Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. v. Slavin, No. 3:98-CV-613 (E.D.Tenn. Aug. 17, 1999) (relates to 1994-CAA-2 and 3)

[Filed August 17, 1999]
No. 3:98-CV-613
Judge Curtis L. Collier

LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY SYSTEMS, INC.,
   Plaintiff,

EDWARD A. SLAVIN, JR.,
   Defendant.

   This case was brought by Plaintiff Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. ("Lockheed") against Defendant Edward A. Slavin, Jr. to compel Mr. Slavin to comply with a September 6, 1996 order from the United States Department of Labor ("DOL") which required Mr. Slavin to repay Lockheed over $27,000 in attorney fees. On June 18, 1999, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering Mr. Slavin to comply with the DOL order. In addition, the Court ordered Mr. Slavin to pay all costs associated with this action and all prejudgment interest accruing from the date of the DOL order. Before the Court is Mr. Slavin's Motion to Reconsider (Court File No. 24) and Plaintiff's Response (Court File No. 26). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing on its Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions. For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

   The Court construes Mr. Slavin's Motion to Reconsider as a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Motions to reconsider under Rule 60(b) are "opportunit[ies] for [the district court] to correct manifest errors of law or fact and to review newly discovered evidence or to review prior decision when there has been a change in the law." United States v. Davis, 939 F. Supp 810, 812 (D.Kan. 1996). Motions seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court, which must balance the ends of justice with public interest in the finality of judgment. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1355, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Motions for relief from judgment seek extraordinary judicial relief and can be granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 535, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "[A] Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for an appeal." Id. at 539. A court is justified in exercising its discretion to grant relief from judgment if (1) there is an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light, or (3) it becomes necessary to remedy a clear mistake of law or to prevent obvious injustice. Segarra v. Messina, 158 F.R.D. 230 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).

   The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated:

We have held that Rule 60(b)(6) should apply "only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered clause of the Rule." Courts, however, must apply subsection (b)(6) only "as a means to achieve substantial justice when 'something more' than one of the grounds contained in Rule 60(b)'s first five clauses is present."

Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

   Mr. Slavin asserts the following errors in the Court's Memorandum and Order which he contends require vacatur:

1. the Court misapprehended the law and facts;

2. the Court failed to allow discovery to proceed on relevant facts relating to Plaintiff's change of policies and procedures as a result of Defendant's work for Mr. Varnadore and other Oak Ridge whistleblowers;

3. the Court failed to schedule oral argument on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment;

4. the Court apparently accepted, without proof, Plaintiff's hierarchial and authoritarian notions regarding Oak Ridge, without taking the time to discern the true facts of Plaintiffs animus and improper purpose of bringing this action;

5. the Court was improperly lobbied by a personal letter sent on Lockheed Martin stationary by G. Wilson Horder of its General Counsel's office. Lockheed's lobbying with a letter is in pari delicto with its past performance and an appearance of impropriety that taints this proceeding.

6. the Court failed to allow any testimonial proof at a hearing on trial on the issues raised in the Anser, Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, and Declaration of Defendant Edward A. Slavin, Jr.

   Mr. Slavin does not discuss in any detail his objections or offer any case law supporting his bases for reconsideration. Mr. Slavin has not brought any new evidence to the Court's attention which could not have been presented earlier, or pointed to any exceptional circumstances which would require the Court to grant this extraordinary relief. Although Mr. Slavin attempted to complicate the issues in this case by rearguing points previously addressed by numerous other courts and administrative agencies and by harping, on extraneous and irrelevant facts, this was a relatively straightforward case. Given the rather simple determination before the Court, oral argument on the

motion was unnecessary as the motion was easily decided based on the parties' extensive briefs. From the various roadblocks and stalling techniques Mr. Slavin has instituted not only in this action but in previous litigation on this same issue, it is apparent Mr. Slavin is doing any and everything to avoid having to repay the attorney fees to which he is no longer entitled. Mr. Slavin has presented no valid basis for overturning the Court's previous decision on this issue. The Court will therefore DENY Defendant's Motion to Reconsider.

   In addition the Court will GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing on its previously filed Motion for Sanction. Since Mr. Slavin so desperately desires to address the Court, he will have the opportunity to explain to the Court why he should not be sanctioned for repeatedly advancing meritless arguments to the Court. The hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions will be held September 28, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before United States District Judge Curtis Collier, Courtroom 1-A First Floor, Howard H. Barker Courtroom, Knoxville, Tennessee.

IV. CONCLUSION

   Since Plaintiff has not pointed to a manifest error in law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change in the law, there is no basis for overturning the Court's June 18, 1999 Memorandum and Order. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. In addition, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing on its Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions. This hearing will be held on September 28, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before United States District Judge Curtis Collier, Courtroom 1-A, First Floor, Howard H. Barker Courtroom, Knoxville, Tennessee.

   An Order shall enter.

      CURTIS L. COLLIER
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE