skip navigational links United States Department of Labor
May 9, 2009        
DOL Home > OALJ Home > Whistleblower Collection
DOL Home USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Bielski v. The Brickyard Inc., 94-STA-27 (ALJ May 18, 1994)



Case No.  94-STA-27

In the Matter of:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH,
     Prosecuting Party

          and

ADAM BIELSKI,
     Complainant    
                              
        v.                   
                              
THE BRICKYARD, INC. and
EDWARD CRONIN,
     Respondents             

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE


     The above-captioned case was forwarded to the undersigned on
March 17, 1994.  The case involves a complaint filed with the
Secretary of Labor by Adam Bielski ("Complainant"), against The
Brickyard, Inc. and Edward Cronin ("Respondents"), pursuant to
Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
49 U.S.C. §2305 ("STAA").  The complaint, which alleges that
Respondents wrongfully terminated the Complainant for refusing to
drive an unsafe motor vehicle, was filed on January 19, 1993 with
Mary Keeney, an investigator with the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA").  It appears
there may have been deficient notice to Respondents in this case. 
The procedural history which follows is set out to highlight the
problem as viewed by the court.  It contains a synopsis of all
pertinent information which is available to the court as of this
date.
                         PROCEDURAL HISTORY
     On February 9, 1993, a letter was sent by OSHA Area Director 

