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Scott v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 92-TSC-2 (ALJ Jan. 29, 1993)


U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
800 K Street. N.W.
Washington. D.C 20001-8002

Date Issued: January 29, 1993

Case No.: 92-TSC-2

In the Matter of

ROBERT K. SCOTT,
    Complainant

    v.

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE COMPANY,
    Respondent

Counsel for the Complainant:

    Douglas B. Baily, Esq.
    A. William Saupe, Esq.
    Sharon A. Sturges, Esq.
       Anchorage, Alaska

    Billie Pirner Garde, Esq.
       Houston, TX

Counsel for the Respondent:

    Robert E. Jordan, III, Esq.
    Morgan D. Hodgson, Esq.
    Mary Woodson Poag, Esq.
    Stephania Daliani, Esq.
       Washington, D.C.

   Lawrence R. Trotter, Esq.
       Anchorage, Alaska

Before: JEFFREY TURECK
   Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

   This is a case for compensatory and exemplary damages arising under the whistleblower protection provisions of the following statutes: the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. 52622; the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §7622; the Solid Waste Disposal


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Act ("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. §6971; and the Water ollution Control Act ("WPCA"), 33 U.S.C. §1367. Regulations governing such proceedings are contained in 29 C.F.R. Part 24. A formal hearing was held from May 19 through June 4, 1992 in Anchorage, Alaska. On August 4, 1992, complainant filed a motion to reopen the evidentiary record for the admission of several documents into evidence. That motion was granted, and four additional exhibits were admitted into evidence. A subsequent motion to reopen the record was filed on November 19, 1992, about 1 1/2 months after the final briefs were filed. That motion was denied on December 21, 1992.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW1

Background

   The complainant, Robert Scott, is a 65 year old native of Monroe, Louisiana. His wife, to whom he has been married for 14 years, is originally from the Philippines. Following service in the Navy during World War II, Scott began a career of operating mechanical equipment in various types of plants including chemical and petrochemical plants, electric generating plants, refineries and pipelines (TR 1440-41), located primarily in the South and Southwest United States (TR 1442-43). He worked for many different employers (TR 1444-45). Scott admitted he was fired from several jobs over the years, for reasons such as refusing to comply with a dress code (TR 1722-23), a disagreement over travel expenses (TR 1724-25), medical problems (TR 1726), and refusing to perform work (TR 1726-27). He also resigned from several others due to what can best be described as personality clashes with supervisors or perceived problems with the employer's treatment of him (see TR 1728-47).

   Alyeska Pipleline Service Company is a consortium of companies -- BP Oil, Exxon, ARCO, Mobil, Amerada Hess, Phillips Petroleum, and Union Oil -- which runs the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TR 70, 74). BP is the major owner of Alyeska, owning more than 50 percent. Exxon and Arco are also substantial owners. The other four companies together own only a small percent of Alyeska (e.g., TR 74). The pipeline transports North Slope crude oil 800 miles to its terminal in Valdez, Alaska, from where it is then shipped by tanker primarily to the lower 48 states (TR 70-71).

   Alyeska currently has about 1400 employees, of whom 350-400 work at the Valdez Terminal (TR 73). Company headquarters are in Anchorage.

   Alyeska is managed by an Owners Committee,


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which functions much as a Board of Directors of a traditional company (TR 2067). Each of the owner companies has a representative on the Owners Committee. Since January, 1991, the chairman of the Owners Committee has been William Rusnack, the ARCO representative on the Committee (TR 2067). Mr. Rusnack has been a member of the Owners Committee since September, 1990 (id.).

   Scott began working for Alyeska in January, 1977 (TR 1448). He was hired as a level 3 technician2 working as an incinerator operator at the Valdez Terminal (TR 1449). When he began his employment, the pipeline was not yet operating (TR 1451). Prior to the opening of the pipeline, in about June of 1977, Scott was injured, apparently by a bear (TR 1454).3 He was out of work due to the injury for about 10 months (id.), and by the time he came back the plant was operating (TR 1456). His specific job was operating the three waste gas incinerators, and this continued to be his primary responsibility until he was transferred to maintenance in 1989 (e.g., TR 1459). Scott was a level 3 technician throughout his tenure at Alyeska -- he was never promoted.

   The terminal operators worked as members of one of four crews called, aptly enough, the A, B. C and D crews. Each crew was on a two-week cycle in which it spent 12 hours on duty and 12 off for one week, then was off duty completely the second week (TR 1474). There were anywhere from six to 10 workers in each crew (TR 1475).

   In response to questions from his own counsel, claimant admitted that he had trouble getting along with many of his coworkers. Specifically, when asked how well he got along with his co-workers, he answered:

Well, on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 being perfect and no problems and zero you don't get along with anybody, I guess I'd probably have rated myself along about 40, maybe.

(TR 1478-79). In fact, in her opening statement, claimant's counsel admitted that her client

had definite problems with his interpersonal relationships. Unfortunately, he offended people on a fairly regular basis at the terminal.

(TR 9 ). But difficulty getting along with co-workers is not Scott's only problem. He also has a problem with the concept of truthfulness.

   Robert Scott was not a credible witness. The


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evidence establishes that Scott has a complete disregard for truth, and will say anything regardless of its truthfulness for his benefit or amusement. For example, his testimony that calling a woman a heifer is complimentary (TR 1747-48) is ludicrous. His letter to the Nationalist Movement seeking the aid of that organization based on the representation that he was suspended from his job for reading or distributing that organization's literature (see RX 103) was a self-serving lie.4 His denial of ever using racist, perjorative terms such as "nigger sawmill'. and others (TR 1753, 1755) was contradicted by too many witnesses to be believable (see, e.g., TR 2312, 2362, 2458, 2514, 2530-31, 2667, 2675, 2782). So were his statements (TR 1786) that he never tried to provoke co-workers into arguments over their different religious beliefs (see, e.g., TR 2312, 2362, 2466-67, 2513-14, 2531-34, 2668-69, 2673-74), and that it was a co-worker rather than himself who intentionally damaged the equipment of a bottling company at which he had been employed (see TR 1741-46; contra TR 2371-72; 2465-66; 2516; 2534-35; 2664-65; 2776-77).

   Co-workers also testified that Scott bought car insurance over the telephone immediately after having an accident, then filed a claim under that policy to recover for that accident (TR 2515); that he falsely accused a co-worker of using drugs knowing that the worker did not (TR 1819-20, 2691-92; see also RX 37), and that he told them he would commit prejury to win a case ( TR 2374, 2465, 2515-16, 2539).

    There were many occasions where Scott's testimony contradicted his own earlier testimony or statements (e.g., TR 1728-1733, 1734-38) or was in conflict with the testimony of numerous co-workers or supervisors. Moreover, his demeanor throughout the course of his 2 1/2 days of testimony lead me to believe that he did not have a high regard for the truth. Accordingly, I have resolved conflicts between his testimony and other witnesses in favor of the other witnesses.

   Therefore, when Scott's testimony is cited in this decision it is either because it concerns an uncontroverted fact or it shows his version of an event.

Scott's Employment History

   Scott's history of employment at Alyeska was such that it is remarkable he still was employed at the time the Wackenhut investigation began. Either Alyeska was an extremely beneficent employer or plant operators are extremely difficult to replace in Valdez, Alaska.5


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   First, Scott's testimony rating himself a 40 out of 100 in interpersonal relationships is a gross overstatement; ten might have been more accurate. Thirteen of Scott's former co-workers (including some who have since been promoted to supervisory positions) testified at the hearing. Three testified on behalf of Scott (Swickle, Thiel, Minish); the other ten testified for Alyeska (Perry, Zecevic, Prince, Comacho, Pickard, Monegan, Goold, Goudreau, Greenlee, Bob Williams). Edward Swickle, who worked with Scott in the maintenance department for most of the year immediately prior to Scott's termination, got along well with Scott (TR 894-95). Apparently, he is unique in that regard. The testimony of Scott's other co-workers6 paints a picture of a man was disdainful and contemptuous (TR 2316, 2361, 2431, 2440, 2458,

2531, 2536-37, 2667, 2755, 2973), vulgar (TR 2365, 2436, 2457, 2512, 2530, 2667, 2676, 2781-82), bigoted (TR 2312, 2362, 2467, 2514-15, 2530, 2667-68, 2675) and deliberately abusive to women (TR 2359-61, 2457-58, 2508-09, 2512, 2756); a man who delighted in harassing co-workers and in fomenting dissent among them (TR 2312, 2362, 2466, 2514-16, 2531-34, 2668-69, 2673-74, 2691-92, 2973). It had reached the point that no one wanted to work with him (TR 2160-61, 2434-35, 2516, 2663-64, 2676; RX 168, at 43). Scott ultimately was transferred out of operations and into maintenance in May, 1989 because his relations with his operations crew deteriorated to the point that the crew members' morale was so low it was affecting their performance (TR 24312631-34, 33; RX 168, at 185). Even on the maintenance crew, no one (except, apparently, Swicker) wanted to work with him (TR 2435).

   Second, Scott's disciplinary history while at Alyeska was unparalleled. Alyeska employs a four-step progressive discipline system. Counselling is the lowest level. From there, it moves to a letter of reprimand, suspension without pay, and finally, termination (TR 2397).

   Respondent's Exhibit 168 is Scott's disciplinary file during his employment with Alyeska. Not counting his performance appraisals (see infra), RX 168 contains 255 pages in which Scott's deficiencies as an employee are discussed. Even this is not a complete record (e.g., RX 60). Yet it is clear that from the beginning of his employment with Alyeska, he was causing problems on the job.

   Two memos written on June 16, 1977 state that Scott had refused to perform jobs assigned to him by his supervisor (RX 168, at 1-3). In early February, 1979, Scott was counselled for abusing the plant guards by the use of "grossly obscene language' (RX 60, at RS 3232). Then in February and March, 1980, Scott was counselled due to his lack of progression, and his shift was changed due to the


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"difficult relationships" between him and the rest of "B" crew (RX 168, at 4-11).

   Scott first became involved in Alyeska's more formal disciplinary program in 1982, when he was put on a Work Improvement Plan, a form of counselling in which a plan of action designed to improve marginal or substandard performance is set up (TR 2402-03). Specifically,

Scott was placed on a 60 day local work improvement plan on July 15, 1982 in an attempt to correct an unacceptable level of absenteeism in the first six months of 1982.

(RX 36, at RS 0816). This 60-day plan proved unsuccessful, and a 90-day Alyeska (as opposed to "local ) Work Improvement Plan was set up (id.). Apparently Scott successfully completedly this plan (TR 2403).

   The record next reports a series of incidents, which occurred from June to September, 1983 (RX 168, at 40-42, 44-45). Apparently the most serious of these occurred on September 12th, when Scott was slow to respond to reports of black smoke coming out of one of the incinerators. To make things worse, Scott blew up at his supervisor, David Greenlee, when questioned about his performance (id. at 45). On September 26, 1983, Larry Planje, Greenlee's supervisor, requested that Scott be terminated. Even at that early date he noted Scott's "long history of problems" and that all attempts to work these out have failed ..." (id. at 43). In what apparently was an endorsement of this recommendation, "Earl" (probably E.E. Boling, to whom Planje's memo was addressed) stated:

Obviously, this is a hopeless case. I think we are remiss if we don't dump this clown.

(Id.). There is no indication in the record of why Scott was not terminated at that time.

   Scott was next subject to discipline on October 28, 1985, when he was suspended for 5.6 work days for verbal sexual harassment of a female co-worker (RX 51-52; see also TR 2509-10). He was again removed from his work crew and assigned to a different crew following this incident (TR 2404). Moreover, Scott was informed at that time that "future incidents of this nature or any other violation of Alyeska policy will result in further disciplinary action being taken, up to and including termination." (RX 52 -- emphasis added).

   Over the next few years, Scott had continuing problems with absenteeism. On January 21 and April


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16, 1986, he was counseled for excessive absenteeism (RX 168, at 167). He also missed over five months of work in 1987 while on medical leave (id. at 120, 127).

