Date: November 4, 1996

Case No.: 96-ERA-27

In the Matter of

SYED M. A. HASAN,
    Complainant,

    v.

SARGENT & LUNDY,
    Respondent.

APPEARANCES:

SYED M.A. HASAN, Pro Se
    For the Complainant

HARRY SANGERMAN, P.C., ESQ.
    For the Respondent.

BEFORE: RICHARD D. MILLS
    Administrative Law Judge

    This case arises under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §5851 (hereinafter the "Act" or "ERA"), and the implementing Regulations found in 29 C.F.R. Part 24, whereby employees of licensees or applicants for a license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and their contractors and subcontractors may file complaints and receive certain redress upon a showing of being subjected to discriminatory action for engaging in a protected activity. This complaint was filed by Syed M.A. Hasan (hereinafter "Complainant") against Sargent & Lundy (hereinafter "Respondent"). The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a hearing and a Recommended Decision and Order. Pursuant thereto a formal hearing was held on August 6, 1996 in Cullman, Alabama. Both parties were afforded a full opportunity to adduce testimony, offer evidence and submit post-hearing briefs. Post hearing briefs were received from Complainant and Respondent.

    On February 20, 1996, Complainant filed a complaint with the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration of the Department of Labor ("Wage and Hour Division"), alleging that Respondent engaged in discriminatory employment practices against him in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, Section 211. Complainant alleged that in 1985 he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity while working for Nuclear Power Services, which resulted in his name being "blacklisted" in the nuclear industry. Complainant alleged that the failure of Respondent to hire him was a direct result of his whistleblowing activities of 1985 and his subsequent blacklisting.

    On May 31, 1996, District Director Jules G. Van Rengen dismissed the complaint. Complainant appealed and requested a hearing. On August 6, 1996, a hearing was held in Cullman, Alabama.

    1. Complainant has worked in the United States for over 23 years as a civil/structural engineer in the nuclear industry.

    2. Respondent is an engineering consulting firm providing services primarily to the power industry, including both nuclear and fossil fuel plants.

    3. Complainant has two degrees, the first is a B.S. in civil engineering from Karachi University in 1965 and the second is a bachelor's degree in physics and mathematics from Karachi University in 1960. (Tr. p. 70).

    4. Complainant's duties as a structural engineer included reviewing pipe support drawings, pointing out errors and notifying his superiors when a problem with pipe support is found. (Tr. p. 137).

    5. Complainant was employed by Nuclear Power Services and was contracted to work at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Site from January of 1982 to August of 1985. Complainant was also working as a team leader in the pipe support group of Nuclear Power Services, which was under the management of Texas Utilities Electric. (Tr. pp. 70-71).

    6. Between January of 1982 and August of 1985, Complainant grew concerned over a number of safety issues regarding the Comanche Peak Nuclear Plant. (Tr. p. 74).

    7. Complainant voiced these concerns to an employee of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and then to his bosses at Comanche Peak, to the management of Texas Utilities, and to the management of Nuclear Power Services, Complainant's employer. (Tr. p. 76).

    8. Complainant was laid-off by Comanche Peak on August 16, 1985. (Tr. p. 79).

    9. After being laid-off, Complainant was contacted by phone by Mr. Andy Stone, who was the head of Nuclear Power Services group in Chicago, Illinois, working as a subcontractor for Respondent. The phone call pertained to future employment with Nuclear Power Services at a different plant.

    10. On the evening of August 16, 1985, Mr. Westbrook, one of the officials of Texas Utilities, and Mr. John Finneran, an official at Texas Utilities responsible for pipe stress and pipe support work at Comanche Peak, briefly discussed with Complainant his safety concerns. (Tr. p. 81).

    11. On August 19, 1985, Complainant, Mr. Westbrook, and Mr. Finneran discussed at greater length Complainant's safety concerns. (Tr. p. 82).

    12. Complainant believed that Mr. Finneran was going to inform all the contractors at Comanche Peak of Complainant's safety concerns. (Tr. p. 131).

