Johnson reported that, although Ross had spoken to him on several occasions
in early 1995, Ross never alleged any falsification issues or safety concerns and specifically never
mentioned any issue related to the falsification of calibration records of pressure instruments.
Instead, Ross had questions and comments about "training and qualification related to the
measuring and test equipment process and about fitness for duty policies and work
environment." (RX-48, p. 6). Johnson further reported that Ross did not make any allegations
[Page 8]
about the falsification of calibration records to the NRC until March 4, 1996, well after his discharge.
Such allegations were inspected and determined to be unfounded. (RX-48, p. 7). It was concluded
that prior to his discharge, Ross never raised any issues to Johnson which were cognizable under
NRC jurisdiction. (RX-48, p. 9). Thus, the NRC concluded that the investigation did not
substantiate the allegation that FPL had illegally discriminated against Ross. (RX-48, p. 11).
D. Training
Upon returning to the I&C Shop, Ross requested further training,
specifically a vendor training class, scheduled for June 1995, for a piece of equipment manufactured
by Hagen. He was not chosen to attend the class for various reasons which were expressed to him
by different supervisors. Ross recalled that Dennis Garner, his supervisor, informed him that
another employee was being sent to the training because he had better attendance than Ross. (Tr. 97).
At other times, he was informed that time in the shop, seniority and shift alignments were
determinative factors in who was being selected to attend the class. (Tr. 98, 278). Ross
acknowledged that of the approximately 50 I&C shop employees, only about 10 were selected to
attend the Hagen training. (Tr. 277).
Ross admitted that absenteeism was a problem for him and that Garner had
counseled with him on several occasions concerning his absenteeism. (Tr. 252, 783-784;
See also attendance records, RX-47).
As a result of his exclusion from Hagen vendor training, Ross attempted to
file a grievance seeking ,000.00 per day in damages which was not accepted by the union since
damages were not an appropriate remedy through the grievance procedure. Ross did not re-file the
grievance thereafter. (Tr. 279).
Hugh Thompson, shop steward, corroborated Complainant's recollection of
the grievance. (Tr. 795-797). Thompson further testified that Ross never mentioned any alleged
nuclear safety concerns, problems with completion or falsification of data sheets or having contacted
the NRC at any grievance meetings. Ross never told Hugh Thompson that he felt he was being
retaliated against, being called "stupid" or denied training because he raised nuclear
safety concerns or contacted the NRC. (Tr. 798, 813).
Dennis Garner testified that only eight spaces were available for day shift
employees to attend Hagen vendor training. Three of the eight spaces were filled by employees who
actually repaired Hagen equipment and additional spaces were available for employees who worked
with Hagen modules in the control room. Garner did not select Ross for Hagen training because he
was a day shift employee who did not repair or work with Hagen equipment in the control room.
(Tr. 768-769). Garner testified that he had no knowledge that Ross had allegedly raised nuclear
safety concerns, complained about falsification of data sheets or had contacted the NRC. (Tr. 766,
769-770, 780). Ross never indicated to Garner that he felt retaliated against by non-selection to the
[Page 9]
Hagen training class because he allegedly raised nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 772). Garner testified
that the majority of I&C shop employees were not selected to attend Hagen training. (Tr. 771).
In early 1995, Ross spoke with Lloyd Thompson, a field supervisor, about
obtaining training. (Tr. 116). No change in training opportunities occurred as a result of his
discussion with Thompson. Complainant testified that he also spoke to Tom Plunkett, who at the
time was the FPL site vice-president, concerning lack of training. (Tr. 117). As a result of that
contact, Bob Marshall of Human Resources recommended that he consult with Dr. Luis Rodriguez.
On March 2, 1995 he met with Dr. Rodriguez. (Tr. 117, 121). Ross initially testified that he
returned to see Dr. Rodriguez and spoke to him about training and harassment. When specifically
asked whether he recalled seeing Dr. Rodriguez in March of 1995, he stated that, "I may have,
I don't specifically recall that." (Tr. 121). Ross made no attempt at that time to seek external
counseling as suggested by Dr. Rodriguez. (Tr. 122).
Ross, through the bid process, sought other jobs including an ANPO and RCO
(Reactor Control Operator) positions. (Tr. 98). He was selected to transfer into an ANPO job on
September 14, 1995, and instructed to report on October 31, 1995. (Tr. 98-99).
Ross testified that he filed several grievances, one of which involved whether
his previous experience as an ANPO at Turkey Point for two years would be counted towards his
need for training as an ANPO. As a result of the grievance it was determined that none of his
previous experience would be counted. (Tr. 121). Several meetings were held in the first week of
September and again on September 13, 1995, to discuss Ross' grievances regarding his lack of
training opportunities. Ross did not testify as to the results of the pending grievances over training.
(Tr. 125).
Franzone testified that in August 1995 Hugh Thompson approached him about
Complainant's desire for training, including Hagen training. Franzone held several meetings with
Ross and his union representatives about training, however, safety concerns were never mentioned.
(Tr. 611). Franzone explained that the Hagen training occurred in June 1995 but that such training
would be offered in the future and Ross may be considered eligible for such training. (Tr. 610).
Franzone further explained that Ross was not selected for Hagen training because the training
concentrated on repairing modules and working on a component level basis, and Ross had poor
attendance and lacked extensive experience in working in the Control Room. (Tr. 614-615).
Franzone stated that the union never submitted a grievance regarding a nuclear safety concern on
behalf of Ross, and Franzone never had any knowledge before Complainant's discharge that he had
allegedly contacted the NRC despite attending numerous meetings with Ross. (Tr. 618).
E. Name-calling
Ross testified that he was initially referred to as "stupid" in 1991
during a discussion among co-employees in the operations department when he was employed as
[Page 10]
an ANPO at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. (Tr. 103-104). Thereafter, he was continually called
by this nickname, "stupid." (Tr. 107). After his transfer to the I&C Shop, Supervisor
Ron Miller referred to him as "stupid" and "would get other people" to do
so. (Tr. 108-109). Ross acknowledged that Miller, who was an operations supervisor, engaged in
name-calling two years before his alleged contact with the NRC. (Tr. 207).
Ross denied that upon his transfer to the I&C shop he introduced himself as
"Michael, they call me stupid in operations." (Tr. 210). He stated that before being
transferred to the Cal Lab in 1993 Supervisor Larry Fuhrmann engaged in name-calling by referring
to him as "stupid." (Tr. 211). However, Bob Marshall, Dennis Garner and Steve
Franzone never called him "stupid." (Tr. 211).
Although Ross stated that he complained to supervisors in 1992 about being
called "stupid," when specifically asked to identify such supervisors, he was unable to
do so. (Tr. 109-110). Ross testified that later in his employment in the I&C Shop and Cal Lab,
around 1994, he was called "stupid" on a daily basis. However, he was unable to
complain to his immediate supervisors, Howie Crouch and Larry Fuhrmann, because they too
participated in such name-calling. (Tr. 110-111).
Complainant testified that upon reporting to the Cal Lab he did not recall
introducing himself as "Michael Ross, everyone in operations called me stupid." (Tr.
216). He testified that neither the employees of the Cal Lab nor Halvorsen referred to him as
"stupid." (Tr. 217). Halvorsen and co-Lab employees Blehm, Slone and Arashiro
corroborate Ross in this regard. (Tr. 707, 726, 739, 745, 754).
Complainant testified that in the summer of 1994 (July) he went to Tom
Wogan, a plant supervisor, and complained about being called stupid and about being
"harassed." Wogan suggested that he speak with Franzone. (Tr. 111-112). Ross later
complained to Franzone but the name-calling did not stop. He reiterated his complaints to Franzone
about being called stupid and raised a "bigger concern" about being denied training and
referred to as "incapable of learning." (Tr. 113).
On cross-examination, Ross testified that he did not inform Wogan that he
thought about killing people, however, he may have said something about being harassed and called
stupid, and not receiving training to which he commented, "what do I have to do to get them
to stop? Do I need to kill them or do I need to O.J. them?" (Tr. 251). He acknowledged that
he could have informed Wogan that "he was the calmest person out here and if it comes to a
choice of ruining someone's day . . ." without completing his thought. (Tr. 252; RX-10).
