III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for jury trial with respect to their Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, claim without
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prejudice to plaintiffs' renewing a demand for jury trial if later legal authority supports such a demand.
DATED: 3/27/2008
RONALD M. WHYTE
United States District Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 However, the court also noted that it would consider an advisory jury if requested by the parties. Murray, 2005 WL 1356444 at *5.
2 In their opposition, plaintiffs concede that the statute does not expressly provide for a jury trial. However, plaintiffs also argue that because § 1514A provides for remedies which include both compensatory damages and special damages, the court can construe the statute to provide for a right to a jury trial. The court is not persuaded. A provision for damages does not necessarily equate to a provision for a right to a jury trial. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346 (concluding that although 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) provides for statutory damages, the statute itself did not confer a right to a jury trial because the statutory text "make[s] no mention of a right to a jury trial or, for that matter, to juries at all"); compare Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (finding that it was proper to imply a statutory right to a jury trial under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where the Act included a specific provision for "legal relief" and specifically incorporated the procedures under the Fair Labor Standards Act which had been interpreted to guarantee trial by jury in private actions). Rather, the court considers these provisions as part of the Seventh Amendment analysis. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346 (considering the statutory remedies in Seventh Amendment analysis).
3 Notably, the paragraph providing for such damages is prefaced by a reference back to the preceding statutory provision setting forth that the prevailing employee shall be entitled relief necessary to make the employee whole. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1)).
4 In addition, the general purpose of the statutory remedies, as stated in § 1514A(c)(1) would serve as a limit on the types of damages that could be included.
5 As to special damages, the Murray court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to specifically plead any special damages and therefore the plaintiff's claim did not include a request for the special damages permitted by § 1514A. 2005 WL 1356444 at *2-*3. The court also concluded that even if plaintiff had made claims for reputational injury and punitive damages as he asserts, § 1514A does not allow such claims. Id.
6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided for a right to a jury trial for claims of intentional discrimination and also provided for remedies including "'future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses,'" as well as punitive damages. See id. at 241 n.12 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. Law No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1073 (1991)).
7 Burke involved the issue of whether a damages award from a Title VII claim was considered a redress for a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and therefore excludable from taxable income for federal income tax purposes.
8 Where the Secretary of Labor adjudicates the claim, § 1514A incorporates the rules and procedures under 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b); thus, the Secretary's final decision is appealable to the court of appeals. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A).
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1344 are part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and relate to fines and penalties for use of mails to defraud and defrauding financial institutions. Section 1348 is the securities fraud provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act providing for enhanced fines and penalties.
10 Section 1514A falls within Title VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley, which is designated as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.
11 Plaintiffs also argue that defendants are equitably estopped from bringing the present motion by virtue of defendants' own demand for a jury trial on their counterclaims involving overlapping and similar facts and issues. The court does not find that the principles of equitable estoppel apply here.