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Hick v. Western Concrete Structures, Inc., 82-ERA-11 (ALJ Apr. 21, 1983)


U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
211 Main Street
San Francisco, California 94105
Suite 600
(415) 974-1514
FTS 8 454-0514

CASE NO. 82-ERA-11

In the Matter of

THOMAS J. HICK,
    Complainant

    v.

WESTERN CONCRETE STRUCTURES, INC.,
    Employer/Respondent

John B. Rowe
    Attorney at Law
    Scoggin Building
    617 North Third Street
    Phoenix, Arizona 85004
       For the Complainant

N. Douglas Grimwood
    Attorney at Law
    Twitty, Sievwright & Mills
    1700 TowneHouse Tower
    100 West Clarendon
    Phoenix, Arizona 85013
       For the Employer/Respondent

Before: ALFRED LINDEMAN
    Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

Statement of the Case

    This is a proceeding pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and the applicable


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implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. Complainant seeks reinstatement and back pay after being terminated from his job as a Quality Control Investigator and Quality Control Supervisor for the employer herein allegedly because he participated in action protected by the Act.

    Complainant filed a written complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division, which conducted an investigation and issued a determination dated July 2, 1982, stating that "the weight of evidence to date" indicated that complainant had been discriminated against in violation of the Act and that appropriate remedial action was required to abate the violation. The employer filed a timely request for a hearing which was conducted on April 5, 1983,1 in Phoenix, Arizona. On April 1, 1983, the employer filed a motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, based on the fact that complainant filed his written complaint with the Department of Labor more than 30 days after his termination. The issues thus presented for adjudication are: the timeliness of the filing of the complaint and, if it was filed in timely fashion, whether a violation of the Act occurred.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Timeliness of Complaint

    Complainant was terminated from his position of Quality Control Supervisor by the employer herein on March 11, 1982. His written complaint to the Department of Labor was filed on June 3, 1982. However, I credit complainant's testimony that he personally visited a local office of the Wage and Hour Division well within the 30-day filing requirement provided by 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(b), only to be mistakenly advised that they could not do anything for him. It was not until some three months later that officials at the Wage and Hour Division were advised that indeed they did have the authority and responsibility to receive the instant complaint. Under such circumstances, I find that complainant would have filed the


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required written complaint in a timely fashion had he not been misinformed, unintentionally, by the officials at the Wage and Hour Division whom he first contacted. It is therefore concluded that his complaint should be deemed to have been constructively filed on the occasion of his first visit to the Wage and Hour Division, and therefore it was timely for purposes of obtaining the jurisdiction provided by the Act and regulations. See School District of City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1981).

No Evidence of Violation

    The employer herein is a subcontractor to the Bechtel Power Corporation on the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Project located about 50 miles from Phoenix, Arizona. It was therefore subject to the so-called "whistleblowing" provisions of the Act and regulations in question.2 The employer's role at the Palo Verde project was to provide "post-tensioning" of concrete by stressing cables inside the concrete after a "pour." The employer had two types of personnel at the job site: production personnel under the Superintendent of operations, Ken Guffey; and Quality Control Inspectors and Supervisors who at the times relevant to this proceeding reported to a Quality Assurance Manager and then to the corporation's president, Allan Stubbs. The function of the Quality Control personnel was to assure compliance with the employer's internal quality control manual which in turn was intended to satisfy the quality control requirements of the contractor, Bechtel, the Arizona Public Service Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Claimant was hired as a Quality Control Inspector on June 1, 1981, by the Quality Assurance Manager, Robert Jacobson. Jacobson was headquartered at the company offices in Gardens, California, but made periodic visits to the job site. Jacobson trained complainant as well as two to three other inspectors who reported to him. On or about July 31, 1981, complainant was promoted to Quality Control Supervisor which meant that he supervised two other Quality Control Inspectors. His work involved scheduling inspections at the time that Bechtel poured concrete or engaged in other parts of the construction process. The inspectors observed calibration of gauges, greasing of tendons, and other elements of the construction process. A considerable amount of the inspectors' work involved paper work documenting the appropriate construction procedures. In November of 1981 Jacobson resigned fulltime employment and was thereafter retained by the employer as a part-time consultant. Thereafter, complainant, as the on-site Quality Control


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Supervisor, was instructed to report directly to the president of the company, who for internal purposes assumed the additional title of Assistant Quality Assurance Manager.

    The gist of the complaint in this case is that throughout his tenure with the employer complainant had many difficulties with the production superintendent Guffey. Examples cited were incidents when complainant felt that Guffey was violating prescribed procedures in terms of installing tendons out of sequence; when Guffey asked complainant to certify certain Bechtel welders, which complainant felt he was not qualified to do (thus he refused); when complainant felt that Guffey was using the wrong gauge to measure the stress on tendons and complainant reported the incident to the company president (who in turn directed Guffey to stop the practice); and when complainant felt that Guffey was not properly greasing tendons as they were installed. Complainant testified that he was tired of calling Jacobson almost daily and he believed he could best obtain support for his ongoing problems with Guffey from the local state quality assurance overseers. Therefore he started "working closely" with Arizona Public Service officials in September of 1981. In sum, the best characterization of the situation was that given by former Quality Assurance Manager Jacobson who stated that he did not think Guffey knew all the quality control procedures or understood how they were to be followed, and that the kind of "butting heads" that occurred between complainant and Guffey was a "habitual problem" between production and quality control personnel in the industry.

