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91cla76.htm


DATE:  July 13, 1995
CASE NO. 91-CLA-76


MARIA ECHAVESTE
ADMINISTRATOR,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,[1] 

     PLAINTIFF,

     v.

VINTON D. ERICKSON FARMS,

          DEFENDANT.


BEFORE:   THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                         FINAL DECISION AND ORDER

     This case is before me for final review pursuant to the
child labor provision (Section 12) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988) and
the implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 580 (1994).  On
September 11, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a
Decision and Order Dismissing Defendant's Exceptions To
Determination Of Violation and Assessment Of Civil Money Penalty
(D. and O.), wherein judgment was declared against Defendant by
default because of continued refusal to comply with discovery
orders.  Defendant had been ordered to surrender documents
requested by the Wage and Hour Administrator (Administrator) that
the ALJ found to be "relevant to jurisdiction over Defendant's
operation as an 'enterprise' within the meaning of Section 203 of
the Act." D. and O. at 2.  The ALJ held that Defendant's refusal
to comply with the February 25, 1992 order compelling discovery
was, ". . . not inadvertent or due to inability to comply." 
Id.  The ALJ's D. and O. is affirmed, as set out below.
                                BACKGROUND
     Pursuant to Sections 211(c), 213(c)(1) and 216(e), of the
FLSA and Sections 516.2, 570.123 and 579.5 of the regulations,
the Administrator assessed civil money penalties (cmp's) against 

[PAGE 2] this Defendant for asserted violations of the Act's child labor provisions.[2] On April 26, 1991, Defendant timely excepted to the assessment of the cmp's. In January of 1992 the Administrator filed Interrogatories and a Request for the Production of Documents. Defendant resisted responding to the discovery request.[3] The ALJ, on February 25, 1992, issued an Order Compelling Discovery. On April 20, 1992, the ALJ issued an order denying what had been treated as a motion by Defendant to reconsider the previous order compelling a response. The crux of the problem during this entire period was aptly summarized by the ALJ in noting that "Defendant's statement(s) [were neither] responsive to the discovery in question [nor did they] comply with the Order compelling discovery of February 25, 1992." D. and O. at 2. DISCUSSION Under the circumstances set forth above, the ALJ's decision to sanction the Defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was a reasonable and proper exercise of judicial discretion. Since the remedies for failure to comply with an order to compel are not expressly stated in the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings, the ALJ was correct in ruling pursuant to the provisions of FRCP Rule 37(b)(2), which expressly establishes the appropriateness of sanctions against parties who fail to obey an order to provide discovery. 29 C.F.R. § 18.6. The Plaintiff sought, and was awarded, a series of sanctions pursuant to the rules, including the right to have Defendant's evidence limited in any subsequent hearing. The overriding purpose of the sanction scheme set forth in Rule 37 is to allow the presiding judge to fashion sanctions which are appropriate for the offense being sanctioned. In that regard, since there will be no hearing in this matter, it was not necessary for the ALJ to enter an order mandating evidentiary limitations. The only real question is whether the ultimate sanction of dismissal is appropriate based upon the Defendant's refusal to comply with the ALJ's discovery orders. Given the Defendant's repeated and intentional failure to comply with discovery mandates, I find that an order of dismissal is appropriate. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's exceptions to the determination of a violation and assessment of a civil money penalty dated July 26 1990, be and hereby are dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant pay a civil money penalty in the amount of $2,450.00 to the United States Department of Labor. SO ORDERED ______________________ Secretary of Labor
[PAGE 3] Washington, DC. [ENDNOTES] [1] This case has not been consistently captioned throughout these proceedings. Since the position of Wage and Hour Administrator has been filled during the pendancy of this matter, the case is recaptioned to reflect the current parties. [2] The asserted violations involved Defendant's employment of a minor during hours when school was in session, the failure to keep records required under the Act, and the failure to assure future compliance with the Act's provisions. [3] The primary point of dispute between the parties concerned the Administrator's attempt to establish coverage, i.e. FLSA jurisdiction, over the Defendant's business operation. The pro se Defendant's responses were typically composed, however, in the form of letters of protest. Defendant asserted, in essence, that the government's information requests were an unusually burdensome intrusion into their business affairs and came at a time when Defendant was involved in the busiest part of the agricultural year. As a result, the responses were not truly responsive; rather they were more in the nature of complaints to the ALJ regarding governmental methodology, as well as questions regarding the government's right to have the information sought.



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