   Scott was suspended once again in early 1988, for smoking in two buildings where smoking was unauthorized (TR 2409-10). In at least one of these buildings a significant amount of flammable material was stored (RX 168, at 130). He was suspended for two full work weeks, and again was warned that further violations could result in his termination (id. at 178-79). Kathy Carr, Alyeska's Manager of Human Resource Services, testified that but for some extenuating circumstances (i.e., medication may have impaired his judgment), he would have been terminated (TR 2412). In fact, she stated that she knew of no other Alyeska employee who was ever suspended twice (TR 2413). Scott's suspension letter also cautioned him to improve his work attendance.

   Scott continued to have serious problems getting along with his co-workers, which led to his transfer to maintenance in mid1989. But he was involved in no further significant disciplinary proceedings until June of 1990, when the so-called "break room incident" occurred. At that time, the maintenance crew on which Scott worked was taking a break. Scott's version of this incident is that he was reading a story in a newspaper aloud to another crew member, and the article contained the word "nigger" at least once, and perhaps more than once (TR 1675-76). A member of the crew, Glenn Meidinger (who is white, as was the entire crew), complained about Scott's use of that racial epithet (TR 1677). Scott replied that it was not his word, but was part of the article; nevertheless he apologized for using it. Meidinger continued to protest (TR 1677-78). Nothing further occurred (TR 1678).

   The description of the break-room incident compiled in Alyeska's investigation, and substantiated by the testimony of Scott's co-workers, is quite different. Scott was known by his co-workers to be a member of a white supremacist group (see RX 90, 93; cf. TR 1916-20; RX 103, 108). He frequently used the word "nigger" in conversation (e.g., TR 2312, 2362, 2457; RX 90, 93), and was unapologetic about it (e.g., RX 90). Scott's deliberate use of the word "nigger" in the break room that day in June, 1990 so aggravated two of Scott's co-workers, one of whom was Meidinger, that they complained to a supervisor, John Runnels (id.; see also RX 87; TR 2191-92).

   Since I find Scott to be totally lacking in credibility (see supra), I credit the version of the incident described in Alyeska's records and confirmed by Scatty co-workers. But more importantly, Alyeska credited this


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version as well. When Leo Anderson, the new Human Resources Representative at the Valdez Terminal, was informed of this incident by Runnels, he initiated an investigation (TR 2196) conducted by Rod Pugh, the Maintenance Manager at the Valdez Terminal (TR 662), and himself (TR 2197). This investigation included interviews with 11 technicians (TR 2197; RX 90, 93) as well as Scott (RX 93; TR 2201). Anderson then contacted Human Resources in Anchorage to get Scott's file (TR 2202). He was sent a three-page summary of Scott's employment record (RX 88), which he described as the most extensive record of employee misconduct he had ever seen (TR 2203). He could not understand why Scott was still on Alyeska's payroll (TR 2204).

   Anderson described the results of his investigation as follows:

I concluded after the interviews and putting all the material together that in fact Mr. Scott had made racial remarks, that he knew what he was doing, and that in looking at the overall record it was clear to me that Mr. Scott's conduct was not appropriate and had not been appropriate for years, that he had been warned that his conduct was not appropriate and had been given every opportunity to bring that conduct into acceptable limits. For some reason, he chose not to do that.

(TR 2206)

   On August 6, 1990, Anderson drafted a memo for the signature of Pugh addressed to the terminal superintendent, Charles O'Donnell, recommending that Scott be fired due to a history of overall unacceptable performance culminating in the break room incident (see RX 93). He signed off on the memo, as did O'Donnell. The memo was then forwarded to Kathy Carr, Alyeska's Manager of Human Resources in Anchorage, on August 8, 1990 (id.). Accordingly to Pepper Smith, Alyeska's Labor Relations Supervisor (TR 622) who was assigned to look into this matter by Carr, O'Donnell was pressing Human Resources "to take really strong disciplinary action." (TR 653).

   When Carr received the recommendation to terminate Scott, she followed her usual procedure and discussed the matter with Lon Trotter, Alyeska's in-house counsel whose responsibilities include personnel matters (TR 2416). Trotter, however, asked Carr to hold up on any action against Scott, stating that some other information ... might be forthcoming." (TR 2417) He gave her no further details. She related this information back to Anderson (TR 2417). Similarly, Rick Collins, who was in the process of taking over O'Donnell's duties as terminal superintendent (TR 2254), had a brief meeting with Wellington in the second week of August, 1990. Wellington asked Collins not to pursue


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Scott's termination, and told him that there was legal action pending regarding Scott (TR 2256). He provided no further information to Collins (id.).

    Anderson tried to find out exactly why the hold was being placed on terminating Scott, but was unsuccessful (TR 2209). When, by early September, no action had yet been taken on the recommended termination, he and Pugh decided to give up on the termination and instead suspend Scott for a week (TR 2210-11; see also CX 128). However, that suspension was not implemented, because by then another incident regarding Scott had occurred (TR 2213). This was the "parking lot incidental.

   But first, between the break room and parking lot incidents was the retool room incident". This involved a series of pranks between Scott and his counterpart on the opposite shift, Don Blackburn (TR 896), over a 2 1/2 - 3 month period apparently ending in late August, 1990 (see RX 168, at 199). Scott and Blackburn, at the end of their respective weekly shifts, would hide the other's tool box or hide the cart on which they put their tool boxes (TR 897; RX 168, at 199). On one occasion, Scott glued Blackburn's tool box to a cart ( RX 168, at 199). It got to the point where Scott had used a crane to hide Blackburn's tool box in the ceiling (TR 898). Finally, Blackburn brought these events to the attention of his shift supervisor, and it ultimately was brought to the attention of Rod Pugh on August 29, 1990. There is no indication that any discipline against either Scott or Blackburn was recommended due to the tool room incident until it was listed as one of the reasons for Scott's termination on the termination letter given to Scott on October 24, 1990 (see CX 12).

    In regard to the parking lot incident, it occurred on September 19, 1990 (e.g., RX 94). While parking his van in the maintenance employee parking lot, Scott apparently backed into the car of a co-worker, Yanko Zecevic (TR 2317-19, 2342-43), causing some minor damage to Zecevic's vehicle (TR 2319, 2346). This was the second time Scott had damaged Zecevic's car (TR 2347); the first time Scott caused $1500-1700 in damages. Scott did not report the incident either to Zecevic or to terminal security. Rather, Zecevic, while being driven back to the maintenance area from a work site, noticed that Scott's car had hit his (TR 2339). Zecevic then reported the incident to building security and to his supervisor, Steve Perry (TR 234143). Scott, Zecevic and Perry went outside to assay the damage. After they separated the vehicles, Scott and Zecevic got into an argument (RX 94; TR 2319-20). As Zecevic approached Scott, Scott shoved him back and started using profanity (id., see also TR 1684, 2349-50).7 Perry quieted them down, and drove them first


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to security and then to Pugh's office. Since Pugh was not in, Perry had Scott and Zecevic return to work (RX 94). When Pugh returned to his office, Perry told him what had transpired. He asked Perry to prepare a memo for him, which Perry did (RX 94). On the following day, Pugh and Leo Anderson interviewed Perry, Zecevic and Scott (see RX 96-97). Perry and Zecevic, who were interviewed separately, reported similar versions of the incident (RX 96); Scott came up with his own version, in which he blamed everthing on Zecevic (RX 97). Pugh clearly believed Perry's and Zecevic's version, and tried to explain to Scott how frustrated he was with Scott's failure to improve his relations with his coworkers (id.). But Scott would not back down (id.).

   Following these interviews, it was Anderson's opinion that he should recommend Scott's termination (TR 2213-14). It was his view that Scott was responsible for elevating the incident into a confrontation that resulted in Scott striking Zecevic (TR 2214). Further, he believed that Scott was not justified in striking Zecevic since Scott admitted that he had not felt threatened (id.). Anderson then put together a binder (RX 168) that provided a history of the parking lot incident and previous events regarding Scott's performance (see TR 2261) and presented this to Rick Collins, the new terminal manager. He recommended to Collins that Scott be terminated (TR 2216).

   Based on the investigation conducted by Anderson, as well as his own investigation of the incident, Collins instructed the maintenance manager, Pugh, to suspend Scott without pay pending further review of Scott's "complete work record." (CX 11) A letter of suspension was issued on October 8, 1990 (id.). That letter simply stated that:

Based on recent incidents with fellow employees, you are indefinitely suspended from work without pay beginning October 9, 1990 pending Alyeska management review of your complete work record. You will be advised of the outcome when the review is completed.

(CX 11 -- emphasis added). Collins then conducted a further investigation, including a review of Scott's entire work history at Alyeska, and had a telephone conversation with Scott on October 12th "to get his side of the story." (TR 2260) He also had further discussions with Anderson. At that point, it appears that Collins had decided to terminate Scott. He then consulted with his supervisor, Theo Polasek, Alyeska's Vice-President of Operations, as well as with Human Resources personnel in Anchorage and Lon Trotter (TR 2261). In order to terminate Scott, it was necessary to get the concurrence of Kathy Carr, the Human Resources Manager


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(id.). But Carr would not commit herself to termination (TR 2262-63). In fact, both Carr (e.g., TR 716) and Pepper Smith (TR 698) favored another suspension rather than termination.

   In order to resolve this conflict, and a similar conflict involving another employee, a meeting of Alyeska's Management Committee was set for October 22, 1990 (TR 2263-64). Respondent's Management Committee is composed of Alyeska's President; its four Vice-Presidents; the General Counsel; the Director of Control and Quality Assurance; and the Director of Corporate Affairs (see CX 80, at RS 2979). Actually attending the meeting were Alyeska's President and C.E.O. James Hermiller (e.g., TR 22i, 2264); Vice-President for Operations Theo Polasek (id.); Vice-President of Engineering & Projects Bill Howitt (id.); Lon Trotter, the in-house counsel responsible for personnel matters (id.); Kathy Carr and Pepper Smith of Human Resources (TR 2264-2421-22); Rick Collins, the Valdez Terminal Manager (TR 2263-2267); Beverly Michaels, the manager of Direct Communications who was standing in for an unfilled vice-president position (TR 222-23, 2264; see also CX 80, at RS 2991); and Steve Whetmore, who served as secretary for the meeting (TR 2264-65). Hermiller, Polasek, Howitt and Michaels attended as members of the Management Committee; the others were there to advise the Committee (see, e.g., CX 69).

   At the meeting, Collins presented the case for terminating Scott, while Kathy Carr presented Human Resources' concerns regarding that course of action, principal among which was that Scott would sue Alyeska for age discrimination or wrongful discharge if he was terminated (TR 2265, 2422-23, CX 69, at RS 2818). Nothing was mentioned about Scott's leaking documents to Hamel; the entire discussion concerned Scott's conduct and behavior (TR 2424). Polasek and Howitt, both of whom either knew Scott personally or knew of him from earlier experiences (TR 2422-23, 2851), strongly supported his termination (TR 2265-66). Hermiller did not take an active part in the Committee's deliberations until the others had finished expressing their opinions (TR 730, 2265-66, 2423). The Committee decided to terminate both Scott and the other employee. Since the Committee members appeared to be in agreement, a formal vote was not taken TR 233, 731, 2267; CX 69).

   Following the Management Committee meeting, at the request of Cathy Carr, Collins scheduled a meeting with Scott to be held the next day, October 23, 1991, to give Scott one last chance to express his side of the story (TR 2267-68). Collins met with Scott for about 1 hours on the 23rd and, together with Human Resources, concluded that Scott raised "no further information that would warrant us to delay or


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stop the termination ...." (TR 2269) Accordingly, a letter of termination prepared by Human Resources in consultation with Collins, under whose signature the letter issued, was hand-delivered to Scott on October 24, 1990, to be effective that day (see TR 2269-70; CX 12). That letter stated as follows:

Your termination is the result of a recurring pattern of misconduct that you are either unable or unwilling to correct. Two incidents in June and one incident in September: (1) when you offended co-workers with your racial slurs and comments (2) when you initiated a series of events involving a large tool box which ultimately was glued to the free store cart and (3) the parking lot incident in September. These were further and final indications of the chronic performance and interpersonal skills Problems that you have displayed in the past.

