A. Counsel's false statement regarding my appointment

   Counsel first asserted that DOL OALJ ("Office of Administrative Law Judges") and I had engaged in improper conduct regarding my appointment in his January 2, 2002, letter to DOL's Associate Chief Judge Thomas Burke requesting reconsideration of Judge Burke's December 21, 2001, "Order Denying [Complainant's] Motion to Reconsider . . . ." In this letter Counsel stated, "DOL OALJ impermissively contacted HUD directly, instead of going through OPM and having OPM make a selection." Although Counsel indicated that he based this assertion upon documents contained in DOL OALJ's December 2001, response to his FOIA ("Freedom of Information Act") request, there was nothing in those documents to indicate such a contact had occurred, and Counsel provided no evidence in support of his assertion.

   Nonetheless, in a January 3, 2002, "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Reconsider," Judge Thomas Burke, corrected Counsel's misapprehension, stating:

In fact, the factual predicate of Judge Greene's motion, that the DOL OALJ impermissibly contacted HUD directly instead of going through OPM for an ALJ to hear this case is incorrect. DOL OALJ contacted OPM who in turn contacted HUD as well as other agencies requesting the availability of an ALJ to be detailed on this case.

   In a January 9, 2002, letter to the Secretary of Labor seeking to cancel the Memorandum of Understanding between DOL and HUD that provides for DOL's reimbursement of HUD for the time spent on this case, Counsel repeated many of the same statements. He again referred to my rulings as "nasty, brutish, and short," again stated that I have a community of interests with the EPA Chief Judge, and again asserted that I intend to benefit HUD financially by giving this case short shrift.

   On January 24, 2002, Counsel filed a "Notice of Filing and Motion to Strike Improper Filings." In this document, filed in reply to EPA's response to Complainant's motion seeking my recusal, Counsel accused officials at EPA, OPM, and DOL of corruption. He charged that:

[EPA's] improper filings impermissibly seek to contaminate the Court with . . . sworn declarations from OPM personnel whose actions require a hearing under oath, not self-serving statements elicited by Respondents, who have special 'pull' with OPM as a Federal agency and its Chief Judge . . . .

The filing of January 24, 2002, also refers to a letter of January 14, 2002, written by Judge Burke. Counsel stated that Judge Burke's letter was "at best an ill-advised unseemly attempt to influence the outcome of a pending recusal motion without troubling anyone with the need for a hearing or compliance with legal norms like due process."

   Other examples of Counsel's abusive statements made in documents filed throughout the course of this proceeding include the following:

• "The undisclosed DOL-HUD-OPM selection of HUD to adjudicate this case, along with an arbitrary, unchangeable budget limit ($10,000) and a non-expert Chief Judge predetermines the outcome of this case . . . ."

• "The 'waters of justice' have been 'polluted' by DOL and HUD's premature and inappropriate dealings with OPM."

• "It is inappropriate for an Administrative Law Judge to function as a 'cat's paw' for Federal agencies."

• "The inartfully drafted MOU in this case is reminiscent of the Ohio conflict of interest cases involving judicial remuneration. . . . where judges made extra money for ruling against criminal defendants." (citations omitted).

• "The MOU [between Judges Burke and Cregar] does not pass either the 'olfactory test' or the 'snicker test.'"

• "EPA makes itself a point source of verbal pollution."

   I have also read Counsel's interlocutory appeal letter to DOL's Administrative Review Board ("ARB") on the chance that it responded indirectly to my Order to Show Cause of January 28, 2002. In that letter, Counsel continued his inappropriate and unprofessional criticisms of me and others, and misstated more facts. He reiterated assertions that were the basis of my Order to Show Cause, made contemptuous statements about the fact that I issued an Order to Show Cause, and made additional derogatory statements. He did not, however, respond directly to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or articulate reasons why I should not disqualify him from further appearance in this proceeding.

