U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-8002
DATE: December 3, 1992
CASE NO.: 92-TSC-5
In the Matter of:
WILLIAM L. MARCUS, PH.D.,
Complainant,
v.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent
Appearances:
Stephen M. Kohn, Esq.
Michael Kohn, Esq.
Kohn, Kohn and Colapinto, P.C.
517 Florida Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20210
For Complainant
Bridget C. Shea, Esq.
Office of General Counsel
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
For Respondent
Before David A. Clarke, Jr.
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
This proceeding arises under the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j-9(i); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622; the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971; the Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1367; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
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Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610, and under the
regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 24.
A hearing was held on July 14 through 17 and August 4 and
5, 1992, in Washington, D.C. The parties were represented by
counsel and were given an opportunity to present evidence and
arguments. The record closed on October 19, 1992, with receipt
of post hearing submissions from the parties.
Contentions of The Parties
Dr. William Marcus (Complainant) alleges that he was
subjected to a hostile work environment and later terminated
because of a memo he drafted and released that warned of
potential harm from the use of fluoride, contrary to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's official position concerning
the safety of fluoride use.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.)
(Respondent) contends that it terminated Dr. Marcus after an
investigation by the Inspector General's office, which alleged
that Dr. Marcus was (1) using official information for private
gain; (2) engaging in private business activities that resulted
in or created the appearance of a conflict of interest; (3)
failing to follow established leave procedures; and (4) failing
to obtain administrative approval for outside employment. E.P.A.
contends that while it was aware of Dr. Marcus' controversial
memo, it was not a factor in the decision to terminate Dr.
Marcus, employment.
Statement Of The Case
Dr. William Marcus was employed as an environmental
toxicologist by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for
approximately eighteen years, ending on May 13, 1992. Dr. Marcus
has a Ph.D. in pharmacology, with a subspecialty in toxicology.
He also has a post doctorate degree in teratology and is one of
approximately three hundred board certified toxicologists in the
United States. (Tr. at 444, 456-58, 448.) While employed by
E.P.A., Dr. Marcus served in various positions in the Office of
Toxic Substances and as Branch Chief in the Office of Drinking
Water. (Tr. at 446-47.) In addition, he received two bronze
medals from E.P.A. for distinguished service. (Tr. at 451-52.)
In the early 1980's, Dr. Marcus became a Senior Science Advisor
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within the Criteria and Standards Division of the office of
Drinking water, at a grade 15 level. (Tr. at 448.)
In addition to being employed at E.P.A., sometime around
1983 or 1984 Dr. Marcus began to engage in outside work as a
consultant in civil cases dealing with toxic chemical substances.
In conjunction with this activity Dr. Marcus provided expert
testimony for a fee at depositions and trials.
At about the same time he began outside work, Dr. Marcus
met with Dr. Joseph Cotruvo (his immediate supervisor), Victor
Kimm (Deputy Ethics Official for the Office of Drinking Water and
Dr. Cotruvo's immediate supervisor), Dr. Arnold Kuzmack
(Director, Program Development and Evaluation Division), and
Donnell Nantkus (the Alternate Agency Ethics Official, Office of
General Counsel) to discuss his outside employment. As a result
of meetings with the these E.P.A. officials, Dr. Marcus believed he
had "blanket approval", to be a paid expert witness in litigation
matters outside of his employment with E.P.A. (Tr. at 461-65;
Cl. Ex. 156.)
E.P.A. was aware of Dr. Marcus' outside activities. Dr.
Marcus would occasionally meet with Mr. Nantkus to describe
anticipated testimony to determine whether there were any
improprieties. (Tr. at 470.) Additionally, Dr. Cotruvo received
a complaint about Dr. Marcus' testimony sometime prior to June,
1987, and approached Dr. Marcus for a response. (Tr. at 472-74.)
Moreover, on August 4, 1989, Dr. Cotruvo received a phone call
from an attorney representing a litigant against whom Dr. Marcus
was testifying; Dr. Cotruvo told the caller about the parameters
of Dr. Marcus' authority to testify, as established by E.P.A.
supervisors, and suggested she call Mr. Nantkes for specifics.
(Tr. at 475-76; Cl. Ex. 51.)
Dr. Marcus, official job title at E.P.A. was
"Toxicologist," and his "Organizational Title" was "Senior
Science Advisor." (Tr. at 971-77; Cl. Ex. 65.) However, Dr.
Marcus adopted the title "Chief Toxicologist," without explicit
E.P.A. approval. Dr. Marcus frequently used this title in both
the E.P.A. workplace and his private consulting business. (Tr.
at 363-64; Cl. Ex. 8; Tr. at 839-40 and 850; Res. Ex. 3, tab 5.)
The fact that Dr. Marcus was using the title of "Chief
Toxicologist" was known to E.P.A. supervisory personnel including
Dr. Cotruvo and Mr. Kimm. (Tr. at 466-67; Cl. Ex. 8.) The
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record does not reflect any effort on their part to curtail the
use of this title by Dr. Marcus prior to the issuance of his
fluoride memo. (Tr. at 841)
During this same time period, E.P.A. moved its facilities
to the newly constructed Waterside Mall complex. Because many
employees complained that materials in the new building were
causing adverse health effects, E.P.A. allowed some employees,
including Dr. Marcus, to work at home.
As Dr. Marcus' consulting business progressed, the line
between his official E.P.A. responsibilities and his consulting
business blurred. For example, while Dr. Marcus introduced his
expert testimony by claiming that he was appearing as a private
individual and not on behalf of E.P.A., he sometimes used the
term "we" as if he were speaking for the Office of Drinking
Water. (Tr. at 845.)
