U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse
Room 409
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Case No. 81-ERA-3
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
In the Matter of:
CAMERON DREW
Complainant
v.
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER
AND LIGHT COMPANY
Respondent
Appearances:
Ray J. Barson
For Complainant
Charles F. Waskevich, Jr.
For Respondent
Before: ROBERT M. GLENNON
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
This is a so-called "whistle-blower" complaint filed in
accordance with a special employee-protection provision of the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. § 5851), and the
[Page 2]
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, at 29 C.F.R. § 24
(1980), implementing the employee protection provisions of the
statute. By that complaint Cameron Drew, of Yardville, NJ, has
alleged that the Jersey Central Power and Light Company, of
Morristown, New Jersey, discharged him from its employment in
retaliation for activities protected by the statute. Jersey
Central, a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities System, is
engaged in the business of generating electrical power at a number
of power stations in New Jersey, including a plant at Oyster Creek,
a nuclear power plant.
In substance Mr. Drew contends that he was discharged because
he raised questions about the safety of Jersey Central's procedures
and activities at the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant and because
he cooperated with the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in reporting those problems.
In substance, Respondent, Jersey Central, contends that it
discharged Drew for legitimate business reasons. In its own words,
Respondent "categorically denies that any alleged assistance
Complainant may have given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in any
way resulted in the termination of his employment."
A regional office of the U.S. Department of Labor conducted an
informal investigation of the complaint, as provided for in the
governing regulations, 29 C.F.R § 24.5, and issued its finding in a
letter dated November 5, 1980. That letter advised the parties of
its conclusion:
. . . That Cameron Drew was a protected employee
engaging in a protected activity within the ambit
of the Energy Reorginazation Act of 1974, and that
discrimination as defined and prohibited by the
Statute was a factor in the actions which comprise
his complaint. . . .
The DOL letter, accordingly, directed the reinstatement of Mr. Drew
and payment of compensatory damages. In accordance with the DOL
regulations, 29 C.F.R 24.4 (D)(3), the Respondent requested a
hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The
procedures governing the hearing are detailed at 29 C.F.R 24.5.
[Page 3]
The matter has been subject of a public hearing at Treton,
N.J., with hearing sessions taking place on December 2, 1980 and
February 18, April 14, and October 14, 1981. Post-hearing briefs
were filed by the parties on March 4, 1982.
1. The General Factual Background. The document which
initiated this proceeding, a 6-page memorandum by which Drew stated
his complaint to the U.S. Department of Labor on September 30,
1980, presents his detailed version of the Events and Circumstances
which caused his firing. In Drew's version, two "whistle-blowing"
contacts with officials of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
occurring nearly a year apart, were the crucial and causal events.
The first of these two contacts between Drew and the NRC
inspectors took place in November 1978 at a time when Jersey
Central was working to conclude a scheduled "outage" at the Oyster
Creek nuclear plant. Drew's testimony is that a welder approached
him and questioned the quality of a four-inch stainless steel valve
intended to be welded into the water quality system. Drew stated:
. . . he informed me that one side of the valve
had a welded flange which had been welded by the
contractor who supplied the valve and since the
weld was defective he refused to weld the other
side because he might be held responsible for the
flange weld also. After inspecting the valve in
question, I concurred it was faulty and went to
the QA Department on-site.
The "QA Department" referred to was Jersey Central's own Quality
Assurance Department, the staff responsible for ensuring compliance
with safety procedures mandated by federal law, among other things.
Drew had two concerns, and expressed them to the QA
supervisor at the Oyster Creek plant. First, he believed that the
manufacturer of the valve was not on the QA Department's approved
list of suppliers, and secondly, in any event, that there was an
apparent defect in a weld on the valve itself.
The QA supervisor conceded only that the weld did not look
right, "cosmetically," but declined to intervene to prevent its
installation as Drew proposed. Instead, Drew was told he could
file a non-conformance report (NCR) to report his concerns formally
within the company. In addition, the engineering department staff
suggested that Drew conduct a hydro-testing of the valve, at twice
[Page 4]
the working pressure, in order to allay his concerns about the
safety of the valve. Drew refused to perform such a test since he
believed it would not satisfy the governing safety regulations.
Drew did fill out a company non-conformance report (NCR), and
took it to William Popow, the Jersey Central official directing the
"outage" process, for his signature. Drew's testimony is that Mr.
Popow reacted as follows:
. . . After reading and hearing my explanations,
he ordered me to tear up the report, I refused and
he again repeated that it was "none of my damm
business and tear up that report." I stubbornly
refused and left his office. . . .
Then, Drew testified:
I went to the NRC office and reported to Mr.
Ernest Journigan an NRC inspector just what had
happened. He looked at the valve and went to
another NRC inspector who was more knowlegable in
welding and he in turn went directly to the
assistant superintendent of the Company and within
a few minutes I was called by the assistant
superintendent and ordered to "fix the valve the
way you want it fixed." The valve was repaired
and installed within 24 hours after one week of
trying to deal with Mr. Popow.
The NCR report which Drew Filled out itself became the focal
point in the second of Drew's alleged whistle-blower sessions with
the NRC staff. Drew retained the original copy of the NCR form and
took it home. Then, in the Fall of 1979, during an essentially
routine audit of Jersey Central's compliance records, the NRC staff
discovered that the NCR report registered by Drew had not been
"closed" in accordance with governing QA procedures. Drew, among
others, was called by the NRC auditors to explain his part in this
filing or processing of the NCR, and he discussed the entire matter
with them again, on October 3, 1979.
On August 17, 1979, shortly before this second contact with
the NRC, after a meeting with his supervisor and other Company
officials in which his attitude and performance were discussed,
Drew was placed in a probationary status. Two weeks later Drew was
shown his annual written performance evaluation, which showed a
[Page 5]
significantly lower rating than he had ever before received in his
5 years in the Company. On September 4, 1980, he was advised that
he had not performed adequately during probation, and that he was
discharged from employment.
In broad outline, Jersey Central's version of its dealings
with Drew is that his general performance and behavior had so
deteriorated by mid-1980 that the decision to terminate his
employment was a reasonable and proper business decision. John
Skorka was the man who directly supervised Drew for most of his
time as an employee of Jersey Central. Mr. Skorka hired Cameron
Drew in January 1975 to be a "welding supervisor." Drew's first
assignment was to establish a program for training and testing
welders in accordance with applicable governmental and insurance
regulations. Skorka recalls that Drew performed very
satisfactorily in handling that first general assignment in his
first two years or so in the Company, but that Drew's performance
declined thereafter. Drew increasingly had difficulty dealing with
people in other departments of the Company, according to Skorka.
He tried to assert more personal authority, in a variety of
situations, than was contained in his job assignment. He showed a
difficult personality. He was a highly individualistic worker
resistant to authority.
2. The Contentions of the Parties. In his post-hearing
brief, the Complainant summarizes the facts of record and urges
his position that the Company (a) treated Cameron Drew differently
from other employees, (b) placed him on probation, and (c)
terminated him, all as a result of his cooperation with the NRC, a
cooperation which prevented his being "a member of the Family." He
contends that the various reasons advanced by Respondent in this
proceeding are merely pretextual for unlawfully discriminatory
actions.
In its post hearing brief, Respondent contends (1) that the
U.S. Department of Labor lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
complaint, arguing that the actions of Cameron Drew in this matter
constituted a deliberate violation of law within the meaning of
subsection (g) of the "whistle-blower" statute (42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(g)), which denies protection to any employee who deliberately
causes such a violation; (2) that Complainant has failed to state a
claim authorized under the statute, but merely unsubstantiated
allegations showing his disagreement with the Company's actions
here; and (3) that Complainant has failed to satisfy his burden,
under Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, - - - U.S.
- - -, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981), of proving by a preponderance of the
[Page 6]
evidence that he was improperly discharged for an impermissible.
reason. In general terms, the Company contends that its suspension
and firing of Cameron Drew were not motivated in any degree as a
retaliatory matter, and that, in fact, Drew simply was not
performing his job at an acceptable level.
3. The Applicable Regulatory Law. The question presented by
the Complaint is whether Cameron Drew was discharged as a
consequence of his having engaged in a protected activity. The
governing statutory protection, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a), provides as
follows:
No employer, including a Commission licensee,
an applicant for a Commission license, or a
contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission
licensee or applicant, may discharge any employee
or otherwise discriminate against any employee
with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment because
the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a
request of the employee)
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about
to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding
. . . for the administration or enforcement of
any requirement imposed. . .
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist
or participate in any manner in such a proceeding
or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in
any other action to carry out the purposes of this
Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Subsection (g) of 42 U.S.C. 5851 provides as follows:
Subsection (a) of this section shall not
apply with respect to any employee who, acting
without direction from his or her employer (or the
employer's agent), deliberately causes a violation
of any requirement of this chapter or of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
[Page 7]
4. Certain Evidentiary Matters. In response to a subpoena
authorized by me, the Respondent made available to Complainant,
approximately two weeks prior to the last trial session, records
purported to be the Company's personnel records of Cameron Drew.
Complainant's counsel did make use of the documents in that file in
the course of his examination of witnesses in that last trial
session, and it was agreed, at the conclusion of the trial, that
Respondent would provide copies of all those documents for
inclusion in the evidentiary record as a late-filed exhibit.
Respondent did thereafter furnish copies of those documents
for the formal evidentiary record. Complainant interposed no
obejction to any of the documents, and I am receiving them into
evidence, collectively, as "late-filed exhibit-personnel records."
The principal documents included are itemized below.
DateAuthorAddressee
08-10-79 Cameron Drew W. Popow
08-10-79 " G. Kelcec
08-21-79 " G. Kelcec
09-12-79 " J. Skorka
11-21-79 " G. Kelcec
12-07-79 " G. Kelcec
08-24-79 George Kelcec C. Drew
11-29-79 " C. Drew
09-20-79 W. Popow C. Drew
11-16-79 " C. Drew
12-21-79 " C. Drew
06-27-80 S. Saha S. Singleton
02-05-80 Carol Tokar J. Skorka
09-04-80 Wayne K. Greenleaf File
10-29-80 L.E. Briggs U.S. DOL
In addition to these documents the exhibit contains a variety
of essentially routine personnel records reflecting no particular
significance for the matters in issue in this proceeding.
At the hearing Respondent introduced, as a part of Exhibit
No. 8, a copy of the same letter identified in the listing above as
the document dated 10-28-80 authorized by L.E. Briggs, addressed to
the U.S. Department of Labor. On objection by Complainant, Exhibit
No. 8 was received in evidence only for a limited procedural
purpose, related to the issuance of certain subpoenas duces tecum.
[Page 8]
It was otherwise ruled in essence that statements contained in the
attached documents offered by Respondent to prove the accuracy of
the matters there asserted were inadmissable hearsay. Neither the
purported author of the document, Mr. Briggs, nor its recipient,
Mr. S. Friedman, was offered as a witness in this proceeding.
Respondent did not articulate at the hearing any particular
exception to the general hearsay rule which would argue cogently
for admission. On posthearing brief, Respondent argues in essence
that there are sufficient circumstantial indicia to guarantee
trustworthiness of that document to justify its receipt in evidence
in this case. On review of this matter I am inclined to agree
with Respondent. Accordingly, Exhibit No 8 is received into
evidence. The central assertion of fact therein for which
Respondent argues admission--that NRC inspector Briggs discovered
the defective valve weld in November 1978 independently of Drew's
report of that defect to NRC inspector Jernigan--is corroborated by
other evidence of record, the uncontradicted testimony of Mr.
Fuller, which I do credit in this respect.
5. Complainant's Performance as an Employee. Drew was
hired
in January 1975 at a time when Jersey Central was reorganizing its
corporate structure. As particularly pertinent here, three new
departments had recently been organized, the Engineering
Department, the Quality Assurance Department, and the Maintenance
Department. John Skorka, then a supervisor in the new Maintenance
Department, interviewed a number of applicants and selected Drew to
be the "welding supervisor" in the Maintenance Department. A
substantial number of new employees were to be hired as a result of
the reorganzation, including twelve or so welders. Drew's first
general assignment was to establish an in-house program or
procedure for instructing and testing the Company's welders, a
function previously performed by outside contractors or insurance
carriers. Drew's job was essentially "advisory" in nature, rather
than "operational," in the sense that he was expected to write
welding procedures and give advice rather than perform welding or
supervise a staff of employees. At particular times, however, he
was expected to perform or supervise special welding assignments.
Skorka testified that Drew "did a commendable job" for the
first two years or so. Skorka testifed:
I was very well pleased. I hired him for a
purpose and I think that there was enough work for
him at that particular time to focus his energies
in this line of work and he did produce what we
wanted him to produce.
[Page 9]
The original expectation was that, for organizational
purposes, Drew would report to a mechanical engineer, who in turn
would report to Skorka. Because of budget and staffing
limitations, however, that engineer position was not filled until
January 1979. Skorka, accordingly, was Drew's direct supervisor
from January 1975 until January 1979.
It is Skorka's testimony that after Drew essentially completed
his first general assignment, that is, after the first two years or
so, he increasingly became a "problem" employee. Drew's
personality was such that he would seek and assert more
responsibility than other people, supervisors or associates, would
want him to have. In 1977, Skorka's own supervisor directed that a
welding manual be prepared for the Company with the intent to place
copies in the various power stations as a reference manual for the
field employees. The manual would give guidance to the on-station
welders to cover routine welding situations and problems, thus
avoiding repeated referrals to the headquarters staff for guidance
in all situations. Drew was given responsibility to prepare the
manual and he did so. But then, in 1977, within a few months of
issuance, Drew recalled the manuals from the field stations.
Skorka believes Drew merely wanted to retain power or authority in
himself at headquarters, and simply recalled the manuals "under the
pretense that he had some changes to make in the numbering
system."
Despite advice from Skorka and his superiors that they really
wanted the manual returned for use in the field generating
stations, Drew held off on the redistribution of the manual until
1979 when a new person, Guy Cheruvenko, was hired [in January 1979]
to be the mechanical engineer in the Maintenance Department and
Drew's immediate supervisor. In June or July 1979, the manual was
again distributed to the various generating stations. Asked why
Drew had deferred the redistribution of the manuals Skorka
testified:
Yes, we had many discussions and it was the
philosophy with Mr. Drew that this manual did not
belong in the stations, that the people were not
qualified or could not use it and he was the only
one qualified to give any type of direction as far
as welding and therefore he just didn't want that
manual in his stations.
[Page 10]
In late 1976, Drew was instructed to write a program to qualify
the Company for issuance of an "R-Stamp," which would be an
authorization by New Jersey to allow the Company to perform its own
welding repairs on boilers or other pressure vessels, using its own
employee staff. The Company intended this program, initially at
least, to cover only its work in its fossil fuel power generating
stations, not its nuclear plant. Drew was asked to work on the
"R-Stamp" program because the QA Department, which normally would
have been given that specific assignment, was then deeply involved
in other work for the nuclear power station at Oyster Creek. The
"R-Stamp" was a new regulatory development, and the fossil fuel
generating manager was anxious to qualify the Company under that
new program. Skorka's staff, the Maintenance Department,
accordingly was asked to take on this special assignment, to avoid
waiting for the QA department to get to this particular problem.
Drew did draft an "R-Stamp" program, within two or three
months, but neither Skorka nor his own superior accepted some
central elements in Drew's plan. Drew's plan centered
responsibility to his own staff position. Skorka's supervisor
showed Drew's draft plan to the manager of QA Department and to the
vice-president in charge of power generation, and they, in effect,
took the project out of Drew's hands. The QA Department initially
handled pertinent repair problems on an ad hoc basis, and then, in
1978, the QA Department developed and established its own R-Stamp
program.
Drew's version of the R-Stamp situation differs in a number of
respects from the summary given here. Where the differences occur,
however, I have credited the testimony of Mr. Skorka as a fully
credible witness in this matter and as the person in a better
position to know the material details in issue.
Also in 1977, Drew was assigned to draft revisions of the
so-called "7000-Series," a series of quality assurance welding
procedures governing certain administrative functions and welding
requirements applicable to weldings performed by the Maintenance
Department. After a period of time, Skorka was not satisfied with
Drew's progress, and a committee was formed to take over the work.
The committee consisted of Drew himself, and a representative for
each of the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. This
[Page 11]
committee did not make much progress either, and Skorka then
assigned two engineers to draft the revisions. Thereafter, until
completion of the project in 1979, Drew was relegated to a
secondary role, giving advice rather than leading the project. The
work on this project was completed in mid-1979, after Skorka's own
comparatively new supervisor, William Popow, became involved in the
matter, and pushed for its completion.
In general, Skorka testified that Drew would not work
harmoniously with other staff, in the QA and Engineering
Departments, particularly. To Skorka, Drew projected an attitude
that only he, Drew, was the expert on welding, and that those who
disagreed with him were not qualified to decide matters in issue
and that he should be given more authority in such matters.
Skorka testified:
I've addressed it to him time and time again
because we've had conflicts with both Engineering
and QA feeling that he was imposing on them,
trying to get them to accept his view points, not
trying to compromise. There were many times when
I had some good ideas and those were acceptable,
but if they were not, they were not accepted. But
to Mr. Drew, it was felt that you have not right
not to accept anything that I [Drew] tell you
people.
