U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-8002
Date: FEB 17 1993
Case No.: 88-ERA-19
In the Matter of:
W. ALLAN YOUNG,
Complainant
v.
CBI SERVICES, INC.,
Respondent
Before: John M. Vittone
Deputy Chief Judge
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT,
ORDER VACATING CONTINUANCE,
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Notice of Reassignment
This case has been reassigned to Deputy Chief
Administrative Law Judge John M. Vittone. All further submissions
in this matter should be directed to Judge Vittone at this
address:
Deputy Chief Judge John M. Vittone
Office of Administrative Law Judges
Suite 400N
800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Status of Complaint
On January 10, 1990, Administrative Law Judge
Stuart A. Levin issued an Order Granting Continuance in this
matter Pending the resolution of the appeal in Young v. CBI
Services, Inc., 88ERA-8. (Judge Levin's Order is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference) The Secretary of Labor
issued a Final Decision and Order in Case Number 88-ERA-8 on
December 8, 1992. Young v. CBI Services, Inc., 88-ERA-8
(Sec'y Dec. 8, 1992). (copy attached hereto and incorporated by
reference)
Judge Levin noted in his January 10,
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1990 Order that Case Number 88-ERA-8 was based on the Respondent's termination
of the Complainant in October of 1987 and that the instant
case, 88-ERA-19, was based on the Respondent's refusal to
rehire Mr. Young in March of 1988. In both cases, the
Respondent contends that it took the adverse employment action
based on the same legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
In Young v. CBI Services, Inc., 88-ERA-8
(Sec'y Dec. 8, 1992), the Secretary held that the Respondent
rebutted the Complainant's prima facie case with evidence that
its actions were motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons -namely the Complainant's past horseplay, ineffective
supervision of subordinates and production problems.
Young, 88-ERA-8, slip op. at 7. The Secretary also held
that the Complainant failed to establish that the proffered
reasons were not worthy of credence. Id., slip op. at 9.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the continuance granted in
this matter by Judge Levin's January 10, 1990 Order is VACATED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties show
cause why the Secretary's findings in Case Number 88-ERA-8 should
not be given res judicata effect in Case Number 88-ERA-19 and, if
given res judicata effect, why those findings do not mandate a
summary decision under 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.41(a) and
24.5(e)(4)(ii) in the Respondent's favor. The parties shall
address whether a genuine issue of material fact is raised such
that an evidentiary hearing is required, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 18.41(b), or whether the case can be disposed of based on
the existing record. See generally Howard v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 90-ERA-24 (Sec'y July 3, 1991) (applying 29 C.F.R.
§§ 18.40 and 18.41 to a ERA whistleblower case).
Responses to this Order to Show Cause must be received by this
Office on or before the close of business (5:00 p.m. EST) on
March 29, 1993 to be timely. Failure to respond timely is ground
for dismissal of the cause. 29 C.F.R. § 24.5(e)(4)(i)(B).
At Washington, D.C.
Entered:
by:
John M. Vittone
Deputy Chief Judge
JMV/trs
U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
1111 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
DATE: January 10, 1990
CASE NO. 88-ERA-19
IN THE MATTER OF
W. ALLAN YOUNG
Complainant
v.
CBI SERVICES, INC.
Respondent
ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE
This matter arises pursuant to a complaint
filed under the Energy Reorganization Act by W. Allan Young. Mr.
Young alleges that CBI Services, Inc. refused to employ him,
because he engaged in protected activities under the Act.
CBI Services denies Complainant's charges, and
moves that this matter be continued pending the resolution of a
related adjudication now pending appeal before the Secretary of
Labor in Young v. CBI Services, Inc., 88-ERA-8. CBI argues
that the underlying justifications which led it to terminate Mr.
Young's employment in October of 1987, giving rise to 88-ERA-8,
were the same reasons which justified its refusal to hire him in
March of 1988. The latter refusal, of course, led to the
complaint here at issue.