In 1985 Dr. Marcus went to his supervisor, Dr. Cotruvo, and
questioned the scientific responsibility of a background document
being used by E.P.A. to regulate fluoride use. (Tr. at 485.) In
the years that followed, Dr. Marcus' interest in fluoride
research remained acute because of its peripheral relationship to
osteosarcoma, a bone cancer he was researching. (Tr. at 492-94.)
In 1988, Dr. Marcus was hired to give expert testimony in
the civil case of Ableman v. Velsicol Corp., wherein it was
alleged that use of chlordane in a pesticide had caused human
illness and death. (Tr. at 478-79.) On April 12, 1988,
attorneys from Spriggs, Bode, & Hollingsworth, the law firm
representing the pesticide manufacturer, complained to E.P.A.
that during the trial Dr. Marcus was using confidential
information, which he had obtained through his official position
at E.P.A. (Cl. Ex. 155 and 158.) Because of this complaint,
E.P.A.'s Office of the Inspector General (Inspector General)
initiated an investigation into Dr. Marcus' outside employment
activities. (Cl. Ex. 155 and 158.)
The investigation remained open for three and one half
years. At times the investigation was very active, with Special
Agents Tracy Connell or Lori Fairchild interviewing individuals
and/or receiving information from various private law firms.
(Cl. Ex. 155.) At other times the investigation was dormant,
with six periods of approximately two months or greater having no
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activity at all. (Id.) Dr. Marcus was not aware of the
investigation.
On May 1, 1990, Dr. Marcus submitted a memo to Alan Hais
(his immediate supervisor and the Acting Director of the Criteria
& Standards Division) outlining in great detail a potential for
widespread adverse affects that fluoride use may have upon the
general public. (Tr. at 500; Cl. Ex. 56.) When Dr. Marcus
perceived that E.P.A. was ignoring this highly critical memo, he
released the memo to Dr. Robert Carton, an E.P.A. environmental
scientist and union representative who was interested in the
fluoride controversy. (Tr. at 500-01.)
Dr. Carton released the memo to William Reilly
(Administrator of E.P.A.), the press, and various citizen's
groups. (Tr. at 369.) The memo received widespread public
attention and was featured in a July 1990 television documentary,
hosted by Roberta Baskin, questioning fluoride safety. In the
documentary, Michael Cook (Director, Office of Drinking Water and
Dr. Marcus, second line supervisor) was interviewed. (Cl. Ex.
202.) During the program, Dr. Marcus' memo was used to directly
refute the E.P.A. position expressed by Mr. Cook. (Tr. at 502,
Cl. Ex. 202.)
On July 27, 1990, Dr. Edward Ohanian, Chief of the Health
Effects Branch, circulated a memo to Margaret Stasikowski
(Director of Criteria Standards Division and Dr. Marcus,
immediate supervisor). (Cl. Ex. 63.) The memo complained of Dr.
Marcus, fluoride memo and the impact of the Roberta Baskin show.
(Id.) Dr. Ohanian stated that Dr. Marcus' memo "sends the wrong
message to the public and scientific community" and "created some
chaos and turmoil." (Tr. at 938-40; Cl. Ex. 63.) Dr. Ohanian's
memo was also sent to Michael Cook (Stasikowski's supervisor, who
had been interviewed on the television documentary), Peter Cook
(Michael Cook's assistant) and Alan Hais. (Cl. Ex. 63.)
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Marcus' supervisor asked him to
prepare weekly activity reports and meet regularly with her. (Tr.
at 888-90.) He was instructed to recertify his inability to work
in the Waterside Mall complex. He was instructed to inform
E.P.A. management of, and seek prior approval for, all occasions
when he was to appear as an expert witness in matters outside his
employment with E.P.A. (Tr. at 508-10.) Ms. Stasikowski
limited Dr. Marcus' official duties to the least controversial
[Page 6]
chemicals. (Tr. at 524.) She also forbade Dr. Marcus from
working on fluoride related matters during E.P.A. hours. (Tr. at
880-85.) Dr. Marcus was no longer given assignments reviewing
his colleagues, work. (Tr. at 524-25.) Also, Dr. Marcus'
request for administrative leave to speak before the American
Chemical Society was denied. (Tr. at 505-07.)
These changes, according to Ms. Stasikowski, were
instituted shortly after she was appointed Division Director in
June of 1990. (Tr. at 890-93.) She stated that the changes were
made to enable her to learn more about her subordinates'
performance and better manage the division. (Id.)
On August 28, 1990, Mr. Michael Cook sent a memo to Dr.
Marcus concerning outside employment. The memo began, "[a]s you
know, you have had blanket approval to engage in outside
employment as an advisor and expert witness on the health effects
of toxic substances." (Tr. at 508-09; Cl. Ex. 66.) Mr. Cook
then went on to say, "I am withdrawing my approval of your
outside employment." (Id.)
On October 2, 1990, Special Agent Fairchild and Special
Agent Francis Kiley (Special Agent in charge of the Washington,
D.C. field office and Fairchild's supervisor) met for the first
time with Michael Cook and Peter Cook. (Tr. at 742-44.) During
this meeting Dr. Marcus' involvement in the fluoride controversy
was discussed. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, the tenor of the Inspector General's
investigation changed. After having remained dormant for six
months, from March to September of 1990, no month passed from
that time forward without investigative activity by Special
Agents Fairchild and/or Kiley. (Cl. Ex. 155.)
In November 1990, Ms. Stasikowski drafted a memo that
accused Dr. Marcus of aberrant and violent behavior, such as
carrying a firearm and threatening E.P.A. staff. (Cl. Ex. 73.)
