
summary of proposed statute at 128 Cong. Rec. 35209, 32510 (1982)); see also Lewis
Grocer Co. v. Holloway, 874 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Congress enacted the
STAA to promote safe interstate commerce of commercial motor vehicles."). See also
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1991).
3 Post-hearing, the
Complainant moved to admit two additional STAA complaints filed by the Complainant (filed
April 6, 1987 (blacklisting) and December 6, 1990 (termination for refusing dispatch due to
fatigue)). In each case, the OSHA regional administrator determined that there was probable
cause to believe that the Respondent violated the STAA. No objection has been received to their
admission. Each complaint is admitted and marked as CX 31 and CX 32, respectively.
4 The Complainant also
generally alleges that his termination was influenced by, among others, his union status as a
member of the Teamsters Democratic Union, his filing of grievances with the union, and his
initiation of other administrative proceedings against the Respondent. However, these separate
allegations relating to his termination do not constitute "protected activity" under the
STAA. Protected activity under the STAA is (1) making safety complaints; and, (2) refusing to
drive when doing so would be unsafe. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a). Complainant's counsel's
request for a hearing relating to his union related allegations is hereby denied, as these
allegations are irrelevant to the STAA inquiry.
5 Complainant filed a separate
STAA complaint in 1988, alleging that he had been illegally blacklisted in 1986. Complainant
also filed a complaint with the NLRB based on his blacklisting allegations. Ultimately, on
February 6, 1992, the Complainant settled his NLRB claims (Nos. 8-CA-20032 and
8-CA-20455), in which he agreed to tender his resignation effective January 31, 1992 and to
refrain
from seeking employment with Freightway or Kaplan Enterprises in the future. Thus, a genuine
issue of law exists whether the Complainant can seek reinstatement in this complaint; however,
despite my request at the hearing, the parties have failed to brief the legal issue propounded by
these facts.
6 The lengthy delay between
referral and the hearing is attributable primarily due to the Complainant's efforts to retain
counsel and to facilitate settlement negotiations.
7 The Complainant testified
that he was willing to accept the determination of the NLRB, and have its determination apply to
his complaint. (ALJX 2 at 4-6). The Complainant interjected into a discussion regarding the
comparative remedies of the STAA and the NLRA that he understood that he would lose ten
years of seniority under the NLRB's determination because his NLRB complaint was predicated
on a failure to rehire and blacklisting, whereas the case was based on his termination. (ALJX 2
at 8). Knowing that he could lose the ten years of seniority, the Complainant agreed to
"defer" to the determination of the NLRB. (ALJX 2 at 13-14).
8 In a letter dated April 28,
1997, addressed to President Clinton and the U.S. Department of Labor, the Complainant states
that the Order of Remand contains several errors. The Complainant states that he was reinstated
with his 1976 seniority in March of 1990. He goes on to state that a union order lead to the
Respondent changing his seniority to 1986, "contrary to the agreement." This letter
is received into the record and marked as ALJX 6B.
9 During the course of the May
14, 1996, hearing, the parties indicated that they were close to reaching an agreement to settle the
Complainant's complaint. (TR1 at 28-30). I continued the hearing, and permitted the parties 45
days to reach a settlement in lieu of a hearing and an administrative determination. The parties
did not reach a settlement, and the matter was reset for hearing on July 10, 1996.
10 The record consists of
the following: TR1 - May 14, 1996 hearing; TR2 - July 10, 1996 hearing; TR3 - July 11, 1996
continuation of hearing; ALJX 1 through ALJX 8; and, Complainant's Exhibits (CX) 1 through
32.
14 Despite the
Complainant's assertion, there is no evidence of record to suggest that the action taken by the
Respondent in response to the B & H lease termination was designed to remove the Complainant
as "a thorn in their side." (See Complainant's Brief at 2). I find it unfortunate for
the Complainant that counsel's brief is long on tangential rhetoric and short on legal application
of the applicable standards to the facts of this complaint.
15 In a separate safety-related
incident, Mr. Kaplan testified that the Complainant made a panic stop which caused tire
problems and said that the brake system needed to be adjusted. (TR2 at 230). (CX 26). Mr.
Kaplan testified that his review of the tractor's records failed to reveal any mechanical problem.
(TR2 at 234). Subsequently, the 121 brake system was removed from the vehicles pursuant to
government request. (TR2 at 234).