Skorka had a role in the events which led to Drew's probation
in August 1979. In late July, Popow, Skorka's immediate
supervisor, asked him to prepare a report on his experiences and
observations concerning Drew. Drew's status came to a head at, this
time, Skorka testified, when Drew's immediate supervisor between
January and July, Guy Cheruvenko, left the Company and, in that
process, stated strong criticism of Drew's attitude as an
employee. Skorka testified:
The reason this thing came to a head, mainly
because we introduced another supervisor into the
chain, who was Mr. Cheruvenko, and there were a
considerable amount of problems there. And when
Mr. Cheruvenko left he let it be known that there
was subordination [sic] involved and that
something should be done about this particular
individual.
[Page 12]
That's when the ball started rolling, that it
could no longer go on the way it was.
On August 2, Skorka gave Popow his report on Drew. The report
did not recommend Drew's probation, but on August 17 Popow and
Skorka did meet with Drew and placed him on a probationary status.
On August 22 Skorka completed his annual performance evaluation of
Drew giving him an overall rating low enough, in practical effect,
to indicate unsatisfactory performance. Although Cheruvenko had
been Drew's immediate supervisor in the half-year or so prior to
August 1979, Skorka had been working at the same field office site
as Drew from May 1979 on, and had observed his performance directly
there.
Prior to the time Cameron Drew was placed on probation he had
received highly favorable annual written employee performance
evaluations. A form checklist was used by the Company in
performing that evaluation, itemizing 17 particular categories of
analysis, such as "working relationship," "productivity," "job
knowledge," etc., and an 18th category for an "overall
evaluation." Each category is marked on a scale of 1 to 9, with 9
representing "Distinguished;" 7 and 8 as "Commendable"; 2 and 3 as
"Fair;" and 1 as "Marginal."
In July 1975, Drew received an overall evaluation of 6, the
highest score in the "competent" range, with his particular
category marks ranging between 5 and 7. In each of the three
succeeding years, the last of them given in September 1978, his
overall evaluation was a 7, or "Commendable." No category was
marked lower than a 6 in 1976 or 1977, and only one category,
"working relationship," received a 5 in 1978.
In the September 1979 annual evaluation, the one prepared by
Skorka on August 22, Drew received an overall evaluation of 3, the
higher of the two "fair" range of values shown. The Company's
Director of Personnel stated that a rating in the 3 or 4 range is
"low," "showing that there is a problem." In particular
categories, Drew was given two 6 ratings, two 5 ratings, three 4
ratings, seven 3 ratings, and two 2 ratings. The two lowest
ratings were for "working relationship" and "analytical ability."
Drew was given a 3 for "productivity" and a 5 for "job knowledge."
[Page 13]
Each of the annual evaluations was performed by John Skorka,
and reviewed by one or more of Skorka's supervisors. The reviewer
for the September 1979 evaluation was William Popow.
Skorka testified that he had been pleased with Drew's
performance in the first two years and that those first two annual
ratings reflected his true opinion. For the latter two years,
however, Skorka said he gave Drew the high ratings to ensure his
annual pay increases, and thus give him incentive to get his
performance back to what he had shown he could offer. Skorka
testified:
Your rating was that I was very pleased with you
initially and they were good ratings.
Later on, you still received good ratings with my
counselling, telling you that you have certain
difficulties and that they should be corrected.
And Mr. Kelcec also sat down with you to talk
these things over.
When he gave Drew the 1978 rating, dropping him from a 6 to a 5 in
working relationship and from a 7 to a 6 in productivity, he did
explain to Drew that he was "having problems along this way."
Skorka said that, despite the high ratings, Drew should not have
assumed he was "doing a good job," because he was then being
appraised of his shortcomings.
Skorka and Drew had an informal, "very good relationship"
for the first two years, because, he testified:
. . . your attitude seemed to have been changed
considerably and you wouldn't be treated as a
member of the family.
In other words, it seemed to, me that I had to get
the point across that I'm serious that this is not
acceptable.
. . . I got more formal with you after a certain
portion of time because it seemed to me that I
could not just operate the way I did, very
informally, because I think I was being used to a
certain extent and I had all sorts of problems
coming in from other people and I was not very
happy about the situation because you really were
my man and you were not living up to my
expectations.
[Page 14]
Although William Popow did not appear as a witness in the
hearing, it is clear that there was a special, adversarial aspect
to relations between he and Cameron Drew. Popow had been hired by
Jersey Central in March 1978 to take over a newly created
position. The new position mirrored his prior job for the General
Electric Company which previously had contracted to do all the
outage planning, and the maintenance and construction during the
outages for Jersey Central at the Oyster Creek nuclear power
station. In 1978, Jersey Central began to do this work in-house,
rather than contracting with General Electric for it. It became
Popow's job to manage the same outage Functions at Oyster Creek for
Jersey Central as he had managed for General Electric as its
contractor.
Drew's written complaint describes their continuing conflict
as follows:
The next phase of my career with the company
involved unavoidable "clashes" with a Mr. Bill
Popow who at that time was employed by General
Electric Company as a field service engineer.
General Electric was under contract for Oyster
Creek's scheduled and emergency shutdowns. Since
it was my responsibility to review the welding
procedures Mr. Popow used, we frequently came into
conflict because he was trying to get the job done
as cheaply as he could For G.E., and I was trying
to get the best and safest job done, where welding
was concerned, for JCP&L. Two years ago Mr. Popow
was hired by the assistant vice-president as our
department director and it was the beginning of
the end of my career with JCP&L. I felt it was
retaliatory.