Ms. Stasikowski informally circulated the memo to supervisory
personnel, including the Assistant Administrator of E.P.A., and
to security. (Cl. Ex. 73; Tr. at 528-34; Tr. at 958-62.) Ms.
Stasikowski formed this opinion of Dr. Marcus from statements she
heard second hand; when she later came to know Dr. Marcus through
work experiences, she realized that this description of Dr.
Marcus was incorrect. (Tr. at 866-69 and 961-62.) However, she
[Page 7]
did not approach the Assistant Administrator or other E.P.A.
personnel to correct her earlier misstatements. (Tr. at 961-62.)
On May 28, 1991, the Honorable Paul McGuckian, Associate
Judge for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Maryland, wrote to E.P.A.
Administrator Reilly. (Tr. at 863-64 and 727.) In his letter
Judge McGuckian complained of improprieties by Dr. Marcus, who
had testified two weeks earlier at a trial over which Judge
McGuckian presided. (Tr. at 863-64 and 727; Res. Ex. 4.)
Special Agent Fairchild referred the matter to the State's
Attorney for Frederick County, Maryland, who declined to
prosecute. (Tr. at 726-30; Cl. Ex. 155; Res. Ex. 3, tab 11.)
On September 25, 1991, Special Agent Fairchild interviewed
Dr. Marcus. (Tr. at 783-84.) Dr. Rufus Morrison, an E.P.A.
ecologist and union steward, attended the meeting. (Id.)
Special Agent Fairchild presented Dr. Marcus with a list of
dates, each of which were purported to represent a work day when
he was appearing as a paid witness while his timecards indicated
that he was either on E.P.A. time or using sick leave. (Tr. at
783-86.) When asked by Special Agent Fairchild to explain these
discrepancies, Dr. Marcus responded that there must be an error,
that the timecards should indicate that annual leave was taken,
and that he had no objection to paying back any salary not due
him. (Tr. at 576-78; Tr. at 334-38.)
On November 7, 1991, the Inspector General concluded its
investigation of Dr. Marcus and released its report. (Res. Ex.
3.) The report charged that Dr. Marcus did not receive approval
for his outside work; failed to report financial gain from his
outside work; falsely described his E.P.A. duties and
responsibilities; released confidential information; and misused
leave. (Res. Ex. 3.)
The Inspector General's report was based, in part, on the
results of interviews with E.P.A. personnel and others. Special
Agents Fairchild and Kiley shredded all investigation notes made
contemporaneously during interviews. (Tr. at 99.) The
destruction of this evidence occurred on the authority of an
erroneously issued closing report and while Special Agent Kiley
was aware of an ongoing Wage and Hour Investigation, a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request by Dr. Marcus and his attorney, an
administrative proceeding for the removal of Dr. Marcus, two
Capital Hill inquiries into possible whistleblower violations by
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E.P.A., and questions to Administrator Reilly concerning the
Marcus firing. (Tr. at 213-26.) The handwritten notes were
destroyed on March 25, 1992, in violation of E.P.A. FOIA
Regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 2.111 (a). (Joint Stipulations.)
On January 13, 1992, Ms. Stasikowski, relying upon the
Inspector General's report, proposed that Dr. Marcus be fired;
she listed five charges against Dr. Marcus. (Res. Ex. 2.) On
May 13, 1992, Dr. Davies concurred with Ms. Stasikowski and
terminated Dr. Marcus, employment with E.P.A. (Res. Ex. 1.) Of
the five charges made by Ms. Stasikowski, Dr. Davies found that
four were substantiated. (Tr. at 1015-16.) The four charges, or
reasons for dismissal, were:
1. Using official information for private gain;
3. Engaging in private business activities that result
in or create the appearance of a conflict of
interest;
4. Failing to follow established leave procedures;
5. Failing to obtain administrative approval for
outside employment.
(Res. Ex. 1 and 2; Tr. at 825-26, 1015-16.) Charge number two,
Conduct Which Is Generally Criminal, Infamous, Dishonest or
Notoriously Disgraceful, was not used as a reason for dismissal.
(Res. Ex. 2, p. 4.)
Dr. Davies testified that his decision to terminate Dr.
Marcus, employment was based on the evidence contained in the
Inspector General's report; the accompanying transmittal memo
from Special Agent Kiley; the material submitted by Paul A.
McGuckian, Associate Judge for the Sixth Judicial Court of
Maryland; Ms. Stasikowski's memo Proposed Removal; and an
interview with Dr. Marcus. (Tr. at 1013-15 and 1043-46.) Dr.
Davies also testified that if one or two of the charges were
found not to be substantiated, he would have to reconsider his
decision to terminate Dr. Marcus, employment. (Tr. at 1064.)
Dr. Davies testified that while he was aware of Dr. Marcus'
activities concerning fluoride, and while he was "bothered" by
congressional interest and inquiry caused by Dr. Marcus, views,
[Page 9]
they in no way influenced his decision to terminate Dr. Marcus'
employment. (Tr. at 1050-52.)
Between 1984 and January 13, 1992, Dr. Marcus was not
disciplined by E.P.A. for (1) using official information for
private gain; (2) engaging in private business activities that
result in or create the appearance of a conflict of interest; (3)
failing to follow established leave procedures; and (4) failing
to obtain administrative approval for outside employment. (Tr.
at 574 and 325.) Dr. Davies testified that he was not aware of
the extent of Dr. Marcus, outside consulting activities until
receipt of the Inspector General's report in 1991. (Tr. at 1045-
46.)