Ross acknowledged that in the summer of 1994 he had a confrontation with
employee Norm Jacques in FPL's parking lot in the presence of fellow car pool rider Joe
Myszkiewicz. Ross testified that Jacques cut him off in the parking lot, looked at him and laughed,
[Page 11]
after which Ross parked his vehicle and approached Jacques. He admitted placing his hand near or
on Jacques' neck area and putting a "choke hold" on Jacques. (Tr. 254-255). He told
Jacques that he had better not cut him off in the parking lot again. (Tr. 255). Myszkiewicz testified
that Ross lunged at Jacques, picking him up from underneath the neck and stated "don't ever
do that to me again." (Tr. 894-895).
After the parking lot incident, management recommended to Ross that he
speak with Dr. Luis Rodriguez, a psychologist in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). (Tr.
114). Ross spoke with Dr. Rodriguez about training and being called "stupid." Ross
was informed that EAP could do nothing about training or name-calling and suggested that he
undergo testing. (Tr. 115). Ross began but did not complete all of the recommended testing. He
spoke with Dr. Rodriguez about obtaining psychiatric counseling, however Dr. Rodriguez was not
"willing to help me or talk to me" about training or the name-calling. (Tr. 115). Ross
stated that he may have declined to meet with the EAP in October 1994 and that he declined to use
external counseling as suggested by the EAP in March 1995. (Tr.256-257).
In about April 1995, Ross talked to the site vice-president, Plunkett and
Marshall of Human Resources concerning the harassment by co-workers and not receiving training.
(Tr. 259-260). Ross acknowledged that during the discussions with Marshall he did not raise any
nuclear safety concerns or mention retaliation by anyone because of raising such concerns. (Tr.
266). Ross further stated that he considered the harassment of being called stupid to be a nuclear
safety concern. (Tr. 266-267). On cross-examination, Ross equivocated in response to whether or
not he informed Marshall or anyone else at FPL before his discharge that he was being retaliated
against in any way because of raising nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 267-272).
Ross testified that he went to Plunkett after viewing an old beach movie in
which truck drivers wore T-shirts that read "I'm stupid" and "I'm with
stupid." (Tr. 273-274). He reported the same labeling was placed on his hat as well as a co-employee's hat approximately four years before he saw the movie (approximately 1991). (Tr. 274).
Mr. Plunkett informed him that he could not do anything about what people called him. (Tr. 276).
Ross never complained to Garner or Hugh Thompson about employees
engaging in name-calling. (Tr. 790, 823). Myszkiewicz testified he never heard anyone call Ross
"stupid," nor did Ross ever complain to him about being called stupid during the three
years they car pooled together. (Tr. 897). Joel Smith, the shop cartoonist, stated he did not call Ross
"stupid," nor did he ever hear anyone else engage in such name-calling. (Tr. 865).
Michael Bridgeman, a fellow I&C specialist, testified that he never referred to Ross as stupid, nor
did Ross ever complain to him about name-calling. (Tr. 832). Leo Capera, Ross' co-worker,
admitted calling Ross "stupid" on one occasion, but after admonishment from Franzone,
he ceased the name-calling. (Tr. 875-876). Capera testified that he had no knowledge of Ross
raising any nuclear safety concerns or going to the NRC. (Tr. 881).
[Page 12]
In August 1994, Franzone spoke with Ross after being informed by Human
Resources of Wogan's July 1994 encounter with Ross and the Jacques incident. (Tr. 604-605). Ross
told Franzone that "people in the shop" including supervisor Furhmann were calling him
"stupid." (Tr. 606). Ross never stated to Franzone that he had any issues with
falsification of calibration data sheets or nuclear safety concerns. Ross never mentioned any
retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 607).
F. The "Parting of the I and Sea" Cartoon
On September 14, 1995, a cartoon was published and circulated in the shop
which depicted Ross as one of five employees selected to leave the I&C shop and become ANPO
operators in the Operations Department. (Tr. 125-126). Ross took offense to the cartoon because
it depicted him chasing butterflies with a "stupid look and wearing a yarmulke." (Tr.
126). Ross interpreted the cartoon as a portrayal of him being a traitor. He faced a different
direction the other four employees, was not going with them, and was between supervision and the
people who were leaving the I&C shop. (Tr. 126).
Ross acknowledged that he and four other I&C specialists bid and were
awarded jobs in the Operations Department as ANPOs. (Tr. 288). Ross testified that he was not
aware Franzone delayed the five employees from going to the ANPO job because he needed I&C
specialists. (Tr. 289). He further acknowledged that he did not understand the cartoon reflecting the
five employees and Franzone as descriptive of Franzone's efforts to retain employees, even though
the cartoon character "Joses" was stating "Let my people go!!" (Tr. 289;
RX-40).
The cartoon reflects four people walking toward the parted sea, one person
going to the left chasing butterflies and Franzone pushing a cart as the "pizza, pizza
guy." (Tr. 290). Ross testified that he is depicted as facing away from the parted sea wearing
what he perceives to be a Jewish yarmulke rather than "thinning hair." (Tr. 292). He
acknowledged that the cartoonist, Joel Smith, could have intended the area on the top of his head to
be a bald spot. (Tr. 293). He did not understand the intention of the cartoonist depicting him facing
away from the other employees or why he was releasing butterflies. (Tr. 293-294). More
importantly, Ross could not explain how the cartoon had anything to do with any nuclear safety
concerns or retaliation for raising such concerns. (Tr. 294-297, 300).
Myszkiewicz, one of the I&C specialist selected to transfer to an ANPO
position, testified that the circle at the back of Complainant's head in the cartoon referred to his
"distinctive bald spot" and found nothing offensive about the cartoon even though he
knew Ross was Jewish. (Tr. 898-899).
Joel Smith, a digital I&C specialist who drew the cartoon, testified he never
intended to harm or offend anyone. (Tr. 856). He did not know Complainant's religion and did not
[Page 13]
intend any religious overtones. Ross was depicted with a bald spot on the back of his head and not
wearing a Jewish yarmulke. (Tr. 861). Smith was unaware that Complainant allegedly raised any
nuclear safety concerns or felt retaliated against for having done so. (Tr. 862).
Bridgeman denied telling Ross that if he complained about the cartoon
"we'll get rid of you." (Tr. 835-836). He believed the cartoon reflected Complainant's
bald spot at the back of his head. (Tr. 832). Capera and Garner saw no religious overtones or anti-Jewish sentiments in the cartoon and thought the circle at the rear of Complainant's head represented
his bald spot. (Tr. 775, 880). Hugh Thompson told Ross he thought the spot on his head in the
cartoon represented his bald spot, not a yarmulke. (Tr. 860).
On September 15, 1995, the following day, Ross requested an assignment to
work with Smith because he wanted to learn to draw cartoons and wanted Smith to show him how
to do so. (Tr. 302). Supervisor Fuhrmann declined to assign Ross to work with Smith. Ross then
sought out Garner for assignment to work with Smith. Garner also refused such a request. (Tr. 304).
Ross informed Garner that perhaps during breaks Smith would do a cartoon for him or show him
something. Ross indicated that he desired to speak with Smith to diffuse the situation with everyone
being mad at him because of rumors that he had complained to management about the cartoon. (Tr.
139). Ross acknowledged that he may have said something to the effect that he was afraid to wait
because he might "lose the balls" to do what he wanted, needed or intended to do. (Tr.
304). Ross stated that he had no evidence that Smith knew he was Jewish when he drafted the
cartoon. (Tr. 309).
Ross became offended when other employees referred to him in the cartoon
as "fucking stupid." (Tr. 127). Ross testified that he went to complain to Dan Coleman,
who apparently was a relief supervisor in the past, however, Coleman walked away when Ross
began to talk "trying to think of what to say." (Tr. 128). He also went to the Safety
Office to complain about the cartoon, but when he arrived no one was there to accept a complaint.
(Tr. 129). He thereafter returned to the I&C Shop, retrieved his job package and performed his job.
(Tr. 130).
Subsequently, Myszkiewicz approached him in the Shop and was "kind
of upset." Myszkiewicz began "hammering" Ross about his father writing letters
to the company and Ross going to the EAP and Human Resources trying to get people fired
presumably for involvement with the cartoon. (Tr. 131). According to Ross, during this discussion,
Capera entered the area promoting a gun raffle, which was commonplace in the work area. (Tr. 133).
Ross commented "something about get an uzi," but, when pressed for specifics, he
testified he remarked "I feel like buying an uzi or something like that." (Tr. 134).
On cross-examination, Ross testified that the "uzi" comments
made to Myszkiewicz were something to the effect of Ross buying an uzi rather than bringing in an
uzi to the plant. (Tr. 320). He acknowledged that after making a comment about the uzi,
[Page 14]
Myszkiewicz stated something to the effect that "we don't need comments like that."