The first shut-down after his joining the company
almost one and one-half years ago at Oyster Creek,
we had a very real problem of communication. it
was quite evident and can easily be proven in
company correspondence that Mr. Popow was not
about to cooperate with or even tolerate me. We
consistently disagreed over code requirements and
interpretations, welding quality, QA involvement,
and Engineering involvement. On one project in
[Page 15]
particular, the control rod drive water quality
valve which was a nuclear safety related system at
the Oyster Creek plant caused me to take drastic
action.
The "drastic action" referred to was Drew's reporting the
defective valve to an NRC inspector during the November 1978
outage.
Mr. S.K. Saha joined the Company on November 19, 1979, as the
senior welding engineer in the Maintenance Department, filling the
position held by Guy Cheruvenko between January and June of 1979.
Mr. Saha became Drew's immediate supervior in this position. Saha
retained this position until February 1981 when he was transferred
to a position with a holding company affiliate of Jersey Central,
the General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation at Reading,
Pennsylvania.
When Saha joined the Company he was informed of Drew's
probationary status, but said he tried to take a fresh look at
Drew's performance as an employee. Shortly after Saha joined the
Company it began another scheduled, but extended, outage at the
Oyster Creek nuclear station, from January to mid-July 1980.
Saha characterized his observations of Cameron Drew as marking
three phases. The first phase was the first two months of Saha's
employment, the time just prior to a January-July outage at Oyster
Creek. In his preparation for the outage, Saha reviewed the
existing welding procedures and the qualifications of the welders
and found "many" violations of regulatory requirements. In fact,
he stated, some of the welding procedures were in disarray, and in
violation of the governing regulatory codes. Saha proceeded to
"requalify" those procedures and also the welders who would be
using them. Saha testified:
Previous to my coming, Mr. Drew was responsible
for qualification of all of the welding
procedures. And he should have known that some of
these welding procedures, they did not meet
construction codes requirements.
[Page 16]
Proper welding technique involves a two-factor testing process
for qualification. First, the precise procedures and materials
that must be used to provide a satisfactory weld must be identified
and approved in advance. Secondly, the welders who will perform
the particular welding work must demonstrate that they are
qualified to do so.
The second "phase" of Saha's dealings with Drew took
place in the early months of the 1980 outage. In mid-February, Saha
assigned Drew to assist at Oyster Creek in supervising or helping
out welders in certain "problem," or more difficult, welding
situations. On one ocassion then, when Drew was assigned by Saha
to help out a job supervisor on a particular welding job, Saha
learned from the job supervisor that Drew had unilaterally changed
the pertinent welding procedure. Saha testified:
And I had issued technical instructions to repair
that. And, two days later, two or three days
later, I had assigned Mr. Drew the second shift
operation, but two or three days later, the job
supervisor, he called me and he said on one of
these instructions, welding procedure
instructions, Mr. Drew had changed the diameter of
the welding rod. If that was acceptable to me. I
said no because that is a technical violation of
the instruction code, and he said that he had
crossed it out and he had signed his name to it
This is one of the examples.
A few days later another incident took place in which Saha
learned that Drew was instructing a welder to follow a procedure
different from that directed by Saha. Since the particular welding
problem was one which had given difficulties in prior outages, and
had been the subject of special training attention prior to this
outage, Saha believed that Drew's contrary instructions to the
welder were given knowingly by him.
The third stage of Saha's dealings with Drew involved his
general observations of Drew on a day-to-day basis in the
succeeding months until August 1980, when he was asked for a
recommendation and report on Cameron Drew's general performance. At
the end of August Saha met with the management and personnel group
to discuss and consider Drew's status at the end of his one-year
probationary period. In June, Saha had prepared a detailed report
of Drew's performance for the prior six-month period. That report
[Page 17]
pointed out some problems or continuing difficulties in supervising
Drew, but generally was hopeful of change. Saha wrote:
To summarize Mr. Drew's performance evaluation, I
can see a slow change towards the better. This
applies to his performance, attitude and dealing
with others. However, his work must be closely
supervised and scrutinized. At this stage there
is no way for me to predict whether or not a "slow
change towards the better in him" will have a
lasting effect.
At the end of August in 1980 at a meeting on Drew's
probationary status, Saha recommended his termination. Saha said
he found more problems with Drew's work in July and August 1980.
He testified:
. . . During the months of July and August, I
uncovered some more material, welding procedures
which were old welding procedures, which were not
adequately tested, full of mistakes and errors,
that were developed by Mr. Drew and were used at
various power stations of the Company.
Saha also testified:
. . . I felt, as a matter of fact even to the
final weeks, he maintained the concept that the
contruction codes are for guidance only, at least.
that is what he kept telling me, and I didn't see
- - I was not convinced that he would follow them
in the future. I was not convinced about it.
The Director of Personnel and Labor Relations for Jersey
Central, John J. Westervelt, became involved in the question of
Drew's status in the Summer of 1980 when he became aware that there
would probably be a recommendation to terminate Drew's employment
at the end of his probation. Because the one-year probationary
status had been an unusually long one, and because Drew was a
comparatively long-term employee, Westervelt personally reviewed
Drew's personnel file. He then became aware that Drew had had
highly favorable performance evaluations prior to his probation,
and for a long period of time. Westervelt then arranged a meeting
in August 1980, with Saha, Skorka, Popow and several other
[Page 18]
management staff people to review the situation. He recalls being
most impressed by Saha's comments and recommendation. He did not
learn of Drew's dealings with the NRC until several weeks after the
firing, when Drew himself raised that concern.
At Drew's request after the firing, Westervelt arranged a
meeting for Drew with Mr. Finfrock, a Company vice-president, and
Westervelt himself. Drew at the meeting negotiated for a
reinstatement elsewhere in the holding company structure. Drew was
told that he would be allowed to interview at the other companies
within the corporate structure, but that these companies would be
told the circumstances of his termination at Jersey Central. At
the close of the meeting, Drew advised Wetervelt that he felt that
he had been discriminated against for talking with the NRC, that
that discrimination was the cause of his firing, and that he might
seek to appeal his firing in the legal system.