C. Counsel's Failure to Comply with Pre-Hearing Order

   On November 13, 2001, I issued a prehearing order that summarized a telephone conference held with counsel for the parties on November 2, 2001. The order states in part:

I admonished both counsel that the "decibel level of this case must be lowered"; and that the conduct in this case must henceforth be civil and professional. As examples of inappropriate conduct, I noted the titling of a motion, "Response to Erroneous Assertions . . ." allegations such as, "Trial is necessary as a result of OSHA's inaccurate, incomplete, incompetent findings," and terminating a telephone conversation with opposing counsel by hanging up. It is incumbent upon counsel to speak, write, and act professionally. It is unnecessary to resort to emotionally laden language to make a successful argument. Any pleadings filed hereafter that contain inappropriate and uncivil language will be deemed in violation of this order and will not be considered. Uncivil conduct on the part of counsel shall be subject to sanctions which may include barring an attorney from representation. See 29 C.F.R § 18.36. Before I determine that sanctions should be imposed or a pleading should not be considered because it violates this Order, the offending party will be given an opportunity to respond and to justify his language and conduct.

I directed both parties to refrain from using string cites in support of a particular point in motions or pleadings. It is usually unnecessary to cite any cases other than the most recent or, alternatively, the seminal case for a particular proposition. Only if multiple cases are necessary to articulate different aspects of the contention are multiple citations called for. Citations should be to specific pages of the case, and cited cases should be followed by a brief synopsis, in parentheses, of the proposition for which the case stands. (Emphasis added.)

   Counsel violated the Order of November 13, 2001, by making inappropriate and uncivil statements as illustrated above and by failing to refrain from string-citing and failing to provide synopses of cited cases. When an attorney string-cites and fails to synopsize cited cases, among other things, he wastes judicial time, as demonstrated in the following examples drawn from documents filed by Counsel in this case.

   A document entitled "Complainant's Notice of Filing and Motion re: Judge Cregar's Status," filed January 8, 2002, contains the following language on page 2:

Judge Cregar should no longer preside: to insure fairness, another judge from another agency should be assigned to Judge Greene's cases. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 784 (2nd Cir. 1976.), reh'g denied 553 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1977). Each of the three Robin factors weighs heavily in favor of someone other than Judge Cregar and HUD to hear this case. 553 [sic] at 10.

   Counsel did not provide a synopsis of the holding in United States v. Robin; he merely referred to three "Robin factors." The page of the decision which supposedly supports Counsel's argument -- page 784 -- does not in fact address "factors" to be applied in the disqualification of a judge. Rather, that page contains a discussion of a dissenting judge who takes issue with the decision to substitute one judge for another. In other words, the point found on page 784 is the opposite of the point Counsel sought to make. Only when one looks at the decision on rehearing does one find a three-part test for the substitution of one judge for another. Further, the Robin case involves a remand of a hearing on sentencing in a criminal case, a critical fact that Counsel failed to disclose. Counsel did not explain why the Robin case should apply in this administrative forum.

   Complainant's January 8, 2002, response to EPA's motion to dismiss the complaint contains a second example:

   A central jurisdictional issue in the instant case is whether a Federal agency employee can be considered an employer and thus a respondent in a whistle-blower case. With regard to this issue, Counsel cited 18 cases and one law review article in support of a single, conclusory proposition. However, Counsel did not explain why cases involving 1) non-governmental entities and their managers, and 2) discrimination and not whistleblower retaliation cases, are relevant to the jurisdictional issue. Furthermore, for most of the cases Counsel failed to identify the specific pages which purportedly support his position so that a reader could search for the relevance that Counsel saw in them without reading each case in its entirety. In fact, the cases appear to have no bearing on the issues raised by this case.

   In the third example, Counsel cited a number of cases in support of a proposition that is both obvious and not at issue. In a letter to DOL's Judge Burke on January 2, 2002, Counsel wrote: "A 'fair trial [and appeal] in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of Due Process.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)." Letter to Honorable Thomas M. Burke, Re: Hon. J.F. Greene vs. EPA Chief Judge Susan Biro, EPA OIG & EPA OALJ: Compl't Judge J.F. Greene's: 1. Notice of Filing in Support of Motion for Recon. 2. Supp. Citations re: Ex Parte HUD-OPM-DOL MOU, at 3. Counsel then continued in a footnote to cite 21 more cases in support of the proposition that a fair trial is a basic requirement of Due Process even in administrative proceedings. Again, Counsel did not provide synopses, although he did provide specific page citations for six of the 23 cases. As the question of whether or not a fair trial is a basic requirement of Due Process is not at issue in this case, there is no reason why Counsel would cite even one case in support of the proposition, let alone 23.