(Tr. 322).
Myszkiewicz testified that a rumor was circulating in the shop that Ross had
complained to management about the cartoon. He decided to approach Ross and determine if he had
complained. In response to his inquiry, Ross remarked "the innocent [always] get the
blame" and "all this stuff makes you want to bring in an uzi." (Tr. 902, 904, 906).
In a raised voice, he told Ross not to say such things. He thereafter reported the "uzi"
comments to fellow employees Dennis Smith and Godfrey Alexander, operations supervisor Charlie
Fernandez and to Complainant's supervisor Furhmann. On September 16, 1995, he reported the
"uzi" comments to Franzone. (Tr. 991). He observed that Ross was acting erratic and
irregular, and Myszkiewicz became concerned for the safety of other I&C specialists. (Tr. 912). All
employees are trained to observe and report irregular conduct and aberrant behavior. (Tr. 914-915).
According to Myszkiewicz and Capera, no gun lottery was being conducted at the time of
Complainant's "uzi" comments. (Tr. 881, 928-929).
Subsequently, according to Hugh Thompson, bargaining unit employees John
Terramoccia, Michael Bridgeman and Dan Coleman requested to meet with Franzone because they
did not want to work with Ross due to the rumors about him, particularly the "uzi"
comments and going to management about the cartoon. (Tr. 801-802). Bridgeman also added that
Complainant's request to work with Smith and the parking lot incident with Jacques motivated him
to speak to Franzone. (Tr. 837). He had no knowledge of Complainant's alleged protected activities.
(Tr. 838-839). According to Hugh Thompson, when he confronted Ross about going to management
concerning the cartoon, Ross stated he started the rumor himself to make employees involved with
the cartoon "suffer or worry about their jobs." (Tr. 802).
Franzone approached Ross at his work site after learning of his concern
about the cartoon and the reference to him as "fucking stupid" and engaged in a lengthy
discussion about Ross' concerns, which did not include nuclear safety issues. (Tr. 626). Franzone
thereafter informed the union stewards and field supervisors that, if anyone continued to call Ross
names, disciplinary action would be taken. (Tr. 627-628).
G. The September 16, 1995 Meeting
On September 16, 1995, Ross was summoned and reported to the VP
conference room where Bob Marshall was present along with Steve Franzone, Hugh Thompson,
Johnny Randalls and a security person. Johnny Randalls and Hugh Thompson, union stewards, were
not present at Complainant's request. (Tr. 143). Franzone informed Ross that he would get right to
the point and stated "we're pulling your badge." (Tr. 144; See RX-15).
According to Ross, he was not informed of the reason for this action although he asked and was
informed that "they could not say." He was instructed to see Dr. Luis Rodriguez. (Tr.
145). Ross was not informed of the reason for contacting Dr. Rodriguez. (Tr. 146).
[Page 15]
Ross testified that as a result of his badge being pulled, he was excluded from
the protected area of the plant where he performed his job. (Tr. 145). According to Ross, the
management officials did not speak to him about the "uzi" incident, any threats that he
may have made, his psychological well-being or his previous union grievances alleging harassment.
(Tr. 147).
Ross reported a break-in of his desk wherein cartoons were placed in each desk
drawer. He requested an investigation be conducted into the break-in. He was informed that an
investigation could not be conducted. (Tr. 149). At the end of the meeting Ross was escorted outside
of the protected area and left the plant with his fellow car pool riders.
On cross-examination, Ross testified that before his discharge he informed
supervisors and managers at FPL that he felt he was being treated differently, adversely or retaliated
against for raising nuclear safety concerns. He specifically recalled making such a statement at the
September 16, 1995 meeting. (Tr. 311). When specifically asked what he said, he testified that
"I felt like I did some grievances and had some discussions with Steve [Franzone] and now
all this stuff is going on." He further vaguely stated that during these
"discussions" they talked about nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 311).
Ross further testified that he informed those present at the September 16, 1995
meeting, he felt he was being retaliated against for having filed grievances. (Tr. 312-313). When
asked specifically if he felt retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns, Ross stated that he had
made such a statement at a September 13, 1995 grievance meeting. He then recanted and stated that
he had not announced that he felt retaliation because of raising nuclear safety concerns at the
September 16, 1995 meeting. (Tr. 313). At the September 13, 1995 meeting, which concerned the
Hagen vendor training, Ross testified that he contended the Hagen vendor training was a nuclear
safety concern. (Tr. 313-314). Ross stated that at the September 16 meeting when his security
badge was pulled, he was retaliated against on that occasion because of having filed a grievance over
the Hagen vendor training and "other things," including the events in the Cal Lab. (Tr.
315). Ross stated that the "uzi" comments were not advanced as a reason for his security
badge being pulled. (Tr. 315).
Garner testified that Complainant's grievances in September 1995 only
involved training issues and Ross never raised any nuclear safety concerns or retaliation during the
meetings. (Tr. 786, 788).
Hugh Thompson testified that at the September 16, 1995 meeting, Ross was
told that his access was being suspended due to his actions, particularly the "uzi"
comment incident. (Tr. 803). Thompson further recalled that although Ross did not immediately
admit to making the uzi comments, he eventually admitted having made such a comment.
Thompson and Randalls, the chief union steward, met with Ross after the meeting and explained the
suspension of access to him. Thompson did not believe that there could have been any doubt in
[Page 16]
Complainant's mind regarding what he had to do to regain access through EAP. (Tr. 805).
Franzone testified that he made the decision to suspend Complainant's access
and have Ross evaluated by EAP based on input from other employees, Human Resources and
security. (Tr. 655-656). Franzone was informed on September 15, 1995, by Furhmann that Ross
had requested a job assignment with Joel Smith to learn how to draw and had made a comment about
"needing to do what he needed to do." (Tr. 621-622). Rich Stripling, a shop steward,
informed Franzone that employees were blaming Ross for going to management and complaining
about the cartoon. (Tr. 623-624). On September 16, 1995, three employees, including Bridgeman
and Hugh Thompson, met with Franzone and stated they did not want to work with Ross because
they felt unsafe. The three employees considered Ross to be unsafe because of the Jacques incident,
the request for job assignment to work with Joel Smith and the "uzi" comments. (Tr.
623-624, 629-630). Franzone had not previously been informed of the "uzi" comment,
but concluded that he could not ignore Complainant's behavior. (Tr. 630). Franzone thereafter
confirmed the "uzi" comments through Myszkiewicz who informed Franzone that he
was fearful of Ross. (Tr. 632-633). Franzone stated that at no time during the September 16, 1995,
meeting did Ross bring up any nuclear safety concerns or allegations of retaliation. (Tr. 635).
Ross testified that at the September 16, 1995 meeting, his pay was suspended
and his unescorted access to the plant was pulled. (Tr. 333). He acknowledged being told that he
needed to see Dr. Rodriguez or EAP for a referral for evaluation. (Tr. 334). Ross further
acknowledged that in his pre-hearing deposition on February 12, 1997, when asked if he was
informed that his access to the plant was being suspended, he responded, "no. That is not
true." He immediately recanted testifying that his access was suspended but the word
"suspended" was not used. (Tr. 335). He stated that he understood he did not have
access to the plant after the September 16, 1995 meeting. He subsequently acknowledged he
affirmed in a pre-hearing, signed affidavit that at the September 16, 1995 meeting he was advised
"my unescorted access to the plant was suspended ." (Tr. 336). (emphasis
added).
H. Dr. Dennis L. Johnson, Ph.D.
On Monday, September 18, 1995, Ross called Dr. Rodriguez who informed
Ross to see Dr. Dennis Johnson, a psychologist, on September 20, 1995. (Tr. 150-151). Ross was
required to drive 100 miles from his home to Dr. Johnson's office located in Stuart, Florida. (Tr.
152). At this appointment, Ross questioned the need to complete certain paperwork and sign certain
forms. Ross sought an opportunity to seek advice and was, according to Ross, denied such an
opportunity. He then left Dr. Johnson's office without completing the paperwork. (Tr. 153). He
subsequently telephoned Dr. Rodriguez to report the events of that day and was informed that
another appointment would be made for him.
Ross attended the second appointment on September 22, 1995. On that day,
[Page 17]
he was administered written tests, which took most of the day, and required his return to Dr.
Johnson's office the following Monday. (Tr. 155-156). On Monday, September 25, 1995, he had
a brief discussion with Dr. Johnson but was not informed of the results of his tests. (Tr. 157). After
meeting with Dr. Johnson, Ross reported to Dr. Rodriguez, confirming that he met with Dr. Johnson.