Steven H. Fuller, the QA supervisor at Oyster Creek, testified
at the hearing in this proceeding. He joined Jersey Central at
about the same time as Cameron Drew, and he has known and worked
with Drew at various times over the years. He was assigned to the
QA staff at Oyster Creek at the time of the so-called flange
incident in November 1978, although he was not then the QA site
supervisor there.
As to the flange incident, he recalls that although Drew may
have been correct that the valve supplier was not on the QA
"approved list" at the time the valve was ordered, Drew was wrong
in the conclusions he drew from that fact. First, he testified,
the QA program did allow acceptance of a product from a vendor not
on the "approved list" provided a specific prior evaluation of the
vendor was performed prior to delivery of the product. Such an
evaluation had been conducted in the case of the valve supplied in
the 1978 outage. Secondly, the vendor in question had in fact been
placed on the "approved list" by the time the 1978 November flange
incident occurred. There is no claim made by the Company, or
Fuller, however, that these justifications were made known to Drew
at the time of the incident.
Mr. Fuller is the person who, at the time of the flange
incident, advised Drew how to file an NCR report. He testified
that it is Company policy to inform employees that they have
authority and ability to fill out and document non-comformance of
quality or safety standards they feel may be a problem. The filing
[Page 19]
of NCR's is not discouraged in any way by the Company. In fact,
NCR's are filed with some frequency: the Oyster Creek plant alone
averages anywhere from 500 to 1000 such filings a year, according
to Mr. Fuller.
When Drew raised his question about the quality of the welded
flange he took Fuller to see that valve. Fuller testified:
Q. Mr. Drew took you over to see the valve?
A. Yes. He did. The valve had been taken from
the store room to the -- or near the job location,
a pre-fab shop and the crate hadn't been opened
until it was delivered to the pre-fab shop. Mr.
Drew showed me the weld that was in question. I
looked at it. I agreed with him that cosmetically
it did not look, quote "very good" unquote. The
identification of whether or not Mr. Drew should
file a non-conformance form came after that.
The conversation regarding what he should do and
how he should fill out the form came after that.
I told him that once he described the
nonconformance, it would have to come back to me. I
would review it against the requirements and, at
that point, we would have to either validate the
non-comformance as being a true violation of the
established requirements or we would have to
invalidate it.
As to the NRC's Performance Appraisal Board's (PAB) audit in
October 1979, Mr. Fuller testified that while this kind of audit
was a comparatively new NRC procedure, it was in essence a routine
matter, that is, one not triggered by any special problem. The PAB
audit disclosed that Drew's NCR had not been formally closed out.
Jersey Central's QA staff apparently did not "close out" the NCR
because it lacked the original copy of the form. Drew had retained
the original copy, as Fuller learned after the PAB audit. Lacking
the original, the QA staff had marked a file copy of that NCR as
invalid and considered the matter closed. For all practical
purposes the matter had been closed, but as a technical matter the
formal closure was not effective because the original copy of the
NCR was not on file. The NRC auditors did no "cite" Jersey
Central for any infraction as a result of that technical
non-closure of the NCR, but it did carry the matter as an item on
its agenda of discussion with Jersey Central officials. The NCR
staff did specifically question Dres, Skorka, and Popow about this
matter in early October 1979.
[Page 20]
About two months later, after the PAB audit, and after several
conversations between Fuller and Drew, the orignial was returned by
Drew to Fuller and the matter of this NCR was finally and
formally marked "closed. "
Fuller did testify, however, that rather ironically, Jersey
Central was "cited" by NRC's October 1979 PAB audit team for a
related infraction of the regulations as a result of the flange
incident in November 1978. When Cameron Drew was told by the
Company to go ahead and fix the weld he objected to, he simply went
ahead and had the welding performed as he believed it should have
been done. There was technical procedural problem, however, with
this approach since Drew neglected to obtain a specific prior
approval of his welding procedure, in accordance with governing
quality assurance rules. The welding procedure he did use was
found to be "qualified," after the fact, following the PAB audit,
but it still was a technical violation of the QA rules. No fine or
other sanction was levied against the Company by the NRC as a
result of this infraction.
Mr. Fuller also presented for the record a series of fifteen
Jersey Central NCR's attributable directly to Cameron Drew, or to
persons working under the supervision of Drew. One of these
fifteen NCR'S, initiated on September 26, 1979, simply reflects the
PAB discovery that Drew had gone forward, as just discussed above,
with welding that flange without obtaining a formal QA approval of
the welding procedure.
Two other NCRs relate to certain incidents in May 1977 when
Drew apparently authorized purchase orders of a certain type of
welding wire without review by the QA Department. These reports
show that on June 1, 1977, Drew agreed to secure QA's review of
such purchase orders in the future. These two NCRs seem to
reflect a routine communications problem between two departments
with no special significance for this case.
The other twelve NCRs concerned incidents taking place in
October and November 1978 in the latter stages of the 1978 Oyster
Creek "outage" in which the flange incident occurred. Fuller's
testimony, however, indicates that NCR reports were commonplace at
this time at Oyster Creek, and I see no value in further analysis
of them. It is not at all clear that any or all of these
particular incidents were specifically related to the disciplining
of Drew.
[Page 21]
6. Argument for Summary Dismissal. Respondent's argument
that the complain should be dismissed as a matter of law, within
the meaning of subsection (g) of the statutory protection in issue
(42 U.S.C 5851 (g)) is without merit. There is no substantial
evidence that Complainant deliberately caused any violation of any
requirement of the law. Drew did proceed to repair the defective
valve in November 1978 without benefit of a prior written approval
of his welding procedure for that weld, but he believed he was
acting properly. He also believed he was acting properly when he
kept possession of the original copy of his NCR report. Also, the
various NCR's charged to Drew's performance by Fuller's testimony
do not reflect deliberate causing of violations.