   This is not the first proceeding in which Counsel has been disqualified, sanctioned, or cited for improper professional conduct. In at least eight other reported cases, Counsel's professional misconduct has prompted censure.

   In Johnson v. Oak Ridge Ops. Office, ALJ Case Nos. 95-CAA-20, 21, and 22, an "Order Barring Attorney Edward A. Slavin from Future Appearances" ("Order") was issued on February 4, 1997, by DOL ALJ Edith Barnett. Counsel was barred from making future appearances before ALJ Barnett because of a "continuing pattern of willful misconduct, including the making of prohibited ex parte communications, engaging in disruptive actions, violating this tribunal's orders, and failing to abide by this tribunal's rules of practice."

   ALJ Barnett's Order and Order to Show Cause detailed some of Counsel's misconduct. For example, Counsel continued to assert for two years that one of his motions had been "under advisement since 1995" despite the fact that the motion had been denied in an order issued in August 1995. He also repeated this false statement to GAO investigators. Counsel referred to opposing counsel as "Nazis" and "redneck peckerwood[s]." He faxed eight separate submissions to the ALJ during a three-day period demanding conference calls and accusing the ALJ of "mishandling of this case," "treating [his] clients shabbily," and "messing this case over to a faretheewell." The ALJ had limited discovery to an issue of timeliness while staying discovery on the merits until the timeliness issue had been resolved. Counsel nevertheless persisted in issuing discovery requests that went "far afield of the timeliness issue, or any issue even conceivably related to the merits" and filed 17 submissions with the court that had nothing to do with the timeliness issue. Counsel also made several demands for the ALJ's recusal, in "excessively familiar" terms, without providing a supporting affidavit as required by 29 C.F.R. § 18.31, or any other supporting statement, rationale, or evidence.

   ALJ Barnett noted that the Supreme Court of Tennessee (before which Counsel is licensed to practice) finds no First Amendment protection for remarks critical of the judiciary where those remarks are false. She cited case law finding meritless an allegation that an ALJ committed reversible error by refusing to order discovery prior to ruling on the jurisdictional underpinnings of the case.

   In Johnson, Counsel filed a response to the Order to Show Cause why he should not be disqualified, which according to ALJ Barnett was "filled, as usual, with savage invective, personal attacks on the undersigned, irrelevancies, and misstatements."

   In addition, prompted by ALJ Barnett's Order to Show Cause, Counsel submitted to the Chief ALJ at DOL a "Motion to Conduct Hearing on Motion to Recuse" requesting recusal of ALJ Barnett or transfer to a different ALJ. The motion was denied on February 12, 1997, because the Chief ALJ has no authority to hear motions for recusal of another judge. Subsequently, on appeal of the case to the ARB, in May 1998, Counsel submitted to the ARB the autopsy report of ALJ Barnett, who had died some months after issuing the final decision in Johnson. The ARB stated in its decision,

It is clear to us -- as it no doubt was clear to counsel -- that the autopsy report is completely irrelevant to the merits of Complainants' challenge to the ALJ's rulings. To the extent that the report is offered by counsel in an effort to sully the reputation of the ALJ posthumously, such a personal attack is contemptible.

Johnson v. Oak Ridge Ops. Office, ARB Case No. 97-057 (ALJ Case Nos. 95-CAA-20, 21, and 22), ARB Final Dec. and Ord., slip op. at 15 (Sept. 30, 1999).

ALJ Lasky issued an Order to Show Cause because of Counsel's "insulting, written abuse of the undersigned, improper professional conduct, and violation of the standards of conduct required in matters such as this."

