25, 2007, Bulls, represented by Menn, moved in state court to compel arbitration. Because Bulls continues to litigate the same issues decided by this Court in a pending state court proceeding and in a second DOL proceeding, Chevron moves for a permanent injunction against Bulls under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the relitigation exception to the Anti-Suit Injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2283. Chevron seeks to enjoin the DOL from further adjudicating Bulls’ claims, and to enjoin Bulls from pursuing his second DOL complaint or seeking to compel arbitration in the pending state court proceeding. Chevron also seeks to enjoin Bulls from filing any lawsuits against Chevron, its entities, and agents without the Court’s permission, and asks the Court to order the clerk of the Court to assign future cases filed by Bulls to this Court.

   The Court scheduled a hearing on Chevron’s motion for permanent injunction and notified the parties. Although Bulls, who was pro se at that time, had notice, he did not appear at the hearing held on November 13, 2007. After Menn appeared as counsel of record to represent him three days later, Bulls objected to Chevron’s request for a permanent injunction regarding his motion to compel arbitration.

   Although the parties do not dispute the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to grant Chevron’s request for an injunction because the All Writs Act does not afford independent grounds for a district court’s jurisdiction. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2002). However, a district court that has jurisdiction over an original federal action has subject matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction to preserve arid protect its jurisdiction. See Id. Moreover, a federal district court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a second action in order to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered by that court in a prior action. Id. (quoting Regions Bank of La. v. Rivet, 224 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2000); see also DowAgrosciences, LLC v. Bates, No. Civ. A. 5:01-CV-33 1-C, 2003 WL 22660741, at * 19-20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14,2003) (also noting that without this doctrine, judgments of federal courts would have little effect whenever later circumstances would preclude a party from re-establishing independent jurisdiction).

   Because Bulls invoked the Court’s jurisdiction based upon the SOA statute that provided for this Court’s de novo review of the DOL administrative decision, the Court finds it has jurisdiction over Chevron’s motion for an injunction enforcing the Court’s prior summary judgment order. See Newby, 302 F.3d at 301 (finding a

district court had jurisdiction to enjoin a defendant from filing a new action without leave of court because the district court had jurisdiction over the action pending before it). Thus, the Court must determine whether an injunction is warranted under the All Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.

   Founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 138 F. App’x 615, 619 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988)); Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 2003 WL 22660741, at *21. Under the relitigation exception, federal courts may enjoin the relitigation in state courts of those issues that federal courts have fully and finally adjudicated. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 2003 WL 22660741, at *22. The relitigation exception applies if a judgment of the federal court precludes the claims (res judicata) or the issues (collateral estoppel) raised in the state litigation. Ballenger, 138 F. App’x at 619. Thus, based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata, the Court must first determine whether to enjoin Bulls from pursuing his motion to compel arbitration in state court, and second, whether to enjoin Bulls from pursuing his second SOA complaint with the DOL and enjoin the DOL from further adjudication of Bulls’ second SOA complaint.

I. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

   The parties dispute whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars Bulls’ state court motion to compel arbitration. Bulls argues the Court may only enjoin him from litigating or relitigating his SOA claims but not from moving to arbitrate his

remaining state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, Bulls argues that the Court’s summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations is not a judgment on the merits. Finally, Bulls argues res judicata does not apply to his state court claim because the federal suit was filed second.

   In response, Chevron points out that Bulls’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress stems from his SOA claim and thus, is based upon the same nucleus of operative facts. Moreover, Chevron avers that a dismissal based upon a statute of limitations is a dismissal on the merits. Furthermore, Chevron contends that even if Bulls filed his state lawsuit prior to his federal lawsuit, res judicata or collateral estoppel bars his state court motion to compel arbitration because the Court rendered final judgment on Bulls’ federal motion to compel arbitration.

   The Court notes Chevron is not asking the Court to bar Bulls’ state lawsuit in its entirety but to bar Bulls’ state court motion to compel arbitration. Because Chevron asks the Court to enjoin Bulls’ from pursuing a particular issue in state court, the Court must determine whether collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies to the arbitration issue.

   Collateral estoppel is limited to matters distinctly put in issue, litigated and determined in the former action. Ballenger, 138 F. App’x at 619. Collateral estoppel has three elements: 1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the

Thus, the Court finds the state court arbitration issue is identical to the arbitration issue decided by this Court. See Id.

