Case No. 86-ERA-38

In the Matter of

DOUGLAS E. BILLINGS,
    Complainant

    v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
    Respondent

    This matter arises pursuant to a Complaint of June 21, 1986, filed with the Office of Administrative Law Judges under § 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851. The relevant facts are as follows.

    In November 1984, Complainant refused to document that a certain tool had been issued for specific work to be performed on a critical system at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant after determining that the tool had not been so issued. In March 1986, Complainant discovered that the documents involving the 1984 incident had been falsified. Complainant alleges that discriminatory actions were taken against him as a direct result of the safety concerns which he raised in connection with the 1984 incident.

    On August 19, 1986 Respondent filed with this Office a Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings or Summary Judgment arguing that no disputed issues of material fact exist, that no showing has been made by Complainant of protected activity under the Act, and that the Complaint was not timely filed. To date, Complainant has not replied to Respondent's Motion.

    A formal hearing was set for August 21, 1986 concerning the above-captioned matter. Due to a clerical error, Claimant's name was omitted from the service sheet and he did not appear at the hearing. It appears clear, however, that a hearing on this matter is unnecessary if the preliminary and dispositive issue concerning whether Complainant's claim is barred by the thirty-day statutory period for bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5857(b)(1) is not decided in Complainant's favor.

    The date which triggers the running of the thirty-day limitation period is the date on which the alleged discriminatory acts by Complainant's employer occurred. Complainant has not asserted and the evidence does not indicate that any alleged discriminatory conduct occurred during the thirty days immediately prior to Complainant's filing of his June 21, 1986 complaint. Nor has Complainant alleged any extraordinary factual situation which prevented the timely filing of the complaint or which would justify the equitable tolling of the thirty-day time limitation period.

    In view of the foregoing, I am constrained to conclude that Complainant has failed to file his complaint within thirty days of the alleged discriminatory acts as required under the Act. I therefore ORDER that the above-captioned matter be dismissed for failure to file a timely complaint.

       E. EARL THOMAS
       Deputy Chief Judge

Dated: 3 OCT 1986
Washington, D. C.

EET/RM/tt