DATE:  May 19, 1992
CASE NO. 86-ERA-32


IN THE MATTER OF

CAROLYN LARRY, 

          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY,

          RESPONDENT.


BEFORE:  THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                        DECISION AND ORDER ON COSTS
                          AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING
                              ATTORNEYS' FEES

     This case arises under Section 210 of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C. §
5851 (1988).  By order of June 28, 1991, the parties were
permitted to brief the appropriateness of the Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ) fee assessment; counsel for Complainant was
permitted to submit a petition for costs and expenses incurred on
review; and Respondent was permitted to respond.  Complainant's
counsel filed a petition on August 23, 1991, together with a
notice of intent to file certain procedural motions.  Respondent
thereafter responded.  Complainant's intended motions have not
been forthcoming.  
     Upon consideration, the following costs and expenses are
approved:

[PAGE 2]
     (1)  In his April 17, 1987, Order Granting Fee Petition
(appended), the ALJ recommended that Complainant's counsel
Charles C. Taylor and Sam Thomas be awarded costs and expenses. 
The ALJ's disposition generally is reasonable, and I hereby adopt
it as qualified below.  The ALJ permitted compensation at an
hourly rate of $100 for 50 hours of pre-hearing preparation and
40 hours of hearing time (36 hours for Attorney Taylor and four
hours for Attorney Thomas).  The ALJ also permitted compensation
in the amount of $350 for telephone conversations and drafting
interrogatories on September 2 and 4, 1986, which represented 3.5
hours of work.  Counsel also claim compensation for one half-hour
of work on August 29, 1986.  Total compensation appropriately
should be ordered in the amount of $9,400, i.e., 94 hours
x $100/hr. = $9,400.  
     Respondent contests counsels' request for a 12 percent
interest additur of $6,738.90 in compensation for the delay in
payment.  I note that in Title VII actions against private
parties prevailing complainants may recover interest on
attorneys' fees.  Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d
760, 764 and n.6 (7th Cir. 1982).  See Library of
Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 313-314 (1986).  
          The lodestar fee may . . . be adjusted upward
          to compensate counsel for the lost value of
          the money he would have received resulting
          from delay in receipt of payment.  "[T]he
          hourly rates used in the 'lodestar' represent
          the prevailing rate for clients who typically
          pay their bills promptly.  Court-awarded fees
          normally are received long after the legal
          services are rendered."  No precise formula
          is available to measure the delay factor. 
          [W]here the hourly rate used in computing the
          lodestar is based on present hourly rates a
          delay factor has implicitly been recognized
          and no adjustment for delay should be
          allowed.  
Nat. Ass'n of Concerned Vets. v. Sec. of Defense, 675 F.2d
1319, 1328-1329 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted),
quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 and
n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).  In extrapolating from the
Laffey Matrix possible current rates and comparing an adjusted
lodestar, counsels' additur appears excessive.  See
Complainant's August 23, 1991, petition for fees and expenses at
Exh. 3.  In particular, 94 hours multiplied by $130 an hour
results in payment of $12,220, whereas a $9,400 lodestar and a
$6,738.90 interest additur results in payment of $16,138.90. 
Accordingly, I consider a reduced adjustment to be appropriate
and permit additional fees in the 
[PAGE 3]
amount of $3,000 to compensate counsel for delay in payment.  
     (2)  Complainant's counsel Billie Pirner Garde and Donald G.
Aplin request attorneys' fees in the amount of $11,285. 
Respondent contests any award for hours billed in a separate
proceeding.  It appears from an examination of counsel's work-in-
progress report that telephone conferences conducted on June 12,
1987, June 15, 1987, and January 19, 1988, were unrelated to the
captioned case.  Similarly, it appears that correspondence
prepared on March 17, 1990, was not in furtherance of this
litigation.  Accordingly, the hours billed for Attorney Garde are
reduced by 6.90 hours.  
     (3)  Respondent contests as excessive the amount of time
spent by Attorney Garde in completing Complainant's brief before
the Secretary.  Preparation entailed record review, legal
research, and document preparation.  In view of the length of the
case record and the number and complexity of the issues presented
by the case, I find counsel's hours to be reasonable.  
     (4)  Respondent objects to nine hours billed for work
performed by Paralegal Sandra L. Shepherd.  This work occurred on
June 23, 1987, in the final stages of Attorney Garde's brief
preparation and entailed primarily proofing and editing the
document.  Use of a paralegal for these purposes is reasonable,
and the charges are approved.  
     (5)  Certain supplemental secretarial costs, necessary
travel expenses, and copying and telephone costs are reimbursable
as part of an attorney's fee because they are "integrally related
to the work of an attorney" and may significantly contribute to
the success of the litigation.  Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of
Ed., 585 F.2d 618, 623-624 (4th Cir. 1978).  Since such costs
are recoverable as attorneys' fees, they are recoverable here
where the statute makes clear that costs and expenses other than
attorneys' fees are compensable.  42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B). 
I, therefore, allow Complainant reimbursement for Federal Express
and airfare charges, which constitute other litigation costs. 
See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law, five-year cum. supp., Ch. 39 at 553 and n.37 (2d ed. 1989).
     (6)  Complainant prevailed on her ERA claim and thus her
attorneys are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably
spent in her representation.  Lamphere v. Brown
University, 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979); Hughes v.
Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 486-487 (3d Cir. 1978).
     (7)  Counsel are entitled to compensation for time
reasonably spent in preparing a fee claim, and Attorney Aplin's
request is approved.  Coulter v. State of Tenn., 805 F.2d
146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 914
(1987); Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685
F.2d 236, 239 (8th Cir. 1982).

[PAGE 4]
                               ORDER
     Respondent is ordered to compensate Charlie C. Taylor and
Sam Thomas, Thomas, Taylor, and Houston, P.C., costs and expenses
in the amount of $12,400.  
     Respondent is ordered to compensate Billie Pirner Garde and
Donald G. Aplin, Government Accountability Project, costs and
expenses in the amount of $10,965.  This compensation represents
attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,595 and costs in the amount
of $370.  
     SO ORDERED.


                               LYNN MARTIN 
                              Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.