Applicable Law
In an alleged retaliatory adverse action case, such as
this, the employee bears the ultimate burden of proof that
intentional discrimination has occurred. Dean Darty, No. 82-ERA-
2, slip op. at 6-7 (Sec'y of Labor, April 23, 1983) citing Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
In such cases, the employee must initially present a prima facie
case showing that (1) she or he engaged in protected activity,
(2) the employer was aware of such activity, and (3) the employer
took adverse action against the employee. McDonell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1972).
If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer must rebut the presumption of retaliatory action by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action. Dean Darty, at 8; Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
Should the employer successfully rebut the employee's prima
facie, case, the employee must present evidence showing that the
employer's proffered reason is a pretext. Dean Darty, at 8;
Burdine, at 253. In order for the employee to meet this burden,
the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
retaliatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer or
that the employer's proffered explanation is not credible. Dean
Darty, at 8; Burdine, at 256.
[Page 10]
Discussion
Dr. Marcus' evidence established a prima facie case. It
showed that he had engaged in protected activity, that his
employer was aware of this activity, and that adverse action was
taken against him. In rebuttal, E.P.A. presented evidence that
it terminated Dr. Marcus, employment for four reasons, none of
which included Dr. Marcus' fluoride activities. The four
reasons, identified as charges by Dr. Davies, must be considered
to determine if they are legitimate reasons for terminating Dr.
Marcus' employment, or as Dr. Marcus contends, pretexts.
Charge No. 1: Using Official Information For Private
Gain:
Dr. Davies and Ms. Stasikowski cited E.P.A. regulations at
40 C.F.R. §§ 3.103 (b) and (d) (1) as the framework for deciding
whether Dr. Marcus violated official policy. To review the
reasons offered for dismissal, Dr. Marcus' conduct must be
scrutinized against these regulations, which read as follows:
Employees may not use their official positions for
private gain or act in such a manner that creates the
reasonable appearance of doing so.
Employees therefore must not:
(b) Use information acquired through EPA duties that
has not been made available to the general public to
further their private interests;
(d) Take any action, whether specifically prohibited or
not, which would result in or create the reasonable
appearance of:
(1) Using public office for private gain . . . .
The cited subsections cover two separate situations. The
first, § 3.103 (b), prohibits using information that is not
available to the general public for private gain. This
regulation, as applied to Dr. Marcus, does not necessarily
prohibit the use of official information. Rather, permissibility
is determined by whether the information is available to the
general public.
The second, § 3.103 (d) (1), is a catchall provision that is
somewhat vague and could be interpreted to cover a myriad of
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activities. The E.P.A. Office of General Counsel has interpreted
this regulation to prohibit accepting payment for any article or
appearance, including testimony, that focuses specifically on the
employee's official duties or on the responsibilities, policies
and programs of the E.P.A. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 58, p. 3 and tab
57.)
Dr. Davies referenced examples of alleged wrongdoing in his
memo entitled Final Decision on the Notice of Proposed Dismissal.
These examples constituted the basis of his determination that
Dr. Marcus had used official information for private gain.
In example number one, Dr. Davies alleged that an October
11, 1986, letter, which Dr. Marcus wrote to an attorney
soliciting private employment as an expert witness, gave the
impression that Dr. Marcus had access to and use of restricted
information through his position at E.P.A. In that letter, Dr.
Marcus referred to two chlordane studies, which were classified
by the E.P.A. Office of Pesticide Programs as "Confidential
Business Information" (CBI). (Res. Ex. 3, tab 5.) In his
letter, Dr. Marcus stated that he had access to the "summaries"
of the studies, which were not "CBI," and that he would be
sending them to Attorney Tippit. (Id.) At the end of the
letter, Dr. Marcus listed his fee schedule as an expert witness.
(Id.)
Dr. Marcus' letter did not refer to his employment at
E.P.A. The letterhead listed Dr. Marcus' name, that he was
"Board Certified" and a "Consulting Toxicologist," and his home
address. The letter offered the nonconfidential summaries of the
studies, not the studies themselves. The summaries were
available to the general public. (Tr. at 563-64.) Therefore,
Dr. Marcus neither used nonpublic information nor solicited
payment for information that focused specifically on his official
duties or on the responsibilities, policies and programs of the
E.P.A. Accordingly, this allegation is not substantiated.
In example number two, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus
impermissibly attended an E.P.A. Reference Dose Group (RfD)
meeting concerning the chemical chlordane, in that he was not a
member of the group and not assigned to work with chlordane, and
that Dr. Marcus' purpose was to use official knowledge that he
gained at this meeting for his own private gain.
[Page 12]
At the hearing, Dr. Marcus produced an E.P.A. manual
listing "William Marcus, Ph.D. (OW)" as an Office of Drinking
Water representative to the RfD group. (Tr. at 552-54; Cl. Ex.
137.) Dr. Marcus also produced the minutes on E.P.A. letterhead
of an RfD meeting which stated that chlordane was discussed by
the group and that Dr. Marcus was present. (Tr. at 563-64; Cl.
Ex. 9.)
In regard to section 3.103 (b), Dr. Davies did not allege
that the information Dr. Marcus obtained at the RfD meeting was
not available to the public. Therefore, the allegation that Dr.
Marcus used nonpublic information regarding chlordane for private
gain is not substantiated. In regard to section 3.103 (d) (1), Dr.
Davies did not allege that the chlordane information focused
specifically on Dr. Marcus' official duties or on the
responsibilities, policies and programs of E.P.A. Accordingly,
this allegation is not substantiated.
In example number three, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus
had used an abstract of the Yonamura study in paid testimony, but
because Dr. Marcus had not filed a FOIA request he must have
obtained the study through his work as an E.P.A. employee,
violating E.P.A. regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 3.103 (b), (d) (1).
