Indeed, Mike McEnany now realizes that he was wrong to have
fired her:
- A. ... I did the wrong thing. I didn't ... forget the
laws, forget the rules, I did the wrong thing. The lady was
doing her job. ...
- A: I fired her because I had a situation where I had a
crew that was not going to work if she was on the job.
- Q: And that's because she was doing her job, wasn't it?
- A: Yes, sir.
[TR 244].
[Page 21]
- 2. Whether respondent was motivated by a
legitimate reason for the discharge
Addressing the issues of motivation and causal nexus,
respondent attempts to argue that James was fired not because she
was doing her job, but because the crew walked off the job. This
argument attempts to create a distinction without a difference.
The crew's "mutiny" arose directly from James'
performance of her job, perhaps indirectly aided and abetted by
respondent's failure to support her previously, and she bore the
adverse consequence of the situation. The crew's action in walking
off the job is not at issue in any event. It is the employer's
action toward James that is at issue.
Respondent relies on Delaney v. Mass. Correctional
Industries, supra, 90-TSC-2 (Sec'y, Marrch 17, 1995) for
the proposition that an employer motivated by concern for the
overall climate and security of the facility when it transferred
complainant may do so despite the complainant's having engaged in
protected activity. This is not a situation like that seen in
Delaney. That case involved improper conduct by the
complainant in terms of the way he broached his safety concerns
with his supervisor. It is significant to the undersigned that the
Secretary explicitly limited his holding to the "unusual facts
of the case," which involved a prison setting. Under other
circumstances, the Secretary held, the manner in which complainant
conducted himself would not have deprived him of whistleblower
protection. In any event, there is no evidence whatsoever of
misconduct by James.
- D. Synthesis of prima facie case and evidence of
motivation
I therefore find that the respondent has failed to rebut the
claimant's prima facie case. Claimant's prima facie
[Page 22]
case being not contradicted or overcome by respondent's evidence,
she is entitled to prevail. Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp.,
91-ERA-46 (Sec'y February 15, 1995), aff'd sub nom.
Carroll v. Department of Labor, 78 F.3d 352 (8th Cir. 1996).
I further find that the evidence establishes by a
preponderance that the proffered motivation -- to avoid the crew
walking off the job -- was not a legitimate reason for discharging
her. The events on October 11, 1995, particularly when seen in
light of the events leading up to it, suggest that James' was
highly resented by the crew and that performance of her
security/safety duties was merely tolerated by management. Safety
and security oversight were the first to go when the need to finish
the job was imperiled.
Complainant argues that there is direct evidence of
discrimination, such that the foregoing shifting burden of proof
analysis is unnecessary. Such a conclusion is warranted on the
record before me, and I find in the alternative that because there
is unrebutted direct, as well as circumstantial, evidence of
discrimination, complainant is entitled to judgment. In such a
case, respondent can avoid liability only by showing that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of James' protected
activity. Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1539, N. 8 (11th
Cir. 1989); Blake v. Hatfield Elec. Co., 87-ERA-4 (Sec'y,
January 22, 1992).
- E. Assuming Respondent had articulated a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
Complainant, whether there is "clear and convincing" evidence that she would
have been discharged
independently of her protected activity?
Even assuming respondent had successfully rebutted
complainant's prima facie case, Mike McEnany's own testimony
reveals that his decision to terminate complainant was motivated,
at least in part, by a protected activity. Under the "dual
motive" framework, in order to avoid liability under the Act,
the respondent must show by "clear and convincing" the
[Page 23]
evidence that it would have made the same decision to discharge
James even in the absence of the protected conduct. In such cases,
the respondent bears the risk that the influence of the legitimate
and prohibited motives cannot be separated. Crosier v. Portland
General Electric Co., 91-ERA-2 (Sec'y, January 15, 1994).
For purposes of the analysis, one can assume that the need to
keep the crew on site and working is a legitimate business reason
for adverse action. Indeed, standing alone and out of context, the
need to keep one's employees working must constitute a legitimate
business reason. However, as indicated above, such a decision
cannot constitute a legitimate reason when, as here, it is
inextricably linked with James' protected activity. Respondent
concedes that James' work performance was always good [ALJX 19, p.