    13. Complainant does not know if Mr. Finneran ever discussed Complainant's safety concerns with an employee of Respondent. (Tr. p. 139).

    14. After returning home, Complainant contacted Mr. Andy Stone's assistant and arranged to come to the Chicago office during the first week of September. (Tr. p. 85).

    15. Mr. Andy Stone informed Complainant that there was no employment for him in Chicago, gave him an airplane ticket to Secaucus, New Jersey, and instructed him to report to the Nuclear Power Services office there. (Tr. p. 86).

    16. Complainant reported to Mr. Bruce Goldman, to whom he related his safety concerns of Comanche Peak. (Tr. p. 86).

    17. On October 18, 1985, Complainant was laid off from Nuclear Power Services. Complainants unemployment

continued until October 12, 1986, despite a diligent search for employment all over and outside the country. (Tr. p. 87).

    18. During the mid-1980's the nuclear power industry declined. (Tr. p. 133).

    19. Respondent has had as many as 5,500 people employed during 1980 but since 1982, has reduced their staff down to about 1,200 full-time people and 200-300 temporary and contract-type people. (Tr. p. 161). Of those 1,200 full-time people, about 800 are engineers. (Tr. p. 161).

    20. Respondent reduced its staff in reaction to the stoppage of work on various nuclear plants, the completion of several nuclear plants, and the cancellation or delay of future plants across the country. (Tr. p. 163).

    21. Because of the decline in the use of nuclear power and the cessation of new construction as well as modifications of plants being handled by I&C (instrument and control) and electrical engineers, the need for civil/structural engineers declined radically. (Tr. p. 163).

    22. On October 13, 1985, Complainant was hired by Bechtel Corporation and remained in their employment until he was laid off on February 2, 1994. (Tr. p. 87).

    23. During 1985, Complainant filed age and religious discrimination charges against Texas Utilities and Stone & Webster with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Those charges centered around his layoff and a failure to hire him. Those charges were dismissed. (Tr. pp. 126-127).

    24. During 1985, Complainant filed an age and religious discrimination case with the EEOC against EBASCO Corporation for failure to hire him. (Tr. p. 127).

    25. Around the same time, Complainant filed age and religious discrimination cases with the EEOC against Houston Lighting & Power and Westinghouse, for failure to hire him. (Tr. p. 127).

    26. In 1989, Complainant filed an Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) Claim against System Energy Resources which was dismissed. (Tr. p. 128)

    27. Complainant, during periods of unemployment between October of 1985 to December of 1995, sent

numerous resumes to Respondent, as well as other employers, in the hopes of obtaining employment. (Tr. pp. 87-88).

    28. In 1994, Complainant filed ERA charges against Bechtel. Complainant filed three separate charges, the first of which was filed after he was laid off. (Tr. p. 146).

    29. After being re-hired by Bechtel, Complainant filed another charge against them while being employed by them, and then finally filed a third charge against Bechtel when he was laid off again. (Tr. p. 147).

30. Eventually, Bechtel settled the case with Complainant. (Tr. p. 147).

    31. On December 17, 1995, Respondents advertised job openings in the "Huntsville Times" of the state of Alabama. (CX-2, p. 4).

    32. This advertisement sought engineers, including civil/structural engineers, to fill various full-time and temporary openings. (CX-2, p. 4). There was potential work in the Alabama area and some permanent positions that needed to be filled in Chicago. (Tr. p. 168). The permanent positions were for I&C (instrument and control) and electrical engineers. (Tr. pp. 168-169).

    33. Respondent received around 300 resumes in response to the advertisement. (Tr. p. 169).

    34. Complainant responded to this advertisement by sending in a resume with a cover letter on December 18, 1996, and followed up with a phone call on January 31, 1996. (CX-1; p. 1). The cover letter and resume was marked by Respondent as received on December 28, 1996. (CX-1; p. 1).