[PAGE 2] Kipp W. Hartmann to: Brick Yard, Inc. 1468 Main Street Millis, MA 02054 The purposes of this letter were several: to serve notice to Respondents that a complaint had been filed; to request Respondents' version of the facts of the alleged incident and Respondents' position with respect to the complaint; to inform Respondents of their right to be represented by counsel in the matter; and to solicit a "Notice of Appearance" should Respondents choose to be represented. On April 1, 1993, a follow-up letter, which stated that no response had been received to the February 9 letter, was sent via certified mail to the same address. Copies of the certified mailing slips which have been obtained by the court indicate that this letter was never acknowledged as received. Thereafter, on June 29, 1993, a letter addressed to: The Brickyard, Inc., Its Successors, and Edward Cronin 180 S. Main Street Providence, RI 02903-2907 was sent via certified mail from OSHA. The return receipt indicates that this letter was received on July 1, 1993, although the signature is illegible. The contents of this letter were also in the nature of a follow-up to the February 9 letter, requesting that Respondent respond to the Complainant's allegations by July 9, 1993. Thereafter, two identical letters, dated October 1, 1993, were sent from OSHA to the following parties: Mahoney, Hawkes and Goldings Attorney John Bradley The Brickyard, Inc., Its Successors, and Edward Cronin and Mrs. Cronin 75 Park Plaza Boston, MA 02116 and Lane & Altman Attorney John Drew The Brickyard, Inc., Its Successors, and Edward Cronin and Mrs. Cronin 101 Federal Street, 26th Floor Boston, MA 02110
[PAGE 3] The substance of these letters was the same as the letter which was sent to "Brick Yard, Inc." on February 9, 1993, i.e., the original notice letter. The letter to Mahoney, Hawkes and Goldings was sent via certified mail and signed for by "M. Jackson." On October 19, 1993, a letter from Attorney Eddirland Duncan of Lane & Altman was sent to OSHA.[1] This letter clearly stated that Lane & Altman represented Mr. Cronin in connection with his bankruptcy case. The letter expressed confusion as to whether Mr. Cronin was involved in the OSHA case, and noted that if such were the case, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a stay of the Department of Labor proceedings until one of several enumerated events occurred with regard to Mr. Cronin's bankruptcy proceeding. Also in response to OSHA's October 1 letter, on October 22, 1993, Attorney John Bradley of the firm Mahoney, Hawkes and Goldings submitted a designation of representative form on behalf of The Brickyard, Inc. regarding this case. On February 18, 1994, OSHA Regional Administrator John B. Miles issued the Secretary's Findings and Order that, inter alia, ordered Respondent to offer immediate reinstatement to Complainant and to compensate him with backpay. These findings were sent by letter on February 22, 1994 to Attorney Duncan at Lane & Altman. The letter specified that the Findings were made in favor of Complainant, and that the accompanying Order was applicable to both The Brickyard, Inc. and Edward Cronin. The letter also explained that Respondent had the right, within 30 days, to file objections to the findings and request a hearing before an administrative law judge, and that in absence of such objections the Findings and Order would become final and not subject to judicial review. The letter and findings were sent via certified mail and signed for at Lane & Altman, although the signature on the certified mailing form is illegible. A similar letter conveying the findings was sent to Complainant on the same date. On March 1, 1994, Attorney Duncan submitted a letter properly addressed to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) in Washington, D.C. In this letter, Attorney Duncan first stated that her firm's representation of Mr. Cronin was in connection with his bankruptcy proceeding. The letter then reiterated Attorney Duncan's earlier assertion that, by virtue of the ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, current actions against Mr. Cronin would be violative of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions. Finally, Attorney Duncan asserted that The Brickyard, Inc. was no longer operating, thus, compliance with the Order would not be
[PAGE 4] possible. Interpreting Attorney Duncan's letter as a timely objection to the Secretary's Findings and Order pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1978.105, the Chief Docket Clerk of OALJ in Washington, D.C. forwarded the case file to the undersigned for the purpose of scheduling a hearing in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1978.106. On March 18, 1994, a Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order was issued by the undersigned, setting the hearing date for Monday, April 4, 1994. The parties were ordered to submit pre-hearing briefs regarding the applicability of the stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to §405 of the STAA. In accordance with the information available in the case file, the Notice of Hearing and Order were served on the following pertinent parties: The Brickyard, Inc. 1468 Main Street Millis, MA 02054[2] Adam Bielski 141 Mendon Street Uxbridge, MA 01569 Eddirland Duncan, Esq. Lane & Altman 101 Federal Street Boston, MA 02110 On March 23, 1994, the requested pre-hearing brief regarding the bankruptcy issue was submitted to the court by Kevin Sullivan, Esq., of the Department of Labor's Office of the Solicitor, whose function is to act as the prosecuting attorney in the proceeding before the administrative law judge.[3] On March 24, 1994, Attorney Duncan responded to the Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order with a letter which again stated that Lane & Altman's representation of Mr. Cronin was limited to his bankruptcy, and noted that no appearance had ever been entered by any attorney from Lane & Altman in this matter, nor had any pleadings been filed on behalf of Mr. Cronin. Attorney Duncan stated that any previous correspondence submitted by Lane & Altman had been in response to receiving correspondence from OSHA, and was only to provide information which Lane & Altman thought would be useful to OSHA in its investigation. Finally, Attorney Duncan stated that her March 1 letter was not intended as an objection to the Secretary's Findings and Order.[4] Having received this most recent letter from Attorney Duncan,