   In his response to the Order to Show Cause, Counsel renewed his attacks on the ALJ, objecting primarily to the ALJ's orders staying all discovery pending the threshold issues of jurisdiction and timeliness and denial of his motion to conduct ex parte interviews with Respondents' employees. The ALJ stated that the document filed by Counsel "attacks the integrity of the undersigned, falsely accuses the undersigned of making derogatory, inappropriate and condescending remarks, and falsely accuses the undersigned of misconduct . . . ." The ALJ indicated that Counsel's statements in his response to the Order to Show Cause were typical of other statements he had made during the course of the litigation. The ALJ stated, "No court in this country would tolerate such contemptuous behavior as Mr. Slavin has demonstrated in the case at bar. No judge of any forum should be subject to such personal abuse which undermines the integrity of the entire system . . . ." Again, Counsel was informed that there is no First Amendment protection for abusive remarks critical of the judiciary when those remarks are false and prejudicial to the administration of justice.

   In yet another case, Counsel was barred from further appearances in the case by the ALJ due primarily to his abusive pursuit of frivolous claims. Williams v. Lockheed Martin, ALJ Case Nos. 1998-EPA-40 and 42, Recommended Dec. and Ord. Granting Summary Dec., slip op. at 11 (Mar. 22, 1999). The ALJ stated:

[T]he workers involved are entitled to protection and a full and fair hearing on any valid complaints. This case represents a clear abuse of that intended process, but unfortunately there exists no meaningful remedy by which to penalize Complainants' Counsel for the unsavory pursuit of the complaints in these cases.

Upon appeal of the case, the ARB cited "a partial list of invective" contained in Complainants' opening brief to the ARB. The ARB listed such statements as:

• The ALJ allowed his prejudices to run this case;
• The Board 'should reject, reverse and remand the ALJ's arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional . . . insolent, hostile and irascible actions';
• Reference to the ALJ's 'kangaroo court';
• The ALJ had a barely hidden agenda: narrowing the law to hurt whistleblowers;
• The ALJ was overtly hostile. The ALJ's one-way 'reign of error' shows partiality toward Respondents . . . . ;
• The ALJ shows palpable, almost pathological 'prejudice' . . . . ;
• The ALJ showed no signs of an active social conscience, or appreciation for whistleblowers, or judicial independence or judicial temperament; and
• The ALJ misrepresented, ridiculed and twisted the facts in an Oak Ridge whistleblower surveillance civil rights case -- marginalizing Complainants. The ALJ's bias is on display, not unlike a judicial confession.

Williams v. Lockheed Martin, ARB Case Nos. 99-054 and 99-064 (ALJ Case Nos. 98-ERA-40 and 42), Final Dec. and Ord., slip op. at 5-6, n. 6 (Sept. 29, 2000) (not all examples cited by ARB included here). The ARB concluded that "Counsel's characterizations of the ALJ's actions are factually inaccurate and insulting . . . . Once again Mr. Slavin has exhibited his disregard of [his] professional obligation."

   Counsel's improper behavior has not been limited to administrative fora. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee has found that Counsel violated the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while representing himself as a defendant in Lockheed Martin Energy Systems v. Slavin, No. 3:98-CV-613, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 1999). In this case Lockheed sued Counsel seeking the return of attorney fees that Lockeed had paid to him as counsel for a third party who had prevailed at trial against Lockheed in another case but who had lost on appeal. As a result of Counsel's abusive statements, Counsel was ordered, among other sanctions, to apologize in writing to his opposing counsel and to the plaintiff. He was ordered to acknowledge in his apology "the inappropriateness of his personal attacks and [to express] remorse for interjecting such attacks in this case."

   The court reviewed all the filings in the case and determined that Counsel had violated Rule 11 in six specific ways:

(1) asserting a number of frivolous challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction when he knew that such assertions were not warranted by existing law, (2) asserting a number of frivolous defenses, including assertions Lockheed lacked standing, laches, statute of limitations, estoppel, unjust enrichment, abuse of process, and invasion of privacy, knowing that such assertions lacked evidentiary support and were not warranted by existing law; (3) frivolously denying the authority of the ARB in the face of the Sixth Circuit's decision to the contrary without any factual or legal basis; (4) asserting the decision of DOL was not final without any factual or legal support for that assertion and with no reasonable basis for believing that to be true; (5) pursuing a campaign of personal attacks on Lockheed and asserting irrelevant matters to portray Lockheed as an entity of ill repute, undeserving of legal rights and protections, without any legal or rational basis to believe such materials were germane in any way to the Court's determination; and (6) pursuing a campaign of personal attacks on Mr. Horde [opposing counsel] and asserting irrelevant matters to malign Mr. Horde's character in an attempt to persuade the Court to discredit anything filed by Mr. Horde on behalf of his client, without any legal or rational basis to believe such materials were material in any way to the Court's determination.

