This amount represents 174.6 hours of work performed by counsel at an hourly rate of $225, 75 hours of paralegal work at an hourly rate of $65, and $528.58 in costs for postage and travel expenses, including board, lodging, and parking. The Complainant has submitted a fully itemized and documented fee petition. We find the level of detail in the descriptions of the services to be adequate. We also find the hourly rate of $225 to be reasonable. Moreover, I&M does not object to the hourly rate billed.
Like the Board, the Sixth Circuit has held that "[t]he starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the lodestar, which is the product of the number of hours
[Page 5]
billed and a reasonable hourly rate." Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 616 (2007). According to the Sixth Circuit, a reasonable fee is one that is "adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers." Id.
Tipton requests $528.58 for reimbursement of costs for postage and travel expenses. As we noted above, postage is part of the overhead of the attorney's office and reimbursement of postage costs is not separately recoverable, absent an extraordinary need. Tipton has not alleged or demonstrated extraordinary need. Therefore, we disallow the request for postage.
I&M contends that the costs requested for counsel's travel expenses related to the oral argument before the Court of Appeals are part of overhead and therefore not reimbursable. Our authority to award a reasonable attorney's fee under the ERA includes the authority to award those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney, which are normally charged to a fee-paying client in the course of providing legal services. See Wheeler, 585 F.2d at 623-624. Travel expenses such as those Tipton's counsel incurred in connection with the oral argument in this case are therefore compensable.
I&M also urges us to reject Tipton's request for reimbursement of $4,875 in paralegal expenses because the description of the work reveals it to be secretarial in nature and therefore part of overhead. We have reviewed the descriptions of the paralegal work and find it to be traditional paralegal work. We also note that "encouraging the use of lower-cost paralegals rather than attorneys wherever possible . . . ‘encourages cost-effective delivery of legal services . . . .'" Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 (1989). We therefore find the paralegal hours to be compensable.
Finally, with regard to both fee petitions, Tipton requests a fee increase equal to the Consumer Price Index to compensate counsel for the delay in his receipt of his attorney's fee award. The ARB has used a formula for determining the amount of any fee enlargement to compensate attorneys for delay in receiving their fee awards. Doyle v. Hydro-Nuclear Servs., ARB Nos. 99-041, 99-042, 00-012; ALJ No. 1989-ERA-022, slip op. at 15-16 (ARB May 17, 2000), overturned on other grounds, Doyle v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 285 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002). A fee increase should be the lesser of the additions calculated as follows:
(1) the number of hours multiplied by the current rates of the attorneys, or
(2) the amount of the award plus the amount of the award multiplied by the percentage change in Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers, U.S. city average (CPI-U).
Since counsel's current rate is the rate he charged for work before the ARB and Court of Appeals, the calculation based on the number of hours multiplied by counsel's
[Page 6]
current rate yields the lesser amount. We therefore decline to add any increase to the fee award requested.
Conclusion
Tipton's attorney has submitted appropriately itemized and documented attorney fee applications. With the exceptions noted, we find the hours expended and the hourly rates charged are reasonable. We reduce the requested hours for attorney work before the ARB by .4 hours and disallow costs of $782.89, resulting in a total award of $15,615. We reduce the hours requested in Tipton's Supplemental Petition by 2 hours for a total supplemental award of $270. Finally, we reduce Tipton's request for attorney fees and costs before the Sixth Circuit by $16.25 and award the total amount of $44,672.33.
SO ORDERED.
WAYNE C. BEYER
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 The Fourth Circuit in Blackburn v. Reich, 79 F.3d 1375, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996) questioned the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in DeFord that the Secretary and the court had mutually exclusive authority to award costs and that DeFord's appeal to the Sixth Circuit did not arise from the same case that TVA appealed to the court.
2 Tipton's counsel initially requested a total of $49,008.58 in attorney's fees and costs, but now has withdrawn his request for 19.2 hours of time spent on his appeal of his front pay award before the Sixth Circuit, amounting to a reduction of $4,320 in his fee request. Complainant's Reply Brief to Respondent's Opposition to Complainant's Petition for Attorney Fees and Costs in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, p. 4. We have adjusted Tipton's fee request accordingly.