    35. On January 31, 1996, Complainant spoke with an employee of Respondent who informed him that Respondent had hired people and that if Complainant had not been contacted, it meant that he had not been considered for a position. (Tr. p. 91).

    36. Around December of 1995, Complainant sent several resumes to Intergraph Corporation, in Huntsville, Alabama. (Tr. p. 91).

    37. On December 20, 1995, five employees of Intergraph interviewed Complainant but ultimately did not offer Complainant a job. (Tr. pp. 91-92).

    38. On February 9, 1996, Complainant filed an official complaint against Respondents with the Washington Office of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. This letter was received on February 13, 1996. (RX-6, p. 2) A copy was sent by Complainant to the Wage and Hour Division Office in Birmingham, Alabama, but no copy was sent to Respondent. (Tr. p. 92; CX-2, p. 1).

    39. Complainant filed a separate complaint against Intergraph Corporation because he was convinced that jobs were available with that corporation and that he had not been selected because Intergraph had knowledge of his safety concerns about the Comanche Peak project in 1985. (Tr. p. 92).

    40. The complaint against Respondent was forwarded to the Chicago Office of the Wage and Hour Division and was received on February 20, 1996. (Tr. p. 93; RX-6, p. 2).

    41. A letter from the Chicago Office of the Wage and Hour Division, dated Wednesday, February 21, 1996, was sent to Eugene Abraham, President of Sargent & Lundy, informing him of Complainant's complaint.

    42. The letter, was marked as received by Respondent on Tuesday, February 27, 1996. (RX-6, p. 1).

    43. Mr. Thomas Rowe, an investigator at the Chicago Office of the Wage and Hour Division called Complainant on February 26, 1996 advising Complainant that he had been assigned the case. (Tr. p. 93).

    44. Previously, on the morning of February 26, 1996, Respondent contacted Complainant to inquire if he would be available for a job. (Tr. p. 93).

    45. On February 27, 1996, Respondents sent a proposal/bid to Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light, which contained the names and resumes of six engineers, including Complainant. (RX-4, p. 1). The request for the bid had been received on February 22, 1996, by Respondents and required a proposal to be returned by February 28, 1996. (RX-13, Section D, p. 6).

    46. Mr. James E. Kelnosky, technical staff manager in charge of the Contract Resources Group division, submitted Complainant's resume in the bid to Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light. (Tr. p. 157).

    47. The Contract Resources Group division provided engineers for short-term assignments at any particular site. The group had been in existence for around one year and two months at the time of the hearing. (Tr. p. 157). Mr. Kelnosky established a base of diverse personnel, whether retired or laid

off, that could be brought back for temporary positions. (Tr. p. 159).

    48. Mr. Kelnosky was not involved in the hiring of full-time employees of Respondent. (Tr. p. 184).

    49. Mr. Kelnosky keeps a log of the resumes he receives and if he receives more than one from one individual, he keeps the most recent one and throws away the earlier. Mr. Kelnosky does not keep a record of when he receives a resume or how many he has received from one individual. (Tr. pp. 199-200).

    50. Mr. Kelnosky, at time of the hearing, had over 3,000 resumes on file. (Tr. p. 200).

    51. Mr. Kelnosky would take the resumes he receives and put them into a database where they would be categorized according to the persons particular field. When a project comes up, the resumes that fit the project in question are given to the project manager to be evaluated. Once done, the project manager tells Mr. Kelnosky which candidates he has selected. Mr. Kelnosky then phones the candidate and makes an offer to them. However, the employment ultimately turns on whether or not the bid is accepted. (Tr. pp. 165-167).

    52. The assistant project manager in charge of structural affairs that selected Complainant as a candidate was Mr. Steve Raupp. (Tr. pp. 171-172).

    53. Mr. Kelnosky testified that on February 24, when he submitted the candidate list including the Complainant's name, he had no knowledge that Complainant had filed a complaint against Respondent. (Tr. p. 175).

    54. Previous to including Complainant's resume in the candidate list, Mr. Kelnosky testified that he had never heard of Complainant. (Tr. p. 175). Mr. Kelnosky also testified that he was unaware that Complainant had ever engaged in any sort of protected activity. (Tr. pp. 175-176).

