U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
1111 20th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036
Case No. 85-ERA-41
In the Matter of
BONNIE J. PARKHURST,
Claimant
v.
K. COMSTOCK & COMPANY, INC.,
Employer
Thomas E. McClure, Esq.
For the Claimant
Bruce E. Heary, Esq.
Glenn Smith, Esq.
For the Employer
Before: GLENN ROBERT LAWRENCE
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION AND ORDER Statement of the Case
Claimant, Bonnie Parkhurst, initiated the above entitled
proceedings by filing a letter complaint with the Wage and Hour
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Division of the United States Department of Labor alleging
discriminatory employment practices against L. K. Comstock, Inc.
in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(a). Claimant contended that her June 14, 1985 layoff by
Comstock was unlawful retaliation for making safety and security
charges against the project engineers, Sargent & Lundy for whom
she had worked.
Pursuant to 29 CFR Part 24, the Secretary of Labor
conducted an investigation into the violation alleged.
On September 18, 1985 the Department of Labor (DOL) notified
Mrs. Parkhurst in writing that a fact-finding investigation had
been conducted in accordance with 29 CFR Part 24 (ALJ Exhibit 1,
in evidence) and in substance that the claim was without merit.
Mr. Parkhurst timely initiated an appeal from this ruling by
telegram to this Office on September 24, 1985 (ALJ-1).
On October 4, 1985 the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission issued a report essentially agreeing with DOL.
(ALJ-2, in evidence).
A hearing was held before the undersigned on January 28,
1986 in Chicago, Illinois, with respect to the Claimant's charge
against L. K. Comstock of unlawful retaliation. Pursuant to
consent of counsel and leave of this office, the parties
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed on
March 11, 1986 with the time to issue the decision extended to
April 17, 1986. The decision to follow is based on my observation
of the witnesses; review of the entire record as well as
the applicable law and regulations.
STIPULATED FACTS
The following facts were stipulated by both counsel or by
counsel for the respective party, as indicated by the specific
reference to the transcript:
1. The following exhibits appended to the transcript were
admitted into evidence:
a. Employer Comstock's Exhibits A-1 through A-39 (TR 12,
lines 21-25);
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b. Employer Comstock's Exhibits C-1 through C-5 (TR 13,
lines 9-13);
c. Employer Comstock's Exhibit B (TR 14, line 6);
d. ALJ exhibit 1 (TR 17, lines 19-22);
e. ALJ exhibit 2 (TR 18, lines 16-19);
f. Claimant's exhibit 1 (TR 77)
g. Claimant's exhibit 2 (TR 86)
3. For her own reasons, Claimant did not work from March 7,
1985 until June 3, 1985 (TR 19, lines 18-22);
4. Claimant worked for Comstock from June 3, 1985 to June
14, 1985 at which time she was laid off (TR 19, lines 7-16);
5. Claimant was rehired by Comstock on September 4, 1985
(TR 19, line 10).
6. Claimant's hourly rates of pay were as follows:
a. January through March, 1985 -- $5.65 hr.
b. June 3, 1985 through June 14, 1985 -- $5.65 hr.
c. September 4, 1985 through December 31, 1985 -- $5.50
hr.
d. January 1, 1986 to date -- $6. 00 hr. (TR 20. lines
9-25)
7. Claimant was a Comstock employee (TR 22, line 1)
8. The deductions taken from Claimant's June 14, 1985
paycheck for unearned vacation, personal and sick days were
proper and Claimant does not claim that these deductions are
related in any way to her charge of discrimination or retaliation.
(TR 153, lines 5-21; TR 153, lines 1-7).
Findings of Fact
1. Claimant Bonnie Parkhurst was hired by L. K. Comstock
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(the employer) on August 15, 1984 Supervisory controls were
exercised by Sargent & Lundy (S & L), a subcontractor of
Commonwealth Edison, the project owner, at the Braidwood Center
a nuclear power site. (TR 21, lines 6-10; 21-25; TR 22, line
1).
2. Claimant was out of the service of Employer during the
period March 7 through June 2, 1985. (TR. 19.)
3. On June 3, 1985, Claimant returned to work and continued
to work through June 14, 1985. (TR 19).
4. Claimant was laid off effective immediately following
June 14, 1985. (TR 19).
5. Claimant returned to work for Employer on September 4,
1985 and continues to work for Employer. (TR 19, 20).
6. During the periods January 1 through March 7, 1985 and
June 3 through June 14, 1985 claimant earned $5.65 per hour.