My review of your record indicates that you have not made any significant attempt to conform your actions to Alyeska's procedures and rules of conduct. Intermediate disciplinary actions have apparently had no affect [sic]. I, therefore, see no alternative to your termination.

(CX 12 -- emphasis added). Collins noted that, unlike the earlier attempt initiated by O'Donnell in August to terminate Scott, he was not requested to hold up on Scott's termination (TR 2273).

   Under Alyeska's problem resolution procedure, Scott appealed his termination on November 9, 1990 (RX 109). That appeal was rejected by Collins on November 28, 1990 (RX 110), and was referred by him to the next level, in which J.M. Dossinger, the Vice-President for Human Resources, and Theo Polasek, the Vice-President for Operations (TR 778), were the decision makers. Dossinger and Polasek held a meeting with Scott on Jaunary 18, 1991 in Anchorage (see CX 161; TR 1715). His termination stayed in effect (TR 1715-16).

   Scott's performance appraisals over the years further illustrate his troubled employment history at Alyeska. The earliest appraisal reflected in the record covered the period from March 12th - June 5, 1990 (RX l). His supervisor, whose name is illegible, noted result of conflicts with undoubtedly appraisal. standard -that Scott "was moved to this crew as a 'B' crew. (Id. at RS 867). This accounts for the short period covered by the In this appraisal, Scott was rated a "C" -- below on two items -Job Knowledge and Productivity -- and was rated a "B" meets the standard -- for the other eight categories, including Interpersonal Relationships (see id.). In the "Technician Progression


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Indicator" list, where l is the highest rating and 6 the lowest, he was rated a 4, which states: "Employee needs additional training at current level before progressing to next level." (Id. at 867)

   His next evaluation covered the period June 5, 1980 April, 1981 (RX 2), and was probably his best. He was rated a "B" or "B+" in every category, and the supervisor's comments noted an improved attitude. The only cautionary notes were warnings to Scott not to allow "personality conflicts" to interfere with his work, and "to be careful of kidding sensitive crew members." (Id. at 1482-83)

   His next appraisal (RX 3), prepared by David Greenlee, and dated May 11, 1982, also was basically a good one. Although he did receive a "B-" rating in Initiative, where it was noted his attitude needed to improve, his overall rating was "Meets Standard." (Id. at 1477) However, it was noted that Scott "can be quick-tempered and excessively candid with his opinions." (Id. at 1476)

   His next appraisal, in June, 1983 (RX 4), indicates a serious deterioration in Scott's performance. Greenlee, who was still Scott's supervisor, noted that Scott had been placed on a work improvement plan due to excessive absenteeism, lack of productivity and his interpersonal relationships (id. at 782). He further stated that, although Scott had completed the work improvement plan, his performance was sliding again (id.). He rated Scott as "C" for both Interpersonal Relationships and Initiative, and a "B-" in Productivity. He stated that Scott:

Expresses frequent negativism to people in positions of authority in the company. Use of profanity and verbal expression are often excessive to others.

(Id. at 781)

    Despite all these negatives, Greenlee charitably found Scott to be meeting job expectation (a "3" rating) (id. at 782). However, he was overruled by his supervisor, Larry Planje, who found Scott's performance to be below standard, and rated him a "5 -- Employee not meeting current expectations" (id.).

   Over the next two months, Scott's performance deteriorated further. In an appraisal apparently written on September 26, 1983 (RX 5), only two months after his previous appraisal Greenlee gave Scott "C" ratings in Productivity, Interpersonal Relationships and


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Initiative, a "C+" in Safety, and a "B-" in Ability To Work Under Pressure. The other five categories produced "B" ratings (id. at 766). Greenlee cited Scott's refusal "to change unacceptable areas of job performance . . .", adding that Scott refuses to accept constructive criticism and undermines "shift morale." (Id. at 767) He rated him a "6 -Employee is not meeting current job requirements. Consider for termination in one month." (Id.) In an accompanying note to his supervisor, Planje, Greenlee stated that he believed they had "reached the point of no return." (Id. at 765) In response, Planje noted that "I see no alternative except to request termination of this employee." (Id. at 930) As noted above, for some unexplained reason Scott was kept on.

   Scott's next performance appraisal (RX 6), dated February 7, 1984, was good. His new supervisor, Mac McKay, found that Scott's work was satisfactory (a "3" rating), and found that he got along well with his co-workers (id.) However, Planje noted that Scott had worked for McKay for only a short time (id. at RS 1459). McKay also did Scott's next performance appraisal, which covered the period through February 8, 1985, again rating him a '3' (see RX 8). Planje signed off on this appraisal without comment. It is significant, however, that McKay rated Scott a "C" (below standard, the lowest rating) in Interpersonal Relationships, stating:

Bob is quick tempered and excessively candid with his opinions[.] At times he has caused excessive discontent on the crew[.] For this reason he is not very well liked.

(Id. at RS 1450)

   Between this performance appraisal and his next, Scott was transferred to D crew from C crew due to the sexual harassment incident discussed above (see CX 1, at 7369). Accordingly, that incident is not reflected on his February, 1986 performance appraisal, which was by his new supervisor, Bob Miller. That appraisal, including the rating for Interpersonal Relationships, was satisfactory (see CX 1). So was Scott's February, 1987 appraisal, also by Miller (see CX 2).

   In mid-1987, Joel Williams became Scott's supervisor, and remained his supervisor until Scott was transferred to maintenance (TR 2611). Williams rated Scott below standard.' (CX 3, at 7507), noting he was the first person he rated in that category (TR 2623). Although he stated on the appraisal form that this low rating was due primarily to Scott's attendance problems, Scott was given


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"C" ratings both in Safety and Interpersonal' Relationships, the Safety rating for smoking in a non-smoking area, and the Interpersonal Relationships rating for creating disharmony among his peers (CX 3, at 7506). He was rated a "C" in Interpersonal Relationship only because Alyeska had no lower rating (TR 2623). The following year, in February, 1989, Williams rated Scott a "3" -- meeting job expectations (CX 4). His rating in Interpersonal Relationship rose to a "B-", although Williams noted that Scott "often exasperates and/or aggravates co-workers." ("Id. at 7510)

   Shortly after the February, 1989 appraisal, Scott's performance deteriorated to the point that he was transferred to maintenance in July of that year (TR 2628-34). His next (and best) performance appraisal, dated January 14, 1990 (see CX 5), was prepared by his new supervisor, John Comacho (TR 2441). Camacho rated Scott as "meets standard", although rating him a "4" (employee needs additional training) rather than a "3" (meeting job expectations) (id. at RS 1232). He also gave Scott a "B" rating (and one "B+") in each performance category (id. at RS 1231). However, Comacho, who was moving to another position at the time, testified that Scott's performance was not up to standard (TR 2442), that the appraisal was overly generous (TR 2444). His cryptic comments regarding some of the performance categories confirm this. For example, in Interpersonal Relationships, his comment was "[u]sually gets along with some of the techs [technicians];" in Initiative, "[n]eeds to be told and instructed on how to perform most tasks"; and in Productivity, "[v]ery slow in completing maintenance tasks." These are not the comments one would expect to accompany a satisfactory rating.

   Thus, Scott's performance appraisals clearly reflect his tumultuous employment history at Alyeska.

Scott's Whistleblowing Activities

   Scott claimed that he is very outspoken, and did not hesitate to criticize Alyeska when he noticed things being done "wrong" (TR 1507-08). In fact, he alleges reporting what he perceived to be a problem on the job within days of his employment with Alyeska, and continued reporting concerns to his supervisors numerous times over the years (TR 1509-11). He testified that these problems concerned safety hazards and such environmental matters as spills, leaks, and drainage problems (TR 1511-12). He added that none of his safety or environmental complaints were ever acted upon by Alyeska (id.).8


[Page 16]

    Scott testified that he realized it was pointless to make internal complaints to Alyeska following an incident in which he believed Alyeska stole notebooks from an employee who allegedly was keeping records showing that oil shipments to Charles Hamel (see infra) contained excess water (TR 1513, 1518-20). He believes this was in the summer of 1985 (TR 1520). In seeking other avenues to express his concerns, Scott testified that he first went to the press (TR 1520). He stated that he did this on one occasion, probably also in the summer of 1985 (id.). However, he thought he was too conspicuous going there, and was sure that if Alyeska found out he was reporting grievances to the press he would be fired (TR 1520-22). He next considered reporting grievances directly to State and Federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or the Alaska Department of Environment Conservation ("DEC"). However, he said he was afraid that his confidentiality would not be maintained (TR 1522-23).

   He finally decided to use Charles Hamel as a conduit for his complaints. Mr. Hamel, a resident of Alexandria, Virginia, formerly ran a business engaged in transporting oil from the pipeline terminal in Valdez to Panama and other points (TR 907). He had previously worked for several United States Senators, including Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska (TR 905-07),9 who was Hamel's prep school roommate. Hamel testified that he had a long-term contract to transport oil from Valdez which was cancelled in 1981 or 1982 because the oil he was shipping contained, for reasons he could not explain, an "enormous amount of unidentified water ...." (TR 907-08) Although he believes he was cheated by Alyeska, he never filed suit against Alyeska in regard to these shipments (TR 1117-18).10 Due initially to the problems arising from these oil shipments, Hamel became involved with proceedings at the Alaska Public Utilities Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, EPA, and DEC, to whom he reported both his own complaints regarding Alyeska's operations and information provided to him by others, including current and former Alyeska employees (see TR 908-10). For example, on March 27, 1985, Hamel filed a citizen's suit with EPA charging Alyeska with violating the Clean Water Act by illegally disposing of and dumping contaminants into Port Valdez (see CX 129). This complaint apparently led to the issuance of a Compliance Order against Alyeska which ordered it to cease and desist the reintroduction of sludge and recoverable crude oil back into the Ballast Water Treatment Facility at the terminal (CX 132).

   Scott had been reading about Hamel's actions against Alyeska in the press. Although he had never met Hamel, he stated that he knew Hamel's allegations were correct (TR


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1523-24). Therefore, in about July, 1985 he started telephoning Hamel, first anonymously and, when he gained confidence in him, subsequently identifying himself (TR 932-33, 1524-25). Scott's first complaint to Hamel concerned the alleged theft of the worker's notebooks mentioned above (TR 932-33). He continued to complain to Hamel up to the time of the hearing, noting that his complaints covered

[t]he whole gauntlet. My concern about the deterioration of the whole facility, which was absolutely just -- it was repugnant to me, the worker atmosphere, the unsafe work conditions, the lack of concern.

... Their training was just a farce. They were putting people in danger, putting equipment in danger. I saw the pollution, the air pollution, the vented gases going straight into the atmosphere, the incomplete combustion, the spills and the leaks that at that point in time no one seemed to give a hoot about.

   (TR 1525-26). He also started turning over to Hamel various Alyeska documents (TR 934-35, 1527), including a magazine, interdepartmental memos, company correspondence, minutes of safety meetings, and an operating manual regarding the power vapor area (TR 1528). He also provided Hamel with documents such as trade publications and booklets which were not produced by Alyeska but which contained information somehow relevant to Alyeska (id; for example, see CX 33). He also sent Hamel his own hand-written notes (TR 1529). Scott testified that all of the Alyeska documents he turned over to Hamel were generally available to Alyeska employees; he never took anyone's private papers (TR 1530). Nor did he send Hamel any attorney-client privileged documents (TR 1531-32).