Complainant filed a previous OSHA complaint in 1983. (CX 8).
16 Ed Lietaert
("Mr. Lietaert") described an event in April of 1985 in which Mr. Kaplan poked his
finger and then struck the palm of his hand into Mr. Lietaert's chest. Mr. Kaplan then made a
fist, but did not strike Mr. Lietaert. Mr. Kaplan apologized. (CX 1). The Complainant testified
that he was uncertain about whether he knew of this incident at the time he alleged Mr. Kaplan
ran him off the property. Thus, the evidence presented by the Complainant on this point is of
questionable relevance.
17 Mr. Kaplan later
testified that the Complainant has "a short wick" which prompted the company to
"just let him go and cool off." (TR2 at 249).
18 Complainant filed a
grievance in 1982. (CX 19). The Complainant could not recall what the grievance was about.
(TR2 at 117).
19 In support of his
position requesting the voluntary layoff, the Complainant introduced evidence that another driver
was granted a layoff. In an October 14, 1986 letter, George Reeder, logistics coordinator for
Freightway, explained the circumstances concerning the lay-off status of Marion Howard. (CX
15). Mr. Howard was given a voluntary layoff for medical reasons. Both Mr. Kaplan and Mr.
Pursel testified that the voluntary layoff was granted only for legitimate reasons, such as medical
conditions or family emergencies. (TR2 at 247; TR3 at 281). Mr. Kaplan would not have
granted the layoff to a driver without a legitimate reason because that driver would have to be
replaced for the 90 day period, and then the replacement driver would have to be let go when the
laid off driver returns at the end of 90 days. (TR2 at 248). The large expense involved in
procuring trucks prevented the company from maintaining extra trucks to provide for the
voluntary layoffs of its drivers. (TR2 at 248).
20 The Complainant's
reliance on Marion Howard's leave request being granted is severely misplaced, as the
Complainant admits on direct examination that Mr. Howard has a medical condition giving rise
to the request. (TR2 at 94). The Complainant has neither alleged nor proven a medical condition
warranting consideration of his leave request.
21 A driver's perceived
apprehension of an unsafe condition is measured in terms of objective reasonableness "in
light of the situation that confronted the employee at the time." Yellow Freight
Systems, Inc. v. Reich (Thom), 38 F.3d 76, 82 (2nd Cir. 1994).
22SeeMoon v. Transport Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987) (McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis applicable to STAA).
23 Subsequent to the
hearing in this matter, the United States Supreme Court extended the protection of Title VII's
anti-retaliatory provision to employment recommendations sought on behalf of a former
employee. Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Thus, discriminatory and retaliatory practices occurring after
cessation of employment are actionable under federal anti-discrimination statues. Here, the
Complainant have proven facts somewhat similar to those presented in Robinson insofar
as a prospective employer contacted the Respondent as a reference in connection with the
Complainant's employment application. As a result, the facts presented pertaining to the
negative employment reference give rise to an adverse employment action. However, the
circumstances surrounding the Complainant's blacklisting charge was investigated pursuant to
his 1987 OSHA complaint.
24 The Complainant's
complete employment history does not appear in the record. However, the Complainant was
terminated in 1985 for the altercation related to his physical, and was re-employed by the
Respondent after the events contained herein.
25 "Animus"
is defined as "[m]ind; soul; intention; disposition; design; will; . . ." Black's Law
Dictionary 87 (6th Ed. 1990). See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1969) (defining "animus" as "ill-will, antagonism, hostility, or
animosity").
26 The Complainant's
reliance on the voluntary layoff granted to Marion Howard is misplaced. Howard's layoff was
granted for medical reasons, and was not requested in the midst a the B & H lease termination, as
was the Complainant's. The record contains no evidence that the Respondent granted a layoff to
any driver under the same circumstances as requested by the Complainant.
27 Although my finding
of no causal connection between the Complainant's protected activity and his adverse
employment actions precludes relief under the Act, I address the remaining elements of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in order to provide a complete discussion of this complaint, which
is now more than ten years old.
28 In Furnco
Construction Corp., the Court explained,
we know from experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.
Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated
as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we assume generally acts with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration . . .
Furnco Construction Corp., 438 U.S. at 577. This consideration prompted the Supreme
Court to adopt the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Keller
v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 105 F.3d 1508, 1518 (3rd Cir. 1997).