    55. After Mr. Kelnosky submitted the candidate list and the bid was submitted, Mr. Kelnosky and Respondent had no control over which engineers would be selected to work on the project. (Tr. p. 176).

    56. Mr. Kelnosky testified that he has very few requests from companies for structural engineers such as Complainant. (Tr. p. 207).

    57. The bid/proposal was eventually turned down by Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light. (Tr. p. 143).

    58. Complainant has no knowledge of the reasons for the rejection of Repondent's bid by Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light. (Tr. p. 143).

   Under the ERA's employee protection provision under which this case is brought:

(1) No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)--

(A) notified his employer of an alleged violation of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);

(D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(E) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or;

(F) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

42 U.S.C. 5851(a) (1988).

    To make a prima facie case of discrimination, the complainant in a whistleblower case must show that he engaged in protected activity, that the employer was aware of that protected activity, and that the employer took some adverse action against him. Complainant must also raise the inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. Dartey v. Zack Co. of Chicago, Case No. 82-ERA-2, Sec. Ord., Apr. 25, 1983, slip op. at 8.

    Respondents first argue that Complainant has not engaged in any type of protected activity, thus failing to meet

the first requirement of his prima facie case. Specifically, Respondents point to the 1987 Recommended Decision and Order of Judge Alfred Lindeman who found that Complainant had not engaged in any protected activities while working for Comanche Peak. (RX-7, p. 5). The Secretary, while agreeing with Judge Lindeman on the merits of the case and ultimately dismissing Complainant's complaint, refused to address the issue of whether Complainant engaged in protected activity. (RX-10, p. 3, footnote 3)

    Respondents argue that Complainant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether he engaged in protected activity since Judge Lindeman found that Complainant did not engage in protected activity under the Act. Collateral estoppel applies when: 1) the issue in question is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; 2) the issue has actually been litigated in the prior litigation; and 3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation has been a critical and necessary part of the judgement in that earlier action.

    First, I find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply since the opinion by Judge Lindeman was a Recommended Decision and Order and the Secretary specifically declined to rule on the protected activity issue in the Final Decision and Order. Thus, while the issue may have been litigated, no satisfactory conclusion was reached to whether Complainant had indeed engaged in protected activity. Accordingly, the issue was never truly determined.

    In his Recommended Decision and Order, Judge Lindeman noted that in the Fifth Circuit, protected activities only arise if the employee has voiced complaints to the NRC. Judge Lindeman found that Complainant had only communicated his complaints to the NRC until long after the employer in that case refused to hire him. (RX-7, p. 5). Thus, in that case, Complainants communications to the NRC did not suffice to establish protected activity within the meaning of the Act. However, while Complainant's past communications to the NRC would not suffice to establish protected Activity since they were after the fact, in the present case his past communications to the NRC are sufficient to constitute protected activity under the Act.

    Finally, Complainant engaged in protected activity when he filed this ERA complaint and complaints with ERA in the past. Filing a complaint of employer discrimination under a statutory employee protection provision is protected. Bassett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co., Case No. 86-ERA-2, Sec. Ord., Sept. 28, 1993, slip op. at 7.

    We now turn to whether Respondent was aware of Complainants protected activity. To establish the element of knowledge of Complainant's protected activities, the evidence must show that Respondent's managers responsible for taking the adverse actions had knowledge of the protected activities. Merriweather v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Case No. 91-ERA-55, Sec. Ord., Feb. 4, 1994, slip op. at 2; In doing so, a complainant can prove knowledge of protected activity by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Bartlik v. Tennesee Valley Authority, Case No. 91-ERA-15, Sec. Ord., Apr. 7, 1993, slip op. at 4.