   Scott testified that he did not know the details of any environmental regulations that were applicable to Alyeska, nor was he aware of the requirements of any EPA or DEC permits under which Alyeska operated (TR 1544-45). Because of this, he tried to send Hamel information which he believed applied to Hamel's concerns (TR 1544). For example, he provided Hamel with information regarding the waste gas incinerator he operated (see, e.g., CX 135) because Hamel believed Alyeska was violating emissions standards (TR 1546-47); the various documents contained in CX 108 because they reference oil spills (CX 108, at A-94) and hazardous waste (id. at A-107); and CX 133 because he believed it indicated Alyeska was planning to try to burn sludge in the oily waste incinerator at Valdez (TR 1574), a procedure he believed could be hazardous (TR 1577). Scott offered similar explanations regarding other documents he turned over to Hamel. However, this decision is too long even without adding a lengthy discussion referencing all of these


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documents; and such discussion is unnecessary in any event in light of the ultimate decision I reach in this case.

   Hamel specifically identified many of the documents turned over to him by Scott (see TR 944-1024). Hamel testified that, when he received documents from Scott and others, he generally passed the information contained in those documents to EPA and DEC (TR 935). He usually did not send the agencies the actual documents because he was afraid it would compromise the confidentiality of his sources (TR 936, 955). He did, however, show many of the documents he had received from his sources to Mike Frank, an Assistant Attorney General of Alaska (TR 986), and the Valdez DEC supervisor, Dan Lawn, who visited him at his home in Alexandria, Virginia (TR 936-37). He also turned over some documents to John Hohn, an attorney for EPA in Seattle (TR 917), which Mr. Hohn indicated were critical to TSCA and Clean Water Act investigations he was conducting (TR 938; see also CX 114). Hamel also testified before the Senate Energy Committee in 1987, during its Arctic National Wildlife Refuge hearing, regarding environmental problems about which Scott had provided him information (TR 942-43); and in that same year he filed another citizen's suit against Alyeska with EPA, and provided EPA with additional information he obtained from Scott (TR 953). In addition, on one occasion, at the request of EPA and/or DEC, Hamel provided Scott with photographs of facilities at the Valdez Terminal for which specific information was requested. Scott provided the information to Hamel (see CX 117), who turned it over to EPA and DEC (TR 949-50). He also provided information given to him by Scott (see CX 145) to the Wall Street Journal in 1989 (TR 989). This led to an article in the Wall Street Journal (CX 149) subsequent to the Exxon Valdez oil spill (TR 990). In connection with the preparation of that article, the Wall Street Journal reporter talked to Scott, anonymously, in a conference call set up by Hamel (TR 991). Further, Hamel gave information provided to him by Scott to the General Accounting Office ( GAO"), which prepared a report based in part on this information (see CX 147).

   Hamel indicated that Scott sent him information about every two weeks (TR 1005). During his testimony, he identified in great detail the documents and information provided to him by Scott which he provided to various outside sources, including those discussed immediately above, as well as the particular violation of law that he believed this information involved. However, as noted in regard to Scott's testimony concerning these documents, no purpose would be served in discussing all of these documents with more specificity. Suffice it to say that Hamel contends that the information he received from Scott and forwarded to State or Federal agencies and Congress concerned possible


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violations of each of the environmental statutes addressed in Scott's complaint in this case.

The Wackenhut Investigation

   As early as the mid-1980's Alyeska was aware that Charles Hamel was representing that he had sources inside the company who were providing him documents, and it began investigating those leaks (TR 301). Alyeska's Manager of Corporate Security, James "Pat" Wellington, testified that Alyeska's first such effort was an internal investigation, initiated by Alyeska's then President, George Nelson, of Alyeska's internal telephone records to see if anyone was phoning Hamel in Virginia (TR 301-02, 307). This investigation, which took place in late 1987 (see CX 105), failed to turn up anything (TR 307-09). Although Wellington stated that he was told by Ivan Henman, Alyeska's Vice-President for Engineering in this same time period (TR 268-69), that Scott was suspected of being one of Hamel's sources (TR 318), he does not remember why Henman believed this (id.). In any event, no investigation of Scott was undertaken at that time (TR 230-22).

   A second investigation to identify a source of a leak of an Alyeska document occurred in May, 1988. Wellington testified that Henman asked him to see if he could determine who had made and distributed a diagram of the Valdez terminal facility (CX 72) which apparently had found its way to a local television station (TR 326-27). After Henman gave Wellington a list of employees who would have had the knowledge to draw that diagram and possibly have a motive to do so, Wellington had a handwriting expert compare the drawing with handwriting samples of the designated employees (TR 332). Apparently there were five employees on the list, including Scott (see CX 19). The handwriting expert stated that four of the employees could be ruled out as the author of the diagram (id.). Although he stated that Scott's writing samples were the closest of the five to the handwriting on the diagram, and he was a very strong possibility, he needed more evidence of Scott's handwriting in order to resolve discrepancies, particularly regarding the letters "M" and "U", between the diagram and Scott's handwriting (id.). Due to this inconclusive determination, no action was taken (see CX 18; see also TR 337).

   Another incident involving a leak of Alyeska documents occurred in October, 1989 when a box of Alyeska operating manuals was discovered in a car impounded by the Anchorage Police Department (see, e.g., CX 70). This box of manuals had been mailed by EPA's Seattle Office to Charles Hamel in care of the Trustees of Alaska (TR 338), an


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environmental organization, several months prior to being discovered by the towing company (TR 341). After confirming with EPA that it had received the manuals from Hamel11 and then had mailed the manuals back to him, and determining that these manuals were routinely made available to Alyeska employees, no further investigation was undertaken (TR 342).

   Things soon escalated. A television program called the "The Scottish Eye", which is produced and shown in the United Kingdom, ran a show about the Exxon Valdez oil spill that was brought to the attention of Alyeska's President and Chief Executive Officer, James Hermiller.12 Hermiller obtained a videotape of the program in January 1990 (TR 100-01). Featured on that program were excerpts from an Alyeska document that was characterized by Hermiller as an Attorney-client privilege document. (TR 97-98) Needless to say, having a confidential company document featured on a television show without authorization was extremely disturbing to Hermiller (TR 103). in late January or early February, 1990, Hermiller asked Pat Wellington, Alyeska's Director of Security, to determine how company documents were being leaked (TR 109).

   Wellington testified that he told Hermiller "that we were going to have to look at an undercover type investigation and that I would need outside help." (TR 372) Hermiller then authorized Wellington to proceed with such an investigation, to be conducted by Wackenhut (TR 147), a security company with which Alyeska had a contract to conduct security clearances. Hermiller testified that he instructed Wellington that the investigation conducted by Wackenhut be lawful and employ standard investigative techniques, but otherwise he relied on Wellington to decide on the investigative techniques (TR 147-48) and monitor the day-to-day activities(TR 145). He also did not limit the cost of the investigation (TR 150).

   Wellington had no specific instructions in regard to keeping Hermiller apprised of the investigation. He reported to Hermiller on an irregular basis -- as often as once a week, or as infrequently as once every three weeks (TR 147). Hermiller testified that he was not advised in advance of any of the investigative techniques employed by Wackenhut (TR 149).

   Wackenhut assigned at least eight people to work on the Alyeska investigation (TR 1260, 1262). Wellington testified that the purpose of the investigation as he described it to Wackenhut was fourfold: to determine what information was being leaked; to identify who was leaking the information; to retrieve Alyeska's documents; and to


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quot;take appropriate legal action against the individuals who were stealing our property." (TR 387) Wackenhut assigned the investigation to its Special Investigations Division, headed by Wayne Black (TR 390). At that point, in early February, 1990, Wellington went to meet with Black and other Wackenhut officials, including its Chairman of the Board, President, Senior Vice-President for Domestic Operations, and in. house counsel (TR 390-91).

   At that meeting, Wellington explained the scope of the investigation (TR 391). He also stressed that the investigation

had to be legal, we would not use any alcohol, we would not use any drugs, we would not use any women ....

   (TR 391). Wellington was apprised of at least some of Wackenhut's proposed investigative methods at the Coral Gables meeting. They discussed the proposed undercover aspects of the operation, including setting up a "phony environmental group" called 'Ecolit'" (TR 393-94). They also discussed Wackenhut's proposal to take people's trash which is put out for collection (TR 403-04), and to plant phony memos in Alyeska's legal department (TR 439).

   Since it was not known who at Alyeska was leaking documents, knowledge of the existence of the Wackenhut investigation was limited to just a few Alyeska officials. Obviously, both Hermiller and Wellington were aware of it. So were Roger Iverson, Wellington's Deputy (TR 408), and the VicePresident of Administration, Steve Dietrich, who was Wellington's supervisor (TR 201). Hermiller stated that Fred Garibaldi, the chairman of the Owners' Committee at the time, was told of the investigation very early on (TR 188); Garibaldi stated he was first told of it in July or August, 1990 (see CX 164, at 3). Even Alyeska's General Counsel was not advised of the investigation until perhaps as late as July, 1990 (TR 191; but see TR 209). And, as indicated by Wellington, extraordinary steps were taken to assure that no else would find out (TR 40709).13

   At the outset of the investigation, Wellington identified Hamel, Scott, and a local environmentalist, Riki Ott, as people the investigation should focus on (see CX 21-23). In fact, Scott was identified as the "top of our list as [a] possible leak." (CX 22).

   Wackenhut utilized several different approaches in its investigation, which began on March 1, 1990


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(see CX 41, at 1). First, Wackenhut somehow obtained Hamel's telephone toll records for the period from approximately December 1989 or January 1990 through May 1990 (TR 1269, 1336). Analysts from Wackenhut's Special Investigations Division, using a computerized date base search called DBASE 4 (TR 1262), then analyzed the telephone numbers reflected on Hamel's records to determine if Hamel had called Alyeska employees (whose telephone numbers were provided to Wackenhut by Alyeska -- TR 1269), including Scott, and to determine any other patterns in Hamel's calls (e.g., TR 1267-70). Later, some of Scott's telephone records were obtained by Wackenhut and analyzed (TR 1271; CX 42). As early as March 30, 1990, Scott was identified through these telephone toll records as having been communicating with Hamel (see CX 29; TR 1290; CX 32, at 8).

   Another technique utilized by Wackenhut was to collect and search the trash of Hamel and Scott (see, e.g. CX 32, at 13-14; CX 38; CX 46-47). Scott's trash was taken on two occasions (see CX 32, at 7, 13), and an inventory of the "items of general interest found on April 9, 1990 was prepared (id. at 13; see also CX 38). Hamel's trash was taken on three occasions (see CX 47, Exhibit List), and Hamel foiled another attempt (TR 1059). It is not clear if any evidence of leaks of Alyeska documents was found through this dubious practice.

   Wackenhut also conducted surveillances of Scott and Hamel. In regard to Scott (see CX 32), two Wackenhut investigators spent over a week in Valdez surreptitiously following him around. During this period they twice took his trash, as noted above, and also did a background check of Scott's business and property interests. In an attempt to trick Scott and other Alyeska employees into revealing their connection to Hamel, the investigators set up an undercover audio-video camera in their hotel suite. They tried to lure Scott and the others there by running classified advertisements and placing fliers on car windshields (including Scott's) in locations such as the Valdez terminal employees' parking lot which noted that an organization doing ecological research and litigation (see infra) had set up an office there. This ploy was unsuccessful.

   In regard to Hamel, Wackenhut sent "an RV loaded with cameras, wires, telephones, computer equipment up to Virginia for use as a listing post." (TR 1264) The RV also contained a scanner, which could read entire pages of documents and load them into a computer's memory (TR 1267). This vehicle was parked near Hamel's house (TR 1264). The record contains little information regarding the use to which this camper was put, but the implications are chilling.


