Robert Jamison
TSA Deputy Administrator
“The Adaptation of Anti-terrorism Policies after the Attacks” – Remarks Delivered at the International Seminar on Terrorism
New Delhi, India
November 29, 2006
Good morning. I’d like to thank the UIC (International Union of Railways) and Indian Railways for inviting me to speak here today, and to India for hosting this critically important conference. It is wonderful to see so many distinguished leaders, governmental and corporate representatives from all over the world in attendance. I applaud your commitment to the issues we will be discussing in the next few days.
Gatherings like this remind each of us how connected we are, despite the separation of national boundaries. We know from recent experiences that we are not working alone in our efforts to diminish terrorism. We are strengthened by colleagues and partners around the world.
There is an Ethiopian proverb that says: When spider webs unite, they can tie up a lion. And, like these proverbial webs, our ability to work together is the key to our strength as we fight terrorism across the world.
Before I get to my remarks, I would like to express my profound sympathy to the Indian government and the people of this great nation for the tragic events of July 11 in Mumbai and the more recent bombing in West Bengal. These attacks and the disrupted bomb plot this week, demonstrate all too well the necessity of a forum like this one where we can bring our collective experience to bear in developing effective means to deter, detect, prevent and respond to terrorism.
We honor the victims here in India, and in other countries throughout the world, by gathering for this purpose.
As many of you know, the Transportation Security Administration, or TSA, was created in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We have been charged with securing our country’s aviation and surface transportation. Many people are aware of our aviation security programs and familiar with the 43,000 Transportation Security Officers (whom we affectionately refer to as TSOs) working the checkpoints at approximately 450 U.S. airports. These men and women just this past weekend handled what is historically one of the busiest travel times of the year during our Thanksgiving holiday. For four consecutive days, our security checkpoints processed approximately 2.2 million people per day. Though people most often think of our aviation mission, our mission is much broader and, as we have seen in Mumbai, London, and Madrid, no less important.
The U.S. rail transit systems – commuter rail and subways – in 30 major cities serve approximately 9.5 billion passengers a year.
As we continue to strive to improve the security of these vital systems, we must not forget the principles that make them viable and efficient. These systems were designed with mobility and ease of access as an enabling fundamental underlying their operational success. Our security efforts must work within the framework of the system and not hamper it.
As you know, the openness and mobility inherent in these systems also presents us with our largest security challenge.
In larger cities such as New York, transit systems have large numbers of stations with multiple entrances and exits, handling up to 1,500 people per minute in some stations. We have a tremendous challenge.
To address this challenge, TSA has developed a multi-layered passenger and transit rail strategy that builds on the fundamentals: training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness. Even as technology gets better and more funding is directed to securing our systems these three fundamentals are the most important things you can do.
Training still represents the best investment you can make to improve transit security. Ensuring that your front-line staff knows what to look for, who to call, and how to react to an event is vital to your success. I cannot stress enough the importance of investing in your people.
Public awareness campaigns enlisting the public in our security mission is an essential force multiplier that helps level the playing field.
Public awareness campaigns have evolved in the U.S.:
Basic awareness
Targeted awareness focused on unattended baggage after Madrid attacks. (The rupee campaign: “If you are alert to this coin as you are to unattended baggage, lives can be saved.”).
Evacuation and emergency response actions
We must make sure that they continue to evolve, continue to get noticed and remain relevant to our passengers.
Emergency preparedness is the third fundamental. Knowing how to respond, drilling that response and having pre-established relationships with your first responders, can be the difference between an ineffective primitive terrorist attack and a tragic railway disaster.
These fundamentals have been built into our layered approach to security. But the success of strategy is dependant upon the local agencies and governments to execute.
Terrorist risk is non-linear, it does not follow a readily predictable course. We attack it by linking TSA’s efforts to other networks in industry and with other governments. We must engage the industry, local law enforcement, municipalities and others to implement.
With that networking concept driving our actions, TSA is focusing on the following areas to improve surface transportation security:
Raising the security baseline across our systems;
Using intelligence and information sharing to focus on the terrorist;
Creating visible, unpredictable deterrence; and,
Understanding and mitigating high-risk, high-consequence events.
I would like to spend some time walking you through these focus areas.
Raise the Baseline
We have established 17 priority security action items that align with the G8 basic principles for addressing subway and railway security. A similar action items list has been issued for freight railroads:
Grounded in the fundamentals of training, management structure, and vulnerability assessments.
Build on the strong response by the transit industry.
Utilizing our inspectors in the field to identify needs to modify our programs.
We are putting a lot of emphasis on training:
More than just the security awareness training, but operational response training.
Chemical attack.
Multiple explosive device attack.
To drive this improved baseline of security, we will continue to utilize the tools available us as the government – grant incentives, voluntary agreements, and, if needed, regulation.
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Given the openness of our systems and the challenge before us, our best defense is to catch terrorists before they get to target. We must continue to get better in sharing intelligence and information and getting it in the hands of the local agencies protecting our systems:
Regularly communicate with the top 100 transit agencies in the United States.
Install secure communications in the 20 largest transit agencies.
Focus on these important information sharing activities – development of a database of technology and a qualified products list.
Visible, Unpredictable Deterrence and Prevention
As noted by Mr. Batra, we cannot harden every entry point, nor screen every passenger coming into our busy stations. But we can deploy visible, unpredictable mobile teams that disrupt terrorists’ planning capabilities and provide high levels of security:
Expand the use of canine teams.
Leverage the networks to create surge capacity (Visible Intermodal Protection Response Teams).
Utilize our research to develop an effective concept of operations to conduct risk based screening.
High-Risk, High-Consequence
As we know, at attack on underground, underwater, and other critical infrastructure can potentially dramatically increase the consequences of an attack.
History has shown us that an attack on underground infrastructure can magnify the impacts of a bomb; significantly complicate the response efforts; and substantially prolongs the recovery time. And underground infrastructure is more vulnerable to chemical or biological attack.
We must be focused on minimizing high consequence risks. We are focused on doing research to fully understand the vulnerabilities and the consequences of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure. We are focusing our funding on hardening these assets and honing our emergency response efforts in these systems. We also must develop and implement our security strategies with those high consequence events in mind.
Given the size and diversity of our systems, we must deploy a risk-based strategy.
I mentioned earlier that terrorist risk does not follow a readily predictable course and that we must attack it by linking TSA’s efforts to other networks in industry and with other governments. The international aviation community leveraged that network and quickly and efficiently managed the threat of liquid explosives. We in the railways and transit sector must leverage our international network to share and drive the most effective strategies for protection our railway systems.
I want to thank Michel DeChamps for taking a leadership role in the International Working Group for Land Transport Security. This important group will play and important role in this task. I also want to again thank the UIC for holding this important forum for improving the security of our railways.
Together, we are fighting a global war on terror. We are here today because we share a common threat and a common desire to keep our citizens safe. TSA is committed to working with all nations to make transit and freight rail, and all modes of transportation, safe and secure. We look forward to working with you in the future
Thank you.
