On January 24, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Robert L. Hillyard issued a [Recommended] Decision and
Order in this case which arises under the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1988).
The ALJ granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment finding
the complaint untimely and ordered dismissal. In accordance with
the regulations implementing the STAA, the case is now before me
for review. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a) (1990).
Although the regulations provide that the parties may file briefs
in support of or in opposition to the ALJ's decision, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1978.109(c)(2), no briefs have been filed before me.
After reviewing the entire record, I find
that the ALJ's factual findings are fully supported by the
evidence and that his -conclusions are in accordance with
applicable lay. Accordingly, I accept his ruling in this case.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c).
The STAA and the implementing regulations
provide that a complaint may be filed within 180 days after the
alleged violation. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305(c)(1); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1978.102(d)(1). The ALJ found, and it is undisputed, that
the instant complaint was not filed until 264 days after the
alleged unlawful discharge. While tolling of the 180-day period
is justified under certain circumstances, I agree with the ALJ
that there is no evidence here of any of those recognized
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circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.102(d)(3); Nixon v.
Jupiter Chemical, Inc., Case No. 89-STA-3, Sec. Final Dec.
and Order, October 10, 1990, slip op. at 4; Hicks v. Colonial
Motor Freight Lines, Case No. 84-STA-20, Sec. Final Dec. and
Order, December 10, 1985, slip op. at 6-8 citing School
District of the City of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16
(ad Cir. 1981). Although Complainant pleads that his untimely
filing should be excused because he was not aware of his rights
under the STAA until after the limitation period expired, and
because he believes his complaint is "valid and
legitimate," neither explanation is sufficient. Ignorance of
the law is not enough to invoke equitable tolling, and I cannot
disregard the limitation period simply because it bars what may
be an otherwise meritorious claim. Allentown, 657 F.2d at
20-21. Since there is no genuine question of fact for hearing on
this threshold issue of timeliness, the ALJ properly ruled that
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1978.106(a), 18.40(a)-(d) (1990).