[PAGE 5] it became necessary for the court to reconstruct the procedural history of this case. Upon agreement by Attorney Sullivan, an ORDER OF CONTINUANCE was issued by the undersigned on March 30, 1994, so that a more thorough consideration of the case could be undertaken. It appeared at first blush that perhaps the case should be remanded and the Secretary's Findings and Order be adopted in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1978.105(b)(2), as there was no timely objection to the initial findings pursuant to those regulations. Upon further investigation, however, it became apparent that proper notice in this case might be lacking with respect to the Secretary's Findings and Order and as to the Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order. During subsequent telephone conversations between the court's staff and Attorneys Duncan and Sullivan, the following information was obtained: 1. Neither Attorney Duncan nor any attorney from Lane & Altman have represented The Brickyard, Inc. with regard to any matter. 2. Neither Attorney Duncan nor any attorney from Lane & Altman has ever represented Edward Cronin with regard to proceedings before OSHA; further, in numerous letters, the firm has specifically limited the scope of its representation to Mr. Cronin's bankruptcy. 3. Mr. Cronin was never personally served with either notice of the complaint which initiated the OSHA proceedings, the Secretary's Findings and Order, or the Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order issued by the undersigned. Also, the following documents, previously not in the file sent from Washington, were obtained by the court from Attorney Sullivan: 1. Notice of Appearance of John Bradley, Esq., dated October 22, 1993, on behalf of The Brickyard, Inc. 2. OSHA's letter dated October 1, 1993, to Attorney Bradley serving notice of the complaint. 3. OSHA's letter dated June 29, 1993 to: The Brickyard, Inc., Its Successors and Edward Cronin 180 S. Main Street Providence, RI 02903-2907
[PAGE 6] sent as a follow-up to an April 1 letter, which served notice of the complaint. 4. OSHA's letter dated April 1, 1993 to: Brick Yard, Inc. 1468 Main Street Millis, MA 02054 sent as a follow-up to a February 9, 1993 letter, which served notice of the complaint. 5. OSHA's original notice letter dated February 9, 1993, to: Brick Yard, Inc. 1468 Main Street Millis, MA 02054 I note that not a single piece of correspondence has been addressed to Mr. Cronin personally. Further, despite having filed the only appearance in this matter, there is no indication that Attorney Bradley was served with the Secretary's Findings and Order when they were issued in February 1994. Lastly, I note that there is no indication that the February 1994 Findings and Order of the Secretary were sent to any other parties except Ms. Beverly Queen, Chief Docket Clerk at OALJ in Washington, D.C., Mr. Bielski, and Attorney Duncan at Lane & Altman. Having considered all of the above, I have determined that there exists a question as to whether the parties in this matter have been properly served with notice of the complaint, of the Secretary's Findings and Order, and/or of the Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order. In a context not wholly related to the issue herein, the Supreme Court stated as follows: The standard procedures which governed the investigation of Hufstetler's complaint against Roadway in this case required that Roadway be notified "of the complaint and of the substance of the allegation" and also that the field investigator consult with Roadway to obtain its explanation for the discharge before the Secretary made any findings and issued a preliminary reinstatement order. [citations omitted].
[PAGE 7] Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 259 (1987). Thus, it is not clear whether the named Respondents herein were ever provided an opportunity to participate in the investigation or to respond to the Findings and Order which issued in February of 1994. See also Smith v. Specialized Transportation Services, 91-STA-0022 (Sec'y, November 20, 1991), which appears to hold that notice to the parties at all stages of an STAA proceeding is required. Under these circumstances, an order to show cause is warranted. ORDER Accordingly, the parties are hereby ORDERED to show cause on or before April 29, 1994 as to why this case should not be remanded to Regional Administrator John B. Miles in order to ensure that proper service and notice and meaningful opportunity to respond be afforded to the parties. JOAN HUDDY ROSENZWEIG Administrative Law Judge [ENDNOTES] [1] This letter was misaddressed to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. However, because the street address was that of the federal OSHA office, Ms. Keeney was the named investigator, and the letter is part of the administrative file, it appears that the letter was received by OSHA. [2] On March 28, 1994, this correspondence was returned to the Boston OALJ as undeliverable. The Post Office label indicated that the addressee's forwarding order had expired, and that the new address of "The Brickyard, Inc." was 180 S. Main Street, Providence, RI. The Notice of Hearing and Pre-Hearing Order was then forwarded to The Brickyard, Inc. at this updated address on March 28, 1994. [3] No judgment is made herein regarding the issue of the effect of Mr. Cronin's bankruptcy on the STAA proceedings. That determination will be made after resolution of the issue of whether there has been proper notice to the parties. [4] I note here that a careful reading of correspondence from Lane & Altman confirms Attorney Duncan's assertions regarding the limitation on the scope of that law firm's representation of Mr. Cronin to the bankruptcy issues alone. However, the March 1 letter at issue is not so clear in its wording that it was unreasonable to presume it was intended to be an objection to the Secretary's Findings and Order. See 29 C.F.R. §1978.105.



Phone Numbers