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   All of these techniques pale in comparison to Wackenhut's investigation conducted under the guise of a fictitious organization called "Ecolit". In an effort to win the confidence of Hamel and identify his sources, Wackenhut opened offices in the name of Ecolit, supposedly an organization engaged in ecological litigation, near its office in Miami and in Crystal City in Arlington, Virginia, near Hamel's Alexandria home (TR 1054, 1061, 1262). To maintain the appearance of a functioning entity, Wackenhut had mail and newspapers delivered to Ecolit's offices, set up an answering machine, opened bank accounts, brought in computer equipment, and provided a receptionist (TR 1262-63, 1286-88, 1333-34).

   Ecolit initiated contact with Hamel in late March, 1990, in Anchorage.14 Either Wackenhut expected Hamel to attend an environmental conference being held in Anchorage at that time (he did not - TR 1030), and took the chance of sending an investigator to Anchorage, or it had independent knowledge that Hamel was going to Anchorage in any event, which he did. Regardless, Ricki Jacobson, a Wackenhut investigator using the alias "Ricki Eidelson", managed to initiate contact with Hamel in a bar in Anchorage, and then on the plane from Anchorage to Seattle, where she was sitting next to him (TR 1034-36). She mentioned that she had Just been hired by the Ecolit environmental group from Miami, Florida, and started talking to Hamel about some of the environmentalists he knew in Alaska (TR 1035-36). Hamel promised that after he returned home he would ask these people to call "Eidelson" to help her out with some information she needed (TR 1036).

   Hamel next heard of Ecolit when Scott phoned him to tell him about the fliers Ecolit put on car windshields in Valdez (TR 1037).

   Subsequently, Hamel had one or more telephone calls with "Eidelson" in which he was introduced to "Dr. Wayne Jenkins",allegedly Ecolit's Director of Research. "Jenkins" was actually Wayne Black, the head of Wackenhut's Special Investigations Division. "Jenkins" provided Hamel with an elaborate description of Ecolit's alleged operations, including a reference to assisting the city of Stuart, Florida in an action to stop pollution near an apartment project where Hamel "coincidentally" happened to own a unit (TR 1037-39). Hamel was totally taken in by "Jenkins" (TR 1039-40).

   Shortly thereafter, on April 9, 1990 (see n. 15 below), "Jenkins" and "Eidelson" came to Washington, D.C. to meet with Hamel. Allegedly, they were interested in a legal support


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program that a software company in which Hamel was involved (MITI) had developed (TR 1040-41). That meeting lasted a good part of the afternoon and evening, and included a visit to Hamel's residence (TR 1040-43). As a result of this meeting, Hamel agreed to permit Ecolit to test the system out in its litigation (TR 1042-43). In addition, it appears that sometime during this day, "Jenkins" obtained from Hamel's residence a brochure sent to Hamel (through an intermediary, the wife of the President of MITI) by Scott (CX 33).15 The attached envelope contained Scott's mailing address (TR 1096).

   About a month later, on May 16, 1990, "Jenkins" returned to the Washington, D.C. area to visit Hamel. With him was "John Foxx", allegedly another Ecolit official, who actually was Wackenhut investigator Richard Lund (e.g., CX 35, at 1; TR 1055). On that day, "Jenkins" and "Foxx" first met Hamel at his house (CX 35, at 1). Black noticed stacks of Alyeska documents in Hamel's living room (id. at 2). When Hamel left the room to make a phone call, Black spent 15 minutes going through these documents while Lund stood watch. He actually took four of the documents, without Hamel's knowledge (id.). On the same day, Black noticed Hamel opening mail which had been sent in an envelope of Scott's personal stationery (see CX 35, at 6). Later that day, Hamel showed "Jenkins" apparently privileged documents from the law firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher regarding the Exxon Valdez oil spill that had come into Hamel's possession. Hamel would not let "Jenkins" take them with him at that time (TR 1053-54, 1103-04; CX 35, at 6). He did at a later date, however (TR 1054-55), giving "Jenkins" access to hundreds of pages of such documents to copy for Ecolit's files (TR 1101-03). Apparently, the privileged document made public in the "Scottish Eye" program was one of those which Hamel had in his possession and to which he gave "Jenkins" access (TR 1112-13). However, Hamel denies being the Scottish Eye's source for these documents (TR 1113).

   Ecolit then opened the Crystal City office referred to above, in which they installed expensive computer equipment including a scanner, and had an allegedly full-time research assistant working there (TR 1061). They encouraged Hamel to use this office, but he rarely did (TR 1068).

   Wackenhut investigators, in the guise of Ecolit employees, then kept up contact with Hamel on at least a weekly basis (e.g., CX 41, at 2). This contact apparently lasted until Alyeska's Owners Committee pulled the plug on the Wackenhut investigation on September 25, 1990 (see, e.g., CX 48). Over this period, Black stated they scanned "approximately 500 stolen legal


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documents" obtained from Hamel into their Virginia computer (CX 47, at p. 2). They also obtained an extensive amount of surreptitiously recorded audio and video tapes of conversations with Hamel (id., at Exhibit List). Hamel also accepted $4000 from Ecolit. Half, Hamel testified, was used to defray some of the expenses of his credit card telephone calls; the other half he gave to Sound Watch, a Seattle environmental group (TR 106668). Although Hamel testified that despite "Jenkins'" constant prodding, he never knowingly identified any of his sources (TR 1068-69), it is clear that Black was able to confirm Scott's association with Hamel through the Ecolit "sting" operation.

Timeliness of the Complaint

   Under each of the statutes at issue in this case, a complaint alleging the occurrence of an adverse employment action relating to an employee's engaging in protected conduct must be filed within 30 days of that adverse employment action. See 15 U.S.C. §2622(b)(1)(TSCA); 42 U.S.C. §7622(b)(1)(CAA); 42 U.S.C. §6971 (SWCA); 33 U.S.C. §1367 (WPCA); see also 29 C.F.R. §24.3. There is no contention on the complainant's part that his complaint was filed within 30 days of an adverse employment action -- either his suspension by the respondent on October 8, 1990 (see CX 11) or his subsequent termination on October 24, 1990 (see CX 12). For Scott's complaint giving rise to this case was not filed until September 5, 1991.

    Scott is relying on the doctrine of equitable tolling to support the timeliness of his complaint. He contends that the complaint was filed within 30 days of his "becoming aware of information that led him to believe that the reasons he had originally, and repeatedly, been given by Alyeska for his termination were not true." (Complainant's Proposed Conclusions of Law, at 15). He argues that the 30-day period in which to file his complaint was tolled until he became aware of this information. It is Scott's burden to establish that he is entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Division, 927 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 198 (1991). He has failed to meet this burden.

   First, even if I were to find that equitable tolling applies to this case, the claim was nonetheless untimely. Where equitable tolling is applied, the 30-day limitations period starts running


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when the facts which support the discrimination complaint were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to complainant.

McGough v. U.S. Navy, ROICC, Case Nos. 86-ERA-18, 19, 20, 2 O.A.A. 3, at 213 (June 30, 1988);16 see also McConnell v. General Telephone Co., 814 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. General Telephone Co. v. Addy, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988). As the court stated in a comparable case involving age discrimination, Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2916 (1991), equitable tolling applies only:

[i]f a reasonable man in [the plantiff's] position would not have known ... that he had been fired in possible violation of the age discrimination act ... The qualification "possible" is important. If a plaintiff were entitled to have all the time he needed to be certain his rights had been violated, the statute of limitations would never run ....

(Id., emphasis on "possible" added; emphasis on "certain" in original).

   Scott had been providing information regarding respondent's operations surreptitiously to Hamel for over five years at the time he was fired. He believed that if respondent discovered his whistleblowing, he would definitely be fired (e.g., TR 1521-22). Accordingly, he took considerable care to prevent being discovered as a whistleblower, including avoiding direct contact with the media (TR 1520-21) and governmental agencies (TR 152223), and mailing information to Hamel via a third party (TR 164344). In addition, he was aware that Hamel's trash had been stolen in the spring of 1990 (TR 1144; cf. TR 1901-10), and it should have been apparent to any reasonable person that Hamel's trash could have implicated Scott as one of Hamel's sources of Alyeska documents.

   Moreover, Scott is an extremely contentious and suspicious man, as amply demonstrated throughout the record. He is also extremely litigious, continually bragging about lawsuits he has brought or intends to bring (e.g., TR 2199-2201, 2312, 2374, 2464, 2515, 2537, 2669). It would have been inconceivable for Scott not to suspect from the day of his termination by Alyeska that it was related to his whistleblowing activities.

   In addition, at some point prior to early July, 1991, Scott contacted an attorney in Anchorge, Olof Hellen, to whom he had been referred by his current attorney, Douglas B. Baily, or gaily's law firm (TR 1925).17 Baily was the


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Attorney General of Alaska at the time, and could not represent Scott. Scott first talked to Hellen over the telephone, then he brought documentary materials to Hellen's office for his review. He testified that he did not meet personally with Hellen. Hellen stated that he reviewed the material which he was provided and decided not to take the case because it was not economically viable. The record fails to disclose whether Scott's whistleblowing activities were raised in connection with Scott's consultation with Hellen. But for Scott to consult an attorney for the purpose of suing Alyeska for wrongful termination and not mention his whistleblowing activities is highly unlikely, particularly since, having already been fired, he had nothing to lose if his activities in this respect became known to Alyeska.

   I find that Scott and any reasonably prudent person in his situation had sufficient information, no later than early July, 1991, even prior to the time the Wackenhut investigation was becoming known, to believe that his termination may have been caused by Alyeska's discovery that he was leaking documents to Hamel. Scott's September 5, 1991 complaint was untimely under these circumstances.

   Further, I find that Scott had actual knowledge of the Wackenhut Investigation, and its connection to Alyeska, no later than August 4, 1991. Hamel testified that he first became aware in about the middle of July, 1991 that he had been investigated (TR 1157), and that he told Scott about it, probably by the end of that month (TR 1168) In fact, Hamel admitted that he had two telephone conversations with Scott both on July 25 and July 26, and probably discussed the Wackenhut investigation (TR 1167-68). Then Anna Contreras, a Wackenhut employee from May 15 through August 1, 1990 who worked on its investigation of Hamel and his sources performing telephone toll analyses and working at the

Miami Ecolit office (TR 1330-32), gave a two-hour Congressional investigators on August 2, 1991 (TR 1343-44, 1156).18 On August 3, 1991, she executed an affidavit regarding the Wackenhut Investigation for Hamel's attorneys (e.g., TR 1368). Hamel was present for part of statement to the Congressional investigators, and throughout preparation of her affidavit(TR 1367-68). Billie Garde, one of Scott's counsel in this case, likewise was present for part of her statement and for the preparation of the affidavit (id.), and an associate of hers was present throughout the Congressional statement (id.). Contreras testified that she told the Committee that Alyeska was paying for the Wackenhut investigation (TR 1369), and stated in her affidavit that Alyeska was involved in covert surveillance (TR 1368).

   Moreover, Contreras was aware that the


[Page 28]

investigation had identified a least one of Hamel's sources (TR 1357), and probably indicated that in her statement to the Congressional investigators (TR 1369-70). Although Hamel disputes what Conteras told the investigators regarding the degree of Alyeska's participation in the Wackenhut investigation, he confirmed that she stated to the Committee investigators that Alyeska was involved in it (TR 1145-46). Further, Hamel did not dispute Conteras' testimony regarding the content of her affidavit. Clearly, by August 3, 1991, Hamel was fully aware that he had been the target of a major undercover investigation by Alyeska (and, he believed, Exxon). He also knew that his sources may have been identified (cf. TR 1147).

    On August 4, 1991, Scott telephoned Hamel from his home in Anchorage using Hamel's credit card number (see RX 136; cf. TR 1163, 1174). This call lasted 14 minutes. Hamel testified that the Wackenhut matter was discussed, including Alyeska's relation to the investigation (TR 1174-75). Although he denies telling Scott any of "the details" because he feared Scott "was at risk" (TR 1175), it is unclear what he meant by "the details." Moreover, his sudden concern for Scott flies in the face of his earlier testimony in regard to Contreras' August 2nd statement:

    Q. Well, now, when you heard the word Alyeska, though, did that cause you to have concern or renewed concern about people like Mr. Scott?