Dr. Rodriguez indicated that he would get back with Complainant. He subsequently informed Ross
that based on Dr. Johnsons's recommendation, he was to see Dr. Salo Schapiro. (Tr. 159).
On cross-examination, Ross admitted that he informed Dr. Johnson he had
become physical with Jacques in the parking lot in 1994, grabbing Jacques' chest. (Tr. 343). Ross
did not recall or know whether he informed Dr. Johnson that he stated to Jacques that he would kill
him. (Tr. 343-344). He also admitted to Dr. Johnson that he had made a statement to the effect of
"getting an uzi" rather than buying an uzi. (Tr. 345).
Ross admitted that during his conversations with Dr. Johnson, he did not
mention anything about being retaliated against because of nuclear safety concerns which he
allegedly raised. (Tr. 351).
Dr. Salo Schapiro, a board-certified psychiatrist, evaluated Ross on October
11, 1995. (RX-42). Ross indicated that they talked for a couple of minutes, but he did not undergo
any testing on that occasion. (Tr. 161). After meeting with Dr. Schapiro, Ross called Dr. Rodriguez
and informed him that Dr. Schapiro indicated he should return for another appointment. Dr.
Rodriguez did not make another appointment for Ross to see Dr. Schapiro. (Tr. 162).
Dr. Schapiro reported to Dr. Rodriquez that Ross was suffering from a
"major mental illness, manifesting clear paranoid compensation as well as a thought process
defect." Moreover, he opined that Complainant's overall capacity to work "seems
impaired based on his cognitive and behavioral/emotional functioning." (RX-22).
Dr. Johnson testified that he performs fitness for duty evaluations and
risk/threat assessments for FPL and has done so for twelve years. (Tr. 950). On October 20, 1995,
he prepared a report for FPL in which he opined that Ross was not psychologically suitable for
unescorted access authorization. Dr. Johnson recommended professional treatment because of his
concerns regarding Complainant's judgment, decision-making abilities and personal stability. (Tr.
961-962; RX-20). During consultation, Dr. Johnson was informed by Ross that he told employee
Jacques not "to do it again, I'll kill you" and that he felt "like get an uzi."
Dr. Johnson reported that Ross never indicated that he was being retaliated against or mistreated for
allegedly filing nuclear safety concerns regarding alleged falsification of calibration data sheets. (Tr.
960).
I. The November 3, 1995 Meeting
Complainant testified that he was contacted by Marshall to report to the
Turkey Point Plant on November 3, 1995. He met with Bob Marshall and Greg Heisterman,
[Page 18]
Manager of Maintenance, who represented Franzone. (Tr. 165). Heisterman chaired the meeting
and produced a report of discipline and a 45-day letter to Ross. Ross stated that a union steward was
present, however, he did not have an opportunity to speak to the steward before the meeting. (Tr.
166).
The report of discipline, which included a five day suspension for
inappropriate behavior and threatening co-workers, was read to Ross, but he refused to sign the
report. (RX-24). Ross was asked if he desired to say anything and he attempted to do so, however,
was informed by Heisterman that he did not really want to hear what had happened. (Tr. 167). The
report of discipline reflects "Employee's [Ross] Reaction" to be, in pertinent part:
"I feel I have been discriminated against. The religious
ramifications of the cartoon are obvious and humiliating. I've gone
to management and asked not to be called stupid on previous
occassions (sic)...I have been more sensitive to this name-calling and
humiliation since John Halvorsen, the Cal Lab Supv, told me that I
would be denied training because of what Hal Blem(sic) and Sonny
Arashiro have said about me. They said I was incapable of being
trained..."
(RX-24).
With respect to the 45-day letter, Ross testified he was verbally informed that
he was unfit for duty based upon a report received from Dr. Johnson. (Tr. 168-169). He was
informed that his fitness was a "long-term type of thing" and that "they didn't think
that I would be able to I guess regain access or whatever within the 45 days." (Tr. 169). He
stated someone suggested that he seek private psychological consultation or treatment. (Tr. 170).
In pertinent part, the 45-day letter read:
I have no choice but to give you 45 days from the date of this letter to find a job
within the company that you can perform. You must have the required qualifications
and, if necessary, seniority. If you have not found a position within 45 days, you will
be discharged from the Company.
(RX-25).
Ross acknowledged that at the November 3, 1995 meeting he was given a
report of discipline and a five day suspension for exhibiting inappropriate behavior and making
comments of a threatening nature to co-workers. (Tr. 357-358; RX-24). Ross acknowledged that
he did not specifically relate to the assembled group that he had raised nuclear safety concerns or felt
[Page 19]
retaliation or adverse treatment by their actions because of having raised such concerns. (Tr. 365).
He only mentioned the name-calling and Halvorsen's impression that he should be denied training
because he was incapable of learning. (Tr. 361, 365).
Ross confirmed that at the November 3, 1995 meeting he also received the 45-day letter. (Tr. 365; RX-25). He testified that it was explained to him during the course of the
meeting that FPL had received Dr. Johnson's report who opined that Ross was not suitable for
unescorted access to the plant. (Tr. 366-367). Ross acknowledged it was reasonable to conclude that
at the November 3, 1995 meeting he understood if he cleared his access within 45 days he would
have retained his I&C position or his newly bid job as an ANPO. (Tr. 370). Ross further
acknowledged that Dr. Johnson recommended he pursue psychiatric or psychological treatment as
a result of his evaluation. (Tr. 372-374).
Marshall testified that Art Cummings, Fitness for Duty Supervisor, explained
to Ross that he needed to seek psychological treatment and after 45 days he could attempt to obtain
conditional unescorted access if he was under continuing treatment. (Tr. 535). Cummings informed
Ross that his psychological problems were "deeply rooted" and he should not expect to
re-obtain access in a short time. Marshall believed that Ross clearly understood the conditional
access part of the discussion. (Tr. 536). Marshall further testified that it was clear from the meeting
that Ross would be responsible for obtaining another job outside the access area within 45 days or
be cleared for access to the plant or be discharged. (Tr. 538). Marshall informed Ross that he could
apply for long-term disability but had to do so within the 45 day period because if he was terminated,
he could not then apply. (Tr. 538-539).
Marshall stated that at the meeting Ross did not mention retaliation due to
nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 534).
After the meeting, Ross went to see Dr. Rodriguez because he wanted to know
if there was anything he could do to get his badge back and to express his willingness to "try
anything." He requested support or a referral to a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist to
obtain treatment and was informed that Dr. Johnson and Dr. Schapiro could not assist in such
treatment because there would be a conflict of interest with FPL. (Tr. 171). Dr. Rodriguez
suggested that he try to get someone on his own. Ross was informed that he needed to find a
psychiatrist or psychologist to provide treatment rather than a regular doctor because Dr. Rodriguez
would only forward Complainant's records to a specialist. (Tr. 172, 376-377).
Ross further testified that Marshall informed him that a list of bargaining unit
and non-bargaining jobs would be made available to him. (Tr. 374-375). Ross also spoke with
Marshall concerning long-term disability and was provided application forms for disability. (Tr.
375).
Subsequently, Ross sought out a private psychiatrist, Dr. Lionel Blackman,
[Page 20]
as early as November 15, 1995. (Tr. 172, 430: RX-28). Dr. Blackman requested that Ross obtain
information regarding his prior psychological evaluations. On November 15, 1995, by certified mail
to Dr. Rodriguez and Marshall, Ross requested all of his records be released to Dr. Blackman. (RX-28). Ross testified that Dr. Rodriguez promised he would produce such records. (Tr. 173). Dr.
Blackman did not receive any of his records until late December 1995 and then received only a part
of the records requested. (Tr. 175). Ross testified that he received a copy of the letter dated
December 11, 1995 from Dr. Rodriguez to Dr. Blackman in which certain materials relating to
Complainant were forwarded to Dr. Blackman. (Tr. 389; RX-31). Dr. Blackman did not render a
report concerning Complainant's psychiatric condition. (Tr. 176).
Ross testified that on December 20, 1995, he attended a status meeting with
Marshall, at which time he prepared a second written request for his records, which was faxed to Dr.