The Inspector General's report stated that the Yonamura study did
not contain confidential business information and was available
to the general public. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 9.)
Dr. Davies assumed that because there was no FOIA request
on file, Dr. Marcus must have either gone directly to the
Information Services Branch or accessed the information through
another E.P.A. employee. This assumption is pure conjecture and
speculation, and as such can not support the decision to
terminate Dr. Marcus, employment. (Res. Ex. 2, p. 3.)
Additionally, I credit Dr. Marcus' testimony that the Yonamura
study was used by the RfD group to support certain regulatory
conclusions, and that the information is available to the general
public. Finally, the Yonumura abstract is not a decision making
process or procedure. Accordingly, this allegation is not
substantiated.
In example number four, Dr. Davies alleged that a document
Dr. Marcus used, Addendum to the Health Assessment Document for
Trichlorethylene, which was stamped "do not cite or quote," had
[Page 13]
limited public access. (Tr. at 1019-21.) Dr. Marcus produced
the document at trial. (Cl. Ex. 134.) The document had been
circulated for peer review to scientists outside the E.P.A., with
no prohibition against redistribution, and is available to the
general public through the National Technical Information Service
at the price of $30.95. The "do not cite or quote" notation
means that the document should not be cited as authority in
scholarly writings or presentations. This document is available
to the public; therefore Dr. Marcus did not violate section
3.103 (b). Additionally, the document did not focus specifically
on Dr. Marcus' official duties or on the responsibilities,
policies and programs of E.P.A.; therefore, Dr. Marcus did not
violate § 3.103 (d) (1). Accordingly, this allegation is not
substantiated.
The next cited example is number six. In this example Dr.
Davies alleged that a French scientific document, which Dr.
Marcus translated for use during private testimony in the case of
Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., was not generally available to
the public. At the hearing, Dr. Marcus testified that the
document was first published in 1897 and is available at the
public library. (Tr. at 633-35.) This document is public
information and does not focus specifically on Dr. Marcus,
official duties or on the responsibilities, policies and programs
of E.P.A. Accordingly, this allegation is not substantiated.
As demonstrated by the above analysis, the five examples
relied on by Dr. Davies to support the first of his four reasons
for terminating Dr. Marcus, employment are not supportable in
fact or law.
Charge No. 2: Conduct Which Is Generally Criminal, Infamous,
Dishonest or Notoriously Disgraceful:
Dr. Davies reviewed this charge made by Ms. Stasikowski in
her memo entitled Proposed Removal. He found that Dr. Marcus'
actions did not sustain this charge. Therefore, he did not rely
on it to support his decision to terminate Dr. Marcus'
employment.
Charge No. 3: Engaging In Private Business Activities That
Result In Or Create The Appearance Of A Conflict Of Interest:
Section 3.103 (d) (1), as discussed previously, prohibits
[Page 14]
accepting payment for any written article or appearance,
including testimony, that focuses specifically on the employee's
official duties or on the responsibilities, policies and programs
of the E.P.A. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 58, p. 3 and tab 57.)
Dr. Davies cited the E.P.A. regulations at 40 C.F.R. §
3.103 and explained that this section, as applied to Dr. Marcus,
prohibits him, when testifying as a private citizen, from
discussing the E.P.A. regulatory decision making processes,
policies and the employees involved in such activities. (Res.
Ex. 1, p. 4.)
Example number one contained two allegations against Dr.
Marcus. First, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus misrepresented
his position and authority at E.P.A. by referring to himself as
the "Chief Toxicologist" for the Office of Drinking Water, for
the purpose of bolstering his stature as a paid witness. Dr.
Marcus' E.P.A. position description lists his job title as
Toxicologist and his organizational title of position as Senior
Science Advisor. (Cl. Ex. 65, p. 5.) At the hearing, Dr. Marcus
explained that he adopted the "Chief Toxicologist" title with the
informal permission of his immediate supervisor, Dr. Cotruvo, and
that E.P.A. personnel were aware of his use of the title "Chief
Toxicologist" for several years. (Tr. at 454-55.)
The "Chief Toxicologist" title was adopted by Dr. Marcus
and was not assigned to him by the agency. Therefore, Dr. Marcus
represented himself by a title that was not his position of
record at E.P.A. However, it is not uncommon in Government
offices for employees to adopt unofficial job titles with the
actual or tacit approval of their supervisors. That appears to
have been the case in this instance. I credit Dr. Marcus'
testimony in this regard.
Second, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus gave the
impression he was appearing as a representative of the E.P.A.
when he was deposed in the case of Kanode v. Trans-Tech, Inc. In
his deposition, Dr. Marcus testified that he signed off on the
"DWEL" for trichloroethylene, and that he agreed with the
finalization because it was a good compromise based on the data.
(Res. Ex. 3, tab 25, p. 152.) Additionally, Dr. Marcus testified
that "DWELs" are part of a Health Advisory; that the Health
Advisory is revisited every three years; that if significant new
data is developed, the Health Advisory is redone; and that Dr.
[Page 15]
Marcus would participate in that process. (Id. at p. 153.)
Since Dr. Marcus discussed his specific duties regarding
the "DWEL" for trichloroethylene and the promulgation of Health
Advisories during his testimony as a paid witness, Dr. Marcus
accepted payment for an appearance that focused specifically on
his official duties or on the responsibilities, policies and
programs of the E.P.A. Therefore, he violated section
3.103 (d) (1). Accordingly, this allegation against Dr. Marcus is
substantiated.
In the next example given, labeled Examples 2 & 3, Dr.