(TR 20.)
7. During the period September 4, 1985 through December 21,
1985 Claimant earned $5.50 per hour. (TR 20).
8. From January 1, 1986 until the date of the hearing,
January 28, 1986, Claimant earned $6.00 per hour. (TR 20).
9. When Claimant worked for S & L, it largely supervised
Claimant's day-to-day activities and controlled her work
activities while the Employer paid Claimant's wages and viewed
her as the Employer's employee. (TR 21-22).
10. Claimant was originally hired by Employer as a clerk-
typist. (TR 49).
11. On September 3, 1985, after Claimant returned to employment
from a layoff, her position changed to clerk. (TR 49, 85).
12. When Claimant was originally hired by Employer to work
for S & L, she helped the leads at S & L with some of their
catch up work and back work. (TR 49, 50).
13. In September, 1984, Claimant began working in S & L's
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mylar room. (TR 49, 50). In this capacity, Claimant was held
responsible for the control and filing of approximately 16,000
mylar prints sent to the Braidwood site after bring filmed and
processed in Chicago. (TR 50, 51).
14. The mylar prints for which Claimant wag held responsible
were drawings used by engineers in the field to build the
Braidwood nuclear power plant. (TR 51).
15. In September, 1984 when Claimant was assigned to S & L's
mylars along with a number of engineering change notice (ECN)
books. (TR 52).
16. In September 1984, the two mylar vaults in S & L's mylar
room were so full that another vault was needed (TR 52) and the
ECN books in the mylar room had an excessive amount of papers in
them in light of the size of the books. (R. 52).
17. In September 1984, the S & L mylar room was approximately
twenty five feet long and ten to twelve feet wide. (R. 53).
18. In September 1984, there was no fire extinguisher in the
S & L mylar room. (TR 53).
19. Claimant was advised of her assignment in the mylar room
by two S & L supervisors: James Stewart, her immediate supervisor
in document control, and Chuck Reese, the supervisor of the
document control department. (TR 54).
20. Although others worked with Claimant in the S & L mylar
room, no one was supervised by Claimant. (Tr. 54-55).
21. In September 1984, the mylar room was easily accessible
to the engineers despite efforts to keep the room secure. (TR
551).
22. In September 1984, there were no locks on the mylar's
vaults, and thus, anyone in the mylar room would have access to
the mylars by merely opening the drawers to the vault. (TR
55).
23. In September 1984 through January 31, 1985 the standard
operating procedure was for mylars to be signed in and out by
the engineers. (TR 55-56, 57).
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24. Because the sign-in procedure was not effective, claimant
used a "computer kickout sheet" to record mylars requested by
the engineers. (TR 56).
25. In the fall of 1984, Claimant discovered outdated mylars
together with the revised mylars. (TR 57, 58). The outdated
mylars were inconsistent with the revised mylars. (TR 59).
26. During the fall of 1984, the mylar room was so tiny and
aisle space was so narrow that Claimant and co-workers had to
wait for one another even to move from one corner of the room to
the other. (TR 59). Claimant and her co-workers were surrounded
by desks, mylar vaults, and an number of rows of book shelves.
(TR 59).
27. In December 1984 or January 1985, Claimant reported
problem, in the mylar room to James Stewart, her floor lead
Marlene Metzen, and Chuck Reese. (TR 60). Both Stewart and
Reese responded that they could not do anything about the mylar
room problems at the time. (TR 60, 65, 67).
28. In December 1984 or January 1985, Claimant reported
these problems to Ken Fuss, assistant field coordinator for S &
L, (TR 65) and George Koladazzak (TR 66) (TR 67). She showed
these men how the computer sheet she was using to inventory the
mylars was not updated to reflect new revisions. (TR 66).
29. Ken Fuss told Claimant that she "has really shaken
everyone up." (TR 66).
30. No immediate changes took place in the mylar room after
Claimant waged these complaints. (TR 66-67).
31. On January 14, 1985, as part of a plant-wide program,
Claimant met with Bill Gagnon, manager of Quality First, the
Quality Control division of Commonwealth Edison. (TR 68). The
interview took approximately two to two and one-half hours. (TR
69).
32. Claimant told Gagnon of all the problems she was
experiencing with the mylars, her concern of having the updated
mylars, her concern of having more mylars, as well as the
potential fire hazard of the mylar room which had no fire
extinguisher. (TR 69). Claimant also mentioned to Gagnon that
she had no cooperation from her superiors at S & L. (TR 69).