   The Court must also determine whether the arbitration issue was actually litigated in this Court. Having considered the arguments of the parties regarding arbitration of Bulls’ claims, the Court determined that there was no evidence that STEPS was a binding contract on the parties. Accordingly, the Court denied Bulls’ motion to compel arbitration. Thus, the Court finds the arbitration issue was actually litigated. See id.

arbitration. In contrast, the Court found Chevron was not bound to arbitrate Bulls’ claims, and because the Court had jurisdiction over Bulls’ claims, conducted a de novo review of the DOL proceeding. Thus, the Court finds its determination that Chevron was not bound to arbitrate Bulls’ claims was a necessary part of the judgment. See id.

   Bulls’ argument that collateral estoppel or res judicata does not apply because the federal suit was filed after the state suit is equally without merit. When two actions that involve the same issue are pending, the final judgment rendered first becomes conclusive in the other action. Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of a second suit under res judicata after the first suit was dismissed with prejudice). Because the Court determined Chevron was not bound to arbitrate Bulls’ claims under the STEPS process, the Court’s determination is conclusive in the state court action. See id.

   Finally, although Bulls asserts "a time bar is not a determination of any issues," the Court disagrees. For purposes of res judicata, a dismissal based upon a statute of limitations is a decision on the merits. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); see also Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a decision by a federal court that a statute of limitations or an administrative deadline bars an action is a decision on the merits for

purposes of claim preclusion); see also Ellis, 211 F.3d at 936 (affirming a district court’s finding that res judicata applied to bar a plaintiffs first suit against a defendant because the plaintiffs same claims filed in a second suit were dismissed as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations).

   Because the Court determined that Chevron is not bound to arbitrate Bulls’ claims, the Court finds collateral estoppel bars Bulls’ attempts to compel arbitration. Thus, the Court grants Chevron’s motion to permanently enjoin Bulls from pursuing arbitration of his claims against Chevron in the pending state court suit. See Ballenger, 138 F. App’x at 616, 622 (affirming a district court’s order enjoining plaintiffs from pursuing a pending state court suit because the issues or claims had already been fully litigated in federal court).

II. DOL PROCEEDING

   Chevron requests the Court to enjoin Bulls from pursuing his complaint in a second DOL proceeding and to enjoin the DOL from adjudicating Bulls’ second complaint. Bulls does not object to Chevron’s request or dispute that res judicata bars his claims before the DOL.

   In Bulls’ federal suit, the Court conducted a de novo review of the first DOL proceeding. Based upon the record, the Court found, as the DOL had found, that Bulls’ SOA complaint was not timely filed and thus, time-barred. Accordingly, the

Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron on May 9, 2007. Less than a month later, on May 30, 2007, Bulls filed a second DOL complaint against Chevron.

   On July 26, 2007, the DOL dismissed Bulls’ second complaint, finding that Bulls did not demonstrate that Chevron or its law firm ("Respondents") were subject to the SOA and most of Bulls’ other claims were barred by the statute of limitations, just as the DOL had determined they were barred in the first DOL complaint. A DOL letter, dated September 28,2007, advised Bulls that there was no reasonable cause to believe the Respondents violated the SOA. The letter also pointed out that Bulls’ allegations in his second complaint "are based on the same activities as the original OSHA complaint and federal court case," and that "[t]he United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and the Department of Labor have both issued final judgments on the merits of [Bulls’] claims." The DOL then stated that "the prior rulings have preclusive effect and prevent re-litigation of the issues."

   One day before the Court held the hearing on Chevron’s motion for injunction, at which Bulls did not appear, Bulls filed objections to the DOL’s order. The DOL set Bulls’ objections for a hearing on December 3, 2007. Based on these facts, the Court must determine whether the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act precludes Bulls’ from pursuing his second DOL complaint.

decision on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. See Nilsen, 701 F.2d at 561; Ellis, 211 F.3d at 937; Kratville, 90 F.3d at 198.