   A. It caused me concern for many people and Mr. Scott wasn't on top of the list because he didn't have a job. He wasn't even there any more. My concerns were for some other people and their familes ....

    (TR 1147).

   Scott testified that he did not know about the Wackenhut investigation when he left on a trip to Huntington, West Virginia subsequent to the August 4th telephone conversation (TR 1978).19 Obviously, this is not a correct statement. That Scott realized the significance of Alyeska's involvement in the Wackenhut investigation is illustrated by the fact that, on that same day, Sunday, August 4th, Scott wrote attorney Olof Hellen requesting that his file regarding his wrongful termination claim be released to John McCarron, an attorney with gaily's firm, "ASAP". (RX 116; cf. RX 117).

   Thus, as of August 4th, 1991, Scott knew or believed the following:


[Page 29]

- He was fired by Alyeska on October 24, 1990;

- He had been leaking Alyeska documents to Hamel and providing Hamel other information for over five years;

- Alyeska would fire him if they knew he was leaking documents to Hamel;

- Alyeska had been involved in a surreptitious investigation by Wackenhut designed to identify those employees who were leaking documents to Hamel; and

- Hamel's trash had been stolen.

He may also have known that specific informants had been identified. Moreover, he had consulted an attorney regarding an action for wrongful termination.

   This knowledge clearly was sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that Scott's termination by Alyeska was related to his whistleblowing activities. It was even more so for Scott, given his suspicious nature and willingness to file suit at the drop of a hat. Scott's self-serving testimony that he had no idea he may have been fired for his whistleblowing activities until he read abut it in the newspaper (e.g., TR 1910, 1922) is simply not credible, both because none of his testimony at this trial was believable, and because there is no doubt (see infra) that he was aware he may have been terminated for turning documents over to Hamel prior to reading the September 5, 1991 Anchorage Daily News article. Accordingly, under any conceivable standard, Scott had sufficient knowledge to file his complaint on August 4, 1991. His September 5, 1991 claim was two days late.

   Scott's lack of credibility regarding the filing of the complaint is further illustrated by his testimony regarding the preparation of the complaint. Scott testified that he first went to see Baily after his name appeared in an Anchorage newspaper in connection with the Wackenhut investigation (TR 1718), either the day the article appeared or the following day (TR 1718-20, 1944). He further stated that the complaint was filed the day after he first went to see Baily in response to the article (TR 1718, 1948-50).

   Scott then testified that this article appeared in the newspaper in the first week of September, not July or August as he had testified in his deposition (TR 1948). Further, he thought the article appeared in the Anchorage Daily News rather than the Anchorage Times20 since he subscribed only to the Daily News (TR 1939).


[Page 30]

Attached to the complaint was an article from the Anchorage Daily News dated September 5, 1991, which stated that recently obtained affidavits disclosed Scott was fired at the close of the Wackenhut investigation. Scott identified that article as the one which led him to see Baily (TR 1952-53).

   Scott further stated that the only thing he brought with him when he first met with Baily was the newpaper article, since Baily already had all his files (id.). The day he first met with Baily they worked late into the night drafting the complaint (TR 1949). The complaint was finished the following day (TR 1950, 1954-55). Since the complaint was filed on September 5, 1991, and Scott testified that it was not finished until the day after he first went to see Baily, he could not have gone to see Baily in response to reading the September 5, 1991 article in the Anchorage Daily News.

   Rather, it appears that Hamel contacted Baily on September 3rd or 4th, 1991, and asked him to meet with Scott (see TR 2947). Baily apparently first met with Scott on September 4, 1991, and filed the complaint the next day. The appearance of the Daily News article on the morning the complaint was filed appears coincidental.

   Apparently realizing that his testimony that the September 5th Daily News article prompted him to first see Baily was inconsistent with the filing of the complaint on that day Scott, on redirect (TR 1985-86) and then re-cross (TR 1987), changed his testimony. He stated that there were articles prior to September 5th which mentioned his involvement in the Wackenhut investigation and which, rather then the September 5th article, led him to see Baily. He stated that he "was fairly certain" he had this article or articles at home (TR 1989). Since this testimony represented a complete about-face from his testimony earlier in the day, Scott was ordered to produce the article(s) to which he was referring (TR 1994-97), either from his own records or from any other source. None were produced.

   In sum, Scott had all the information necessary to base a claim under the various whistleblower protection statutes under which this case was brought as early as the time he was fired, but certainly not later than August 4, 1991. Therefore, his claim had to be filed not later than September 3, 1991, which was 30 days from August 4th. By the time he first met with Baily on September 4, 1991, it was already too late to file the claim. Accordingly, even if equitable tolling applies to this case, the claim nonetheless was untimely filed, and must be dismissed.

   The foregoing discussion is predicated on a


[Page 31]

finding in the complainant's favor on the issue of whether equitable tolling should be applied in this case to stay the 30-day limitations period under TSCA, CAA, SWDA, and WPCA. As was just noted, the claim was not timely even if equitable tolling is applied. However, Scott has failed to establish that equitable tolling should apply to this case.

   The leading case concerning the doctrine of equitable tolling in a DOL whistleblower case brought under environmental legislation (in that case, TSCA) is School District of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1981)("Allentown"). In that case, the court reversed the Secretary of Labor's application of equitable tolling, holding that the restrictions on equitable tolling Must be scrupulously observed." (Id. at 19) The court, citing Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978), held that tolling is applicable when:

"[1] the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of action,

[2] the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or

[3] the plaintiff has raised the precise statutory claim in issue but has mistakenly done so in the wrong forum."

...

We do not now decide whether these three categories are exclusive, but we agree that they are the principal situations where tolling is appropriate."

(Id. at 19-20). Scott is not contending that any category other than the first is applicable to this case.

   Scott's argument that the 30-day limitations period should be tolled fails on two grounds. First, there is no evidence that Alyeska "actively mislead the plaintiff respecting the cause of action ...." Scott contends that Alyeska's notice of termination did not disclose the discriminatory reason for the termination, stating instead that the termination was for cause. But since employers rarely if ever tell employees they are being subjected to adverse action for reasons which are in violation of the law, holding that there is equitable tolling because an employer informs the employee of a different reason for an adverse action would virtually eliminate the periods of limitation in the various environmental statutes at issue in this case. Congress could not have intended such a result. As the court stated in an analogous age discrimination case,


[Page 32]

This [argument]...implies that a defendant is guilty of fraudulent concealment unless it tells the plaintiff, "We're firing you because of your age." It would eliminate the statute of limitations in age discrimination cases.

Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., supra, at 451. In the same vein, the court held-that fraudulent concealment requires more than that the defendant failed to disclose "the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff's claim is founded ...." (Id.)

   Perhaps the case most directly on point with Scott's is Blumberg v. HCA Management Co., 848 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1988), another Age Discrimination Act case. In declining to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in that case, Judge Rubin stated:

Unlike the plaintiffs in the cases upon which she relies, however, Blumberg was advised at the time of termination that she was being discharged for cause, and she was able to evaluate the propriety of the reasons for her dismissal immediately. Blumberg's suggestion that the Hospital somehow misled her by not expressly declaring that her discharge was due to her age is tantamount to asserting that an employer is equitably estopped whenever it does not disclose a violation of the statute. This would make the 180-day period virtually meaningless.

(Id. at 645 -- footnote omitted). See also Pruet Production Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1986).

   The cases that have applied equitable tolling to a statute of limitations in discrimination cases have been cases in which the employer was found to have misled the employee into believing he or she has no cause of action. For example, in McConnell v. General Telephone Co., supra, at 1317, the employer misled the employee into believing he had been temporarily laid off rather than terminated. Similarly, in Charles A. Kent, 84-WPC-2 1 O.A.A. 2, at 441 (Remand Decision and Order of Secretary of Labor, April 6, 1987), and Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975), the employees were misled by the employers into believing they had not been terminated. In all these cases, since the employees were misled into believing that no adverse action had been taken against them, they could not have been aware that a cause of action existed.

    A similar decision was reached in Cooper v. Bell, 638 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1980). In Cooper, a race discrimination case, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether the limitations period


[Page 33]

should be tolled on the basis of the employee's contention that his employer, the United States Government, misled him into believing that a white male could not file a discrimination complaint.

   Therefore, Alyeska's failure to inform Scott that he was being terminated for leaking company documents to Hamel is not evidence that Alyeska actively misled Scott respecting the cause of action.

   Scott also appears to be contending that, even if Alyeska did not actively mislead him into failing to file his claim, equitable tolling still is appropriate. In this respect, Scott argues that the limitations period did not start running until he became aware, or reasonably should have become aware, that he was a victim of discrimination, i.e., until he became aware both of his termination and the discriminatory cause of the termination. That is a misreading of the case law. In fact, the limitations period started running no later than when he was notified that he was terminated, October 24, 1990.

   Scott cites several cases in support of his position. Most, however, stand only for the proposition that the limitations periods in various statutes prohibiting employment discrimination are not jurisdictional, and can be tolled in appropriate instances. See Miller v. ITT Corp., 755 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1985); Hart v. J.T. Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1979); Bickham v. Miller, 584 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1978); Doyle v. Alabama Power Co., 87-ERA-43, 3 O.A.A. 5, at 42 (Final Decision and Order of Secretary of Labor, Sept. 29, 1989). In each of these cases, equitable tolling was rejected.

   Scott also cites Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., supra. In Reeb, the court states that:

the statute of limitations ... does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.

(Id. at 930 -- emphasis added); see also McConnell v. General Telephone Co., supra; McGough v. U.S. Navy, ROICC, supra, 2 O.A.A. 3, at 213. However, it is clear from these and other decisions that the phrase "the facts which would support a cause

of action" refers only to knowledge of the discriminatory act, in this case Scott's termination by Alyeska, not to the knowledge of the employer's illegal motive for that act. As the Secretary stated in McGough:


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Moreover, the implementing regulation at 29 C.F.R. §24-3(b)(1987) states clearly: "Any complaint shall be filed within 30 days after the occurence of the alleged violation." (emphasis added). Thus, "the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful." Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)(emphasis in original).

McGough, supra, 2 O.A.A. 3, at 214-15. See also Merrill v. Southern Methodist University, 806 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986); Pruet Production Co. v. Ayles, supra, at 48-49.

   Scott was fully aware that he was terminated on October 24, 1990. He was also aware that he has been providing Alyeska documents to Hamel, and he believed he would be fired if Alyeska found this out. There is no basis for equitable tolling in this case.

   Under any rationale or legal theory, Scott's complaint in this case was untimely. Therefore, this case must be dismissed.

Scott's Termination

   Even if the complaint in this case had been timely, it must nonetheless be dismissed. For Scott's termination was unrelated to his whistleblowing activities. The irony in this case is that, rather than cause Scott's termination, his whistleblowing delayed and almost prevented it.

   Initially, in cases brought under the statutes at issue in this case and other similar statutes protecting whistleblowers, it is the complainant's burden to make a prima facie showing that:

1. The complainant engaged in conduct protected by the applicable statute;

2. The party charged with unlawful discrimination knew of the employees protected activity; and

3. The adverse employment action was motivated, in whole or in part, by the employee's protected activity.

See, e.g., Dartey v. Zack Co., 82-ERA-2 (April 25, 1983); see also Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984). If


[Page 35]

the complainant can establish each of these elements, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. I find that Scott has failed to meet his burden of proof. In the alternative, I find that Alyeska has carried its burden of proving a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.

   First, for the purposes of this decision, it is being assumed that Scott's conduct was protected by one or more of the statute under which this case was brought. Second, although most of the key players involved in Scott's disciplinary proceedings during the relevant period were unaware that Scott had been engaged in whistleblowing activities (see infra), the person who held the ultimate authority in regard to Scott's termination, Alyeska President James Hermiller, was fully aware that Scott had been providing information to Charles Hamel.