The Court finds Defendant Edward A. Slavin, Jr., has presented to the Court a pleading, that is, his Answer, as well as other written motions and other papers, which contain defenses, claims, and other legal contentions not warranted by existing law and that in fact were frivolous, baseless, irrelevant, meritless, abusive, offensive, and redundant. These pleadings . . . were not filed for proper purposes, but were presented to cause unnecessary delay and needlessly increase the cost of the underlying litigation. The filing of meritless and redundant pleadings is recognized as appropriate for sanctions under Rule 11. These pleadings . . . contain vicious personal and uncivil attacks against opposing counsel and Plaintiff, were motivated by an intent to harass, and were filed in bad faith.

Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted). The court in Slavin also stated,

The Court read every word of the 17-page Answer, and it pained the Court to do so. This pleading is not characteristic of the quality of work the Court expects from a lawyer. In fact, it falls below what the Court would expect from someone who had never attended law school.

Id. at 14. In determining what sanctions to impose on Counsel, the court in Slavin explained in part,

Here the Court is faced not just with an attorney who has filed baseless, frivolous, and unprofessional pleadings and responses to motions, but an attorney who has done so repeatedly, flagrantly, and in a manner which reflects a callous disregard for the proper and efficient functioning of the Court and also reflects a sense of disrespect for the authority of the judicial system and the obligations of the legal profession. For such flagrant, repeated misconduct a censure or reprimand is appropriate. The Court intends this Memorandum and Order to serve as a censure or reprimand . . . .

Id. at 19, 21. After reviewing Counsel's reported misconduct in administrative proceedings, the court in Slavin stated:

The Court will not impose this [$10,000] sanction immediately, but will instead suspend imposition of this sanction for one year, conditioned upon Defendant complying with all the foregoing sanctions and the Defendant not engaging in conduct violative of Rule 11 before any Court, whether Federal or state, judicial or administrative. Even if an administrative body does not have a rule comparable to Rule 11, Defendant is expected to conform his conduct to Rule 11 standards. Any violation before any court, judge, administrative law judge, or administrative review board or body would warrant imposition of this monetary sanction.

Id. at 22.

   Counsel failed to comply with the District Court's order, prompting the court to lift suspension of the $10,000 fine on April 27, 2001. Not only did Counsel fail to appear at his own hearing as directed by the court, but he failed to repay attorney's fees as ordered and failed to comply with other elements of the court's order. Slavin, No. 3:98-CV-613 (E.D. Tenn., Order of April 27, 2001); telephone call with Clerk of Court, United States District, E.D. Tenn. (May 16, 2002) (Counsel had not complied with the Court's orders of Dec. 6, 1999, and April 27, 2001, and Counsel's appeal of the Dec. 6, 1999, Order was dismissed by the appellate court on April 3, 2002, for failure to prosecute.)

   Despite suffering a sanction imposed by a United States District Court under Rule 11, Counsel has continued to behave unprofessionally in cases other than the case before me. In November 2000, Counsel's abusive conduct caused a brief he had filed on behalf of his client to be stricken in Pickett v. Tenn. Valley Auth., ARB Case No. 00-076 (ALJ Case Nos. 99-CAA-25 and 00-CAA-9) (Nov. 2, 2000). The ARB stated:

Finally, we concur with TVA that counsel for Pickett has "engaged in personal and vitriolic attacks on a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge . . . ." While counsel for Pickett has the right to criticize rulings of the ALJ with which he disagrees, he has no right to engage in disrespectful and offensive personal attacks upon the ability and integrity of the ALJ . . . .

A brief containing such invective ordinarily should be stricken. Accord Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1962). We find no reason to depart from the general rule in this case and accordingly, we GRANT TVA's Motion to Strike Pickett's opening brief.

Pickett, ARB Case No. 00-076, at 2 (citation omitted).

