U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
2600 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, New Jersey 08104
DATE: August 26, 1996
CASE NO: 94-ERA-41
In The Matter Of
SAYED MANSOUR,
Complainant
v.
ONCOLOGY SERVICES CORPORATION
Respondent
Appearances:
Timothy G. Griffin, Esq.
On Behalf of the Complainant
Marcy Colkitt, Esq.
On Behalf of the Respondent
Before: Ainsworth H. Brown Administrative Law Judge
[Page 2]
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
This case arises under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act
("ERA") of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982) (hereinafter "the Act"),
which prohibits a Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") licensee from discharging
or otherwise discriminating against an employee who has engaged in activity protected under the
Act. The Act, designed to protect so-called "whistleblower" employees from retaliatory
or discriminatory actions by their employers, is implemented by regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part
24. A hearing was held before me on December 12, 1995, in Cranford, New Jersey, at which time
the parties were given the opportunity to present oral and written arguments, witnesses and
documentary evidence.
1The following references are used herein:
"Tr" refers to the Transcript of the formal hearing held on December 12, 1995;
"Rx" refers to Respondent's exhibit; and "Cx" refers to Complainant's
exhibit.
2Complainant indicated that he sat
for the test again in July, 1994 (Rx 4 at 14), but later maintained that he sat for the test only once,
(Rx 4 at 15, 16).
3Dr. Derdel explained that the nuclear
material used in OSC's treatment centers is regulated either by the states or the federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, depending on whether the state in which the treatment center is located is
an "agreement state," i.e., a state that has an agreement with the NRC allowing the state
to oversee the use of radioactive materials under the auspices and direction of the NRC.
4Complainant testified that Joanne
Russell is Dr. Colkitt's wife and also an officer of OSC, but he could not identify what office she
held. (Tr at 43.)
5OSC and Complainant referred to
those health physicists contracted to work on an hourly basis, rather than retained as employees, as
"independent locums." (Tr at 23.)
6Dr. Derdel and Complainant had
both attended a conference of the American College of Radiology and the American Society for
Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology ("ASTRO") in New Orleans, Louisiana. (Rx 19.)
7Complainant alleged that Dr. Derdel
asked him to go to Flagstaff and sabotage a piece of OSC equipment, to "show the power of
OSC." (Tr at 190-193.)
8Complainant had been aware, since
April or May, 1993, that the reorganization and regionalization of the physics department was
underway. (Tr at 296-297.) Complainant testified that the regionalization was a good idea, (Tr at
241), and Complainant concedes that the regionalization plan has taken effect, (Complainant's Post-Hearing Brief at 23).
9Complainant nonetheless maintained
that Dr. Colkitt offered him the Director of Physics position, but he turned it down. (Tr at 133.)
10Marcy Colkitt explained that she
distributed the memorandum to the other employees "because I didn't want to send a memo
directly only to (Complainant] because I didn't think it would be a nice thing to have in a file."
(Tr at 395.)
11The November 18, 1993 letter
states "As we have discussed, your position with Oncology Services Corporation has been
eliminated. Accordingly, today is your last day of employment." (Rx 8.) Respondent argues
that this language demonstrates that the decision to terminate Complainant had been previously
discussed. (Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief at 14.) Semantically, however, the language only
implies that the elimination of Complainant's position had been previously discussed. As noted
above, the elimination of Complainant's position does not necessarily equate with 'Complainant's
termination. Alternatively, the "as we have discussed" language might simply refer to
the discussion earlier that same day, which Complainant requested be reduced to writing. Therefore,
I note that this letter is not persuasive evidence that Complainant had prior unambiguous notice of
the decision to terminate him.
12An "internal"
complaint is one lodged with a supervisor of the company itself, while an external complaint is one
lodged with an outside agency, such as the NRC. Kahn v. United StatesSecretary of
Labor, 64 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 1995).
13Rather, OSC has, at best,
demonstrated that the April 29, 1993 letter was typed on the same machine (typewriter, computer
or word processor) as the May 16, 1994 complaint. I do not conclude, however, that the document
was fraudulently created.
14Respondent argues that to prevail
in a "mixed motives" case, complainant must produce "direct evidence" of
discrimination, "i.e., more direct evidence than is required for the McDonnellDouglass/Burdine prima facie case." (Respondent's Br at 32, citingStarceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d. Cir. 1995)). Respondent
points out that the Starceski court required "conduct or statements by persons involved
in the decision making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory
attitude."
This standard, although applicable in the Third Circuit to Title VII and
ADEA cases, is not properly applicable in the instant case. The Secretary has chosen not
to apply Title VII analysis to dual motive cases under the environmental whistleblower protection
statutes, but, rather, has adopted the Wright Line test applied by the National Labor
Relations Board ("the Board") to cases of antiunion-animus-based discrimination. In
determining whether an employer's action is unlawfully motivated, the Board frequently relies on
circumstantial evidence to shift the burden to the employer. See Merchants Truck Line v. N. L.
R. B. , 577 F. 2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1978), enf'g 232 N.L.R.B. 676 (delay in discharge after
the alleged offense is discovered) ; Wells Dairy d/b/a/ Wells BlueBunny, 287
N.L.R.B. 827 (1987), enf'd 865 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1989) (departure from established
procedures for discharge); Forest ParkAmbulance Serv. , 206 N.L.R.B. 550 (1973)
(failure to tell the employee the reason for the discharge at the time of discharge) ; Clark &
Wilkins Indus., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1988), enf'd 887 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(timing of the discharge) . Indeed, the Secretary's decisions under the ERA also suggest that
circumstantial and inferential evidence can invoke a dual motive analysis and shift the burden of
proof or persuasion to the employer. See Young v. CBI Services, Inc., 88-ERA-8 (Sec'y
December 8, 1992) slip op. at n.4; St. Laurent v. Britz. Inc., 89ERA-15 (Sec'y October 26,
1992), slip op. at 4 n.3. Direct evidence that Respondent's decision-makers relied on Complainant's
protected activity in deciding to terminate him is thus not a prerequisite to a dual motive finding and
burden shifting analysis. A preponderance of evidence, whether circumstantial and inferential in
nature or direct, is all that is required.