    Complainant seeks to establish Respondent's knowledge of his protected activities by alleging that he was "blacklisted" within the nuclear power industry. In Howard v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 90-ERA-24, Sec. Ord., July 3, 1991, aff'd sub nom., Howard v. United States Department of Labor, 959 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1992), the Secretary cited Black's Law Dictionary 154 (5th ed. 1979) for the following definition of "blacklist";

    Blacklist. A list of persons marked out for special avoidance, antagonism, or enmity on the part of those who prepare the list or those among whom it is intended to circulate; as where a trades-union "blacklists" workmen who refuse to conform to its rules, or where a list of insolvent or untrustworthy persons is published by a commercial agency or mercantile association.

    In the present case, Complainant has made no specific allegations of a "blacklist," in the sense of a "list of persons marked out for special avoidance, antagonism..." Nowhere does Complainant allege that there exists a document or any other source of communication that has been distributed throughout the nuclear industry. Complainant instead contends that a statement made in 1985 by Mr. John Finneran about informing all of the other contractors at Comanche Peak, which included Respondent, about Complainant's safety concerns, led to his widespread blacklisting throughout the nuclear industry that persists to this day. (Tr. p. 131). In testimony it was clear that Complainant has no knowledge of whether Mr. John Finneran ever told any of the contractors at Comanche Peak of Complainant's safety concerns or whether Respondent had ever received this information. (Tr. p. 131). Complainant has not brought forth even one witness or one piece of evidence that even hints at the idea that he has been blacklisted. Complainant instead relies on the remark made by Mr. Finneran and the fact that he has had great difficulty securing employment in the nuclear structure/pipe support field, a field which has declined drastically since the early 1980's. Finally, Complainant maintains that he has been blacklisted throughout the nuclear industry even though he had been hired for many years by the Bechtel Corporation, a corporation

heavily involved in the nuclear industry. It would seem that if a blacklist had been distributed, the Bechtel Corporation would have had knowledge of it. Instead, this corporation hired Complainant for almost ten years. Accordingly, I find that Complainant has failed to establish that Respondents had knowledge of his past protected activities and discriminated against him as a result of a blacklist.

    It is possible that Respondent had knowledge of Complainants prior protected activities through means other than an industry-wide blacklist. It is also possible that Respondent learned of the complaint against them filed by Complainant and took retaliatory action against him. In order to establish the knowledge element of the prima facie case, Complainant must present evidence that the employees of Respondent who made, or participated in, any adverse actions against him had the requisite knowledge of his prior protected activities (which includes the making of the complaint). Bartlik v. Tennessee Valley Auth., slip op. at 4; Crosby v. Hughes Aircraft Co., Case No. 85-TSC-2, Sec. Ord., Aug. 17, 1993, slip op. at 23-24. Specifically, Complainant must show that Mr.James Kelnosky, manager of the Contract Resources Group, and Mr. Steve Raupp, the project manager assistant who had selected Complainant for the bid that was ultimately turned down, were aware of Complainants protected activity.

    Although Mr. Steve Raupp did not testify, the fact that it was he who selected Complainant for a job seems to rebut any speculation that he had knowledge of Complainant's past protected activities and was acting upon it. Likewise it was Mr. Kelnosky who gave Complainant's resume to Mr. Raupp to be considered for employment. Mr. Kelnosky testified that he had never heard of Complainant and had no knowledge of Complainant's protected activity or complaint against Respondent. Complainant has brought no evidence suggesting otherwise and there is nothing to suggest that the testimony of Mr. Kelnosky is not credible.

    The sequence of events appears to rule out even the possibility that Complainant was added to the list of engineers included in the bid in order to appease Complainant and avoid the claim against them. On February 21, 1996, a letter was sent to the President of Respondents from the Chicago office of the Wage and Hour Division. It was marked received on February 27, 1996, by the employee relations department of Respondent. (RX-6, p. 1). The bid request had been received by Respondents on February 22, 1996 and Complainants resume was submitted on the candidate list on February 24, 1996. (Tr. p. 175). On February 26, 1996, Respondents called Complainant asking him if he would be available for employment should the bid be accepted. (Tr. p. 93).