Johnson. (CX-14, Exh. 3). Dr. Johnson's office informed Ross that upon receipt of a release from
FPL his records would be forwarded. (Tr. 176-177). Ross advised Marshall that he was unable to
accomplish psychological counseling with Dr. Blackman because of his inability to obtain the
records he requested on November 15, 1995. (Tr. 434). Ross did not return to Dr. Blackman after
December 20, 1995. (Tr. 177). Marshall testified that as of December 20, 1995, Ross had not
sought a release of his records from Dr. Johnson's office. (Tr. 547). Marshall concluded that Ross
had not done anything to comply with the conditions set at the November 3, 1995 meeting regarding
psychological or psychiatric treatment and had "not done enough" to find another job,
thus, in short, he had not complied with FPL's expectations. (Tr. 550). Marshall testified that the
termination was not implemented 45 days after the notice because it was the holiday season and
there is "a lot of stress during that time." (Tr. 549).
On cross-examination, Ross denied that he received a list of job openings on
November 17, 1995. (Tr. 378; RX-45). He also denied receiving a list of available jobs on
November 29, 1995. (Tr. 379). Ross testified that he did not receive a job listing dated November
20, 1995, but received a job listing dated December 14, 1995. (Tr. 380). He did not recall receiving
a listing dated December 8, 1995. (Tr. 381). Ross testified that he requested from Marshall any type
of training that would make him more marketable. According to Ross, Marshall stated that training
was not possible at that time. (Tr. 381-382). Ross indicated that on November 8, 1995, he
forwarded a letter to Marshall regarding a specific listing in a local newspaper for a customer service
representative position. (Tr. 383; RX-26).
Ross further stated that the job listings received from FPL were untimely in
that the period for applying for such vacancies had expired before he received the listings. (Tr. 431).
Ross testified that during ANPO training, a trainee did not need unescorted access since, if a need
to enter the plant to do walk downs occurred, the trainee could be escorted to perform those
functions. (Tr. 431-432). Thus, he could have attended ANPO training while continuing to regain
unescorted access to the plant.
J. The December 29, 1995 Termination
On December 29, 1995, Ross was called into the plant to attend a meeting with
Franzone and Marshall. At the meeting, Franzone read a letter dated December 29, 1995, which
[Page 21]
terminated Ross' employment from FPL for failing to achieve employment in a non-access job or
regaining unescorted access. (Tr. 177, 392; RX-32).
Ross testified that his understanding from the November 3, 1995, meeting was
that, because his psychological problems were long term, there was no possibility that he would ever
be able to regain access within the 45 days extended to him by the 45-day letter. (Tr. 179). He
further understood that he would have to find jobs that would be outside the protected area in order
to retain his employment with FPL. (Tr. 179). He applied for a customer service position with the
company. He was specifically informed by Marshall that, if he was going to apply for any job
position, he had to go through Marshall. (Tr. 179).
He testified that he asked Marshall at some point in time what he had to do
to return to his ANPO job, proceed to the ANPO position for which he had been selected through
the bid process or to continue his nuclear tutor position which he had filled before the 45-day letter.
(Tr. 180). Ross testified that the ANPO job and the nuclear tutor job were outside of the protected
area.
Ross testified that the nuclear tutor job only consumed ten hours per week and
provided income of a couple hundred dollars per week. (Tr. 182). Although he had applied for the
customer service position, he acknowledged he was not accepted for that position although he
thought he was qualified since it required communications skills and some typing. (Tr. 182). He
further stated that the I&C Shop had some jobs that were outside the access area. (Tr. 182).
Ross testified that on December 29, 1995, Franzone and Marshall did not
elaborate on the reasons for terminating Complainant. (Tr. 183; CX-6).
Ross testified that he did not feel that he had any psychological problems, any
homicidal tendencies to hurt anyone, nor did he harbor any problems such as that. He believed the
intense harassment to which he was subjected, along with the discrimination and retaliation, created
a stress or a strain on him which may have affected his ability to perform his job. (Tr. 205-206).
Ross testified that it was very important to be very physically and mentally
fit to work in a nuclear power plant. He further agreed that an I&C specialist is a critical position
since the duties of that job could easily trip the reactor or bring the plant down. (Tr. 207).
On cross-examination, Ross testified that on December 29, 1995, he was not
offered an exit interview or a whole body count. (Tr. 396). Ross admitted that he did not
specifically request a whole body count at the time of his termination. (Tr. 400). He stated that he
believed his denial of a whole body count played a part in the harassment, discrimination and
[Page 22]
retaliation against him for having raised nuclear safety concerns. (Tr. 402). He, however, admitted
that it is not a requirement of the NRC that an employee be given a whole body count on the day he
departs employment. (Tr. 404). He further admitted that the questionable personnel practices of
denying an exit interview and whole body count were raised to the NRC and found to be non-meritorious. (Tr. 404-405; RX-35; RX-36).
Ross testified that the ANPO position for which he was selected was outside
the protected area and that some I&C jobs were also outside the protected area, but were digital
specialist positions for which he was not qualified. (Tr. 408-409). During outages, I&C digital
specialists are brought into the plant to perform their duties. (Tr. 409). Ross testified that the
nuclear tutor job which he performed was not a collective bargaining position but he was paid extra
wages as a tutor during lunch and after hours. (Tr. 409-410). He further stated that part of the
ANPO training required the trainees to enter the plant and "walk down the jobs" and do
certain hands-on training inside the protected area. (Tr. 410). ANPO training was the initiation of
a career path that would possibly lead to a RCO position, a NPO (Nuclear Plant Operator) or a SNPO
(Senior Nuclear Plant Operator), which are all licensed programs and which, from time to time,
require work within the protected area. (Tr. 411-412).
Franzone testified that Ross was discharged because he never regained his
access nor did he make any progress in finding another job within FPL. Franzone stated that at the
time of Complainant's discharge he was not aware that Ross had gone to the NRC nor was he aware
that Ross raised nuclear safety concerns or voiced concerns over falsification of calibration data
sheets. (Tr. 636, 670). Franzone testified that he was not retaliating against Ross by discharging
him for raising any past concerns. (Tr. 636). Franzone further stated that the whole point of ANPO
training was to license and permit employees to enter the plant unescorted and hold a watch station.
(Tr. 637). According to Franzone, ANPO jobs are also critical and require mental and physical
stability. (Tr. 642). Franzone acknowledged that if an employee was asked to falsify documents or
calibration readings, such requests for falsification would be a safety concern. (Tr. 665-666).
Marshall corroborated the testimony of Franzone that Ross did not mention
nuclear safety concerns, falsification of data sheets or retaliation against him for such activities
during the termination meeting or at any other time. (Tr. 550, 554, 580).
IV. DISCUSSION
Prefatory to a discussion of the issues presented for resolution, it must be
noted that I have thoughtfully considered and evaluated the rationality and consistency of the
testimony of all witnesses and the manner in which the testimony supports or detracts from the other
record evidence. In doing so, I have taken into account all relevant, probative and available
evidence and attempted to analyze and assess its cumulative impact on the record. See
Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority , Case No. 92-ERA-19 (Sec'y Oct. 23, 1995)(Slip Op.
p. 4).
[Page 23]
Credibility of witnesses is "that quality in a witness which renders his
evidence worthy of belief." Indiana Metal Products v. NLRB , 442 F.2d 46, 51 (7th
Cir. 1971). As the Court further observed:
Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
credible source, but must, in addition, be credible in itself, by which
is meant that it shall be so natural, reasonable and probable in view
of the transaction which it describes or to which it relates, as to make
it easy to believe ...Credible testimony is that which meets the test of
plausibility.
442 F.2d at 52.
It is well-settled that an administrative law judge is not bound to believe or
disbelieve the entirety of a witness' testimony, but may choose to believe only certain portions of the
testimony. Altemose Construction Company v. NLRB , 514 F.2d 8, 16 and n. 5 (3d Cir.
1975).
Moreover, based on the unique advantage of having heard the testimony
firsthand, I have observed the behavior, bearing, manner and appearance of witnesses from which
impressions were garnered of the demeanor of those testifying which also forms part of the record
evidence.
In short, to the extent credibility determinations must be weighed for the
resolution of issues, I have based my credibility findings on a review of the entire testimonial record
and exhibits with due regard for the logic of probability and the demeanor of witnesses.
Generally, of the two primary witnesses in this matter, Complainant was not
an impressive witness in terms of confidence, forthrightness and overall bearing on the witness
stand. His testimony can generally be characterized by inconsistencies, retractions and
contradictions. He appeared confused and equivocal during portions of his testimony, particularly
related to his suspension of access and the evaluation by Dr. Johnson. He presented testimony in
a muddled, unfocused manner and lacked direction, often straying from the question at hand to other
unrelated events. On the other hand, Steve Franzone's testimony was straight-forward, detailed and
presented in a sincere, consistent manner. Franzone conveyed a genuine concern for Complainant
and his perceptions of the work place.