Davies made three allegations. First, he alleged that Dr. Marcus
began his deposition in the case of Ableman v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp. by mischaracterizing E.P.A. ethics regulations and falsely
stating that he had authority to testify as a private citizen.
In his testimony, Dr. Marcus began with the following disclaimer:
For the record, I am here as a private individual. My
opinions are strictly those of a private individual and do
not necessarily represent those of my employer, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency.
(Res. Ex. 3, tab 28, p. 9.) When asked to explain this
statement, Dr. Marcus testified:
As part of the agreement I have with my employer, when I
engage in outside employment I am to do it as a private
citizen and to include as part of the record that it is
strictly my personal opinion.
(Id. at p. 9.)
As will be discussed later, the evidence shows that Dr.
Marcus did have administrative approval to appear as a paid
witness. Therefore, the allegation that Dr. Marcus
mischaracterized E.P.A. ethics regulations and falsely stated
that he had authority to testify as a private citizen is not
substantiated.
Second, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus described E.P.A.
procedures and policies and related a discussion between E.P.A.
and Velsicol Corporation employees in his testimony in the
deposition in the case of Ableman v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. In
his testimony, Dr. Marcus discussed he following topics:
[Page 16]
E.P.A.'s investigation of the problems of pesticide
application;
his duties at E.P.A. regarding evaluating the allowable
levels of chlordane and heptachlor, when airborne;
his E.P.A. duties concerning chlordane and heptachlor use
as termiticides;
that E.P.A. had compelled Velsicol to provide test
information concerning exposure for crawl space homes and
for slab-based homes;
that he was involved in work that established the E.P.A.
standard for cyclodienes and that Velsicol withdrew its
product from the market when it learned that E.P.A. was
preparing to suspend its approval of the product; and
that E.P.A. had concluded that chlordane and heptachlor are
animal carcinogens.
It appears that Dr. Marcus testified about his specific
duties or about the responsibilities, policies and programs of
the E.P.A. Therefore, he violated § 3.103 (d) (1), and this
allegation against him is substantiated.
Third, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus, in his
deposition testimony in the case of Abelman v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp., consistently used the term "well in discussing E.P.A.
policies and procedures, for the purpose of conveying the
impression that he was testifying as an official E.P.A.
representative. In his testimony, Dr. Marcus discussed
evaluating chlordane and heptachlor. He said:
Remember, we are strictly the Office of Drinking Water and
we don't ordinarily, unless specifically requested, make
some conversions; but, if say you would like to know, I
would be happy to try.
(Res. Ex. 3, tab 28, p. 115.) In addition, when testifying about
how he formed the conclusion that Velsicol had decided to
withdraw its chemical from the market rather than have it
[Page 17]
suspended by E.P.A., Dr. Marcus said:
What happened at EPA was we, "we" being the Office of
Drinking Water and my responsibility, were in the midst of
writing or revising our standards. As part of my
responsibility, I was to keep track of the ongoing actions
in the chemicals we have already had . . . .1
(Res. Ex. 3, tab 28, p. 173.)
In his testimony, Dr. Marcus used the pronoun "we" as if he
were speaking for the E.P.A. Such statements were probably
intended to bolster his credibility and authority as an expert
witness. In this regard, as well as because Dr. Marcus'
testimony concerned his specific duties and the responsibilities,
policies and programs of the E.P.A., Dr. Marcus violated §
3.103 (d) (1). Accordingly, this allegation is substantiated.
In example number four, Dr. Davies alleged that in his
testimony in the case of Brushel v. Alternate Energy Resources,
Inc., Dr. Marcus discussed his regulatory responsibilities and
represented himself as a representative of the E.P.A. In his
testimony, Dr. Marcus referred to an E.P.A. regulation that had
been proposed but not yet promulgated. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 29, p.
66.) In addition, Dr. Marcus used the pronoun "we" in describing
the Office of Drinking Water's responsibilities concerning health
advisories. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 29, p. 66.)
A review of his testimony indicates that Dr. Marcus used
the pronoun "we" as if he were speaking for the E.P.A. Such
statements would likely bolster his credibility and authority as
an expert witness. In this regard, as well as because Dr.
Marcus, testimony concerned his specific duties and the
regulatory responsibilities, policies and programs of the E.P.A.,
Dr. Marcus violated § 3.103 (d) (1). Accordingly, this allegation
is substantiated.
In example number five, Dr. Davies alleged that in his
testimony in the case of Weir v. Exxon Corp., Dr. Marcus
discussed internal E.P.A. processes and procedures about
regulatory actions in which he had participated when working in
the Office of Drinking Water. In his deposition, Dr. Marcus
discussed benzene in drinking water and his role in drafting the
[Page 18]
E.P.A. regulatory proposal covering that subject. (Res. Ex. 3,
tab 32, p. 62.)
A review of his testimony indicates that Dr. Marcus
discussed his specific duties and the responsibilities, policies
and programs of the E.P.A. Therefore, Dr. Marcus violated §
3.103 (d) (1). Accordingly, this allegation is substantiated.
In example number six, Dr. Davies stated that he was unable
to locate an E.P.A. document to which Ms. Stasikowski had
referred in her memo entitled Proposed Removal, and therefore he
did not have the "document of prime importance in this charge."
Dr. Davies then alleged that since Dr. Marcus had consistently
crossed the line between expressing a private opinion and being
an employee of E.P.A., Dr. Marcus had committed a general
violation of § 3.10 (d) (1).
In this example, Dr. Davies found, despite the lack of any
evidence to substantiate the specific charge proposed by Ms.
Stasikowski, that a violation occurred. Since there is no basis
given to support this allegation, it is without substance and not
sufficient to support the termination decision.
