Office of Administrative Law Judges 2 Executive Campus, Suite 450 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
(856) 486-3800
Issue Date: 02 February 2004
CASE NO.: 2003-SOX-00008
In the Matter of:
MARGOT GETMAN Complainant
v.
SOUTHWEST SECURITIES, INC. Respondent
Appearances:
Margot Getman, Pro se
Complainant
Stuart Blaugrund, Esq.
Respondent
Celeste Winford, Esq.
Respondent
Before: Paul H. Teitler
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
This matter arises under the employee protection provision of Public Law 107-204, Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (the Act) enacted on July 30, 2002. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(b)(2)(B) provides that an action under Section 806 of the Act will be governed by 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b), which is part of Section 519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (the AIR 21 Act). The Act affords protection from employment discrimination to employees of companies with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781) and companies required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, the law protects so-called "whistleblower" employees from retaliatory or discriminatory actions by their employer because the employee provided information to their employer or a federal agency or Congress relating to alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 or 1348, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
Because of its recent enactment, the Act lacks a developed body of case law. Consequently, I will base my decision in this matter on the body of law developed under other whistleblower acts. I will give particular regard to AIR 21 Act case law, an act which provides the procedures under which a claim under the Act is to be handled.
1 During her term of employment with Respondent, Complainant's legal last name was Durow. She subsequently resumed using her maiden name, Getman.
2 Respondent has alleged that the complaint in this matter is untimely because it was filed with OSHA two days beyond the allotted 90 day period within which to file a complaint. However, the record shows that Complainant attempted to file her complaint with various governmental agencies and officials prior to the expiration of the 90 day period. Based on her attempts to file her claim in the wrong forums, I find that Complainant equitably tolled her claim. School Dist. of the City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19-21 (3d Cir. 1981).
3 Abbreviations used throughout this decision and order include: "CX" for Complainant's exhibit, "RX" for Respondent's exhibit, and "TR" for the transcript of the August 26-27th, 2003 hearing.
4 In the record both this memo and the August 1, 2002 U-5 are marked as being exhibit "CX 14." I will refer to the memo, dated December 18, 2002, as being exhibit "CX 14B."
5 Respondent asserts that because the report lacked a rating and a date it was incomplete and therefore could not have been ready for review. However, Complainant credibly explained during her testimony that it was common practice not to include certain information in a report until it was ready for final submission, an event occurring after the review committee meeting. Further, it is interesting that Tangun never seemed to have taken issue with Complainant not reaching the review committee with her Cholestech report. Tangun was her direct supervisor and made light of other seemingly much less important alleged infractions by Complainant than her having wasted three months by researching the company and not producing a reviewable report. Yet, if Tangun's testimony is to be believed, the research and report on Cholestech were just abandoned without Complainant receiving any reprimand. Tangun unconvincingly tried to distance himself from the report by refusing to even admit that Complainant wrote it, saying only that "[t]here's a report." (TR 149).
6 Similarly, a plaintiff in the 5th Circuit must allege, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, "(1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which plaintiff relied (5) that proximately caused [the plaintiffs'] injury." Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.1994) (quotation omitted).
7 The jurisdictional requirement of the Securities Act is satisfied here through Complainant's use on Respondent's behalf of the telephone system in carrying out the research necessary to prepare the Cholestech report.
8 It is sufficient that Respondent attempted but did not succeed in violating securities law. To find otherwise would require that a whistleblower allow the violation to occur before reporting it. This would defeat the intent of the Act and whistleblower law in general, which is to prevent the carrying out of the underlying crime.
9 The inaccuracy of a ‘strong buy' rating is confirmed by the precipitous decline of Cholestech's stock from a high of greater than $25 in November of 2001 to less than $10 in August of 2003. (CX 2).
10 An example of purchaser reliance on the market information provided by Respondent was provided by potential customer Founders, a Colorado-based money management company. (TR 249). Founders had contacted Complainant to learn more information regarding a company called Practice Works. (TR 43).
11 Respondent asserts that it would not have been motivated to rate Cholestech as ‘strong buy' in order to garner banking business because another firm had already issued a report on Cholestech giving it a ‘strong buy' rating. By Respondent's reasoning, the existence of the other company's report ended any chance Respondent had to enter into a business relationship with Cholestech based on the strength of Complainant's rating. However, the testimony indicates that multiple banking companies can take part in a banking deal and that Respondent was not aware of the other report until after Complainant's had completed the report. (TR 32, 244-245). That the other company had published a report on Cholestech with a ‘buy' rating therefore does not support Respondent's assertion.
12 She would have been required to contact outside authorities to meet Respondent's definition of "report" since the individuals she would have made an internal report to, namely Tangun and Hultgren, were members of the review committee.
13 To rule otherwise, i.e. that to make a finding based on a temporal relationship required close proximity in time between events, would mean that to avoid liability under the Act an employer would only have to wait a certain amount of time before terminating a whistleblowing employee.
14 I note that the extensive job offer letter Respondent provided to Complainant does not address issues relating to required office hours and how she was to manage her assistant, thus indicating that Complainant had, as she asserted, a reasonable expectation of latitude in these matters.
15 In Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck, a defamation claim, the court reasoned that federal law had established a comprehensive system of oversight and self-regulation by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in order to ensure adherence by members of the industry to both the statutory mandates and ethical standards of the profession, and concluded that the NYSE's disciplinary function conforms to the requirements of a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding. Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 917 (1992). Therefore, statements made on a Form U-5 and later used as the basis for an NYSE investigation were considered "statements uttered in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding." Id . at 683. Respondent's intentional misstatement on Complainant's U-5 is therefore of a serious nature as it was accomplished in the course of a "quasi-judicial administrative proceeding."