   However, Scott has failed to meet the third criterion for establishing a prima facie case -- that his termination was motiviated, in whole or in part, by his whistleblowing.

   As was noted in great detail above, Scott had an extraordinarily stormy employment history at Alyeska. He had been suspended for misconduct twice previously, in 1985 and 1988, which was unique among Alyeska employees, and had to be transferred from operations to maintenance in 1989 because he could not get along with any of the operations crews.

   In June, 1990, the break-room incident occurred. As noted above, that incident precipitated proceedings to terminate Scott by Leon Anderson, the new Human Resources Representative at the Valdez Terminal, who noted that Scott's employment record was the worst he had seen in his 36 years in employee relations (e.g., TR 2203), and Charles O'Donnell, the terminal manager at that time. After O'Donnell was promoted, Rick Collins, who succeeded O'Donnell as terminal manager, continued to push to have Scott fired. None of these men were aware of the Wackenhut investigation, or that Scott had been identified as a whistleblower, while they were attempting to fire him following the break room incident (see, e.g., TR 2170, 2209, 2224, 2256-57). Likewise, Kathy Carr, the head of Human Resource Services in Anchorage, through whose office the recommendation to fire Scott was referred, was not one of those who were informed of the investigation (see supra), and there is no indication that she was aware of it even at the time of the Management Committee meeting (e.g., TR 2424). O'Donnell, when he was promoted to a position in Anchorage in August, 1990, assumed that Scott was going to be terminated (TR 2170).


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   This recommendation was not carried out, however. For the Wackenhut investigation was coming to a head and, disclosing only that a non-specified investigation was under way, both Wellington and Trotter put a hold on any disciplinary actions against Scott at that time (see supra). Therefore, were it not for the Wackenhut investigation, Scott probably would have been fired in August, 1990, following the break room incident. Alyeska's knowledge that he was providing information to Hamel, obtained through the Wackenhut investigation, actually stopped Alyeska from proceeding with his termination at that time.

   Then, on September 19th, the parking lot incident occurred Again, it was Anderson who initiated the effort to terminate Scott, and he was strongly supported in this action by the new terminal manger, Collins. There is no evidence to indicate that Anderson had found out about the Wackenhut investigation when he recommended for a second time that Scott be fired; and Collins specifically stated that he was still unaware of the Wackenhut investigation at this time (TR 2273). Kathy Carr, who disagreed with Collins regarding this action, also does not appear to have found out about the investigation. However, it should be noted that her disagreement primarily was based not on the appropriateness of termination in relation to Scott's conduct, but on her fear that Scott, who was only about a year away from retirement, would sue Alyeska if he was fired (TR 2418-19, 2423 cf; CX 69). Obviously, she was correct in her belief.

   Thus, at the time the issue of Scott's termination or suspension was brought before the Management Committee on October 22, 1990, none of the proponents -- Anderson, Collins or Carr -were aware that anything more was involved other than Scott's misconduct on the Job. Moreover, although the Human Resources Department in Anchorage may have disagreed with the Valdez Terminal Manager and his Human Resources Representative regarding whether Scott should be fired or suspended, it cannot be argued that termination would have been an unreasonable action in light of Scott's overall employment history at Alyeska culminating in the break room, tool box and parking lot incidents.

   At the Management Committee meeting, the Wackenhut investigation was not mentioned (TR 2424-25; cf. TR 2273, 2854). Only work histories of the employees were discussed (TR 2263-67, 2422-24; 2850-52). Of the Committee members present, the record contains little information about Ms. Michaels, who apparently took no part in the discussion (see TR 2266, 2851). In any event, there is no evidence in the record to suggest she would have had any knowledge of the investigation. Howitt testified in no uncertain terms that he was unaware of the investigation until August, 1991 (TR 2849, 2854); and the evidence indicates that


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Polasek was out of the loop on the investigation as well (see supra). Although Mr. Trotter, who did know of the Wackenhut investigation by that time, attended the meeting, it does not "appear that he took an active role. Moreover, he was not a member of the Management Committee.

   At that meeting, after Collins and Carr presented their positions, Howitt and Polasek spoke. Howitt was the Valdez Terminal Manager when Scott was suspended first in 1985 and then in 1988, and personally signed Scott's 1985 suspension letter (RX 168, at 84; see also id. at 130). He addressed Scott's disciplinary history, and supported the recommendation to terminate him (TR 2851). Polasek also knew of Scott's history. In fact, when Hermiller became Alyeska's President, it was' Polasek who first brought Scott to his attention, mentioning Scott's "terrible performance" at the Valdez Terminal (TR 87). Polasek also supported termination (TR 2422). Michaels did not take a position (e.g., TR 2851). Up to this point, Hermiller had not actively participated in the discussion (TR 2423, 2852).

   The only two members of the Management Committee in attendance who expressed an opinion at the meeting prior to Hermiller's active participation (and the only regular members of the Committee in attendance aside from Hermiller) strongly supported termination. Moreover, since both were quite familiar with Scott's employment history at Alyeska, their opinions were entitled to strong consideration. At that point, Hermiller stated that, in light of the discussion, he believed termination was appropriate (TR 2423, 2852). No vote was taken (TR 2853).

   Thus, the Committee had reached a consensus before Hermiller, the only Committee member who knew about the Wackenhut investigation, expressed an opinion. Further, this decision was clearly reasonable, based on the specific incidents arising since June, 1990 considered in light of Scott's overall employment history, a history with which two of the Committee members were personally familiar. That Hermiller, who had knowledge of Scott's whistleblowing, ratified this decision is not evidence that Scott was fired because of his protected conduct. The whistleblower protection legislation is not intended to insulate whistleblowers from legitimate disciplinary actions resulting from their misconduct. As the Secretary stated in Lopez v. West Texas Utilities, 86-ERA-25, 2 O.A.A. 240, Secretary's Final Decision and Order (July 26, 1988):

Although whistleblowers are protected from retaliation for blowing the whistle, the fact that an employee may have blown the whistle does not afford him protection from being disciplined for reasons other than his whistleblowing activities nor does it give such an employee carte blanche to ignore the usual obligations involved in an employer-employee relationship.


[Page 38]

(Id. at 8-9, 2 O.A.A. 4, at 243, citing Dunham v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1986).

   Scott argues that the Owners Committee, in its meeting held on September 25, 1990 in Denver, ordered Scott's termination because he was leaking documents to Hamel. That meeting was called at Hermiller's request to inform the Owners Committee of the Wackenhut investigation and the results obtained up to that point (TR 2069). It was not a full Owners Committee meeting. Rather, the meeting was limited to the representatives from Alyeska's three primary owners -- Fred Garibaldi, BP's representative, who was the Chairman of the Committee; Darrell Warner, President of Exxon Pipeline, who was Exxon's representative; and William Rusnack, President of ARCO Transportation Company, who represented ARCO (TR 193 2068).21 Attending the meeting for Alyeska's management were Hermiller, Wellington, Fred Smith (Alyeska's General Counsel) and Trotter (e.g., TR 193-94). Also attending the meeting was Paul Bilgore, an attorney with ARCO who apparently was acting as Secretary for the meeting. At the meeting, the details of the Wackenhut investigation were set out (see, e.g., CX 48), and surreptitious videotapes of Hamel were shown (TR 2069). Scott's name was brought up as a source of Hamel's information (TR 2073).

   Following this presentation, the Committee, expressing serious reservations about the investigation, ordered it discontinued (TR 200, 2075-76; cf. TR 2125, 2146). Hermiller was further instructed to avoid using any material obtained from the investigation (TR 2076-77).

   A regularly scheduled meeting of the full Owners Committee was held on October 3, 1990, only a week after the ad hoc meeting. The Wackenhut investigation was a major topic of this meeting as well. The actions listed above were ratified at this meeting (see, e.g., TR 2083).

   The "smoking gun" Scott points to as proof that the owners orderd him fired for providing documents to Hamel is Claimant's Exhibit 48 -- Bilgore's hand-written notes of the September 25, 1990 meeting. Bilgore took 3 1/2 pages of notes regarding the meeting. He stated, inter alla, that Scott was identified as a leak (see CX 48, at 2). He also noted "Call off the dogs" (id. at 4), apparently to indicate that the investigation was to be shut down.

   The last line of the memo, listed as (5) under a heading entitled "Summary", states:


[Page 39]

"Get rid of Scott - based on demerits. (Id., at 4). Scott argues that this was an instruction to Hermiller to fire him due to his whistleblowing activities and make it appear that he was being fired for legal, work-related grounds (see Scott's Proposed Findings of Fact at 42). However, there are several problems with this interpretation of these seven words. First, it is unclear why Bilgore would have used such convoluted language in his own confidential notes.22 If the Committee had decided to terminate Scott for Making documents to Hamel, why would he not have written that in these confidential notes? It seems more likely that this comment was direct, not cryptic, and means just what it says - fire Scott because of his poor work performance. Other evidence, which will be discussed below, supports this interpretation as compared to Scott's, although neither may be correct. For the preponderance of the evidence indicates that no determination to fire Scott for any reason was made at that meeting. Instead, the Committee told Hermiller not to take any action against Scott at that time.

   Complainant's Exhibit 162 is a handwritten memo prepared by John Burns, an attorney with Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker in Los Angeles.23 That firm was retained by the Owners Committee to advise it in regard to the ramifications of the Wackenhut investigation. The memo appears to be Mr. Burns' notes of a meeting held on October 11, 1990 from 2:00-4:00 p.m. Present at the meeting were the name Owners Committee representatives who were at the September 25th ad hoc meeting -Garibaldi, Warner, and Rusnack -- as well as Bilgore and three attorneys including Mr. Burns, from Paul, Hastings. Based on these notes, it appears that the attorneys from Paul, Hastings were first getting involved in this matter, since the meeting opened with an explanation of the structure and functioning of the Owners Committee and Alyeska (CX 162, at 1-2). The meeting then went into a discussion of the Wackenhut investigation (id. at 3). In discussing the September 25th meeting, Burns reported the following:

Scott was recommended by Alyeska specifically for termination on basis of proof of leak source - he was then on suspension for fighting on the job.

Orders to Alyeska on 9-25:

STOP taping
terminate activities
secure materials
hold on Scott/others

(Id. at 5). It is not clear from Burns' memo which of


[Page 40]

the Committee members -- or Bilgore -- provided this information at the October 11th meeting. But it had to have been one of them, and all of them were at the September 25th meeting. In any event, it appears from Burns' memo that Alyeska indicated at the September 25th meeting it wanted to fire Scott for leaking documents, but was instructed not to.24

   Claimant's Exhibit 163 is a summary of an interview of Darrell Warner conducted by Joel McIntyre of Paul, Hastings on November 30, 1990 in regard to the Wackenhut investigation. In describing the September 25th meeting, Warner also mentioned an Alyeska plan to fire Scott, presumably for leaking documents to Hamel (CX 163, at 7). But he noted that "the Owners instructed [Alyeska] management not to do anything until the Owners got back to them." (Id. at 8; see also id. at 12). Interestingly, the memo goes on to say:

Warner does not rember if the Owners Committee [on September 25 or October 3] told Hermiller not to fire Scott at all, or not to fire Scott over the data.

(Id. at 14). In any event, according to Warner, Alyeska was not told to fire Scott due to his whistleblowing activities. Similarly, Claimant's Exhibit 164 is a summary of an interview with Fred Garibaldi by another Paul, Hastings attorney, Dorothy Kirkley, conducted on Jaunary 7, 1991. This interview summary contains the following statement:

Either at [the September 25] meeting or the October 3 meeting, the Owners [sic] representatives discussed whether or not Bob Scott could be fired. According to Garibaldi, it was ultimately decided that Alyeska could terminate Scott for cause and so long as the leaks were not one reason for the termination.

(CX 164, at 4-5 -- emphasis added).