15]. Mike McEnany had no problem with her work. There was no
indication whatsoever that her job was in jeopardy [TR 47-48, 121,
128-29, 152, 259]. McEnany admits that the way she was performing
her job had nothing whatsoever to do with his decision to fire her
[TR 263]. It was the fact that she was performing her job
that led to her discharge.
On the basis of the record before me, I conclude that
respondent has failed to demonstrate that it would have terminated
James even if she had not engaged in protected activity. There is
no "clear and convincing" evidence -- or indeed, any
evidence at all -- that James would have been fired but for her
enforcement of the plant security rules and the crew's walking off
the job in protest
- F. Whether claimant has borne her burden of
proof.
As indicated previously, the claimant retains at all times the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Having
thoroughly reviewed the evidence above, I find that the
preponderance of the evidence establishes each and every element of
her whistleblower claim. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates
that James was engaged in protected activity when she reported
Ramirez, that respondent knew about the protected activity, and
that an adverse employment decision was made against her for that
reason.
[Page 24]
Further, the evidence establishes that respondent's stated
reason for discharging James -- to keep the crew on the job -- is
not a legitimate reason under the Act, because it is inseparable
from the performance of her duties as a security escort.
Respondent has further failed to establish that it would have
discharged the complainant even if she had not engaged in protected
activity. Rather, I find that respondent intentionally
discriminated against complainant because she had engaged in
protected activities.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that complainant Tracy James
is entitled to relief under the Act.
REMEDIES
Based upon my finding that respondent has violated the Act,
complainant is entitled to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
5851(b)(2)(B) and 29 C.F.R. § 24.6(b)(2). Complainant seeks
back pay and interest from the date of her discharge until October
28, 1995, in the amount of $603.50 [CX 19, p. 2]. Complainant also
seeks front pay in an unspecified amount, compensatory damages of
$25,000, and attorneys fees in an amount to be determined by
separate proceedings.
- A. Wages: Back and Front Pay
An award of back pay is not a matter of discretion but is
mandated once it is determined that an employer has violated the
Act. Adams v. Coastal Production Operators, Inc., 89-ERA-3
(Sec'y, August 5, 1992). The purpose of a back pay award is to
make the employee whole by restoring the employee to the position
where he or she would have been had the unlawful discharge not
occurred. Blackburn v. Metric Constructors, 86-ERA-4
(Sec'y, October 30, 1991), slip op. at 11, aff'd sub nom.
Blackburn v. Martin, 982 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1992).
Back pay ordinarily runs from the date of discharge to the
date that complainant receives a bona fide offer of reinstatement.
Williams v. TIW Fabrication and Machining, 88-SDW-3 (Sec'y,
June 24, 1992). However, although respondent made an unconditional
[Page 25]
offer of reinstatement only a few hours after her discharge, it had
not at that time taken steps to assure that the workplace was safe
and no longer hostile. Cf. Boytin v. Pennsylvania Power
and Light Co., 94-ERA-32 (Sec'y, October 20, 1995). As such,
I find that James was not required to accept the offer and that her
back pay continued.
Respondent has stipulated that the sum of $603.50 is an
accurate calculation of complainant's back pay [TR 85-86]. That
sum is therefore awarded, along with other related benefits, and
pre-judgment interest calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6621.
I note that James obtained alternative employment with Florida
Power at the Crystal River plant effective October 30, 1995 at a
higher rate of pay than she was earning with respondent [TR 85].
James argues that she is entitled to front pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Front pay may be appropriate where "discord
and antagonism" would render reinstatement an ineffective
remedy. Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d
1435 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985);
Creekmore v. ABB Power Systems Energy Services, Inc., 93-ERA-24 (Sec'y, February
14, 1996). As indicated throughout this
decision and order, reinstatement was not a viable option when
offered, and is not sought by complainant. In West v. Systems
Applications International, 94-CAA-15 (Sec'y, April 19, 1995),
the Secretary held that the administrative law judge may order
reinstatement despite complainant's not seeking it, when
complainant offers no strong reason for not returning to her former
job. In that event, respondent's back pay liability terminates
upon its tender of a bona fide offer of reinstatement, whether
complainant accepts it or not.
