Before me for review is a Recommended Decision and Order (R. D. and 0.) issued on November 3, 1995, by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in this case arising under the employee protection
provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
(STAA) 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1994). The ALJ found that
the Complainant, Paul Polchinski, failed to establish that
Respondent, Atlas Bulk Carriers, violated the STAA when it
terminated his employment, and recommended dismissal of the
complaint. Upon review of the ALJ's R. D. and O., as well as the
case record and the parties' submissions, I agree that the
complaint should be dismissed for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
Complainant, a bulk fuel truck driver, had as his primary
duty with the Respondent the delivery of fuel to customers. It
is undisputed that Complainant began his employment with
Respondent on November 7, 1993. On May 17, 1995, he was
terminated by Respondent for spilling approximately three to five
gallons of gasoline at a delivery site. As a result of this
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spill, the customer asked that Complainant not be allowed to
return to the site.[l] This incident took place on May 16, 1995.
On the previous day Respondent received a separate complaint
regarding Complainant's conduct from another of its customers.
That incident involved Complainant's driving a burning truck into
a gas station.
Complainant's contention is that safety-related concerns he
voiced regarding overdue tank tests, loose and worn fittings, air
leaks, bad tires, leaking fuel hose connections and "other
mechanical problems," RX 1 at 3, R. D. and 0. at 2, led to his
discharge. Respondent, on the other hand, denies that
Complainant made any internal safety complaints at any time and
points out that Complainant failed to submit the mandatory
vehicle inspection reports which the company required of all its
drivers. R. D. and 0. at 3. Respondent contends that these
reports, had they been properly submitted, would have alerted
them to all alleged safety problems. Complainant did not contest
the allegation that he failed to submit the mandatory vehicle
inspection reports.
The ALJ's finding that Complainant failed to provide any
support for his allegation that he made internal safety
complaints before he was fired is supported by substantial record
evidence and is therefore, conclusive. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1978.109(c)(3)(1995).[2] Further, the ALJ found, and I
agree, that the decision to terminate Complainant was reached
following separate complaints against him by two different
customers and the proximity of these customer complaints to the
termination action serves to validate the nondiscriminatory
nature of the discharge decision.
I accept the ALJ's holding that Complainant's termination
was "a legitimate personnel action dictated by nondiscriminatory
business considerations." R. D. and 0. at 7. Accordingly, this
complaint IS DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERT B. REICH
Secretary of Labor
Washington, D.C.
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[ENDNOTES]
[1] This is the sole reason listed on Complainant's termination
notice as well as in the original summary of allegations
contained in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
(OSHA) Discrimination Case Activity Worksheet. In evidence
developed during the course of the hearing, however, Respondent
supplemented its reasons for discharging Complainant with other
acts of misconduct. See, R. D. and 0. at 4. While the
Complainant disagrees with Respondent's "'characterization" of
these incidents, he does not dispute their occurrence.
Id.
[2] The ALJ committed harmless error in holding that Complainant
did not established a prima facie case. Since "this case
was fully tried on the merits," it is not necessary to engage in
an analysis of the elements of a prima facie case. USPS Bd.
ofGovernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 (1983);
Carroll v. BechtelPower Corp., Case No. 91-ERA-
0046, Sec. Dec., Feb. 15, 1985, slip op. at 11 n.9, petition for
review docketed, No. 95-1729 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 1995) (under the
Energy Reorganization Act). Once Respondent produced evidence
that Complainant was subject to discharge for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the answer to the question of whether a
prima facie case was presented is no longer useuseful.
If Complainant has not prevailed by a preponderance of the evidence
on the ultimate question of liability, it matters not at all whether
he presented a prima facie case. See Boyles v. Highway Express, Inc.,
Case No. 94-STA-21, Sec. Dec., July 13, 1995, slip op. at 2-3.