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Gagnon advised Claimant that there would be an investigation and
that he would advise her of the outcome. (TR 70).
33. On February 1, 1985, S & L supervisors, Chuck Reese and
Ann Muzzarelli, gave Claimant a reprimand and changed her job
assignment from the mylar department to documentation. (TR 70,
71).
34. The size and condition of the mylar room as well the
standard operating procedures therein remained substantially the
same between September 1984 until February 3, 1985. (TR 70
71).
35. On February 3, 1985, the walls of the mylar room had
been extended to enlarge the room (TR 73); the number of desks
decreased from three to two (TR 74); another usable mylar vault
was in the room (TR 74); a fire extinguisher was in the room (TR
74); the door to the mylar room was changed with the addition of
a piece of glass, thereby preventing someone outside of the room
from reaching inside the room to open the door (TR 74-76).
36. On February 17, 1985, Claimant wrote a letter to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and to the Wage and Hour Division
of the U.S. Department of Labor. (TR 76-78; Claimant's Exhibit
No. 1).
37. Beginning on March 7, 1985, Claimant took time off from
work due to her husband's illness after receiving permission
from Ann Muzzarelli, Claimant's supervisor from S & L. (TR 79,
80).
38. In April, Frank Rowland, project manager of Employer,
wrote Claimant and advised her that she had exhausted her
vacation days and informed her that she could not take off work
for her husband's illness only for her own. (TR 81, 82).
39. Claimant then obtained medical leave from her
physician. (TR 82).
40. On Approximately May 31, 1985, Claimant contacted Rowland
and advised him that she would be returning to work. (TR 82).
Rowland advised Claimant to report to Joe Klena, project
engineer, with Employer. (TR 82).
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41. While she was working for S & L, Claimant was paid time
and one-half for overtime. (TR 83).
42. On June 3, 1985, when Claimant returned to work, she was
assigned to the xerox room running copies working directly for
Employer. (TR 83). She then started working a 40 hour work
week. (TR 83).
43. On June 10, 1985, Joe Klena told Claimant and another
employee that she was being laid off due to lack of work. (TR
83-84).
44. On August 22, 1985, Frank Rowland wrote Claimant and
offered her a position as a clerk at $5.50 an hour (TR 156, TR
84, lines 17-22) in the xerox room. (Joint Exhibit A-17).
45. Although Claimant's job responsibilities were essentially
the same ones she performed in June 1985, her job title
was "clerk" rather than "clerk/typist". (TR 84-85).
46. Chuck Reese and Ann Muzzarelli knew that Claimant spoke
with Mr. Gagnon with Quality First. (TR 94, 95).
47. When claimant was hired at S & L through Employer she
was told to take orders from supervisors at S & L. (TR 100).
48. Claimant always received her paycheck, from Employer.
(TR 100).
49. When Claimant was originally hired by Employer she was
given policies and practices documentation from Employer. (TR
100).
50. Claimant was docked by Employer for days of personal and
vacation days she took which had been authorized by Ann
Muzzarelli. (TR 107).
51. Claimant received ,360.00 in unemployment compensation
during the summer of 1985. (TR 109).
52. During the period of June 17 through September 2, 1985,
Claimant lost 56 eight hour non-overtime days. (TR 115). Her
non-overtime wage loss for this period is $2,531.20.
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53. During the period September 3 through December 31, 1985,
when Employer was paying Claimant 15 cent per hour less than
what she was previously making. Claimant worked 86 eight hour
days. (TR 116). The difference in non-overtime pay Claimant
would have earned had she continued to earn $5.65 per hour and
what she actually earned during this period was $103.20. (TR
116).
54. When Claimant worked for S & L in the mylar room she
averaged 15 hours per week in overtime.
55. During the period June 3 through December 31, 1985, had
Claimant been working overtime 15 hours per week she would have
worked 30 weeks of 15 hours overtime each plus two additional
days of two hours of overtime each. (TR 117). Had Claimant
been paid at a base rate of $5.65 per hour during that period,
her overtime wages would have amounted to $3,779.85. (TR 118).
56. The problems discovered in the mylar room for which
Claimant was reprimanded could have been created by others who
had access to the mylar vaults. (TR 127).
57. When Claimant was working in the S & L mylar department
approximately one-third of mylars were easier to track due to
Claimant's efforts. (TR 128) The remaining two-thirds of the
mylars became less easy to track. (TR 128).