In example number seven, Dr. Davies made two allegations.
First, he alleged that in Dr. Marcus' deposition testimony in the
case of Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., he discussed E.P.A.
procedures, internal deliberations and policy development.
In the deposition, Dr. Marcus stated that there had been a
disagreement between the Office of Drinking Water and the Office
of Pesticide Programs concerning the handling of a case involving
arsenic. The disagreement was eventually resolved in favor of
Dr. Marcus' office. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 34, p. 52.) Since this
testimony focused on Dr. Marcus, duties and the resolution of an
intra-agency dispute, it constituted a violation of section §
3.103 (d) (1). Therefore, this allegation is substantiated.
Second, Dr. Davies alleged that Dr. Marcus had relied on
documents that contained nonpublic information when testifying
privately. The only document presented by E.P.A. that related to
the case of Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc. was the Addendum to
the Health Assessment Document for Trichlorethylene. That
document, as discussed earlier in this opinion, is for sale
through the National Technical Information Service, and therefore
[Page 19]
it is available to the general public. Therefore, Dr. Marcus'
use of this document was not a violation. Accordingly, this
allegation is not substantiated.
As demonstrated by the above analysis, six of the nine
allegations relied on by Dr. Davies to support the second of his
four reasons for terminating Dr. Marcus' employment are
supportable in law and fact.
Charge No. 4: Failing To Follow Established Leave
Procedures:
Dr. Davies alleged that the Inspector General's report
documented a pattern by Dr. Marcus, during the period from 1988
to January 1990, of misusing sick leave and not taking annual
leave while engaging in paid employment as an outside consultant.
The Inspector General's report cited eight specific instances of
alleged leave abuses, as follows:
First, the Inspector General's report stated that on May
23, 1988, Dr. Marcus took eight hours of sick leave while in
Dallas, Texas, on private business, and that when interviewed by
Special Agent Fairchild, Dr. Marcus said that the records were in
error and should indicate that annual leave was taken and that he
had no objection to paying back any salary not due him. (Tr. at
752; Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p. 4; Res. Ex. 3, p. 13.)
The timecard for that period is not accurate, in that the
cumulative totals for the two week pay period, which show the
amount of sick and annual leave charged against Dr. Marcus'
account, do not reconcile with the leave reported used for each
individual work day. The timecard reported that eight hours of
sick leave were used on May 23, 1988, and that forty-eight hours
of sick leave were used during the entire two week pay period;
however, the cumulative totals showed that thirty-four hours of
sick leave were charged against Dr. Marcus' account for the pay
period. (Cl. Ex. 210, p. 6.) Additionally, the timecard
reflected that no annual or compensatory leave was used during
the pay period; however, thirty-four hours of annual leave and
fifteen hours of compensatory leave were charged against Dr.
Marcus' account. (Cl. Ex. 210, p. 6.) Therefore, while sick
leave was reported as being used, annual and compensatory leave
were charged against Dr. Marcus' account. Accordingly, the
timecard is not accurate and does not prove an abuse of leave
[Page 20]
procedures.
Second, the Inspector General's report stated that on July
11, 1988, Dr. Marcus signed an affidavit relating to private
business but did not take leave. (Res. Ex. 3, p. 13.) When
interviewed by Special Agent Fairchild, Dr. Marcus said that he
signed the affidavit after work hours. (Tr. at 753; Res. Ex. 3,
tab 11, p. 4.) The E.P.A. offered no evidence that the affidavit
was signed during work hours. Dr. Marcus' explanation is
plausible. Accordingly, this allegation is not substantiated.
Third, the Inspector General's report stated that on
November 3, 1988, Dr. Marcus used sick leave wile attending a
deposition in Baltimore, Maryland. (Res. Ex. 3, pp. 13-14.)
When interviewed by Special Agent Fairchild, Dr. Marcus stated
that the records were in error and should show annual leave and
that he would have no objection to paying back any salary not due
him. (Tr. at 753; Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p. 4.)
The timecard reflected that six hours of annual leave were
used during the two week pay period, but eleven hours of annual
leave were charged against Dr. Marcus' account. (Cl. Ex. 210, p.
4.) Therefore, the timecard is not accurate. However, while the
timecard may be supportive of Dr. Marcus, claim that he used
annual leave and that the timecard is incorrect, there were only
five hours of annual leave that were charged against Dr. Marcus'
account for the pay period and which were not reported as used
for any specific day. Therefore, while it appears that there was
not enough unaccounted annual leave to establish that Dr. Marcus
had taken annual leave for the day in question, the inaccuracy of
the timecard renders it unreliable. Such evidence is inadequate
to support this allegation.
Fourth, the Inspector General's report stated that on
February 21, 1989, Dr. Marcus did not take leave while at a
deposition in Rockville, Maryland. (Res. Ex. 3, p. 14.)
Additionally, the report stated that Special Agent Fairchild
showed him his timecard, which indicated that he did not take
leave. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p. 4.) Also, the report stated that
Dr. Marcus said that the record was in error and should reflect
annual leave and that he did not object to paying back any salary
not due him. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p. 4.)
Special Agent Fairchild testified at the hearing that she
[Page 21]
showed Dr. Marcus the timecard, that the timecard indicated that
Dr. Marcus had used sick leave, and that Dr. Marcus stated it
should be annual leave. (Tr. at 753-54.) The timecard was not
introduced into evidence. Special Agent Fairchild's hearing
testimony contradicted the Inspector General's report.
Therefore, the reliability of the Inspector General's report is
in question, and Dr. Davies' reliance on this example was
misplaced.