    Beginning shortly after the resignation of Jacobson as fulltime Quality Assurance Manager in November 1981, the employer's president, who has been in the business for over 30 years, began making periodic on-site visits in the course of which he for the first time became personally acquainted with complainant and his job performance. Specifically, between December 8, 1981 and early March of 1982, he observed what he considered to be inadequate quality control procedures within his organization at the site; e.g., finding that complainant and another inspector had spent all night on the job, that calculations and record-keeping were not being done in the best possible manner. As a consequence, he gave informal instructional lessons to complainant and the other inspectors and by early March 1982, which coincided with the completion of the first of three of the planned units at the Palo Verde project, he had decided to revamp his quality control operation for


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the next phases. Accordingly, on March 11, 1982, after complainant had been called back to the Gardena headquarters for a session involving paper-work that had to be finalized for submission to Bechtel at that juncture, complainant was informed that he was being terminated. At the time there were no other inspectors on the job as they had either been laid off or had quit.

    Although complainant never filed or caused any enforcement proceeding under the Act, I find that his quality control job activity, by its very definition, and his contacts with the Arizona Public Service representatives responsible for overseeing compliance with nuclear reactor installations, broadly construed constituted "action to carry out the purposes of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a)(3); 29 C.F.R. 24.2(a)(3).

    I do not find, however that complainant was discharged because he engaged in such protected activities. Rather, he was terminated because, notwithstanding his satisfactory job performance under Jacobson, once Jacobson had departed and complainant came under the direct scrutiny of Stubbs, his performance was found less than what Stubbs wanted for the future staffing of his quality control operations at the Palo Verde project. The clear import of the testimony is that in effect the training of the quality control inspectors by Jacobson did not produce the expert habits and know-how desired by the more experienced Stubbs. And it was complainant's misfortune to fall victim to this happenstance. It is noted that complainant was never admonished or otherwise told by the employer that he should not continue "butting heads" with Guffey or that he should not continue "working closely" with Arizona Public Service representatives, and that in their depositions neither the Arizona Public Service representatives (Fowler and Forrester) nor Bechtel's Quality Assurance Manager (Robertson) claimed that complainant was ever dissuaded from contacting them or maintaining his assigned responsibilities regarding Guffey and the operations under him. Also, it is uncontroverted that when complainant was replaced by Pam Donigan as Quality Control Inspector (and then Quality Assurance Manager), she was given no advice or instruction either to decrease vigilance of Guffey's operational activities or stop contacts with assigned regulatory representatives. Finally, I fully credit the testimony of the employer's president that, notwithstanding Guffey's relationship with complainant, when complainant was to be replaced by Ms. Donigan, Guffey in fact recommended that complainant be retained as the


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inspector under her. Mr. Stubbs chose another inspector, however, because he thought it would not be prudent to retain complainant in a demoted status.

    In summary, having weighed the record in its entirety I find no evidence that complainant's discharge was a pretext or retaliation for his differences with operations superintendent Guffey, or that the employer had any reason to chastise or stop complainant from enforcing the safety requirements on the nuclear project. I am convinced that Guffey's actions were basically attributable to his naturally gruff demeanor and his professional interest in getting production done on schedule, and that the employer's decision not to retain complainant for the next phase of the project was a legitimate business judgment. In short, this is not a "dual motive" case; I find no evidence that complainant would not have been discharged "but for" his engaging in the aforesaid protected activities. See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 273 (1977); Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1982); Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hospital v. Marshall, 629 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1980). I therefore conclude that there has been no violation of the Act and regulations, that the complaint is without merit and it should be denied.

ORDER

    It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of Labor reverse the July 2, 1982, determination of the Director of Enforcement of the wage and Hour Division and deny the complaint.

       ALFRED LINDEMAN
       Administrative Law Judge

Dated: APR 21 1983
San Francisco, California

AL:scm

[ENDNOTES]

1 It is noted that the hearing was not held until said date in part because complainant requested and was granted, over objections by the employer, continuances of two previously scheduled hearing dates before other administrative law judges. See 29 C.F.R. § 24.3(a). Also, because of said postponements and the opportunity they afforded for appropriate discovery measures, the March 16, 1983, motion by the Solicitor of Labor to quash complainant's subpoena of the Wage and Hour Division's investigatory files was granted.

2 The Act provides in relevant part:

No employer, including a . . . contractor or a subcontractor of a [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission licensed or applicant, may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee . . .

(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a . . . proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or;

(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such proceeding or in any other manner in such proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act, of 1954, as amended.

(emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a). The implementing regulations state that:

any person is deemed to have violated the particular federal law and these regulations if such person intimidates, threatens, restrains, coerces, blacklists, discharges, or in any other manner discriminates against any employee . . . .

who has engaged in any activity set forth in the statute. 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(b).



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