7. Discussion and Conclusion. Examined in a light most
favorable to Complainant this proceeding involves the kind of
situation now generally categorized as a "dual motive" case, that
is, one in which the decision to discharge an employee may have
involved two motivating factors: one a legitimate business reason,
and the other a reaction to employee activity protected by law. In
Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1980),
the National Labor Relations Board reviewed extensively its prior
evidentiary tests for adjudicating dual motivation discharge cases,
and adopted a new formulation:
. . . First, we shall require that the
General Counsel make a prima facie showing
sufficient to support an inference that
protected conduct was a "motivating factor"
in the employer's decision. Once that is
established, the burden will shift to the
employer to demonstrate that same action
would have taken place even in the absence of
the protected conduct. (251 NLRB at 1089).
As noted in Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v.
Donovan, Docket No. 81-4215, decided March 8, 1982, F2 (2d
Cir. 1981), the Wright Line test is an adaptation of the so-called
"but for" test, stated in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The rule is summarized by
the Court in Consolidated Edison to be as follows:
[Page 22]
. . . The [Supreme] Court said that burden
was properly placed upon the employee to show
that his conduct was constitutionally
protected, and that such conduct was a
motivating factor in the Board's decision not
to rehire him. Thereafter, the district
court "should have gone on to determine
whether the Board [of Education] had shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have reached the same decision as to
respondent's [employee's] reemployment even
in the absence of the protected conduct."
This is known as the "but for" test. In
other words the employee would not have been
dismissed but for his engaging in protected
activity.
The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison took note of
apparently conflicting rules in the Circuit Courts as to placement
of the burden of ultimate persuasion in comparable dual motive
discharge cases arising under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), and concluded:
Our view is that we should adopt the rule
enunciated in the Mt. Healthy case which
places the burden on the employer to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have reached the same decision as to the
employee's dismissal even in the absence of
the protected conduct.
The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison specifically adopted this
"but for" test for application to proceedings under the statute in
issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 5851.
On the surface, there are a number of factual elements tending
to establish that Complainant here has made a prima-facie showing
to support an inference that his protected conduct was a motivating
factor in his suspension and discharge. First of all, Cameron Drew
did engage in protected activity, particularly in November 1978
when he refused to "mind his own business," and did report to the
NRC a situation he felt was a safety problem the Company would not
correct. There is evidence that the NRC may have discovered and
acted upon the defective valve independently of Drew's report. But
that same evidence, NRC inspector Briggs' letter, Exhibit No. 8,
[Page 23]
shows that the Company's specific concern was that the NRC had been
"informed" of the defect. Drew had been arguing with the QA Staff
and Mr. Popow for a week about this valve, and it is Drew's
uncontradicted, specific testimony that Popow had reacted angrily,
saying that it was "none of my damn business and tear up that
report." When the NRC reactor inspector reported the defective
valve to the assistant superintendant of the Oyster Creek station,
John Sullivan, Sullivan asked him "if I had been informed of the
weld defect." Then, it was Drew that Sullivan promptly called and
ordered "to fix the valve the way you want." I am persuaded that
Drew did blow a whistle, and that the Company probably knew it and
was concerned about it.
There is circumstantial evidence which could support a finding
that Drew's later probation and subsequent discharge actually were
motivated, in part at least, by his whistle-blowing activity. As
late as September 14, 1978, only a matter of weeks before the
Oyster Creek confrontation in early November, Drew had been given a
formal written evaluation of "Commendable" for his prior year's
performance in the Company. That evaluation had been signed by
three superior Company officials: Skorka, his immediate supervisor
(but who actually had a job position two levels above Drew's
position in the organization); George Kelcek, who was then Skorka's
supervisor; and I.F. Finfrock, a Company vice presdient.
From the "Commendable" rating in September, Drew was
dropped to a marginal or unsatisfactory 3-rating the following August.
Skorka actually assigned the 3-rating to Drew, but only after Popow
had intervened in the matter. This was the first time Skorka had
given one of his technical staff persons an unsatisfactory annual
evaluation. The factual inquiry becomes whether this extraordinary
down grading and disciplining of Drew in August 1979 was due in
some measure, at least, to Company (in the person of Popow,
particularly) concern about his "blowing the whistle" to the NRC in
November 1978.
Taken by itself, the above-summarized factual picture, I
believe, would establish a prima-facie case that Drew's protected
conduct was a motivating factor in his August 1979 discipline.
But on a careful review of the record, I find sufficient
evidence to contradict and overcome Drew's case in this respect.
Cameron Drew for many months had been a stubborn headstrong
employee whom the Company had ample grounds to discipline in August
[Page 24]
1979. While Skorka then regarded Drew as an adequately skilled
technician, he had been frustrated by Drew's attitudes for some
time. Judging by Skorka's demeanor and responses as a witness at
the hearing, and placing his responses in context with other
evidence of record including Drew's testimony, I do credit Skorka's
account of his increasing difficulty and frustration dealing with
Drew's personality as a subordinate employee. I believe that the
marginal or unsatisfactory rating he gave Drew on August 22, 1979
represented his own personal opinion of Drew's overall performance
as an employee.
Drew's own testimony shows a long history of clashes
disagreements, communications problems, non-cooperation, etc.,
between himself and Popow. Drew did not get along either with Guy
Cheruvenko, his immediate supervisor in the months just prior to
August 1979, and I believe Skorka's testimony that Cheruvenko's
criticism of Drew triggered the decision to do the
"something-should-be-done" type of review of "Drew's performance.