   Counsel's abusive conduct provoked judicial censure as recently as January 2002 in Erickson v. U.S. Envt'l. Protection Agency, 1999-CAA-2 (ALJ Jan. 24, 2002) and again in February 2002 in Campbell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). In Erickson the ALJ stated:

Respondent moved to bar Complainant's attorney Edward Slavin, Jr., from representing Complainant in her Whistleblower protection suit on the basis of 29 C.F.R. § 18.36 (2001), alleging that Mr. Slavin has failed to adhere to reasonable standards of conduct before the administrative law judge, and in fact, details a history of unwarranted personal attacks and allegations before other administrative law tribunals. I note that Mr. Slavin has systematically engaged in personal attacks, name calling and obtuse behavior throughout this proceeding. I do not find it appropriate, however, to disqualify Mr. Slavin under 29 C.F.R. § 18.36 (2001) at this time. Further such behavior by Mr. Slavin may make such a motion more appropriate in the future. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to Disqualify Complainant's Attorney is DENIED.

Erickson, 1999-CAA-2, slip op. at 3.

   In Campbell, after citing Counsel's misconduct, the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court of Tennessee directed the clerk of court to furnish a copy of its opinion and make the court file available to the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility for appropriate action, stating that Counsel's "conduct constituting a personal attack on the trial judge" was "offensive and improper" and that such "repetitive misconduct can neither be tolerated nor ignored." (Campbell, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 43, at * 19, *24)

   The Campbell panel cited many examples of Counsel's misconduct that are markedly similar to the misconduct that he has exhibited in other cases, including the case at bar: that the trial judge "rushed his consideration of this case"; "took an inadequate amount of time for a rushed reading of the transcript"; "erred by mocking and trivializing" a witness; "showed bias and prejudice by making pejorative remarks about press releases"; "made erroneous conclusions, revealing his prejudice and bias"; "'shot from the hip"'; "based his decision on prejudice: he drove under the inference"; "unreasonably based his decision on information he did not know: this is the judicial equivalent of building a skyscraper from a House of Cards"; "scorned First Amendment Rights"; "dispensed 'injustice' though it appears in this case that this was possibly not from a mere mischance"; and "made no intent to hide his intent: to be a 'cat's paw' for Defendant, denying Ms. Campbell a fair trial, even attempting to have her counsel disciplined." Id. at *20-22. The panel also added that Counsel "erroneously state[d] . . . that a motion for new trial was a procedural prerequisite for appeal," and "filed a series of "citations" of supplemental authority in the Court that added nothing new and failed to address the key element of his client's case." Id. at *22-23.

   The cases summarized above demonstrate that Counsel has been notified repeatedly in at least eight previous proceedings by as many different judges and appellate authorities that the type of conduct he has exhibited before me does not conform to professional standards.

   Section 18.34(g)(3) of 29 C.F.R. states:

Denial of authority to appear. The administrative law judge may deny the privilege of appearing to any person, within applicable statutory constraints, e.g. 5 U.S.C. 555, who he or she finds after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter does not possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or is lacking in character or integrity; has engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or has engaged in an act involving moral turpitude. No provision hereof shall apply to any person who appears on his or her own behalf or on behalf of any corporation, partnership, or association of which the person is a partner, officer, or regular employee. (Emphasis added.)

   Section 18.36 states:

Standards of conduct. (a) All persons appearing in proceedings before an administrative law judge are expected to act with integrity, and in an ethical manner. (b) The administrative law judge may exclude parties, participants, and their representatives for refusal to comply with directions, continued use of dilatory tactics, refusal to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly and ethical conduct, failure to act in good faith, or violation of the prohibition against ex parte communications. The administrative law judge shall state in the record the cause for suspending or barring an attorney or other representative from participation in a particular proceeding. Any attorney or other representative so suspended or barred may appeal to the Chief Judge but no proceeding shall be delayed or suspended pending disposition of the appeal; provided, however, that the administrative law judge shall suspend the proceeding for a reasonable time for the purpose of enabling the party to obtain another attorney or representative. (Emphasis added)

   Counsel has violated 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.34(g)(3) and 18.36. First, he has engaged in improper and unprofessional conduct, in violation of § 18.34(g)(3). Second, he has refused to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly and ethical conduct; and third, he has refused to comply with directions, in violation of § 18.36. The Order to Show Cause of January 28, 2002, cited three types of Counsel's conduct that fall within these prohibitions: making a false statement to the tribunal; making insulting, abusive, and unprofessional statements; and failing to comply with an order.

