U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
525 Vine Street, Suite 900
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
DATE: September 3, 1993
CASE NO: 93-CAA-0011
IN THE MATTER OF
PATRICK STUDER
Plaintiff
v.
FLOWERS BAKING COMPANY OF TENNESSEE, INC.
Respondent
Mr. Patrick Studer
Unrepresented
Larry Eber, President
For the Respondent
BEFORE:
Richard E. Huddleston
Administrative Law Judge
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
The action arises upon a complaint filed
against Flowers Baking Company of Tennessee, Inc., alleging
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discrimination "because of the charges that I had against
them with Labor Relations and the EPA last year." The nature
of the "charges ... EPA last yearn is not identified in the
complaint. However, the matter was referred to the Wage & Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor as a complaint alleging
a violation of the Clean Air Act (hereinafter
"Act"), Public Law 95-95, § 322, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622. Upon completion of its investigation, the Department
of Labor found no violation of the Act, and so notified the
Plaintiff on August 10, 1993. By telegram received August 16,
1993, the Plaintiff has requested a formal hearing before the
Office of Administrative Law Judges. This matter has now been
assigned to the undersigned, and all further correspondence,
motions, or other pleadings shall be filed with:
Judge Richard E. Huddleston
Office of Administrative Law Judges
525 Vine Street, Suite 900
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
The Act at § 7622 (a) provides in relevant part
that,
No employer may discharge any employee or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee
... (emphasis added).
This case does not involve the issue
of discharge. Thus, in order to state a cause of action under
the Act, the Plaintiff must allege that (as a result of
protected activity) he has been discriminated against with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.
I note, initially, that the complaint,
itself, does not clearly allege any protected activity under
the Act, but generally refers to "because of the charges
that I had against them with . . . the EPA last year. "
However, it is apparent that the Wage & Hour Division was
aware of a previous complaint filed by the Plaintiff under
the Act, as such is referenced in the District Director's
August 10, 1993, response. Assuming that protected activity
is properly alleged, the discriminatory conduct complained of
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is stated as "The facts are that Merrell Carnes has an
opening for a school and has filled the opening with a person
of half the seniority that I have." Generally, any
discriminatory action taken against an employee as a result
of protected activity is considered to be a violation of the
Act. However, not all actions taken or business decisions
made by an employer, which affect an employee, are considered
discriminatory.
I have reviewed the complaint filed by
Mr. Studer to make a preliminary determination of whether the
complaint at least states a valid complaint under the Act,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. As stated above, I do find that it is at least
adequately alleged that Mr. Studer did engage in protected
activity under the Act, as he referenced charges he made
against Respondent "with the EPA last year."
However, the action complained of does not on its face allege
any conduct by the Employer which is discriminatory activity.
Instead, the complaint merely alleges that he was not
selected for a school he wanted to attend. There is no
allegation of any activity by the Employer in which Plaintiff
was treated differently from other employees. For example, if
the Plaintiff was the only employee more senior than the
person who was selected for the school in question, and if
the Employer had a practice of selecting the most senior
person to attend such functions, failure to select the
Plaintiff might be considered discriminatory. However, such
is not alleged here.
It is my preliminary judgment that
even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, he has not alleged any activity which would be
considered discriminatory. Therefore, his complaint does not
state a cause of action under the Act.
It is, therefore, Ordered, that:
1. The Plaintiff, Patrick Studer, shall show
cause in waiting within 10 days of this order why his
complaint should not be summarily dismissed as failing
to state a valid cause of action under the Clean Air
Act.
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2. Following receipt of the Plaintiff's response, a
decision will be made whether a hearing should be
scheduled, or whether this matter must be dismissed.
Entered this the 3rd day of
September, 1993, at Cincinnati, Ohio.