2 References to the record are as follows: Transcript: Tr.; Complainant's Exhibits: CX-; Respondent's Exhibits: RX-; and Administrative Law Judge Exhibits: ALJX-.
3 CX-256, Complainant's July 11, 2002 letter addressed to Mr. Matias is exhibit 2 to RX-6. Accordingly, CX-256 is hereby received into evidence.
4 Prior to working with Respondent, Complainant was an over-the-road driver for "Schneider" for "about a year." He performed the same occupation for "American Driver" for "about four and a half years." He briefly worked for "Roahl Transport" while he worked for American Driver. (Tr. 229-231).
5 Complainant stated that, "if you've got a truck that runs 65 miles per hour and all you're looking at is driving time on the highway," it is not possible to complete a 630-mile trip from Birmingham, Alabama to Dallas, Texas in ten hours. If a truck could maintain a speed of 69 miles per hour, Complainant stated it would be "questionable" whether the driver could complete the 630-mile trip in ten driving hours. (Tr. 283-284).
6 Complainant testified he submitted no other written complaints to Respondent before March 13, 2002. (Tr. 301).
7 Complainant denied initially calling Mr. Morrison from Waco. Mr. Morrison did not tell Complainant to "go to the depot," nor did he say "go to a designated motel. He said go find your own motel room." (Tr. 559).
8 Complainant's driving log for the March 14, 15, and 16, 2002 round-trip from Dallas to San Antonio was not submitted to Respondent after his completion of the trip. Complainant admitted there is a box for the submission of driving logs in Respondent's break-room at the Dallas facility, but testified he was unable to deliver his log upon arrival because Respondent's facility was locked. Complainant admitted he made no further effort to submit his driving log to Respondent. Although Mr. Morrison allegedly requested that Complainant's wife deliver copies of his Waco hotel receipts, Complainant did not provide his driving log to his wife to be included with his hotel receipts. (Tr. 286, 308-309).
9 Complainant never photographed the office sign of John Matias. He believed John Matias was an employee of OSHA because "[Mr. Matias] was conducting a training for OSHA." Mr. Matias "said he worked for OSHA," and was training other OSHA representatives when Complainant met him on July 11, 2002. (Tr. 247-250).
10 Complainant noted Jackson, Mississippi precluded trucks from passing directly through town. He also noted Shreveport, Louisiana imposed a 45 miles-per-hour speed limit. (Tr. 284-285).
11 At the hearing, the parties referred to "Arno," which ostensibly means Arnold Transportation Services, Inc., an employer which inquired of Complainant's background with Respondent pursuant to a March 20, 2002 pre-employment questionnaire. (RX-1, pp. 83-85).
12 Complainant's 2002 and 2001 Wage and Tax Statements indicate he earned $11,793.11 and $38,578.46, respectively, from Respondent. (CX-257; CX-258).
13 On Friday, March 22, 2002, Complainant filed a petition with a state court in Dallas County requesting depositions of Mr. Morrison and "Mr. John Vince," a mistaken reference to Mr. Vincent. Complainant was introduced to Mr. Vincent "three or four months" after he started employment with Respondent. Sometime after Christmas 2001 or in January 2002, Complainant requested a sleeper truck from Mr. Vincent. Complainant's last encounter with Mr. Vincent occurred on March 15, 2002, when his conversations with Mr. Vincent and Mr. Morrison culminated in the interview report. Other than those three incidents, Complainant did not speak with Mr. Vincent "other than hi and bye." (Tr. 239-240; RX-2).
14 Driving logs submitted by Complainant indicate he drove fewer hours and reveal different points of origination and destination. For instance, Complainant's copy of his driving log for September 20 to 21, 2001 indicates he was off duty for twenty-one hours and driving three hours on a trip from "Larado, Texas" to Dallas, Texas; however, Respondent's copy of his driving log for the same dates indicates Complainant was off-duty for twenty hours, driving for three and a half hours, and on-duty (not driving) for one-half hour on a trip from "San Antonio, Texas" to Dallas, Texas. (CX-90; RX-5, p. 320; Seealso Tr. 264-268; CX-91 through CX-97; EX-5, pp. 321-332).
15 Complainant admitted he was referring to the interview report which he did not sign. (Tr. 306).
16 Complainant acknowledged his February 25, 2003 affidavit which described a safety meeting and included supporting documentation. He admitted the supporting documentation was dated March 11, 2001, "over a year earlier," and was time-stamped March 15, 2001. (Tr. 297-299).
17 Complainant did not know who Joel McCarty was, although Sandy Marshall "sounds familiar. I'm not sure." (Tr. 300). Mr. McCarty is identified as Respondent's General Counsel in High Point, North Carolina. He is available to receive complaints of discrimination or harassment as is Ms. Sandy Marshall. (RX-1, p. 39).
18 A review of the videotape copy of the deposition confirms Mr. Matias's testimony regarding the appearance of the logo.
19 Mr. Matias acknowledged a photograph that fairly and accurately represented the front of his office building, which has not changed since July 2002. In the photograph, the words "Engineering Safety Consultants" are clearly written on the wall. (RX-6, p. 12; RX-6, exhibit no. 1).
20 Complainant testified he was in the "same position" as Mr. Jeremiah, and had to "work my logs." (Tr. 260-261).
21 Because Complainant did not submit his freight bills, which Respondent requires drivers to do, Mr. Morrison had to re-create them using the electronic tracking system which indicated Complainant arrived at 3:30 a.m. (Tr. 538).
22 Of note, Counsel for Complainant indicated to the undersigned that there is a Latin phrase which applies to this matter: "He who is silent in the face of wrongdoing is guilty of that wrongdoing." (Tr. 17).
23 It should be noted the petition is associated with "Cause No. 02-2704." No supporting information or description of that cause was offered by Complainant.
24 There is no transcript of the hearing on Complainant's Petition For Deposition of record.
25 Although the "pretext" analysis permits a shifting of the burden of production, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the complainant throughout the proceeding. Once a respondent produces evidence sufficient to rebut the "presumed" retaliation raised by a prima facie case, the inference "simply drops out of the picture," and "the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question." St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 510-511. SeeCarroll v. United States Dep't of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1996) (whether the complainant previously established a prima facie case becomes irrelevant once the respondent has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action).
26 The respondent must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the adverse employment action. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the respondent. Upon articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action or "explaining what it has done," Respondent satisfies its burden, which, as noted above, is only a burden of production, not persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 256-257; 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 1095-1096 (1981). Respondent does not carry the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for the adverse employment action. Id.
27 Complainant relies on Turgeon v. Maine Beverage Container Services, Inc., Case No. 93-STA-11 (Sec'y, 30, 1993) to argue he was terminated for his protected refusal to drive while fatigued. The facts of that case are inapposite to the facts at hand. There, the record clearly supported a conclusion the respondent compelled its employees to falsely log driving hours and would even assist the drivers in that task. The complainant in Turgeon, clearly refused an assignment to drive because of fatigue. Case No. 93-STA-11 @ 3-4. Here, the record does not support a conclusion Respondent compelled its employees to falsely log driving hours or even assist the drivers in that task, nor is there evidence Complainant refused to accept a driving assignment or discontinue driving or remaining on duty when he was out of hours or fatigued.
28 Complainant relies on extra-record excerpts of deposition transcripts of Mr. Vincent and Mr. Morrison which appear to indicate the facts of his discharge, including the confrontation prior to discharge and the litany of reasons Respondent identified in its reasons for discharge, warranted Respondent's decision to terminate Complainant.