Rule 4.1 of the MRPC states: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . ." The MRPC defines misconduct, in part, to include a violation or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, engagement in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" or "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Rule 8.4. The MRPC also provides that a lawyer "(a) shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct" such a statement previously made (Rule 3.3); or "(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal"; or allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or supported by admissible evidence, or state a personal opinion as to justness, credibility, culpability, or guilt or innocence (Rule 3.4); or engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal (Rule 3.5). Counsel has violated each of these prohibitions.

   While counsel has the right to criticize rulings of the ALJ with which his client disagrees, he has no right to engage in disrespectful and offensive personal attacks upon the ability and integrity of the ALJ. Such attacks violate Counsel's "professional obligation to demonstrate respect for the courts." Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., ALJ Case Nos. 98-ERA-40, 98-ERA-42, ARB Nos. 99-054, 99-064, Final Dec. and Ord., slip op. at 6 (Sept. 29, 2000). Accord A.B.A. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Preamble, Rules 3.5 and 8.2 (2002). See also In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding attorney's vitriolic comments in contravention of Rules 3.5(c) and 8.4(d) and grounds for disbarment).

It must be made plain that the purpose of a brief is to present to the court in concise form the points and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. A brief in no case can be used as a vehicle for the conveyance of hatred, contempt, insult, disrespect, or professional discourtesy of any nature for the court of review, trial judge, or opposing counsel. Invectives are not argument, and have no place in legal discussion, but tend only to produce prejudice and discord.

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St Louis Ry. Co. v. Muncie & Portland Traction Co.,166 Ind. 466, 466 (1906).

   In U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Washington v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993), the attorney alleged that the trial judge had materially altered the trial transcript as well as the supporting tape recording despite disavowals by the court reporter and tape-recorder experts who examined the tape. The circuit court determined Sandlin had violated the professional conduct rule that a lawyer "shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications, integrity, or record of a judge . . . ." and suspended Sandlin's license to practice. Id. at 864 (quoting Rule 8.2(a)). In reaching its holding, the Sandlin court noted that Sandlin had complained to the FBI without first checking with the court reporter, and had repeated his allegations even after the court reporter told him she had not done what he claimed, thus depriving him of any reasonable basis to make his allegations. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 867. In addition, Sandlin's statements claiming that experts had confirmed alteration of the tape recording were patently false because the experts had, in fact, told him that they could not confirm whether or not the tape had been altered.

   The requirement that Counsel refrain from making insulting, abusive, and unprofessional statements about the judges before whom he appears does not conflict with his ethical duty to zealously represent his clients. The court in B&L Appliance and Servs., Inc. v. McFerran, 712 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting WorldCom Network Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 698 N.E.2d 1233, 1236-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)) aptly noted that:

[O]verheated rhetoric is unpersuasive and ill-advised. Righteous indignation is no substitute for a well-reasoned argument. We remind counsel that an advocate can present his cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.

   An illustrative case, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Waller, 929 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Ky. 1996), involved an attorney who filed pleadings stating that the trial judge was a liar, a racist, incompetent, and had a personal interest in the proceedings. The court stated:

There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use such scurrilous language with respect to a judge in pleadings or in open court. The reason is not that the judge is of such delicate sensibilities as to be unable to withstand the comment, but rather that such language promotes disrespect for the law and for the judicial system. Officers of the court are obligated to uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice and, at a minimum, this requires them to refrain from conduct of the type at issue here.

Waller, 929 S.W.2d at 183.

   Counsel's statements in the instant case go well beyond zealous representation of his client. He has attacked the credibility, integrity, and impartiality of two judges, the administrative hearing system, and other government officials involved in my appointment as trial judge. Compl't Judge J.F. Greene's Pet. for Interloc. Appeal, at 4, para. 5 (Feb. 8, 2002).