   Finally, the fourth element is met because the same cause of action is involved in both the second DOL proceeding and Bulls’ federal suit. See Vasquez, 325 F.3d at 675. Bulls’ federal suit and second DOL complaint involve the same nucleus of operative facts regarding Bulls’ termination and his claim that Chevron violated the SOA. Thus, the Court finds res judicata applies to Bulls’ complaint in his second DOL proceeding. See id. Because Bulls’ claims against Chevron have been previously litigated, the Court grants Chevron’s request to enjoin Bulls from pursuing his second DOL complaint.

   Moreover, the Court has discretion to enjoin the DOL’s proceedings under the All Writs Act when the elements of res judicata are satisfied. See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a district court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to enjoin a DOL investigation and adjudication of a plaintiffs SOA claim, and remanding to the district court to determine whether it should exercise its discretion and enjoin the DOL’s proceedings under the All Writs Act); see also FordMotor Co. v. Woods, Civ. A. No. 04-1733, 2006 WL 1581177, at *1, *3 (W.D. La. June 6, 2006) (explaining that the All Writs Act extended to allow the court to order the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission ("LMVC"), a non-party, to

dismiss a plaintiffs complaint in order to protect the court’s order that the plaintiff arbitrate his claims and to enjoin the plaintiff from further prosecuting his claim against the defendant before the LMVC).

   In dismissing Bulls’ second complaint, the DOL explained it had previously issued a final judgment on the merits of Bulls’ claims, and that the DOL’s and the Court’s final judgments have preclusive effect. However, in spite of the DOL’s explanations and conclusions, Bulls continues to pursue his claims before the DOL. The Court finds the important public policy of achieving judicial economy will be served by granting Chevron’s request for injunctive relief See Vasquez, 325 F.3d at 677 (finding that a district court did not err by invoking the re-litigation exception, which seeks to prevent wasteful and harassing revisiting of previously decided matters, to permanently enjoin the plaintiffs from relitigating an issue previously decided by the court). Because the DOL contends it has completely adjudicated and issued a final judgment on the merits Bulls’ claims and because the Court has discretion to enjoin the DOL from further proceedings in order to protect the Court’s order, the Court finds an injunction is warranted. See Leon, 464 F.3d at 963. Given the foregoing, the Court hereby

   ORDERS that Plaintiff Chevron Global Energy Inc.’s Motion for Injunction Pursuant to All Writs Act and Relitigation Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act (Civ.

A. No. H-07-3236 Document No. 9) is GRANTED. The Court further

   ORDERS that Defendant Chevron’s Request for Injunction Pursuant to All Writs Act and Relitigation Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act (Civ. A. No. H-06-3810, Document No. 46) is GRANTED. The Court further

   ORDERS that Keith B. Bulls is permanently enjoined from, directly or indirectly, pursuing his claims against Chevron with the United States Department of Labor. Keith B. Bulls shall dismiss, in writing, his DOL Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint, styled Keith B. Bulls v. Chevron Corp., et al., Case No. 6-3280-07-9 13, by December 14, 2007. The Court further

   ORDERS that Keith B. Bulls is permanently enjoined from, directly or indirectly, filing any pleading, motion, or request to compel arbitration. Keith B. Bulls shall move to withdraw his motion to compel arbitration in the 215th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas, styled Keith B. Bulls v. Chevron Corp., et al., Cause No. 2006-10 104, by December 14, 2007. The Court further

   ORDERS that Keith B. Bulls is enjoined from, directly or indirectly, filing any action, complaint, claim, or suit in any court or federal administrative agency against Chevron Corporation, Chevron Global Energy Inc., Chevron Global Gas, Chevron Upstream and Gas, Chevron Pipe Line Company, Chevron Pipe Line Holdings Inc., Sabine Pipe Line LLC, Bridgeline Holdings L.P., Bridgeline LLC, Chevron U.S.A.

Inc., Chevron U.S.A. Holdings Inc., or their predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates, partners,joint ventures, owners, related entities, or agents, including any current or former employee, shareholder, officer, director, contractor, attorney, or representative, without first obtaining written permission from the undersigned. The Court further

   ORDERS that the clerk of the Court is directed to assign all future cases filed by Keith B. Bulls to the undersigned’s docket.

   If Keith B. Bulls fails to comply with any provision of the foregoing Order, he shall be subject to monetary sanctions and/or contempt by this Court.

   SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 5 day of December, 2007.

            DAVID HITTNER
            United States District Judge