Kasny, Andrews and Greany denied that the hours of service subject came up,
although they recalled a number of occasions when complainant discussed the "vicious
cycle." Other discrepancies indicate that complainant's memory of the events is perhaps
more as he wishes they had occured, rather than how they actually occured. For example, Dave
Andrews recalls telling complainant that his desire to have the day shift trucks come in earlier
was not workable because the customers dictate the volume of freight [TR 622-625]. Greany
echoed this fact of business life [TR 727-729]. Yet Mr. Michaud testified that Andrews agreed
with him about bringing the day trucks in earlier. Another discrepancy is that Kasny and
Andrews deny talking to complainant about the New Hampshire Railway Act, but complainant
may have talked to another driver, Jeff Labreque, about it [TR 167-8].
Second, Mr. Michaud's own testimony was extremely vague and often tangential. He
spoke haltingly about key events, and was frequently unable to remember dates, and who said
what. It is unnecessary to determine whether his lack of clarity stems from conscious
dissembling, for Mr. Michaud himself admitted that his mental state causes his mind to wander
and lose focus [TR 83, 86, 170, 186]. As a result, he is not a reliable witness.
Third, complainant's statements about the "vicious cycle" and getting his run
accomplished centered primarily on his extra job assignments and concern with making more
money, rather than on perceived safety or hours violations. Mace v. ONA Delivery Systems,
Inc. , 91-STA-10 (Sec'y January 27, 1992).
Finally, the fact that Mr. Michaud kept his alleged early contacts with the DOT and state
trooper a secret from BSP management suggests that he either did not make those contacts at all
or that he was not really seriously concerned about management making a change. In this regard,
I find complainant's testimony contradictory and not at all reconcilable. Complainant testified
that before his October review, he instituted a conversation with a state
trooper about the hours of service rules; again, he was very vague about the when, where and
what of these contacts [TR 86, 88-89]. However, he claims that he did not see the document that
"jogged his memory" and "concern" about the hours of service rules [CX
2, last page] until the October review itself [TR 74-76, 78-80]. There is no explanation for why,
if he had no concern about the hours of service violation until the review, he supposedly called
the DOT and stop a state trooper before that time. Even assuming he telephoned DOT
[Page 21]
and contacted the trooper after the review, it is undisputed that he did not disclose the company's
name to state or federal authorities, nor tell BSP about the contacts [TR 184-186]. A reasonable
inference is that his level of alleged concern was somewhere between minimal and none. The
evidence leaves it very uncertain whether Mr. Michaud actually contacted DOT or spoke to a
state trooper.
In short, I find that Mr. Michaud was engaged primarily in a struggle to get his point
across to Alex Kasny, who was simply too new in his job to handle the situation well. While this
may have been poor management, along with an interpersonal struggle, it was not about DOT
hours of service violations. Rather, the record convinces me that the hours-of-service issue was
incidental and, more likely than not, after the fact of discharge. For these reasons, I conclude that
the complainant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he registered internal
complaints cognizable under the Act.
(ii) "refusal"
Mr. Michaud claims he did not wish to begin his shift two hours earlier, as requested by
Kasny in late November 1993, because of an hours of service concern. His testimony was:
" .. after the union vote and Michael Greany had come
in just before Thanksgiving, they were afraid of losing ... a
substantial customer. That would be probably that way. ... And he
says, we'd probably be working real crazy hours, and we were a
brunch of drivers when he pulled us in to let us know. ...
***
... then after that, Alex Kasny, within that week or something,
Alex Kasny brought -- when I came in to punch in my time card, it
showed the next day that I was supposed to come in at 3:00, because
he sets the time clocks, you know, what you're supposed to do and all
of that. I says, how can I come in at 3:00? So, I went into his office.
He brought us -- no, I'm sorry. He brought us in, me and Larry Roy,
to let us know more about that later on. And we got -- went into the
office, and he sat us down. And he says, we need somebody to do the
pedal runs from 3:00 to about 5:00 ... And I said, I can't do that. He
says, why not? I says, because from 3:00 -- if you promise me I'll get
out when I'm finished with my run and everything from Logan at
3:00, then I will do it. But if you ... "
According to Mr. Michaud, Kasny's response was extremely gruff:
" ... And he says, we can drive as many hours as we
want. And I says, I beg to differ. And I says, I'm not going to do it.
And he turned around, he said, I'm telling you, if I tell you to come
in at 3:00, you're going to come in or else..."
[Page 22]
[TR 106-109]. Complainant concedes that his immediate supervisor, Glenn Osterberg,
re-arranged
the schedule the very next day to accommodate his concern about Kasny's request to come in
earlier
[TR 232-233].
