U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400N
Washington, D.C. 20001-8001
Date Issued: January 6, 1998
Case Number: 95-CAA-10
In the Matter of:
Harry L. Williams,
Complainant,
v.
Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc.;
Martin Marietta Corporation;
Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc.
Respondents.
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
This proceeding was commenced by a complaint filed on August 2, 1994
under the employee protection provisions of six federal environmental protection statutes: the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7622; the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2601; the Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA"), as amended by the Resource Recovery and Control Act
("RRCA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6971; the Comprehensive Environmental Response
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9610; (together referred to as
"Environmental Acts") and the Energy Reorganization Act ("ERA"), 42
U.S.C. § 5851. The proceeding is governed by the regulations promulgated under the
above referenced statutes by the Secretary of Labor which are found at 29 C.F.R. Part 24.
Complainant, Harry L. Williams, contends that he was the subject of
disparate treatment because he engaged in activity protected under the aforesaid statutes. The
District Director of the Nashville, Tennessee regional office of the Employment Standards
Administration, United States Department of Labor, found after an investigation that
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Complainant had not set forth a claim on which relief under the environmental protection statutes
could be granted.
Complainant timely appealed the Employment Standard Administration's
decision to the Office of Administrative Law Judges on March 8, 1995. A hearing was
scheduled for September 25 - 29, 1995, but continued at the request of Complainant.
Subsequently, the following Orders were issued disposing of pre-hearing motions filed by the
parties:
(1) Union Carbide Corporation was dismissed as a Respondent by Order dated June 26, 1995 ;
(2) An Order dated July 19, 1995 granted in part and denied in part a motion for discovery and the production of documents;
(3) Complainant's request to order the United States Department of Energy to honor his FOIA request was
denied by Order dated August 1, 1995;
(4) United States Department of Energy was dismissed as a Respondent by Order dated August 2, 1995;
(5) The Y-12 plant, the K-25 plant, Sam Thompson and Lorry Ruth were dismissed as Respondents by Order
dated August 8, 1995. The same Order denied Respondent Lockheed Martin Energy System's motion to
dismiss Complainant's complaint against Martin Marietta Corporation and Martin Marietta Technologies;
(6) An Order permitting in part and denying in part discovery and the exchange of exhibits and witness lists
was issued on August 24, 1995;
(7) An Order providing for scheduling, sanctions and the confidentiality of medical records was issued on
November 1, 1995.
(8) Orders concerning discovery were issued on March 4, 1996; July 10, 1996; September 25, 1996;
and again on December 16, 1996.
Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (formerly Martin Marietta Energy
Systems); Martin Marietta Corporation; and Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc
("Respondents") filed a Motion for Summary Decision dated February 16, 1996
arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Respondents are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
During the period February 1996 through September 1996, Complainant
requested and was granted six extensions of time in which to reply to Respondents' Motion for
Summary Decision. No response was filed. On September 30, 1997 the undersigned
administrative law judge issued an Order allowing Complainant twenty-five additional days to
respond. Although two requests by Complainant for additional time were denied, Complainant
filed interalia a "Partial Response To Summary Judgment," along
with a request for additional time to file a more detailed statement. Complainant's partial
response is considered; however, his request for additional time to file a more detailed statement
is denied.
SUMMARY DECISION
The standard for granting summary decision is set forth at 29 C.F.R.
§18.40(d) (1996). This section, which is derived from Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, permits an
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Administrative Law Judge to recommend summary decision for either party where "the
pleadings, affidavits, material obtained by discovery or otherwise, or matters officially noticed
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." 29 C.F.R. §18.40(d).
The non-moving party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat
a properly supported motion for summary decision. Gillilan v. TVA, 91-ERA-31(Sec'y
Aug. 28, 1995) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), but the determination of whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists must be made viewing all the evidence and factual
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Respondents argue, inter alia, that summary decision should be
granted in whole or in part because most of the adverse actions set forth in Complainant's
complaint are barred by the statute of limitations and those which are alleged to have occurred
within the statutory period were not adverse to the Complainant or were not taken as a result of
any purported protected activity.