The parties have complied with my order of August 2, 1989.
Complainant's counsel, by letter of August 21, 1989, has
submitted the specific amount received by complainant in
satisfaction of her claims against Respondent, including her
claim in the above-captioned case which arises under the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1982). Respondent's counsel, by letter dated August 291, 1989,
has certified that Respondent consented to the terms and
conditions set forth in the document entitled "Release", which
was signed by Complainant on August 3, 1988.
[Page 2]
The terms of the Release encompass matters arising under
other laws than the ERA. Release at 1-2. My authority over
settlement agreements is limited to matters arising under
statutes within my jurisdiction. See Polizzi v. Gibbs & Hill,
Sec. Order, July 18, 1989, slip op. at 9 (order appended).
Aurich v. Consolidate Edison Company of New York Inc., Case No.
86-CAA-2, Sec. Order Approving Settlement, July 29, 1987; Chase
v. Buncombe County, N.C., Case No. 85-SWD-4, Sec. Decision and
Order on Remand, November 3, 1986. Accordingly, I have limited
my review of the Release to determining whether its terms and
conditions are a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of
Complainants' claim arising under the ERA. Except as described
below I find the provisions of the Release to be fair, adequate
and reasonable.
In the Release, at 4, Complainant agrees that "except as
required by law, she will not participate in, aid, abet, support,
encourage, or assist any other claims that may be brought against
Kaiser or Raymond and/or the officers, directors, employees,
attorneys, agents, successors, assigns, or insurers of any of
them." This provision, among other things, prohibits Complainant
from voluntarily cooperating with or assisting any state or
federal agency, including the Department of Labor and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, in the investigation and prosecution of
federal and other laws. I held in Polizzi, slip op. at 5-8, that
provisions which have the effect of restricting the
administration and enforcement of law are against public policy.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in Polizzi, I find
that the quoted language of the instant Release is void and thus
unenforceable.
There is nothing in the Release or elsewhere in the record
which enables me to determine whether the Respondent, the party
in whose favor the void provision runs, intended to agree to the
other provisions of the settlement if the provision, which I have
found to be void, is severed. Accordingly, the Respondent is
ORDERED to show cause, within 30 days of receipt of this order,
why the provision of the settlement, which is void, should not be
severed and the remainder of the agreement approved, and the case
be dismissed with prejudice. See Release at 5.