The Act prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for refusing to operate a
vehicle in violation of the hours-of-service regulations at 49 C.F.R. Part 395. Ass't Secretary
and
Brown v. Besco Steel Supply , 93-STA-30 (Sec'y January 24, 1995); Settle v. BWD
Trucking
Company, Inc. , 92-STA-16 (Sec'y May 18, 1994); Greathouse v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc. ,
92-STA-18 (Sec'y August 31, 1992). However, when the reason for refusal is a personal
economic
one, or where the driver fails to adequately convey that safety is the basis for his refusal, his
activity
is not protected under the Act. Paquin v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. , 93-STA-44 (Sec'y
July
19, 1994); Waldrep v. Performance Transport, Inc. , 93-STA-23 (Sec'y April 6, 1994).
Moreover, the Act does not protect refusals that are only incidentally related to regulatory
violation
concerns. Kanavel v. U-Haul Co. of Northwestern Ohio , 88-STA-9 (Sec'y October 24,
1988).
For the reasons stated above, I find that the evidence does not establish a refusal based on
safety or hours of service concerns. Mr. Michaud actually did not refuse at all. He said he would
do the early run beginning at 3:00 p.m. if he could complete them by 3:00 a.m. Though he and
Kasny had words about it, Osterberg changed the arrangement the very next day and complainant
never did have to confront the situation. Even if Mr. Michaud had "refused," I find
that
his statements to Kasny were not so much about hours of service as they were about who was
going
to determine his schedule, assignments, and how he was to perform his job.
In addition, to come within the protection of § 31105(a)(1)(B)(I) of the Act [the
"when" clause], complainant must demonstrate that an actual violation of a Federal
regulation would have occurred had he not refused to operate the motor vehicle as directed by
BSP.
Nolan v. AC Express , 92-STA-37 (Sec'y January 17, 1995), slip op. at 6. A
complainant's
[Page 23]
unsubstantiated opinion that a violation would have occurred had he driven as requested by
management, even if reasonable and made in good faith, is insufficient to invoke protection
under
this provision. Ass't Sec'y & Vilanj v. Lee & Eastes Tank Lines, Inc. , 95-STA-36 (Sec'y
April 11, 1996); Brame v. Consolidated Freightways , 90-STA-20 (Sec'y June 17,1992),
slip
op. at 3. Rather the complainant must prove that his assessment of the unlawful situation was
correct. Brame , supra ; see also Doyle v. Rich Transport, Inc. ,
93-STA-17
(Sec'y April 1, 1994), slip op. at pp. 2-3 (complainant must prove conclusively that condition
violated Federal safety regulation); Yellow Freight system, Inc. v. Martin , 983 F.2d
1195,
1199 (2d Cir. 1993) (driver must show that operation would have "been a genuine violation
of a federal safety regulation at the time he refused to drive.").
The evidence establishes that there had been violations of the 60/7 and 12 hour rules at BSP,
in that drivers reported off duty more than 12 hours after coming on duty, without being required
to
maintain a log [CX 11; TR 650, 784]. Mr. Michaud's claimed concern for a potential 12 hour
violation can certainly be termed reasonable or in good faith, given his testimony that he thought
he
would be required to drive a 14 or 16 hour shift.9 However, that was not what Kasny testified he had in mind; his proposal was to
move the entire shift forward two hours, not to extend the shift two hours [TR 534]. Under the
circumstances, complainant has not proven that his assessment of the situation was correct and
that
a violation of hours of service would have occurred. According to Kasny, his proposal was
actually
implemented later, with great success [TR 484-490].
(2) Motivation:
whether the evidence establishes that BSP's motivation was
legitimate, pretextual, or mixed?
Complainant refutes the proffered explanation, arguing that
it is pretextual because, among other things, BSP has changed its position over time about
the
motivation for his discharge. Whereas previously the company was concerned about time cards
and
"other documents," now it claims that its concern was only with the manifests.
Complainant is correct that an employer's "switching" positions casts doubt on the
claimed legitimacy of its reason for discharging an employee.
[Page 24
It is undisputed that the person who made the decision, and the only person with authority
to make the decision, to discharge Mr. Michaud was Michael Greany. While complainant may
have
had his differences with Kasny, nothing in the record shows that those differences had occurred
with
Greany. Greany has consistently maintained that his concern, and that of company owner Jack
Law,
was with the dissemination of information from the manifests that could be helpful to a
competitor.