More practically for this case, however, an additional award
of front or back pay would be meaningless in this situation, where
complainant has been employed since October 30, 1995, is now
earning more than she did with McEnany, and her post-discharge
earnings will offset any front or back pay award after October 30,
1995..
- B. Compensatory Damages
[Page 26]
Complainant claims compensatory damages in the amount of
$25,000, primarily for emotional distress. The Act authorizes
compensation for pain, suffering, mental anguish or loss to
reputation. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B).
The record establishes that James was extremely upset and
crying on the day of her discharge, and that thereafter she
experienced difficulty sleeping, eating and functioning socially,
and visited a physician who prescribed Valium. In the days that
followed her discharge, she was worried that members of the crew
might follow her [TR 86-87]. She was also concerned about her
reputation at work, where she found news articles posted in the
locker room about her job situation [TR 88-89]. Her husband
corroborated the troubles she experienced [TR 170-173] and there
was no evidence to contradict it.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that she suffered
physical harm, wage loss over $600, or other financial loss such as
home or penalties on retirement withdrawals. Comparative review of
other cases awarding compensatory damages for emotional distress
and humiliation shows a range from ,000 to $50,000. For example,
in Creekmore v. ABB Power Systems Energy Services, Inc., 93-ERA-24 (Sec'y,
February 14, 1996), the complainant suffered
emotional distress, humiliation and loss of reputation much like
that described by James. However, he also had a heart attack,
arguably because of the layoff, was out of work for several months
and had to dip into his retirement fund. The Secretary had doubts
about an actual connection between the layoff and the heart attack,
but concluded that an award of $40,000 was justified for the
emotional distress.
Damages for emotional distress are not amenable to precise
calculation, yet that does not and should not preclude an award for
the suffering attributable to it. Given the awards previously
approved by the Secretary, the sum of $25,000 is justified under
the circumstances of this case.
- C. Attorneys' fees
Complainant is entitled, as the prevailing party, to an award
of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses related to the
complaint. The complainant's attorney is directed to submit
[Page 27]
documentation of fees and expenses incurred within 15 days of the
issuance of this Recommended Decision and Order, to which the
respondent may respond not later than the close of business,
September 30, 1996. The parties' attention is directed to
Sutherland v. Spray Systems Environmental, 95-CAA-1 (ARB,
July 7, 1996) in reference to the presentation and calculation of
fees and expenses.
IV. RECOMMENDED ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that
respondent Pritts-McEnany Roofing, Inc., also known as McEnany
Roofing, shall make complainant Tracy A. James whole for losses
suffered by reason of its unlawful discharge of her, by paying the
following amounts:
1. For the period of October 11, 1995 to and including
October 28, $603.50 representing lost wages in the form of back
pay, plus pre-judgment interest calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§6621, plus any fringe benefits the complainant would have
accrued during that period; and
2. In compensation for mental and emotional distress, the sum
of $25,000.
It is further ORDERED that respondent take the
following remedial action:
1. Remove from complainant's personnel and other records any
and all adverse references regarding her protected activities;
2. Refrain from including statements in any job references
which have the effect of "blacklisting" complainant
because of the performance of her protected activities; and
3. Post a copy of the Secretary's final Decision and Order
for a period of thirty (30) days after review and issuance by the
Administrative Review Board, in conspicuous places where
respondent's employees may congregate; and further provide a copy
of the Secretary's final Decision and Order to any of its employees
who may request a copy.
[Page 28]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fifteen (15) days of the
issuance of this Recommended Decision and Order, complainant's
attorney shall submit to the undersigned and to counsel for
respondent documentary evidence of the professional fees and
expenses incurred in pursuing this litigation to date. The parties
are encouraged to enter into stipulations as to such aspects of the
complainant's fees and expenses as they can reasonably agree to.
Respondent shall submit its objections, if any, to the undersigned
and to counsel for complainant not later than the close of
business, September 30, 1996.
- Christine S. McKenna
- Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the
administrative file in this matter will be forwarded for review by
the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins
Building, 200 Constitution Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20210. The Administrative Review Board has the
authority to issue final decisions in employee protection cases
adjudicated under the regulations at 29 C.F.R. Parts 24 and 1978.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 19978-19989 (1996).
[ENDNOTES]