The issues presented for resolution will be treated seriatim
hereinafter.
A. Timeliness of Complainant's Complaint
(1) The Filing Period
An employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against in violation of the ERA must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
[Page 24]
within 180 days of the alleged violation. The time period for administrative filings begins on the
date that the employee is given final and unequivocal notice of the Respondent's employment
decision. The United States Supreme Court has held that the proper focus is on the time of the
discriminatory act and not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.
Delaware State College v. Ricks , 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498 (1980); Chardon
v. Fernandez , 454 U.S. 6, 9, 102 S.Ct. 28, 29 (1981).
In the present case, on September 16, 1995, Respondent suspended
Complainant's unescorted access authorization to the Plant, which was necessary for Complainant
to perform his job. Respondent implemented such action based on Complainant's aberrant behavior
and conduct manifested in his request to be assigned to work with Joel Smith to learn how to draw
cartoons, his reactive response to the September 14, 1995 cartoon, his "uzi" comments
and implicit threats to co-workers and the employee concern of having to work with Ross who was
considered unsafe. I&C Maintenance Supervisor Franzone instructed Ross to contact Dr. Luis
Rodriguez to have him determine the appropriate course of action. Dr. Rodriguez recommended
Complainant see Dr. Dennis Johnson, a psychologist, for further evaluation. Dr. Johnson, in turn,
concluded that Complainant was not psychologically suitable for unescorted access authorization
and recommended he participate in psychiatric and psychological treatment. (Tr. 961-62).
On November 3, 1995, a meeting was held during which Complainant
received the "45-day" letter from Respondent which informed him that his unescorted
access to the facility had been suspended and that he had 45 days to find an alternative job within
the company that did not require unescorted access. (See RX-25). I specifically find that
at this meeting, Complainant was told by Franzone he would be terminated if he did not regain his
access to the nuclear plant or failed to find another position with FPL within the 45-day limit. I
further find that Complainant acknowledged and understood the terms and conditions of the
"45-day" letter as explicated by Franzone during the meeting. On December 29, 1995,
Complainant received a termination letter which informed him that in addition to finding an
alternative position within the company, he could have cleared his access requirement through the
Medical Review Officer. (See RX-32).
Respondent correctly argues that the time for filing a complaint begins when
the employee receives final and unequivocal notice of the challenged employment decision, rather
than the time that the effects of that decision are ultimately felt. English v. Whitfield , 858
F.2d 957, 961 (4th Cir. 1988). In the English case, the court opined that the letter received
by the employee, giving her ninety days to find an alternative job in the company or she would be
terminated, was final and unequivocal because there was no intimation in the letter that the
employment decision was subject to appeal, review or revocation. Id .
[Page 25]
Respondent contends that because the Complainant received a similar letter
as in the English case, Respondent's "45-day" letter to Complainant was final
and unequivocal notice of the employment decision. Thus, Respondent avers that the time period
for filing the instant complaint commenced on November 3, 1995.
Complainant contends, however, that his case is distinguishable from
English because the letter he received was not final and unequivocal notice of termination.
Complainant further argues that Respondent's "45-day" letter was actually part of a
continuing violation to terminate Complainant for reporting safety violations by Respondent to the
NRC. He further argues that because the December 29, 1995 termination letter, and not the
"45-day" letter, informed Complainant that he could clear his unescorted access through
the Medical Review Officer or find alternative employment within forty-five days, the time period
within which to file his complaint should commence on December 29, 1995.
The undersigned initially denied Respondent's motion for summary decision
on the timeliness issue because genuine issues of material fact existed, including the apparent
inconsistency between the 45-day letter, which omitted any reference to Ross regaining his
unescorted access to the plant, and the December 29, 1995, termination letter. (ALJX-9). At the
hearing, additional evidence relating to the finality, definiteness and equivocation of the notice to
terminate Complainant was presented. It is patently clear that at the November 3, 1995 meeting,
Complainant was informed by Franzone that he would be terminated within 45 days if he failed to
regain access to the nuclear plant or failed to find another position with FPL outside the protected
area. Based on Complainant's testimony, I find that as a result of the November 3, 1995 meeting,
he fully understood the foregoing conditions of the termination notice. Thus, I find that the option
to regain his unescorted access was not a new condition raised for the first time in the December 29,
1995 letter.
Considering the foregoing, particularly the acknowledgment and
understanding by Ross of the conditions of the termination notice discussed at the November 3, 1995
meeting, I conclude that the November 3, 1995 letter, is final, definitive and unequivocal. The letter
is decisive and conclusive, leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change. There is no
intimation in the notice that the employment decision was subject to appeal, review or revocation.
The notice is unequivocal in that it is not ambiguous, i.e., free of misleading possibilities.
Complainant was aware that if he did not regain his access to the nuclear plant or did not find
another position with FPL within the 45-day limit, he would be terminated.
The fact that assistance may have been extended to Complainant through job
listings or placement does not alter the triggering date of the filing period. See
Ballentine v. Tennessee Valley Authority , Case No. 91-ERA-23 (Sec'y Sept. 23,
1992)(Slip op. at 2). Therefore, I find and conclude that November 3, 1995 constitutes the date of
the alleged discrimination and the commencement of Complainant's filing period.
[Page 26]
(2) Alleged Continuing Violations
Complainant's assertion that Respondent engaged in continuous violations
through the date of his termination, and thus his complaint was timely filed, is without factual
foundation. Ross contends that, after reporting safety concerns to the NRC, he was subjected to acts
of retaliation which manifested itself in the form of name-calling, assignment to the menial tasks of
handing out equipment, repeatedly being refused training without reasons and denied a
"transfer" from such a hostile environment. A theory of retaliatory harassment is
cognizable under the ERA. English v. Whitfield , supra. , at 963-964.
The timeliness of a complaint may be preserved under the theory of a
continuing violation where there is an allegation of a course of related discriminatory conduct and
where the complaint is filed within the requisite time period after the last alleged discriminatory act.
See Eisner v. Electrical District No. 2 of Pinal County , Case No. 90-SDW-2
(Sec'y Dec. 8, 1992); Howard v. Tennessee Valley Authority , Case No. 91-ERA-36 (Sec'y
Jan. 13, 1993); Wagerle v. The Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, Depts of Physiology
and Pediatrics , Case No. 93-ERA-1 (Sec'y Mar. 17, 1995). Timeliness is measured from the
last occurrence of discrimination. Garn v. Benchmark Technologies , Case No. 88-ERA-21
(Sec'y Sept. 25, 1990). Moreover, a continuing violation may exist if related discriminatory acts
constitute a course of discriminatory conduct by Respondent which has gone unabated. Flor
v. United States Department of Energy , Case No. 93-TSC-1 (Sec'y Dec. 9, 1994).
In Flor , the Secretary adopted the analysis of "sufficiently
related" by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a Title VII case, Berry v.
Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. , 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 479 U.S.
868 (1986). The Berry court listed three determinative factors in its analysis: (1) whether
the alleged acts involve the same subject matter; (2) whether the alleged acts are recurring or more
in the nature of isolated decisions; and (3) the degree of permanence of such action. Id. at
981. The fact that each of the various acts relied upon by Complainant may have affected his
working conditions or environment does not make them "related" for purposes of the
continuing violation theory. Gillilan v. Tennessee Valley Authority , Case Nos. 92-ERA-46
and 92-ERA-50 (Sec'y Apr. 20, 1995); See also Holtzclaw v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky Natural Resource and Environmental Protection Cabinet , Case
No. 95-CAA-7 (ARB Feb. 13, 1997).
The record establishes that three of the four factors upon which Ross relies
(menial taskings, denial of training and denial of a transfer) were isolated events and factually can
not be construed to be recurring. None of the alleged acts involve the same subject matter and each
reached a degree of permanence because they all occurred before November 3, 1995. There is no
record evidence that any of the four retaliatory acts/factors occurred within the 180 day filing period
after November 3, 1995, or during the 180 days preceding the actual filing on June 21, 1996. In
view of the above, I find and conclude that Complainant failed to establish a continuing violation
theory which would have delayed the commencement of the statutory filing period.
[Page 27]
(3) Equitable Tolling
Complainant does not argue that if the 180-day filing period is held
to commence on November 3, 1995, the limitation period must be tolled for equitable considerations.
