FINAL ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT
AND DISMISSING CASE
The above-captioned consolidated cases arise under the
employee protection provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, as amended (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982), and are before
me for review of a Settlement Agreement entered into by the
parties and purporting to settle in one document both of the
captioned complaints by the Complainants, husband and wife. In
each case the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended
order of dismissal based upon settlement of the respective
complaint.
On March 16, 1990, upon review of the Settlement Agreement,
[Page 2]
I issued an order to show cause. As I explained in that order:
Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement broadly
prohibits Complainant from "disclos[ing] any of the
facts underlying the Complaints or any claims that were
raised or that could have been raised in the
Complaints." Paragraph 6 also prohibits Complainants
from "disclos[ing] this settlement or the contents or
terms of this Settlement Agreement and relateddocuments to any third party or parties, except for
disclosure of this Agreement and related documents to
the Court, to the extent necessary to obtain the
Court's approval of this Agreement and dismissal of the
Complaints." (Emphasis added) [Footnote omitted].
Paragraph 6, as such, would appear to restrict
Complainants from providing information or documents
obtained in the course of this case to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) or any other agency.
* * * *
Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement accordingly may
restrict access by the Department of Labor, as well as
other agencies, to information Complainants may be able
to provide relevant to the administration and
enforcement of the ERA and many other laws. So
construed, its effect would be to "dry up" channels of
communication which are essential for government
agencies to carry out their responsibilities. See
Polizzi v. Gibbs & Hill Inc., Case No. 87-ERA-38, Sec.
Order, July 18, 1989, slip op. at 3-6.
* * * *
For the reasons set forth in Polizzi, slip op. at 5-7,
I hold that Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement is
void to the extent that it would prohibit Complainants
from communicating to federal or state enforcement
authorities as identified above.
Slip op. at 3-5. Because it was not clear on the record whether
Respondent intended to agree to the remainder of the settlement
if the provisions of Paragraph 6 I found to be void were severed,
Respondent was given an opportunity to show cause why the
[Page 3
remainder of the agreement should not be approved and the case
dismissed.
I further stated in the March 16, 1990, order that:
Paragraph 7 provides in part that the parties agree
"that any civil action or other litigation arising out
of or resulting from a breach or violation or alleged
breach or violation of this [Settlement] Agreement,
shall be controlled by the laws of the State of Texas."
I note that the Secretary has the discretionary
authority to bring an action in United states [sic]
district court to enforce an order issued pursuant to
the ERA whenever a person has failed to comply with
such order. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d). In such an
action, moreover, the district court has jurisdiction
to grant all appropriate relief, including, but not
limited to, injunctive relief, and compensatory and
exemplary damages. Id. I interpret Paragraph 7 as not
restricting in any way the authority of the Secretary
to bring an enforcement action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(d), nor as limiting in such action the
jurisdiction of the district court to grant all
appropriate relief as identified in the statute.
Slip op. at 7-8. Complainants and the Respondent were given an
opportunity to show cause why Paragraph 7 should not be approved
as interpreted in my order.
The 30-day time period for submitting responses to the show
cause order has expired and no submissions have been received.
Wherefore, Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement is
severed to the extent that it would restrict Complainants from
communicating to federal or state enforcement authorities as
described above. Paragraph 7 is interpreted as not restricting
the authority of the Secretary or the jurisdiction of the
district court under 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) as identified above. In
all other respects I find the settlement to be fair, adequate and
reasonable and it is approved. These consolidated cases are
DISMISSED with prejudice. See Stipulation of Dismissal.