As in Waldrep v. Performance Transport, Inc. , supra , 93-STA-23 (Sec'y April 6,
1994) slip op. at p. 5, there is no reliable evidence that Greany knew about any "hours of
service" complaints by complainant. While complainant dwelt on the written statements
about
the events of December 23 1993 [see, for example, TR 587-590] the statements of Kasny and
Osterberg substantiate that they confronted Michaud on the morning of December 23, 1993 about
copying time cards and manifests, and he dodged their questions [CX 14, 16,. 17], as he himself
admitted in his own testimony. I am therefore unable to find that BSP has switched its positions.
I do find that the "information relay" from Vaughn to Andrews to Kasny to
Greany contained flaws. First, I credit Danny Vaughn's statement only to the extent that (1) he
saw
Mr. Michaud photocopying in the early morning hours of December 23, 1993; and (2) he told
Andrews and Kasny that he had seen complainant photocopying time cards and manifests [TR
671-674]. I credit these assertions only because Mr. Michaud admits to the former, and because
Andrews
corroborates the latter [TR 625-629]. The remainder of Vaughn's testimony is entirely
discredited
by the fact that Mr. Taylor could not have been present at the time of the event [TR 833], despite
the
fact that the witness described Taylor's actions in detail [TR 698-711]. Vaughn is either
dissembling, or recollecting some other night when Michaud and Taylor may have made
photocopies
at the same time [TR 835].
Second, Andrews conveyed misinformation to Kasny, relaying that Vaughn had seen Taylor
and Michaud acting suspiciously, as if they were trying to hide something [TR 636-638].
Vaughn
denies this [TR 704]. However, this is of little moment because Kasny did not relay the
information
on to Greany [TR 777], and it therefore could not have formed a part of his thinking in
discharging
complainant.
[Page 25]
Third, Kasny's testimony was that Vaughn confirmed he had seen Michaud making copies
of time cards and "other paperwork," which he thought were manifests, out of the
files.
These are the files where the manifests are kept [TR 590], and Kasny assumed without knowing
for
a fact that indeed manifests were being copied. [TR 498-511, 574-590, 603-609]. The evidence
is
unclear whether claimant actually photocopied manifests other than his own. However, for
Kasny
to conclude that he was doing so was not unreasonable under the circumstances, given what
Vaughn
had told him and particularly given the confirmation of complainant's own evasive conduct when
confronted about it.
As a result, I conclude that any flaws in the information relay do not materially diminish the
legitimacy of Greany's motivation for discharging complainant. On the morning of December
23,
1993, Greany either already knew of, or was informed of these specific facts: that Michaud was
disgruntled because he was complaining about working long hours for not enough money, that he
had personal financial worries, that he was seeking a job elsewhere, that he had been caught
photocopying company documents out of company files containing information valuable to
potential
competitors, and that he had evaded direct questioning when confronted about the situation.
One can theorize about the possibility of a "conspiracy" among Vaughn,
Andrews and Kasny. Yet the evidence does not rise above a possibility and certainly does not
become a probability. Moreover, even if there had been an out-and-out conflict between Kasny
and
Michaud about hours regulations [as opposed to getting the job done efficiently], the decision
maker
himself knew of no underlying hours of service problem.
Complainant also suggests that the manifests cannot be considered to have been confidential
documents, and thus the motivation is pretextual. That they are not confidential, I agree. The
evidence showed that BSP did not treat them as confidential, nor maintain any policy to assure
their
integrity -- other than keeping them in file cabinets. Mr. Greany considered them confidential, a
status he felt was implied rather than explicit [TR 798-800]. However, the fact that business
records
are not maintained as confidential does not detract from the legitimacy of a business' concern
about
their potential misuse in the hands of a disgruntled employee.
[Page 26]
There is insufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance that the motivation for
discharging Mr. Michaud was anything other than legitimate.
In view of my findings concerning protected activity and motivation, the burden does not
shift to BSP to show that it would have discharged complainant in the absence of protected
activity.
It is therefore unnecessary to determine the facts under the "mixed motive" standard.
(3) Causal nexus:
whether the evidence establishes that BSP discharge of complainant was
motivated at least in part by his having complained about hours of service violations?
As indicated above, there was perhaps some animus between Kasny and Michaud, and
perhaps Michaud had irritated Osterberg and Andrews as well. However, that irritation cannot
be
fixed on alleged complaints about hours of service, given the record before me. Mr. Greany
testified
that he fired complainant because of his unauthorized copying of sensitive documents. It is well
established that an adverse employment action immediately after the employee engages in totally
unprotected conduct militates against a causal nexus. Gibson v. Arizona Public Service Co.,
90-ERA-29, 46 and 53 (Sec'y September 18, 1995); Etchason v. Carry Companies of
Illinois,
Inc. , 92-STA-12 (Sec'y March 20, 1995). Moreover, three additional factors effectively sever
any inference of a causal connection. First, if Mr. Michaud's timetable of the facts is believed, he
began to complain about hours of service problems after his October 1993 review. But he was
not
discharged for more than two months, during which time he received a raise, and Glen Osterberg
"went to bat" for him in terms of Kasny's request that he begin his shift two hours
earlier. Second, the very event that complainant alleges triggered his discharged -- his being
discovered photocopying documents in preparation, he says, for a DOT complaint -- is precisely
what he concealed from Kasny and Osterberg. By his own admission, no one at BSP knew of his
intent to file such a complaint, nor event that he had spoken to DOT or state personnel
previously.