It is most probable that, in August 1979, Popow well
remembered his November 1978 disagreements with Drew, including
Drew's "whistle-blowing" report on the valve incident. But Drew's
own testimony makes it clear that there were many other matters to
sustain anger and disagreement between these two men. Drew
believed that Popow's being hired in March 1978 "was the beginning
of the end of my career with JCP&L." Popow was hired at a position
in the Company two or three supervisory levels above Drew, and yet
Drew's own testimony shows Drew continuously confronted Popow
directly on a broad range of management responsibilities, including
"code requirements and interpretations, welding quality, QA
involvement, and Engineering involvement," in Drew's words.
In the face of specific direct evidence of substantial, good
reason for the Company to take a careful new look at Drew's
performance in August 1979, and to begin a formal discipline or
control process for his performance, I conclude that the
circumstantial evidence tending to establish Drew's November 1978
whistle-blowing as a "motivating factor" does not stand above the
level of mere speculation, and that it does not prevail to
establish a prima facie case of motivation.
There was a second occasion, in October 1979, when Cameron
Drew reported on Company activities to the NRC. But the evidence
here does not show that entire occasion as essentially more than a
[Page 25]
routine kind of activity initiated by the NRC on its own. I do not
find substantial evidence, even of a circumstantial nature, to show
that the Company reacted in any way to Drew's participation in that
audit.
When Drew was discharged in August 1980, much of the specific
justification seems to have been based on Mr. Saha's experiences
with Drew. He too had difficulty in controlling Drew, who, even
though he was on probation during Saha's early months on the job,
would unilaterally proceed to change or override Saha's
instructions. I believe Saha's account of his role in Drew's
discharge: that it was Saha's opinion that Drew would not reliably
follow his supervision in the future. I do not Find substantial
evidence, anything beyond mere speculation, to support a finding
that Drew's meeting with, or reports to, the NRC were or became a
"motivating factor" in his being disciplined and discharged by the
Company.
I conclude, therefore, that Complainant here has not made a
prima facie showing sufficient to support an inference that his
protected conduct was a motivating factor in the Company's decision
to discipline or discharge him.
Bearing in mind, however, that the Wright Line and
Consolidated
Edison tests are comparatively new for use in factual situations of
the type involved here, I have also analyzed and evaluated the
evidence just as though Complainant's prima facie threshold burden
had been met. In so doing, I also find that the preponderance of
the evidence is that Drew's superiors at Jersey Central would have
proceeded to discipline him in August 1979 and terminate his
employment in September 1980 even if he had not engaged in this
protected activity.
Cameron Drew performed satisfactorily for the first two years
of his employment at Jersey Central, but thereafter failed to
perform to the satisfaction of the various supervisors, John Skorka
in particular. Skorka continued to give Drew high annual
performance ratings through 1978 to ensure annual pay increases he
believed functioned as incentives to Drew, but he coupled those
ratings with warnings and counseling to be more cooperative and to
work within the limits of his own job assignments. Skorka had
hired Drew, had served as Drew's immediate supervisor for most of
his employment, and had believed that Drew was regarded as "his
man" in the Company. Skorka, accordingly, was increasingly
[Page 26]
frustrated by his inability to control Drew. The essence of
Skorka's criticism of Drew was that, from some point in 1976 on, he
had a mistaken, unrealistically inflated estimate of his own
position in the Company, and that this characteristic resulted both
in repeated conflicts with supervisors and co-workers, and in
inadequate performance by impeding several important projects to
which Skorka assigned him between 1976 and 1979. These were the
effort to qualify for an R-Stamp, the 7000-Series program, and the
distribution of a welding manual to field station welders.
I believe that Skorka had lost patience with Drew by mid-1979,
when Cheruvenko added his criticism to trigger a hard new look at
Drew's performance, and that by this time Skorka was ready to give
Drew a serious warning about his performance. Skorka's written
evaluation on August 22 reflected his actual opinion, and this new
low rating for Drew was in itself a de facto probation.
The record is silent as to Popow's state of mind in August
1979 when he acted with Skorka to place Drew on probation, but it
is assumed for purposes of this analysis that in some measure his
actions were motivated by Drew's whistle blowing report to the
NRC. Such a motivation, however, is not per se either (a)
impermissable as a matter of law or (b) conclusive evidence
refuting the Company's claim to have acted legitimately in
disciplining Drew. Drew's own testimony tends to establish that
1978 valve incident and Drew's report to the NRC are but parts of a
substantial record of "unavoidable clashes" between himself and
Popow. As noted by the Supreme Court in Mr. Healthy, the fact a
dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident of protected activity "is
inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision," does
not require reinstatement of a discharged employee. The Court
observed:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have
the employment question resolved against him
because of constitutionally protected conduct.
But that same candidate ought not to be able, by
engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer
from assessing his performance records and
reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of
that record, simply because the protected conduct
makes the employer more certain of the correctness
of its decision. (429 U.S. 274, 86).
[Page 27]
During his probationary status Drew was assigned to a new
supervisor who then encountered the recurrent problem of keeping
Drew under control following instructions and supervision.
Finally, Saha not only doubted the Drew would reliably follow his
supervisor in the future, he also uncovered mistakes in Drew's
prior work on welding procedures. Saha knew about the 1978 whistle
blowing matter, but testified credibly that he approached his job
with Drew with an open mind. His testimony concerning his dealings
with Drew was specific and credible, and I believe that his
recommendation in August 1980 to discharge Drew did reflect his own
opinion as a responsible supervisor. With all of the above
findings in mind, I conclude that, assuming arguendo that Drew's
protected conduct was a motivating factor in his discipline, the
preponderance of the evidence is that the Company would have
treated him in the same manner even in the absence of the protected
conduct.
In view of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that this Complaint
be, and it is hereby, DISMISSED.
ROBERT M. GLENNON
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: JUN 16, 1982
Boston Massachusetts
NOTICE: Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 24.6(a) this recommended decision
is being forwarded this date, along with the records, to the
Secretary of Labor for a final order.