Courts have held that time limitation provisions in like statutes are not
jurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to file a complaint within the prescribed period is an absolute
bar to administrative action, but rather analogous to statutes of limitation and thus may be tolled by
equitable consideration. School District of the City of Allentown v. Marshall , 657 F.2d
16 (3d Cir. 1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. , 64 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981);
Donovan v. Hakner, Foreman & Harness, Inc. , 736 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984). The Court
in School District of the City of Allentown warns, however, that the restrictions on
equitable tolling must be scrupulously observed ; the tolling exception is not an open
invitation to the court to disregard limitation periods simply because they bar what may be an
otherwise meritorious cause. Accord , Rose v. Dole , 945 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir.
1991).
In School District of the City of Allentown , the court, relying on
Smith v. American President Lines, LTD. , 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978) which interpreted
Supreme Court precedent, observed that tolling might be appropriate only where a respondent
actively misled the complainant respecting the cause of action; or where the complainant has in some
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights; or a complainant has raised the precise
statutory claim in issue but has mistakenly done so in the wrong forum. Id . at 19-20.
Complainant argues that Respondent deprived him of documentary
information that, if timely received, would have allowed him to make a "good faith
effort" to regain his unescorted access through outside professional assistance and/or obtain
a job not contingent upon access. Contrary to his assertions, I find that Ross failed to request
medical documentation from Drs. Johnson and Schapiro regarding testing and evaluation until
December 20, 1995. There is no record evidence of any earlier requests made of Drs. Johnson or
Schapiro by Complainant.3
Moreover, the credible record evidence establishes that Ross was supplied
with job listings during November and December, 1995, contrary to his general denials.
(See RX-45). Ross applied for only one non-nuclear position, but was deemed unqualified
and not extended an interview. The record also amply supports a conclusion, and I so find, that the
ANPO position, for which Ross was selected, required training and job duties within the unescorted
area of the plant. I do not regard Ross' nuclear tutor job, sponsored by the University of Maryland,
to be a viable alternative to the November 3, 1995 notice because it is performed on a part-time
basis and is not a regular position at FPL. Accordingly, I find Ross did not establish that Respondent
deprived him of timely, necessary information which would have allowed him to fulfill either option
available to him to avoid termination.
[Page 28]
In the present matter, Complainant neither alleges, nor does the record support
a conclusion, that Respondent attempted to conceal information or mislead him, that he was
prevented from asserting his rights or that he mistakenly raised the precise statutory claim in the
wrong forum. Thus, having considered the foregoing factors, the undersigned finds that
Complainant failed to establish a basis upon which to raise the issue of equitable tolling.
Accordingly, equitable tolling of the statute is not justified in this particular case.
Therefore, a timely complaint under the ERA should have been filed by May
3, 1996. Since the complaint was not filed with DOL until June 21, 1996, it was clearly untimely.
See Kang v. Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center , Case No. 92-ERA-31 (Sec'y Feb. 14, 1994); Cox v. Radiology Consulting Associates, Inc. , Case No. 86-ERA-17 (Sec'y Nov. 6, 1986; ALJ Aug. 22, 1986); Prybys v. Seminole Tribe of Florida ,
Case No. 95-CAA-15 (ARB Nov. 27, 1996). I further find that there is no genuine issue of material
fact concerning Complainant's failure to timely file his complaint within the 180-day statutory
period. Accordingly, his complaint under the ERA is time-barred and it is recommended that such
complaint be dismissed.
B. Respondent's Alleged Discriminatory Actions
Notwithstanding the foregoing recommendation of dismissal,
alternatively, assuming arguendo that Complainant timely filed his complaint with DOL,
I find and conclude that Respondent took adverse action against Complainant for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons.
The Secretary of Labor has repeatedly articulated the legal framework within
which parties litigate in retaliation cases. Under the burdens of persuasion and production in
whistleblower proceedings, the complainant first must present a prima facie case.
In order to establish a prima facie case, a complainant must show that: (1) the
complainant engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that conduct; and (3) the
employer took some adverse action against the employee. Bechtel Construction Company v.
Secretary of Labor , 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 1995). The complainant also must present
evidence sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the
adverse action. Id . See also McCuistion v. TVA , Case No.
89-ERA-6 (Sec'y Nov. 13, 1991)(Slip op. at 5-6); MacKowiak v. University Nuclear Systems,
Inc. , 735 F.2d 1159, 1162 (6th Cir. 1983).
The respondent may rebut the complainant's prima facie
showing by producing evidence that the adverse action was motivated by legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. Complainant may counter respondent's evidence by proving that the
legitimate reason proffered by the respondent is a pretext. Yule v. Burns International Security
Service , Case No. 93-ERA-12 (Sec'y May 24, 1994)(Slip op. at 7-8). In any event, the
complainant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was retaliated
[Page 29]
against in violation of the law. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct.
2742 (1993); Dean Darty v. Zack Company of Chicago , Case No. 82-ERA-2 (Sec'y Apr.
25, 1983) (Slip op. at 5-9) (citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981)).
Since this case was fully tried on the merits, it is not necessary for the
undersigned to determine whether Ross presented a prima facie case.
See Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp. , Case No. 91-ERA-46 (Sec'y Feb. 15,
1995)(Slip op. at 11, n.9), aff'd sub nom Bechtel Corp. v. U.S.
Dep't of Labor , 78 F.3d 352 (8th Cir. 1996). Once FPL produced evidence that Ross was
subjected to adverse action for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, it no longer serves any
analytical purpose to answer the question whether Ross presented a prima facie
case. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether Ross prevailed by a preponderance of the evidence on
the ultimate question of liability. See Reynolds v. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. ,
Case No. 94-ERA-47 (ARB Mar. 31, 1997)(Slip op. at 2); Boschuk v. J&L Testing, Inc. ,
Case No. 96-ERA-16 (ARB Sept. 23, 1997)(Slip op. at 3, n. 1); Eiff v. Entergy Operations,
Inc. , Case No. 96-ERA-42 (ARB Oct. 3, 1997). If Ross did not prevail by a preponderance of
the evidence, it matters not at all whether he presented a prima facie case.
The undersigned finds that as a matter of fact and law, FPL has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Zinn v. University of Missouri , Case
No. 93-ERA-34 (Sec'y, Jan. 18, 1996)(Slip op. at 4). Achieving unescorted access to the protected
area of a nuclear facility is a process that is highly regulated by the NRC. See 10 C.F.R.
§§ 26.10 and 73.56. It is incontrovertible that safety and security of nuclear facilities
is paramount in light of the potential for death and destruction if not properly supervised and
monitored.
The record clearly demonstrates, as detailed hereinabove, the unusual, erratic
and bizarre behavior exhibited by Complainant throughout his employment with FPL. Not only did
he assault a co-worker in FPL's parking lot, but he also made comments to co-workers and
supervisors about killing people and bringing an Uzi to work. These comments were reasonably
interpreted as threatening the safety and well-being of persons employed at FPL. It is undisputed
that Complainant was employed in a security-sensitive position. Testimonial evidence shows that
I&C specialists play a crucial role in the operation of the plant; a mistake could potentially shut
down the reactor. As Respondent avers in brief "in light of the nature of FPL's business,
nuclear energy production, Ross' aberrant behavior left unchecked could well have posed a threat
to the public at large." (FPL's Proposed Recommended Decision and Order at 54).
Accordingly, I find and conclude that FPL properly suspended Ross'
unescorted access privileges. In Mandreger v. The Detroit Edison Co. , Case No. 88-ERA-17 (Sec'y Mar. 30, 1994), the Secretary recognized that "the inherent danger in a nuclear power
plant justifies [Respondent's] concern with the emotional stability of the employees who work
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there" and noted that the NRC requires licensed operators of nuclear facilities to ascertain the
emotional stability of its employees. (Slip op. at 17). Moreover, in Mandreger , there was
ample reason not to permit Complainant to return to work at Respondent's nuclear plant after
psychotic episodes. See also Jones v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority , 1996
WL 556995 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (employee who threatened to get an Uzi was properly suspended from
work in order to undergo psychiatric examination); Floyd v. Arizona Public Svc. Co. , Case
No. 90-ERA-39 (Sec'y Sept. 23, 1994)(complainant's revelation of a pact to kill executives if any
harm befell complainant or another co-worker provided ample reason for temporarily suspending
complainant's authorization to enter a secured area, evaluating complainant's fitness for duty, issuing
complainant a written reprimand, and suspending complainant without pay); Couty v. Arkansas
Power & Light , Case No. 87-ERA-10 (Sec'y Feb. 13, 1992)(finding respondent articulated
legitimate business reasons in support of its action in discharging Complainant including
complainant's abusive, disruptive, profane, and threatening behavior toward supervisors on at least
three occasions).