Greany simply could not have known, nor could he have been motivated, by a fact that Mr.
Michaud
intentionally concealed. Three, even Mr. Michaud seems to have understood that if he got
caught
copying company records, it was a reason for discharge [TR 189-190].
[Page 27]
When one couples Mr. Greany's stated reasons for the discharge with the fact that the
discharge followed immediately on the heels of complainant's secretive photocopying activities;
that
he was not discharged immediately after he allegedly began to bring up hours of service
violations;
and that he actively concealed the allegedly protected reason for photocopying the documents,
the
most reasonable inference is that Mr. Michaud's "blowing the whistle" did not lead to
his discharge.
IV. RECOMMENDED ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Secretary ORDER
that the complaint of Robert Michaud alleging discrimination under the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act be DENIED and DISMISSED .
Christine McKenna
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in
this matter will be forwarded for review by the Administrative Review Board, U.S.
Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Ave.
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210. The Administrative Review Board has the authority to
issue final decisions in employee protection cases adjudicated under the regulations at 29
C.F.R. Parts 24 and 1978. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19978-19989 (1996).
[ENDNOTES]
1 References in the
text are as follows: "ALJX ___" refers to the
administrative law judge or procedural exhibits received after
referral of the case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges;
"CX __" refers to claimant's exhibits; "RX
__" to respondent's exhibits; and "TR __" to the
transcript of proceedings February 20-22, 1996.
2 CX 16, 17,
19 and 21-23 were not admitted; RX 1, 7, 9, 11 and 13 were not
admitted [TR 850-851]. The following ALJ exhibits were admitted
post-hearing:
ALJX 31: Correspondence dated 2/26/96 from ALJ to both
counsel
ALJX 32: Correspondence dated 3/19/96 from Butterfield
to ALJ
ALJX 33: Respondent's post-trial brief
ALJX 34: Complainant's post-trial brief
ALJX 35: Stipulation regarding back wages
ALJX 36: Correspondence dated 5/29/96 from Winger to
ALJ
3 Before the Act
was recodified in 1994, this provision prohibited adverse
employment action against an employee for refusing to operate a
vehicle "when such operation constitutes a violation of any
Federal rules..." (emphasis added). For this reason, it was
often referred to as the Act's "when" clause. The
legislative history of the recodification makes it clear that the
substantive law of the Act is intended to remain unchanged. H.R.
Rep. No. 180, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994).
4 This provision
has traditionally been referred to as the "because"
clause, although the 1994 recodification would appear to make
this distinction -- between the "when" and the
"because" clauses -- impractical. See Note 4,
supra . Mr. Michaud does no6t invoke protection under the
"because" clause.
5 BSP witnesses
testified that this circumstance did not affect the on-line
supervisory staff. Alex Kasny testified that he was advised to
handle day-to-day operations and personnel matters as usual [TR
527], and Greany confirmed that it did not affect the company's
ability to take adverse employment actions in the normal court of
business [TR 796].
6 Paul became
safety director several weeks later [TR 730-731].
7 Complainant
testified that no negative comment, including those about his
talking too much on the job, and the quality and quanity of his
work, was on his performance appraisal paperwork he looked at it
and signed it during his October evaluation [CX 3; TR 91-94].
8 Jeff Labreque
testified that he heard other drivers complain about hours of
service problems, but never to BSP management. He also said
that BSP never expressed concern about possible violation of
hours of service regulations. However, this testimony was
stricken [TR 155-156]. There is no evidence other than
complainant's testimony touching directly on drivers complaining
about hours of service problems to BSP management.
9 I note that
Mr. Michaud's understanding of the hours of service regulations
is incomplete. His view is that working more than 12 hour shifts
on the 100-air mile radius runs is illegal, independent of the
log issue. Nevertheless, there are numerous instances in the
record before me, including testimony by BSP witnesses, that
drivers were running more than 12 hours and never required to
prepare logs. Therefore Mr. Michaud's incomplete understanding
of the regulations is of little moment, except insofar as it may
explain the persistence in his own behavior, per his own
testimony.