   As Counsel has engaged in virtually identical behavior before numerous other tribunals in the past and has been specifically informed that such behavior is unacceptable, he cannot possibly be unaware of governing standards. I conclude that he has engaged in this conduct before me knowingly and deliberately, with intent to disregard the rules of professional conduct, the rules of this administrative proceeding, and the rules of common civility. Counsel's insulting, abusive, and unprofessional statements constitute improper conduct, in violation of both 29 C.F.R §§ 18.34(g)(3) and 18.36, as well as the rules of professional conduct.

   Finally, Counsel has failed to comply with a direct order issued by this tribunal. Not only did Counsel engage in abusive and pejorative comments directed toward me, he also made pejorative comments about another judge, opposing attorneys, and government officials involved in the case. At both the pre-hearing conference and in my follow-up pre-hearing order, I specifically ordered counsel for all parties to refrain from making pejorative statements. In addition, Counsel failed to follow my order prohibiting the use of string citations without synopses. These orders were prompted by Counsel's inclusion of literally hundreds of case citations in his filings, many apparently made at random or with little if any relevance to the issues raised by this case.

   Attorneys are required and expected to follow the orders of a tribunal, regardless of personal views about the appropriateness of the orders. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kouri-Perez, 8 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.P.R. 1998) (court sanctioned attorney who violated court's explicit order to refrain from personal attacks on opposing counsel, in violation of rules of professional conduct); See also In re Shuill, 741 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 2001) (failure to appear at scheduled court hearings was in defiance of court order and, as such, misconduct in violation of Rule 3.4(c)). As the court in In re Shull stated:

Misconduct of this kind delays the administration of justice, inconveniences all others involved in the proceeding, wastes judicial resources, potentially compromises the interests of clients, and subjects the attorney to possible charges of contempt, or, as here, professional misconduct.

Id. at 727. And as the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mills, 755 N.E.2d 336, 409 (Ohio 2001) (quoting State v. Wilson, 285 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Ohio 1972):

The integrity of the judicial process demands total deference to the court, particularly on the part of its officers. Respect for the law and obedience to the orders and judgments of the tribunals by which it is enforced lies at the very foundation of our society.

   Counsel has refused to comply with directions and refused to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly conduct, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 18.36. That behavior also constitutes improper professional conduct in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 18.34(g)(3) by violating the MRPC, which also governs Counsel's professional conduct.

   Counsel's misconduct began at the outset of this litigation. In the face of a clear written warning on November 13, 2001, Counsel continued to misbehave. His continued misbehavior led me to consider sanctions. I learned in early January, while considering my options regarding Counsel's behavior, that Counsel has a long history of professional misconduct. Reviewing that history (a matter of public record) brought me to the tentative conclusion in January that Counsel is unable or unwilling to conform his behavior to professional standards. That conclusion was confirmed when Counsel failed to respond to the Order to Show Cause, thereby forfeiting the opportunity to explain himself, apologize, and reform. Issuing additional warnings would be futile and a waste of time because Counsel appears to be uneducable.

   I have considered the right of Counsel's client to choose her representative. However, Complainant's private right must be balanced against the public's right to fair and efficient adjudicatory systems that operate with integrity and dignity. The public interest is not served by allowing attorneys to practice who engage in serious misconduct and who evidence no intent to reform their behavior. The public interest in protecting and upholding the integrity and reputation of the judicial system outweighs Complainant's right to counsel of her first choice.

   Accordingly, it is ORDERED that

1. Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Attorney at Law, is permanently barred from appearing before me in this or any other matter, and is further barred from acting in an advisory capacity to any party to a proceeding before me in this or any other matter;

2. A copy of this Order will be forwarded to the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Mr. Slavin is admitted to practice law in the State of Tennessee, Bar No. 012341;

3. The Chief Docket Clerk will, upon request, make the relevant portions of the file of this case available to the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee for appropriate action; and

4. Complainant will have 30 days from the date of this Order in which to obtain another representative. If she is unable to do so within that period, she will inform this tribunal of her need for additional time or state that she will proceed pro se.

      WILLIAM C. CREGAR
      Administrative Law Judge

Dated June 20, 2002