Because Bulls did not complete the STEPS process before he filed an administrative complaint with the EEOC, Bulls cannot now allege that either he or his attorney were misled into believing that STEPS precluded his filing an administrative claim. Thus, the Court finds Chevron did not actively mislead Bulls to participate in STEPS in order to delay his filing a SOA claim because Chevron was not aware of this claim. See Allentown, 657 F.2d at 19-20.
B. Wrong Forum
The same reasoning applies to Bulls's contention that he filed in the wrong forum by agreeing to participate in STEPS. See Allentown, 657 F.2d at 19-20. To assert a claim that he filed in the wrong forum, Bulls must have timely filed in the wrong forum. See Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 591 (explaining that equitable tolling applies where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum) (emphasis added). Bulls did not timely assert a SOA claim in the STEPS process because he did not allege this cause of action until August 2005, long after the SOA limitations period had passed. Thus, Bulls did not timely file his SOA claim in the wrong forum. See Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 591
Because the Court finds that Chevron did not actively mislead Bulls to engage in STEPS rather than file his SOA claim with OSHA, and Bulls did not timely file his
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SOA claim in the wrong forum, Bulls has not met his burden to justify equitable tolling. See Allentown, 657 F.2d at 19-20, The Court declines to exercise its discretion to equitably toll the limitations period, and Bulls's complaint is properly dismissed as untimely. See Teemac, 298 F.3d at 456. Because Bulls is procedurally barred from bringing his SOA claim, the Court grants Chevron's motion for summary judgment and dismisses his claims. Given the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 27) is DENIED as MOOT. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Writ of Mandamus Relief and Renewed Motion to Stay (Document No. 30) is DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff Keith Bulls's Motion for Temporary Stay, Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Implementation of Briefing Schedule (Document No. 33) is DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Defendants Chevron Corporation, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 16) is GRANTED.
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SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 9 day of May, 2007.
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 One of the benefits to the STEPS program is that Chevron pays the cost of the mediator and reasonable attorney fees.
2 In response, Chevron requested that Bulls's attorney submit a more detailed description of the nature of his claims. On October 19, 2004, his attorney responded that Bulls asserts claims of "discrimination and harassment on account of his gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and comparable provisions of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act."
3 Although the Act mandates that an employee file a complaint with the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor ("DOL" or "Secretary"), the Secretary delegated this responsibility to OSHA. See Willis v. Vie Fin. Group, Inc., Civ.A. No. 04-43 5, 2004 WL 1774575, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2004) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(e)) ("§ 1980").
4 OSHA found "there is no reasonable cause to believe that Respondents [Chevron] violated SOA . . . The Act requires that a Complaint must be filed within 90 days of an alleged violation of the Act. The appeals process/internal grievance procedure does not toll the time to file the complaint. Consequently, this complaint is dismissed as untimely."
5 Although Bulls was represented by counsel when he filed his OSHA complaint, his attorney subsequently withdrew. Thus, Bulls filed his objection to OSHA's preliminary dismissal and all subsequent filings pro se.
6 Specifically, the ALJ found that, inter alia, 1) Bulls's ninety day filing period began when he was terminated on August 27, 2004; 2) his February 2006 OSHA complaint was untimely; and 3) because Chevron had no duty to correct his mistaken belief that the STEPS process precluded his filing his lawsuit, Bulls was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
7 Under federal regulations, the ALJ's decision becomes "the final order of the Secretary unless the [Administrative Review] Board ("Board"), within 30 days of the filing of the petition, issues an order notifying the parties that the case has been accepted for review." § 1980.110(b). Because the Board did not issue an order accepting Bulls's petition, the ALJ decision became the final agency decision. See id. On January 17, 2007, the Board issued a "final decision and order dismissing [his] appeal."
8 Although Bulls filed his complaint pro se, on April 4, 2007, new counsel for Bulls filed a notice of appearance in the case at bar
9 Chevron also moves to strike portions of Bulls's affidavit in his response to its motion for summary judgment, alleging that some of his allegations were not based on his personal knowledge, are conclusory, constitute improper legal opinion, and/or lack factual support. However, the Court finds its analysis and conclusions do not rely on those portions of Bulls's affidavit and thus, Chevron's motion to strike is denied as moot. See Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex Tin Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1192, 1212 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (denying as moot plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affidavits because the court did not consider them in addressing the pending motions).
10 Although Bulls desires to arbitrate his dispute under the STEPS process, the Court finds no language in the STEPS documentation that indicates that STEPS is a binding contract between Chevron and Bulls that requires Chevron to arbitrate Bulls's claims. Thus, the Court denies his request to compel Chevron to arbitrate his claims.
11 The Court notes the gravamen of Bulls's complaints, written pro se, are that Chevron discriminated against him in violation of Title VII and retaliated against him as a whistle blower in violation of the SOA. Relative to his discrimination charges, employees must exhaust their administrative remedies with the EEOC before bringing suit. See Price v. Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 2006). Under Title VII, Bulls had 90 days after the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to file suit. See id. Because the EEOC dismissed his complaint and issued a right to sue letter on August 19, 2005, and Bulls filed the instant suit more than a year later, his discrimination charges are dismissed as untimely. See id. Thus, the Court only considers his whistle blower claims that were the subject of his OSHA complaint.
12 In the instant lawsuit, Bulls asserts claims against additional parties, asserts additional claims, and makes unsubstantiated allegations that were not raised in the administrative proceeding. Regarding additional claims, Bulls avers the STEPS program is a binding contract by which Chevron is bound to arbitrate this dispute. However, a court of appeals can review only those claims that have been administratively exhausted. See McClendon, 2005 WL 2847224, at *4 (citing Willis, 2004 WI. 1774575, at *5-6). If an ALJ issued a decision that did not include a particular allegation, a plaintiff may not raise that issue on appeal. Id. Thus, because Bulls did not raise his claim that STEPS was a binding contract in the administrative process, this claim is barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Id. Regarding new and unsubstantiated allegations, Bulls avers Chevron's outside counsel conspired with Chevron to engage in illegal activities and participated in violating the Act. First, the Court finds that such bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, as previously explained, Bulls may only proceed in federal court on the claims that were the subject of his OSHA complaint. See Willis, 2004 WL 1774575, at *6 (explaining that the district court can only conduct a de novo review of those claims that have been administratively exhausted). Accordingly, the Court finds Bulls's additional claims and allegations and his claims against additional parties are dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Id.
13 Bulls relies on § 1980.114 that provides for de novo review in district court if the Department of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180 days of his complaint.
14 Moreover, the Court declines to remand Bulls's claims because the ALJ's decision became the Secretary's final decision after Bulls filed this suit. See § 1980.110(b) (explaining that if the Board does not accept the petition for review within 30 days of its being filed, the ALJ's decision becomes the final order of the Secretary). Thus, the Secretary's decision was final on November 25,2006, thirty days after Bulls filed his petition for review on October 25, 2006.
15 Bulls asserts his OSHA filing was within the limitations period because he did not suffer a "final" adverse employment action until the STEPS process concluded. Accordingly, he contends the parties terminated the STEPS process in January 2006, and he timely filed his OSHA complaint in February 2006.
16 The Court notes Bulls gives no explanation for his delay in claiming that Chevron terminated him based upon his knowledge of Chevron's alleged violations of the Act.
17 Although Bulls avers Chevron misled him regarding the STEPS process or that he filed in the wrong forum, Bulls does not contend that he has been prevented from asserting his rights in any other extraordinary way.
18 Bulls subsequently requested arbitration pursuant to STEPS procedures.