Fifth, the Inspector General's report stated that on March
17, 1989, Dr. Marcus signed an affidavit relating to his private
business but did not take leave. (Res. Ex. 3, p. 14.) When
interviewed by Special Agent Fairchild, Dr. Marcus said that he
signed the affidavit after work hours. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p.
4.) Dr. Marcus, timecard reported no leave taken for the pay
period but showed sixteen hours of annual leave charged against
his account. (Cl. Ex. 210, p. 3.) Therefore, sixteen hours of
leave were used sometime during the two week pay period.
Therefore, the timecard is not accurate. Additionally, Dr.
Marcus, explanation is plausible, whereas E.P.A. has offered no
evidence that the affidavit was signed during work hours.
Accordingly, this allegation is not substantiated.
Sixth, the Inspector General's report stated that on August
9, 1989, Dr. Marcus was attending a deposition in Washington,
D.C., which started at 3:15 p.m., but he did not take leave.
(Res. Ex. 3, p. 14.) The report also indicated that when
interviewed by Special Agent Fairchild, Dr. Marcus said that his
normal work day was from 6:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., that the leave
records were in error and should indicate that two hours of leave
were taken, and that he had no objection to paying back any
salary not due him. (Res. Ex. 3, tab 11, p. 4; Tr. at 754.)
The record reflects that there were two timecards for this
pay period. (Tr. at 301 and 733-34.) One timecard reported that
four hours of annual leave were taken for the day in question,
while the other timecard reported that four hours of sick leave
were taken. (Cl. Ex. 210, p. 2.) The hours of sick and annual
leave reported on both timecards do not equate with the total
number of hours charged against Dr. Marcus' account. (Id.)
Therefore, the accuracy of the timecards is in doubt.
Additionally, neither timecard referenced the other
timecard, and the Inspector General's report did not note the
[Page 22]
existence of two timecards.
Seventh, the Inspector General's report stated that on
August 10, 1989, Dr. Marcus was at a deposition in Washington,
D.C., which ended at 10:26 a.m., but that his timecard did not
reflect that he took leave. (Res. Ex. 3, p. 14.) Special Agent
Fairchild testified that she showed Dr. Marcus his timecard, that
he said it was in error and should reflect that two hours of
annual leave had been taken, and that he did not object to paying
back any salary not due him. (Tr. at 754-55; Res. Ex. 3, tab 11,
pp. 4-5.) Two timecards existed for this pay period, and both
indicated that three hours of annual leave had been taken, from
7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. (Cl. Ex. 210, p. 2.)
The timecards contradict the Inspector General's report in
that they reflect that annual leave was taken. I credit the
timecards as the being the best evidence and find that this
allegation is not supported by the credible evidence.
Eighth, the Inspector General's report stated that on
January 12, 1990, Dr. Marcus signed a sworn statement in Los
Angeles, California, but that his timecard did not reflect that
he had taken leave. (Res. Ex. 3, p. 14.) Special Agent
Fairchild testified that when interviewed, Dr. Marcus told her
that he was in California all day, that he should have taken
annual leave, and that he was willing to amend his timecard or
pay nine hours back to the Government. (Tr. at 755; Res. Ex. 3,
tab 11, p. 5.)
The timecard reported that no annual leave was taken on any
specific day during the two week pay period; however it also
showed that eight hours of annual leave were charged against Dr.
Marcus' account for sometime during this pay period. (Cl. Ex.
210, p. 1; Tr. at 297-99.) Therefore, the accuracy of the
timecard is in doubt and cannot be used to support the
allegation.
As demonstrated by the analysis above, on six of the eight
days of alleged leave abuse, the timecards do not appear to
accurately report leave taken by Dr. Marcus. on the one occasion
when a timecard was not produced, the testimony of Special Agent
Fairchild contradicted the Inspector General's report. On
another occasion, a timecard contradicted the Inspector General's
report. On the two days where it was alleged that Dr. Marcus
1 The entire statement made by Dr.
Marcus is not quoted here
Because it was not provided in the Inspector General's report,
which contained only excerpts of the deposition transcript.
2 The Inspector General
submitted Dr. Marcus' leave records
to Federal authorities for prosecution on the issue of alleged
leave abuse. on June 6, 1991, the Public Integrity Section of
the U.S. Department of Justice declined to pursue prosecution
because
The available evidence shows that of the twenty-two known
days in which Marcus testified at a trial or a deposition,
he failed to take leave for only one of those days. The
value of that one day of leave is below our threshold for
prosecution.
(Res. Ex. 3, tab 60; Tr. at 740.)
Moreover, on March 12, 1992, the Investigation Division of
the Office of the Inspector General declined to pursue
prosecution under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act because
the timecards were not sufficient to support charges when neither
Dr. Marcus' timekeeper nor his immediate supervisor could recall
"telephonic leave requests over three years ago." (Cl. Ex. 177;
Tr. at 737-38.) These two instances of declined prosecution
suggest that the Inspector General was aware of the lack of
evidence supporting its claim that Dr. Marcus engaged in a
pattern of abusing leave procedures. (Res. Ex. 1, p. 6.)
3 That employee, an
Environmental Engineer GS-14, received
remuneration to speak on behalf of a commercial chemical company
at a public meeting; the employee introduced himself as a
representative of E.P.A. (Cl. Ex. 211, p. 239.) In the proposed
disciplinary memo, the E.P.A. supervisor made four charges
against the employee and proposed a sixty day suspension. (Id.)
4 In so finding, I do not credit the
testimony of Ms.
Stasikowski and Dr. Davies that Dr. Marcus, fluoride activities
played no role in the decision to terminate Dr. Marcus'
employment.