A. Whether Complainant engaged in activities protected under the STAA.
B. Whether Respondent discriminated against Complainant in retaliation
for her alleged protected activities.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Complainant's formal complaint alleges a myriad of activities and
"inadequate and unsafe" conditions about which she claims to have complained. She
contends that she was discriminatorily terminated by Respondent because she filed a complaint,
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began a proceeding, testified in a proceeding or will testify in a proceeding related to a violation of
the commercial motor vehicle safety regulations. She avers that her discharge was related to her
refusal to drive an unsafe commercial motor vehicle because she was not properly licensed about
which she had a reasonable apprehension that she or someone else would have been seriously injured
or impaired had she operated the unsafe vehicle. She further contends that she complained that
Respondent's electronic on-board computer system and logging procedures were not in compliance
with DOT regulations and refused to falsify electronic logs to match DOT paper logs or visa versa
which was illegal and not in compliance with DOT rules and regulations.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that Complainant did not engage in any
protected activity and failed to establish that any logs were falsified or that she was forced to edit
logs or required or instructed to drive a commercial motor vehicle that was unsafe or without a
proper license. Respondent further contends that there is no causal connection between
Complainant's separation from employment and her alleged protected activities. Respondent asserts
it had a legitimate business reason for separating Complainant from employment which she failed
to rebut as pretext and that Complainant would have been separated regardless of her alleged
protected activity.
III. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
Complainant Nancy Young
Complainant has an associate degree in electronics and occupational safety
and health technology. She was referred to Respondent by Del Mar College where she worked as
a computer technician/student assistant. (Tr. 660-661). Complainant began employment with
Respondent on April 27, 1998 as a systems administrator in the Alice, Texas district. Her job duties
consisted of taking care of the software for the new electronic on-board Rockwell system. On July
1, 1998, her job duties were supplemented to include training drivers on the log-in procedures of the
Rockwell system and supervising the installation of hardware. (Tr. 604-606). She testified that
training drivers required her to drive commercial motor vehicles (CMV). She was instructed to drive
CMVs by Lance Marklinger, the facility manager at the Alice district. Id. Complainant
obtained a driver's permit in June 1998 which required that she drive with a licensed driver. (Tr.
607).
In August or September 1998, she began reporting to Jay Kleinheinze, the new
acting facility manager. (Tr. 608). Mr. Kleinheinze changed her duties to include supervising the
installation of Rockwell units, test-driving DOT CMVs and training DOT drivers on the system. (Tr.
609).
Complainant testified that, from her date of hire through September 1998, she
complained to Mr. Marklinger that the keypads for the Rockwell system were improperly mounted
on the floorboard or not mounted at all creating an unsafe condition in that the keypads on the
floorboard were a visual distraction or if unmounted could hit the driver in the head. (Tr. 610-611,
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613-614). Corrections to the conditions were initiated when Mr. Kleinheinze assumed the district,
but not in all areas since Victoria, Texas and Mission, Texas had the same problems. (Tr. 611). She
stated that in June 1999, Victoria, Texas still had units mounted on the floorboard, behind the seat
or not mounted at all. (Tr. 612).
1 The name of Respondent appears as
amended at the hearing.
2 References to the record are as
follows: Transcript: Tr.___; Complainant's Exhibits: CX:___; Respondent's Exhibits: RX-___; and
Administrative Law Judge Exhibits: ALJX-___.
3 At the conclusion of Complainant's
case, Respondent moved for a "directed verdict" or summary judgment on the basis of
a lack of credible evidence of any protected activity. The motion was denied because an arguable
prima facie case had been presented sufficient for Respondent to go forward with its case. In
view of my findings and conclusion, Respondent's motion is now moot.
4 Complainant testified that every time
she encountered improper (uninsulated) wiring, she would take photos of the incident and provided
the photos with a Risk Identification Report (RIR). This activity evidenced her troubleshooting and
discovery of unsafe conditions of vehicles. (Tr. 779, 783-793; XC-20, 1-7 of 8 pages).
5 Complainant later testified that they
visited the Texas Department of Public Safety on March 5, 1999. (Tr. 766). She claimed that SGT
Salinas was shown an electronic log which had been "falsified" because the location sites
were not shown and the driver had "over-logged." These allegations could not be
correlated to the paper log which verified the accuracy of the claim. (Tr. 774).
6 Although the "pretext"
analysis permits a shifting of the burden of production, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains
with the complainant throughout the proceeding. Once a respondent produces evidence sufficient to
rebut the "presumed" retaliation raised by a primafacie case, the
inference "simply drops out of the picture," and "the trier of fact proceeds to decide
the ultimate question." St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 510-511. SeeCarroll v. United States Dep't of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1996)(whether the
complainant previously established a primafacie case becomes irrelevant once
the respondent has produced evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action.)
7 The respondent must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the adverse employment action. The
explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the respondent. Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 256-257. Respondent does
not carry the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for the adverse
employment action. Id.
8 Complainant's claim that in
September-October 1998 as many as 40 units did not have operable speedometers in the Alice district
was effectively refuted by certified mechanic Zachary Tamez of the Alice district who testified that
an inoperable speedometer was a rare event and he only had to repair five speedometers in three
years.
9 Mr. Melton, Lombardo and Rose
testified that Complainant had a misconception that editing an electronic log, which is permitted by
DOT and is a legal act, was "falsification" of the log. In South Texas, Respondent was
not "live" with the computer system in June 1999. Complainant's claim that she was
directed by Mr. Lombardo to make the logs match is illogical since a combination of electronic and
paper logs was authorized by DOT.
10 Mr. Melton, Greer and Theis
denied the occurrence of any unit fires caused by the wiring of the on-board computer system.
11 The Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Macktal [an ERA case] is controlled by its earlier decision in Brown & Root, Inc. v.
Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984)[also an ERA case] where it was concluded that internal
complaints do not rise to the level of protected activity under the ERA. However, in Stiles v. J.
B. Hunt Transportation, Inc., Case No. 92-STA-34 @ 2 (Sec'y Sept. 24, 1993), the Secretary
declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's rulings by extending the Brown & Root rationale to
cases under the STAA for reasons previously noted regarding the legislative intent of the Act.
Although this matter arises within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, I am
constrained to follow the Secretary's position.
12 The only evidence of
"hostility" offered by Complainant was Mr. Lombardo anger at her for refusing on June
18, 1999, to send by e-mail the passwords or "access codes" for facility computers to
allow him access to data needed for a report. At this point in time, she still had not provided the
information in the format requested by Mr Lombardo on May 24, 1999. The June 21, 1999, meeting
was scheduled to gather the information still outstanding.