The evidence also shows that Ross underwent evaluations for his fitness for
duty by a stipulated expert in the field of threat assessment in the workplace. Dr. Johnson examined
Complainant and concluded that Complainant was not psychologically suitable for unescorted access
authorization at a nuclear power plant.
Dr. Johnson also referred Complainant to a psychiatrist for a second opinion.
Dr. Schapiro opined that Complainant suffered from a major mental illness and manifested clear
paranoid decompensation as well as a thought process defect. It is reasonable to conclude that such
findings are inconsistent with someone psychologically suitable for unescorted access to a nuclear
power plant. In Crosier v. Portland General Electric Co. , Case No. 91-ERA-2 (Sec'y Jan.
5, 1994), it was determined that based on the opinion of a clinical psychologist, who recommended
denial of continued access because of complainant's aberrant behavior, complainant failed to
establish a pretext for respondent's actions.
It is also axiomatic that when Complainant was found to be unsuitable for
unescorted access, he could no longer enter the protected area to perform his job. However,
Respondent did not discharged Complainant. Instead, FPL gave Complainant 45 days to find
alternative employment with the company or regain his access authorization. The record indicates
that Complainant satisfied neither of these conditions. Accordingly, I find that Complainant was
appropriately discharged and that FPL has established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action.
The burden shifts to Complainant to demonstrate that FPL's proffered
motivation was pretextual and that its actions were actually based on discriminatory motive.
Leveille v. New York Air National Guard , Case No. 94-TSC-3 and 94-TSC-4 (Sec'y Dec.
11, 1995)(Slip op. at 7-8); Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp. , supra. at 6;
See Bechtel Construction Company , supra. at 934. Complainant may
[Page 31]
demonstrate that the reasons given were a pretext for discriminatory treatment by showing that
discrimination was more likely the motivating factor or by showing that the proffered explanation
is not worthy of credence. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(c); Zinn , supra at 5;
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. , 27 F.3d 1133, 1139 (6th Cir. 1994). Complainant retains the
ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the adverse action was in
retaliation for the protected activity in which he was allegedly engaged in violation of the ERA.
Id . (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
See also Creekmore v. ABB Power Systems Energy Service ,
supra . Thus, I find that Complainant has not shown that the reasons articulated for his
termination were pretextual.
Complainant asserts that FPL did not cooperate with him in his alleged attempt
to secure other employment within the company or his alleged attempt to seek treatment to regain
his access to the power plant within the forty-five day limit. In this regard, Complainant testified
that he did not receive any IPS job listings, that he had applied for a position in FPL's Information
Management Business Unit, and that he had already been offered an ANPO position prior to his
suspension. The undersigned concludes that FPL adequately rebutted this evidence with the
credible evidence that Complainant was provided with IPS job listings, but never applied for any of
those jobs. Additionally, FPL points out that Complainant was not qualified for the only position
in which he ever expressed any interest. Lastly, the ANPO position offered to Complainant before
his suspension of access required unescorted access to the nuclear facility, a privilege which
Complainant no longer had.
Furthermore, Complainant produced no persuasive evidence that his alleged
efforts to seek treatment from his own psychiatrist during the 45-day period were in any way
hindered by FPL. To the contrary, the record establishes that FPL's agents repeatedly advised
Complainant on what needed to be done in order for him to regain his unescorted access, and
periodically checked on Complainant's status to determine if he had sought treatment or otherwise
made any effort to regain his unescorted access. I find that Complainant's claim that he was hindered
by FPL on this issue simply not persuasive.
Moreover, the passage of one and one-half years from the time of
Complainant's initial alleged protected activity convinces the undersigned that the timing of the
alleged retaliation is too remote from Complainant's protected activity to establish any causal
connection between such activity and the adverse action.4 See Bonanno v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. , Case Nos.
95-ERA-54 and 96-ERA-7 (ARB Dec. 12, 1996).
Assuming arguendo , that Complainant did meet his burden of proof
showing a causal connection between his protected activity and the name-calling or cartoon, which
the record totally refutes, I find that the evidence demonstrates that FPL took immediate action to
remedy the situation as soon as Complainant first expressed his unhappiness with the name-calling
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and cartoon. In fact, Franzone testified that during one of his meetings with Complainant, Ross
expressed displeasure at being called "stupid" and the allegedly offensive cartoon.
Immediately following this meeting, Franzone met with and instructed other employees at FPL that
anyone engaging in such conduct or behavior would be subject to discipline. Other witnesses who
were present at these meetings corroborated Franzone's testimony. Thus, I find that the evidence
clearly shows that FPL had no intent to harass Complainant based upon alleged nuclear safety
concerns or complaints.
Therefore, the undersigned finds and concludes that Complainant has failed
to demonstrate that discriminatory motives played any part in FPL's decision to terminate his
employment. The record evidence establishes that the sole reasons for FPL terminating Complainant
were (1) his failure to regain access to the nuclear power plant based on his erratic behavior and (2)
his failure to obtain other employment within the company during the 45 day time period. Other
than Complainant's own testimony, most of which I found incredible and unpersuasive, there was
no evidence that he ever raised any nuclear safety concerns while employed by FPL. If he did so
complain, Complainant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that FPL was aware
of Complainant's alleged protected activity or activities which form the basis of his claim for
retaliatory discharge.5
Thus, the undersigned finds that Complainant has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that FPL exhibited any discriminatory motive in reaching its decision
to terminate Complainant. Accordingly, no further analysis is warranted because Complainant was
subject to adverse action for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
V. RECOMMENDED ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
upon the entire record, I find and conclude that Complainant did not timely file his complaint with
DOL pursuant to the 180 day statutory time period under the ERA. I also find and conclude that
there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning Complainant's failure to timely file. I further
find and conclude that Respondent articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse
action against Complainant as specifically set forth above. Complainant failed to carry his burden
to demonstrate that such reasons were pretextual or that a preponderance of the evidence establishes
Respondent's adverse action was motivated for discriminatory reasons. Therefore, it is
recommended that Complainant's complaint be DISMISSED.
ORDERED this 3rd day of December, 1997, at Metairie, Louisiana.
LEE J. ROMERO, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE
This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in this
matter will be forwarded for review by the Secretary of Labor to the Administrative Review Board,
U. S. Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.
W., Washington, D. C. 20210. The Administrative Review Board has the responsibility to advise
and assist the Secretary in the preparation and issuance of final decisions in employee protection
cases adjudicated under the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Parts 24 and 1978. See 61 Fed. Reg.
19978 and 19982 (1996).
[ENDNOTES]
1 References to the record are as follows:
Transcript: Tr.___; Complainant's Exhibits: CX-___; Respondent's Exhibits: RX-___; and
Administrative Law Judge Exhibits: ALJX-___.
2 Moreover, the investigative report
is a relevant public document of a federal agency concerning the same complaint presented by the
instant case. See Mosbaugh v. Georgia Power Co. , Case Nos. 91-ERA-1 and 91-ERA-11 (Sec'y Nov. 20, 1995); Creekmore v. ABB Power Systems Energy Services, Inc. ,
Case No. 93-ERA-24 (Dep. Sec'y Feb. 14, 1996)(Slip opinion at 4).
3 Although Ross requested Marshall
to "have Dr. Luis Rodriguez, Dr. Dennis Johnson and Dr. Salo Schapiro release and send any
and all files, records, reports, notes, tests, test results and any other information to Dr.
Blackman," thus attempting to place the burden of production on FPL to seek medical release,
as a practical matter, such information was not producible at FPL's request in view of the medical
privilege existing between medical professionals and patient. (RX-28).
4 This conclusion is buttressed by
the record evidence which is devoid of any animus on the part of Respondent. Incongruously,
Respondent even selected Complainant for an nuclear operator position with a defined and
progressive career path.
5 Complainant's claim that
Respondent knew or should have known of his activity is premised on the small number of Cal Lab
employees. Thus, Complainant urges an analogy to the "small plant doctrine"
recognized in labor relations matters that knowledge can be inferred from shop-talk or the closeness
of a small group. However, the "small plant doctrine" requires a minimal showing that
it is commonplace for the small group of employees to gain knowledge of similar events or rumors.
There is no such evidence present in this record.