    By comparing dates it would appear that Mr. Kelnosky and Mr. Raupp could not have had notice of Complainant's claim against Respondent. It is possible that they somehow might have gotten notice of the complaint prior to receiving the letter from the Wage and Hour Division or that the information contained in the letter was given to them before the letter was actually marked as received. However, the burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case rests on the Complainant and he has provided no evidence to suggest that Mr. Kelnosky and Mr. Raupp had notice of Complainant's complaint before they added his name to the list of candidates.

    Assuming arguendo that Complainant could prove that Respondent's were aware of his past protected activities or the claim filed against them, Complainant would still have to show that Respondent took adverse action against him. Complainant alleges that because of his past protected activity, Respondent has taken adverse action against him by refusing to hire him. Complainant's evidence of this is the high number of resumes he has sent to Respondent, his qualifications in comparison to other employees of Respondent, and the failure of Respondent to have been selected for the contract to Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light.

    Complainant has failed to show any evidence of adverse action against him by Respondent. First, it is irrelevant how many resumes he has submitted to Respondent since, according to Mr. Kelnosky, only the most recent resumes are kept on file and no record is kept of the number of resumes received by a single individual. (Tr. pp. 199-200). Further, Respondent has been reducing its workforce since the early 1980's. Thus, it is not surprising that Complainant has never been hired by Respondent.

Complainant argues that other engineers have been hired by Respondent in the last few years. Complainant cites the hiring of 10-15 engineers, most of them as contract engineers, rather than permanent engineers. However, what Complainant fails to note is the number of engineers Respondent has not hired in the past few years. At the time of hearing, Mr. Kelnosky had over 3,000 resumes on file. (Tr. p. 200). Complainant also fails to note whether the engineers hired were going to be employed in his area of expertise, which is pipe support. More than likely, they were not. Mr. Kelnosky stated that he receives very few requests for structural/pipe support engineers such as Complainant. This testimony is very credible in light of the present state of the nuclear power plant construction and modification.

    Complainant alleges that Respondent was not serious about being awarded the contract with Entergy/Arkansas Power and Light. First, it would seem to be to the economical disadvantage of Respondent not to try to secure the contract.

Complainant alleges that Respondent purposely failed to send in the required number of resumes. In the request for the bid, it stated that "at any time during the duration of the contract, zero (0) to approximately 11 contract engineers may be required." (RX-13, Section D). The following page instructs the bidders to submit a total of 11 resumes. Absent from the record are any modifications to the request for a bid or any details of industry practice concerning the number of resumes required. During testimony, the issue became considerably more muddled:

   BY MR. HASAN:

    Q There were a total six positions -- right? -- on the Arkansas project?

    A (by Mr. Kelnosky) I believe that is correct.

    Q Six structural engineers.

    A I believe that there was three positions available, one at each different level. There was three different levels. I think if you look at the page, I think that is what it says. It asks for two resumes for each one of the positions, and I believe that is what we supplied. It is six or seven. They might have asked for three on one of the positions.

    (Pause.)

    MR. HASAN: Thank you, sir.

(Tr. p. 220).

    While it is not clear exactly how many positions were available and how many resumes were required, and whether or not the support engineers requested were factored into the numbers, it is clear that Complainant has not shown that Respondent purposely tried to lose the contract by submitting the wrong number of resumes in order to insure that he would not be hired. Complainant has not shown why Respondent's bid was rejected and, had the bid been rejected because of an insufficient number of resumes, why Respondent failed to submit the correct number of resumes.

    In sum, most of Complainant's case is based upon pure speculation. Speculation that he has been blacklisted, speculation that Respondents were aware of the blacklisting, and speculation that Respondents acted upon it. Accordingly, Complainant has not established his prima facie case and this complaint must be dismissed.

The complaint of discrimination filed by Syed M. A. Hasan pursuant to Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act, as amended, is DISMISSED.

      RICHARD D. MILLS
      Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in this matter will be forwarded for final decision to the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 and 19982 (1996).