On April 21, 1989, Judge Thomas Murrett ruled,
in 88-ERA-8, that despite Mr. Young's protected activities, CBI
did not improperly discharge him. Judge Murrett found that, as a
general foreman in charge of pipefitters on a previous job, Mr.
Young was "known to have engaged in repeated instances of
unprofessional, immature, and even obscene behavior on the
job." (D & O at 8). As a consequence he concluded, based
upon the record before him and his evaluation of witness
credibility "that CBI's determination to discharge (or not
to permanently employ) Mr. Young in October 1987 on the basis of
his past horseplay, considered by it to be odious, when coupled
with the reduced production performance on the shift which he
supervised to have been justified, notwithstanding his history of
engaging in protected activity." D& O at 8; 88-ERA-8. Complainant has appealed this conclusion to the Secretary of
Labor.
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In light of the fact that an appeal of Judge
Murrett's findings and conclusions in 88-ERA-8 are pending before
the Secretary, the parties in this proceeding were, by order
issued on October 11, 1989, invited to "identify with
particularity the specific fact issues which were not adjudicated
in 88-ERA-8 and which are relevant in this proceeding."
The parties response to the inquiry of October
11, 1989, demonstrates that the factual circumstances which Judge
Murrett found to constitute justification for discharging Mr.
Young are essential elements in defense of the decision not to
rehire him. Judge Murrett found that knowledge of Mr. Young's
conduct and performance on previous jobs led CBI to terminate
him, and according to Complainant, the decision by Mr. Helfast
not to hire him was also based upon Mr. Helfast's knowledge of
Mr. Young's prior conduct and performance. (See, Complainant's
letter dated October 31, 1989).
Complainant further emphasizes that the
circumstances which supported Judge Murrett's findings and
conclusions were not adequately adjudicated in 88-ERA-8. He
argues that he was not confronted at the hearing with allegations
concerning the "leghumping" incident, and that
witnesses were not cross-examined at the hearing about the
incidents. Indeed, despite Judge Murrett's findings, Complainant
now questions "the validity of respondent's leg-humping
allegations," and argues that he has a right to cross-examine CBI's witnesses on this issue.
Yet questions of substance and procedure
concerning whether or not Complainant had an adequate opportunity
to address this issue before Judge Murrett, and whether or not he
was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or call
witnesses on his behalf are matters which are properly before the
Secretary on appeal. The fact that two separate alleged acts of
discrimination arise out of a common course of conduct does not
necessitate two de novo adjudications of the underlying conduct.
The employer here first terminated, and subsequently refused to
rehire Mr. Young based upon its knowledge of his past conduct.
While both the termination and the refusal to rehire may be acts
of alleged discrimination, the underlying conduct is common to
both.
Consequently, Complainant here seeks to
relitigate de novo the "validity" of procedures
and defenses in 88-ERA-8. Yet, the question is not whether a new
trier of fact might reach different conclusions on a new record,
but whether the record before the Secretary supports Judge
Murrett's findings on appeal.
Should the Secretary determine that
Complainant's assertions of error are correct, adequate remedies
will be available. If Complainant's contentions are rejected by
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the Secretary, however, relitigation of factual issues affirmed
on appeal would not seem appropriate.
Complainant has acknowledged that 88-ERA-8 and
this case, "arise out of the same underlying chain of
circumstances, ....and the witnesses...(are)...the same in each
case...." (See, letter dated December 19, 1988). Moreover,
Complainant elected not to consolidate the two cases. (See,
letter dated December 29, 1988). Because the underlying chain of
circumstances, in 88-ERA-8 and this matter are inextricably
intertwined, the disposition of this case must hinge upon the
resolution of factual and procedural issues on appeal in 88-ERA-8. Accordingly,
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that further proceedings in this
matter be held in abeyance pending the disposition of the appeal
in Young v. CBI Services, Inc., 88-ERA-8.