   All of these documents are consistent in that they indicate the Owners Committee ordered Hermiller not to terminate Scott because he leaked documents to Hamel, although there is confusion over when or if Hermiller was given permisson to fire Scott for cause. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Bilgore's terse comment in summary of the September 25th meeting --" Get rid of Scott based on demerits -- was not an invitation to Alyeska to fire Scott due to his whistleblowing but make it appear he was being fired for cause. Rather, the Owners were genuinely concerned that the Wackenhut investigation was improper and perhaps illegal, and did not want any action taken which was based on evidence turned up during that investigation (see CX 162-64).


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   As stated in note 24 above, Burns, notes of the October 11, 1990 meeting and the interview summaries of Warner and Garibaldi were confidential, non-discoverable documents prepared by attorneys retained by the Owners Committee to assess the legal ramifications of the Wackenhut investigation. It would have been to the Committee's benefit for Warner and Garibaldi to have been candid with their counsel. Similarly, there would have been no reason for Burns to take inaccurate notes at the October 11th meeting.

   Accordingly, I find-that the evidence fails to establish any direction by Alyeska's Owners Committee to fire Scott because of his whistleblowing activities. Rather, Hermiller was instructed that he could terminate Scott only for job-related factors.25 That is exactly what happened. Moreover, since the evidence fails even to suggest that any of the Alyeska officers and employees other than Hermiller who were involved in the decision to terminate Scott were aware of what occurred at the September 25th and October 3rd Owners Committee meetings, even if the Owners Committee had ordered Scott terminated for leaking information to Hamel, it would have been of little consequence. For the proceedings leading to Scott's termination were based solely on job-related factors, and were entirely the product of people who had no knowledge of the Wackenhut investigation.

    Scott points to several other factors leading to a conclusion that he was fired not for cause but for his whistleblowing. First, he points out that the Management Committee meeting at which the final decision to fire him and one other employee was made was the first and only Management Committee meeting at which such personnel actions were taken. Second, he notes there were conflicts in the testimony regarding the role the tool box incident played in his termination. Third, he notes that only he, and not Zecevic, was disciplined for the parking lot incident. Fourth, he points out that another employee identified as a whistleblower in the Wackenhut invetigation, Bill See (see, e.g., CX 48, at 2) was not terminated, and contends that See was not fired so that Alyeska could argue that retaining Mr. See, a known leak, was evidence that Scott was fired not by reason of his leaking information, but for other independent causes.

   (Scott's Proposed Findings of Fact at 61).

   These arguments are specious. That the Management Committee may not have been called upon to decide other personnel matters would indicate only that other internal conflicts about employee discipline were otherwise resolved.26


[Page 42]

That there were inconsistencies in the testimony in regard to the importance of the tool box incident in the decision to terminate Scott is not surprising. There are innumerable inconsistences in the record of this case, as there are in any record of this length. Considering that 32 people testified at the hearing over 13 days of trial, and the recollections of numerous others are contained in the almost 200 documentary exhibits, inconsistencies are bound to arise. Futher, the tool box incident clearly was not a major factor in Scott's termination in any event. Instead, it was the break room and parking lot incidents that precipitated the disciplinary actions leading to Scott's termination. Further, was disciplined for the parking lot incident is the fact that Scott struck Zecevic. Finally, that only Scott consistent with Scott's totally unsupported allegation that See was not disciplined to provide Alyeska with an alibi for terminating Scott smacks of desperation. If anything, that See was not fired supports Alyeska's position that Scott was fired for his misdeeds rather than for leaking information to Hamel.

Dual Motive Analysis

   If one were to find, as I did not, that Hermiller's participation in the Management Committee meeting at which Scott was terminated constituted a significant role in the termination, and were to infer that animus against Scott for leaking documents to Hamel was a mayor reason for Hermiller's desire to terminate him, an issue I do not have to reach, then this case could be considered a dual motive case.

The dual motive doctrine is implicated when it is found that the employer's adverse action against the employee was motivated by both prohibited and legitimate reasons,-i.e., that the employer had dual motives. See Generally Wilson v. Bolin Associates, Inc., 91-STA-4, Final Dec. and Order, Dec. 30, 1991, slip op. at 4; Palmer v. Western Truck Manpower, Case No. 85-STA-6, Sec. Dec. and Order on Remand, Jan. 16, 1987, slip op. at 9-10; McGavock [v. Elbar, Inc., Case No. 86-STA-S, Sec. Final Dec. and Order, July 9, 1986] at 12. In such a case, in order to avoid liability, the employer has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision as to the employee's discharge even in the absence of the protected conduct. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-58 (1989); Wilson at 4.

Park v. McLean Transportation Services, Inc., 91-STA-47 (Final Decision and Order, Sec'y of Labor June 15, 1992).

   The evidence in the record clearly shows


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that Alyeska would have made the same decision even in the absence of the protected activity. As was noted in the previous discussion, Hermiller played no role in the proceedings to terminate Scott until they reached the Management Committee. At the Committee meeting, two of the other three Committee members, who had no knowlege of the Wackenhut investigation, strongly endorsed terminating Scott for cause, and the third, a substitute sitting in for a vacant VicePresident position, expressed no opinion. Hermiller clearly had no reason to oppose their recommendation. Acordingly, even if he could have exercised the authority to prevent the Committee from terminating Scott,27 that he failed to do so, even if solely due to animus against Scott for leaking documents to Hamel, is immaterial. There were ample legitimate grounds to fire Scott, and Hermiller had no reason to dissuade the other Committee members from doing so.

   Therefore, I find that the evidence establishes that Scott would have been terminated even in the absence of his protected activity. He was an unsatisfactory employee, and his termination was reasonable.

   In summary, I find that this claim was not timely filed, and Scott's termination was not due to his whistleblowing. Either finding is sufficient to dismiss the case.28

RECOMMENDED ORDER

   It is recommended that this case be dismissed.

      JEFFREY TURECK
      Administrative Law Judge

[ENDNOTES]

1Citations to the record of this proceeding will be abbreviated as follows: CX -- Complainant's Exhibit; RX Respondent's Exhibit; JX -- Joint Exhibit; TR -Hearing Transcript.

2Technicians at the Valdez Terminal are paid on a scale of 1 to 6. One is the lowest pay grade; six is the highest.

3This enigmatic incident was not explained further in the record.

4Scott has not contended that the "break room incident" (see infra) involved any of the Nationalist Movement's publications. See TR 1916.

5Alyeska produced a considerable amount of testimony regarding a new personnel policy allegedly introduced at the behest of Hermiller through which the company would impose tougher discipline on its employees, as a way of explaining why Scott was terminated in 1990 but not previously. However, this testimony was extremely self-serving, and I give it little weight. Besides, I cannot conceive of any personnel policy, no matter how lenient, that could explain why Scott was not terminated prior to 1990; nor would it have been necessary to come up with a harsher policy to justify terminating him following the incidents which occurred in the summer of 1990 (see infra).

6Michael Thiel's testimony was confined to a discussion of the parking lot incident (see infra). He offered no opinion regarding Scott's desirability as a co-worker.

7Michael Thiel, a maintenance technician at the terminal, testified that he viewed the incident from 30-40 yards away and saw Zecevic strike Scott rather than the other way around (TR 1192). Since this version of the incident is contradicted by all the participants, including Scott, it is rejected.

8There is no allegation that Scott was ever disciplined by Alyeska in regard to these complaints.

   There is much evidence in the record (e.g., TR 2313-15, 2337, 2461, 2467, 2666, 2760-63) that Scott has no concern whatsoever for safety and the environment. However, whether Scott's activities relevant to this case are protected under the whistleblower protection provisions of the environmental statutes at issue here does not turn on his motivation. Accordingly, this issue will not be addressed further in this decision.

9Senator Gravel is erroneously referred to in the transcript as Senator "Ravell".

10He has filed other suits against Exxon, however.

11Hamel confirmed that these documents, which he characterized as engineering drawings, were furnished by him to EPA (TR 1132).

12I found Hermiller's testimony at the hearing to be less than candid. He was a contentious witness, and his testimony often gave the impression that he was holding back or not giving complete answers to questions. Frequently, his testimony appeared self-serving. As the person who authorized the Wackenhut investigation, which was roundly criticized by the members of the Owners Committee (see infra), he has a personal as well as a corporate interest in this hearing. I have weighed his testimony accordingly.

13P>Darrell Warner, Exxon's representative on Alyeska's Owners Committee, was inadvertently informed of the investigation by Dietrich on August 9, 1990 (CX 162, at 3-4). Dietrich apparently assumed that the members of the Owners Committee knew about it.

14The timing of this contact is confirmed by an entry in an attachment to a memo prepared by Wayne Black. See CX 47, Exhibit List, Item 1.

15The back of the envelope in which the brochure was sent was marked: "4-9-90 427 [Wackenhut's case number for the Alyeska investigation (TR 1260)] WBB [initials of Wayne B. Black] Rec'd at C. Hamel residence Washington, D.C. [sic]". It appears to be Black's usual way of marking documents (see CX 35, at p. 3 ) . Hamel testified that he did not give this document to "Jenkins" or throw it away (TR 1098). Black indicated it was discarded by Hamel (see CX 47, Exhibit List - Item 3 ) . Black did not testify at the hearing.

16O.A.A. is an abbreviation for Decisions of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and Office of Administrative Appeals, U.S. Department of Labor. It will be used in citing to DOL decisions.

17Scott testified that he visited Hellen's office prior to moving to Anchorage, and he moved to Anchorage in early July, 1991 (TR 1438, 1926-27).

18Another former Wackenhut employee, Gus Castillo, also gave a statement to the Committee that day (TR 1344).

19There is conflicting testimony regarding whether he left for West Virginia on August 4th or August 5th. It serves no purpose to try to resolve this conflcit, although it is more likely that he left on the 5th. In this regard, see TR 1992.

20The Anchorage Times went out of business during the course of the trial in this case.

21Rusnack had succeeded Garibaldi as the Chairman of the Owners Committee at the time of the hearing (TR 2066-67).

22The Bilgore notes -- CX 48 -- as well as CX 162-65 (infra), are documents which are subject to the attorney -client privilege and, in the normal course of events, would never have become public. They were obtained from Alyeska pursuant to subpoena by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which, over Alyeska's objections, released them to the public.

23See my Post-Hearinq Order in this case dated August 28, 1992 regarding the authorship of this document.

24The statement in Burns' notes that, on September 25th, Scott was on suspension for fighting, is incorrect. The parking lot incident had occurred at that time (on September l9th), but he was not suspended until October 8, 1990 (see CX 11). Therefore, although the Committee could correctly have been informed at the September 25th meeting that Scott was involved in a fighting incident, in regard to Scott's current work status either the Committee was misinformed or it misunderstood the information conveyed. Scott contends it was the former-that either Hermiller, Wellington or Trotter told the Committee Scott has been suspended -- and that this somehow is proof of Alyeska's illegal motive in disciplining Scott (see Complainant's Reply Brief at 17-18). But it is difficult to see any such connection.

25There is confusion among all the participants regarding whether cetain things occurred at the September 25th meeting or at the full Owners Committee meeting held on October 3rd. However, none of the participants have indicated that contradictory actions were taken in the two meetings. Rather, the confusion extends only to whether specific things, such as the order to Alyeska not to fire Scott for whistleblowing, occurred at the first or second meeting. Since both meetings occurred before any disciplinary action against Scott was taken, it is not of great importance whether the order not to fire Scott for whistleblowing was given on September 25th or October 3rd.

26It should be noted that the evidence fails to support Scott's contention that Alyeska's Management Committee has never made personnel decisions. Rather, Hermiller testified that the Management Committee had not made personnel decisions while he was President of Alyeska (TR 224-25), a relatively short period.

27The record fails to indicate how the Management Committee decides an issue, i.e., does each member have one vote, or does the President have the final say regardless of the opinions of the other members?

28Due to these findings, there is no reason to address the question of whether Scott engaged in protected activity.



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