Office of Administrative Law Judges 2600 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, NJ 08104
(856) 757-5312 856-757-5403 (FAX)
DATE: May 31, 2000
CASE N0.: 1999-CAA-00017
1999-CAA-00018
In the Matter of
DONALD SURRETTE Complainant
v.
FOSTER WHEELER ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION
and
EDWARD BLACK ASSOCIATES Respondents
Appearances:
Stephen L. Raymond, Esquire, Haverhill, Massachusetts, for the Complainant
Howard M. Radzely, Esquire (Wiley, Rein & Fielding), Washington, D.C., for the Respondent Foster
Wheeler Environmental Corporation
Gerard J. Burns, P.E., Boston, Massachusetts, for the Respondent Edward Black Associates
Before: Daniel F. Sutton
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
I. Jurisdiction
This case arises under the environmental whistleblower protection provisions of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §7622, and the Comprehensive Environmental
Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §9610, and the
regulations promulgated thereunder which are found at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. The matter is before the
undersigned Administrative Law Judge pursuant to the Complainant's request for a hearing. 29 C.F.R.
§24.4(d).
1 The documentary evidence admitted to the
record will be referred to as "ALJX" for jurisdictional and procedural documents admitted by
the administrative law judge, "CX" for documents offered by the Complainant,
"FWX" for documents offered by Respondent Foster Wheeler, and "EBX" for
documents offered by Respondent EBA. Citations to the hearing transcript will be designated
"TR".
2 The Area Director's letter states that the
Complainant alleged a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 , 29 U.S.C.
§651 et seq., in addition to violations of the CAA and CERCLA. The alleged Occupational
Safety and Health Act violations are not before me as whistleblowing activities related to occupational
safety and health issues are not subject to the Department of Labor's administrative adjudicatory processes
but are, instead, governed by section 11 of the Act and enforced in United States Federal District Courts.
Tucker v. Morrison & Knudson, ARB No. 96-043, ALJ No. 94-CER-1 (ARB February 28, 1997),
slip op. at 5. See also, Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
3 The Regulations require that a request for
hearing be filed within five business days of receipt of the OSHA determination. 29 C.F.R.
§24.4(d)(2). The Claimant testified on cross-examination by counsel to Foster Wheeler that he did
not recall when he received the Area Director's May 7, 1999 determination letter, but he was sure that he
filed his request for hearing within the five-day time limit because he's "punctual like that."
TR 194. Neither Respondent has challenged the timeliness of the Complainant's hearing request.
However, assuming that Foster Wheeler's questioning of the Claimant could be construed as raising the
timeliness issue, I find that the Claimant's uncontradicted testimony that he transmitted his request by
facsimile within five days of receiving the Area Director's May 7, 1999 determination letter is sufficient to
meet his burden of establishing that his request was timely filed. Compare Staskelunas v. Northeast
Utilities Co., ARB Case No. 98-035, ALJ No. 98-ERA-8 (May 4, 1998), slip op. at 3 (although
complainant failed to definitively establish when he received determination letter, request for hearing
received by the Office of Administrative Law Judges more than five days after the mailing date was
clearly untimely even if it were assumed that the request was mailed on the date complainant received the
determination letter).
4 The record reflects that the Army Corps
of Engineers investigated Surrette's complaints and reported to the EPA that there was no discharge of
untreated or unfiltered gasses from the Silresim plant and that there had not been any storage of waste
barrels in excess of any applicable regulation. FWX 13. It appears that no further action was taken on
Surrette's complaints.
5 I note that Surrette's testimony, if
credited, that Burns was angry over the filing of the EPA complaint and subsequently did not place
Surrette in jobs could support a discriminatory refusal to hire allegation against EBA. However, Surrette
did not include a refusal to hire allegation in his complaint, and he did not move to amend the complaint
to include such an allegation. Moreover, no evidence has been introduced concerning the requisite
elements of a refusal to hire case; that is whether (1) Surrette applied and was qualified for a job for which
EBA was seeking applicants, (2) despite his qualifications, he was rejected and (3) after his rejection, the
position remained open and EBA continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. See, Samodurov v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., ALJ No. 89-ERA-20 (Sec'y
November 16, 1993), slip op. at 6-7, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802(1973). Under these circumstances, I conclude that the issue of whether EBA refused to hire Surrette
for other jobs because he filed an EPA complaint has not been tried by implied consent and is not properly
before me. C.f., Yellow Freight System. Inc. v. Martin, 954F.2d 353, 358-59 (6th
Cir.1992) (unpleaded issue may be tried by implied consent); MacLeod v. Los Alamos National
Laboratory, ARB No. 96-044, ALJ No.94-CAA-18 (ARB April 23, 1997), slip op. at 6-7.
6 The ARB did not hold that there is an
"inevitable overlap"between safety and environmental concerns, as suggested by Surrette in
his brief. That quotation was taken from the complainant's brief. Id. at 10-11.
7 I have not relied on Surrette's
unfamiliarity with the CAA and CERCLA or his inability to specify whether any conditions covered by
his complaints violated the environmental acts since a complainant's inability to specify the controlling
EPA regulations is not determinative of whether the complainant engaged in protected activity.
Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Services, Inc., ALJ No. 91-SWD-1 (Sec'y November 1, 1995), slip op. at 5.
8 It is noted that the Secretary has held that
an allegation of record falsification by a water treatment plant operator, whose duties included treatment
of water so it could be released in accordance with state regulations, was sufficient to show a reasonably
perceived violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1367. Carson v.
Tyler Pipe Co., ALJ No. 93-WPC-11 (Sec'y March 24, 1995), slip op. at 5.
9While there is no dispute that Surrette's
complaint to the EPA is protected, there is also no dispute that this activity, occurring as it did after his
termination, played no role in the termination decision. See, Bailey v. System Energy Resources,
Inc., ALJ Nos. 89-ERA-31 and 32 (Sec'y July 16, 1993), slip op. at 4.