58. In July of 1985, four clerk positions became available
with Employer. (TR 182).
59. In July of 1985, Joseph Klena gave Claimant no consideration
in being hired for one of the clerk positions. (TR
183).
60. On July 16, 1985, Virginia Tharp was hired as a clerk
by Employer (TR 184).
61. As a clerk for Employer Virginia Tharp was a xerox
operator, the same functional position Claimant held in June
1985 and from September 1985 to the date of hearing. (TR. 31,
38).
62. Laid off employees of Employer are ordinarily called
back to work when the position they left becomes available. (TR
at 32).
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63. Virginia Tharp was hired as a permanent employee and not
as a summer hire. (TR 185).
64. Employer through Frank Rowlan maintained that during
Claimant's layoff in the summer of 1985, permanent positions in
the xerox room were not filled instead only temporary summer
positions were hired. (TR 37).
65. Claimant too had taken personal days and vacation days
which had not yet accrued. Frank Rowlan took the position that
when she returned to work she would earn them so that Employer
could "balance the books." (TR 40, 151).
66. Frank Rowlan acknowledged becoming aware of Claimant's
complaint to Quality First in early March 1985. (TR 48, 147).
67. Of the 1100 employees on the Braidwood project site
approximately 50 work for S & L. (TR 143, 161).
68. Employer's responsibility at the Braidwood site is the
electrical installation of the plant. (TR 143).
69. S & L acts as the architect/engineer at the Braidwood
site. (TR 144).
70. The Employer through Frank Rowlan claimed that Claimant
was not offered a position in the xerox room in July 1985
because Rowlan "didn't figure she would . . . be interested in
that demotion." (TR 157). In August 1985, Rowlan claims that
he offered her a position because she was going to be a good
guy." (TR 158).
71. Employer through Frank Rowlan claims that Commonwealth
Edison imposes requirements on Employer as to the exact number
of employees it can have in each department. (TR 159).
72. Although Employer has no formal policy regarding the
recall of laid off employees, Employer through Frank Rowlan,
maintained an informal practice of contacting laid off good
employees if they are interested in returning to work. (TR
160).
73. Employer's employees who work for S & L must follow
Employer's personnel policy. (TR 164).
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Discussion
The employer's counsel presented his case skillfully.
However notwithstanding the employers protestations it seems
apparent to this observer that the claimant's criticism of
unsafe nuclear conditions triggered the impermissible
discriminary conduct on the part of the employer. (TR 179).
Claimant is now relegated to working as a xerox operator though
she appears quite bright a able to perform more challenging
work.
Raised by the employer are a number of points. They will be
discussed in turn. Firstly it argues Citing Brown & Rout, Inc.
v. Donovan, 747 F.2d, 1020 (5th Circuit 1984), that the February
1, 1985 reprimand and assignment were not violations of the
whistle blower act as the employee had not gone outside the
company to make an official complaint but merely complained to a
quality control unit within the company. In the Brown case, the
Circuit disagreed with the Labor Department that a discriminatory
act steming from a quality control complaint was actionable
under the statute. However in the 9th circuit case of Mackowiak
v. University Nuclear System, Inc. 739 F.2d 1159, decided the
same year, as Brown the Court of Appeals sided with the Labor
Department to the extent that it held that "every action of
quality control inspectors are "in affect" part of a NRC
proceedings and were covered by the act . . . "In other words,
contractors regulated by § 5851 may not discharge quality control
inspectors because they do their job too well". The testimony
of the employee here establishes that she functioned as a type
of quality inspector and it was this activity that caused the
discriminatory acts of the employers. From another standpoint,
it is concluded that her very complaints to the quality
inspectors is comtemplated by the act. Without such protection
the nuclear whistle blower provisions would be rendered
ineffectual.
As discussed in the findings, the attempt to restrict
liability to Sargent & Lundy would not appear justified. The
indicia of control by L. K. Comstocks and Company was evident in
this record and they were in fact Claimant's employer. The cite
to Whiteheard v. Safeway Steel Products, Inc. 497 A.2d 803 (May
1985) is of course noncontrolling. In any event that case
focuses on a temporary employment situation which is not the
case here. Listening to the employers witnesses, persuades they
[Page 12]
could and most likely did assert considerable behind the scenes
control over claimant.
The employer is correct in its contention that the claim for
personal and vacation days was waived (TR 153). Further the
unemployment compensation, given the particular facts of this
case, should be deducted from any award.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A prima facie case of retaliatory discharge violative of
the "whistle blower" protection statute of the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 42 U.S.C. Section 5851 was established by
substantial evidence.
2. A discrimination claim under Section 5851 must include
proof: (1) that the party charged with discrimination is an
employer subject to the Act; that the complaining employee was
discharged or otherwise discriminated against with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment;
and (3) that the alleged discrimination arose because the
employee participated in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
proceeding. Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735
F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984). See the aval motive test
discussed in Mt. Healy City School District v. Doyle 429 U.S.
274 (1977).
3. An employer subject to the Act includes "a contractor or
a subcontractor of a Commission licensee." 42 U.S.C. Section
5851(a). The Claimant was employed by L. K. Comstock and S & L
both of which were contractors or subcontractors of a Commission
licensee, Commonwealth Edison. (TR 21, 68).
4. The Claimant was discharged or discriminated against
with respect to terms of employment. On February 1, 1985, she
was reprimanded by S & L supervisors and her job assignment was
changed. (TR 70, 76). Beginning on March 7, 1985 Claimant took
time off of work due to husband's illness after receiving
permission from S & L (TR 79, 80), but in April the Employer
informed her that she could no longer take the time-off. (TR
81, 82). When Claimant returned to work on June 3, 1985 she was
given a new assignment without overtime (TR 82). On June 10,
1985, she was laid off allegedly due to lack of work. (TR 83,
84). In July, 1985 four clerk positions became available.
[Page 13]
Virginia Tharp was hired as a permanent employee. (TR 185). The
Claimant was given no consideration for one of the new positions,
(TR 183), although employees are ordinarily called back
to work when the position they left becomes available. (TR 32).
She was not recalled to work until September, 1985. (TR 84).
This course of conduct was clearly discriminatory and deprived
Claimant of wages and other benefit, or employment she would
have enjoyed.
5. Claimant was discriminated against because she participated
in an NRC related proceeding. only participation in such
a proceeding is required to establish a prima facie case; a
claimant is not required to show that she disclosed unique
evidence or evidence that the employer attempted to hide in
order to make out a cage of discrimination under the Act.
DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983).
Internal safety and quality control complaints trigger the
protections of the "whistle blower" provision of the Act.
Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1163.
6. The presence or absence of retaliatory motive is
provable by circumstantial evidence even if there is testimony
to the contrary by witnesses who perceive lack of such improper
motive. Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1172.
7. After relating numerous safety problems to her superiors
on two separate occasions (TR 60-67), and seeing no changes take
place (TR 66, 67), Claimant met with Quality First, the Quality
Control division of Commonwealth Edison concerning the safety
hazards. (TR 68, 69). Approximately 2 weeks later her S & L
supervisors reprimanded her and changed her job assignment from
the mylar department to documentation. (TR 70, 71). Two days
later the hazards of which she had complained were corrected.
(TR 73-76). Shortly after Claimant registered her internal
complaint she was reprimanded and discriminated against based on
the terms and conditions of employment.
8. Under Title VII interrelated operations will be held
jointly liable for discriminatory treatment of an employee. In
the context of Title VII liberal construction is to be given to
the definition of "Employer" so as to carry out the purposes of
Congress to eliminate discrimintation. Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting
Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th (Cir. 1977). The most
important requirement under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(b) in
defining the term employer is that there is sufficient indicia
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of an interrelationhip between the immediate corporate employer
and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part
of the aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is
jointly responsible for the actions of the immediate employer.
Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1983). When
such a degree of interrelatedness is present the departure from
the normal separate existence between entities is adequate
reason to view the conduct of one party as that of both.
Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337.
9. For guidance in testing the degree of interrelationship,
the courts will apply a four part test formulated by the NLRB:
The degree of (1) interrelatedness of operation, (2) common
management (3) centralized control of labor relations and (4)
common ownership. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337; Baker 560 F.2d
at 392. While each factor is indicative of interrelatedness and
while control over the elements of labor relations is a central
concern, the presence of any single factor in the Title VII
context is not conclusive. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337. All
four criteria need not be present in all cases and even when no
evidence of common control of labor relations policy is
presented the circumstances may be such that the Title VII single
employer doctrine is applicable. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1338.
For example, in EEOC v. McLemore Food Stores, Inc., 25 F.E.P.
1356 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) three corporations were held to be a
single enterprise where there was cooperative hiring of new
employees and a practice of loaning and transferring employees.
10. The game rationale should be applied in the context of
the Energy Reorganization Act.