DATE: May 12, 1999
CASE NO: 98-SOC-1

In the Matter of:

CHICAGO DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT STANDARDS
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
    Complainant

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF FIELD LABOR
LOCALS, COUNCIL 73, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
    Respondent

Appearances:     Rory K. McGinty
    Attorney for Respondent

    Donald D. Carter, Jr.
    Office of the Solicitor
    Attorney of Complainant

Before: JOHN M. VITTONE
    Chief Administrative Law Judge

   This case arises under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (hereinafter "CSRA") [Act of October 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1192, et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.], and the reporting requirements for labor organizations as set forth in Section 201 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (hereinafter "LMRDA"), as amended [29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.]. The federal regulations pertinent to this case are provided at 29 C.F.R. Parts 402, 403, 408 and 458.

   The CSRA requires public sector labor organizations that represent civilian employees of the United States Government to comply with certain standards of conduct in order to assure that said organizations are free from "corrupt influences and influences opposed to basic democratic principles." 5 U.S.C. § 7120(a). In carrying out this purpose, Congress granted authority to the Assistant Secretary of Labor to adopt "such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purpose of this section." 5 U.S.C. § 7120(d). In order to guide the Assistant Secretary in his or her duties, Congress required that any such regulations "conform generally to the principles applied to labor organizations in the private sector." 5 U.S.C. § 7120(d).

   The Assistant Secretary, in complying with the mandate of Congress, adopted regulations under the CSRA which closely resemble the minimum standards of conduct contained in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the "LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., which is applicable to private sector labor organizations. One set of provisions contained in the LMRDA, which were adopted by the Assistant Secretary in promulgating the regulations under the CSRA, are what are commonly referred to as the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." 29 C.F.R. § 458.2; see also 29 U.S.C. § 411 et seq.

   In the case at bar, the Chicago District Director, Office of Labor-Management Standards, Employment Standards Administration, United States Department of Labor (hereinafter "District Director"), filed the complaint involved in this case on December 16, 1997. The District Director alleges in his complaint that an investigation was conducted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 458.50 which led to the conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that the National Council of Field Labor Locals, Council 73, American Federation of Government Employees (hereinafter "Council") violated the CSRA and 29 C.F.R. § 403.8 by its refusal to permit William Wheatley, a member of an American Federation of Government Employees Local (hereinafter "AFGE") affiliated with the council, to examine all books, records, and accounts of the Council necessary to verify the Labor Organization Annual Reports (Reports) filed by the Council with the United States Department of Labor for fiscal years 1991- 1996.

   Specifically, the District Director contends that there is just cause for such examination, including but not limited to substantial reductions in cash on hand in fiscal year 1991, expenditures in excess of income in fiscal year 1992, substantial increases in "other disbursements" in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, absence of reported investment income in fiscal years 1991-1996, expenditures for legal fees in connection with Mr. Wheatley's request to review Respondent's records, and possible multiple reimbursements for travel expense in fiscal year 1996. The District Director further contends that the Council's parent body, the AFGE, has expressly acknowledged that just cause has been established with respect to at least some of the requested records, and that the Council itself has expressly agreed to allow examination of at least some of the requested records.

   Accordingly, the District Director seeks an order directing Respondent to allow Mr. Wheatley and/or his auditors or attorneys to examine the books, records, and accounts of the Council necessary to verify its Reports for fiscal years 1991 through and including 1996; for the costs of this action; and for such other relief as may be appropriate.

   On March 26, 1998 and March 30, 1998, the District Director and Respondent, respectively, filed motions for summary decision. On April 6, 1998, the District Director filed an answer in opposition to Respondent's summary decision motion. Respondent filed a reply to the District Director's motion on April 8, 1998.

   Hearings in these cases are governed by the regulations promulgated at 29 C.F.R. § 458.69, et seq., and, as those regulations are silent on the filing/granting of motions for summary decision, this Court must utilize our Rules of Practice and the standard for granting summary decision is set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d). This section, which is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, permits an Administrative Law Judge to recommend summary decision for either party where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d). The non-moving party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Gillian v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 91-ERA-31 (Sec'y Aug. 28, 1995) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists must be made viewing all the evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. (citing OFFCS v. CSX Transp., Inc., 88-OFC-24 (Asst. Sec'y Oct. 13, 1994).

   This Administrative Law Judge, having reviewed the pleadings filed in support of their respective motions, finds and concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact at issue, that a formal hearing is not necessary, that summary judgment is appropriate and I shall now proceed to weigh and evaluate all of the evidence and to draw the appropriate factual inferences based upon applicable statutory precedents.

   On the basis of the totality of this closed record I make the following:

   1. Respondent is, and at all times relevant to this matter has been, an unincorporated association with a street address of 230 S. Dearborn Street, Room 468, Chicago, Illinois 60690, and a mailing address of P.O. Box 2317, Chicago, Illinois 60690, affiliated with and subordinate to the American Federation of Government Employees.

   2. The Council is, and at all times relevant to this matter has been, a labor organization within the meaning of section 701 of the CSRA (5 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a)(4), 7120(c))

   3. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Part 403, Respondent filed Labor Organization Annual Reports (Reports) for fiscal years 1991 through 1996.

   4. William Wheatley is a member in good standing of Local Union 648 of the American Federation of Government Employees, which is a local affiliated with Respondent.¹

   5. William Wheatley, by letter dated April 3, 1995 to Jesse Rios, President, National Council of Field Labor Locals, advised the Council that he was concerned about the financial dealings of the Council.

   6. In the letter referenced in item 5 above, Wheatley states that he had reviewed certain records of Local 648, American Federation of Government Employees, and that those records reflected payments to the Council for dinner wine, pens, notepads and convention expenses in 1993 that he questioned.

   7. By letters dated April 13, 1995 and August 1, 1997, Wheatley filed complaints with the Department of Labor pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 458.53 alleging just cause for examining books, records, and accounts necessary to verify Labor Organization Financial Reports filed by Respondent for fiscal years 1991 through 1996, and that Respondent had not permitted such examination.

   8. The District Director investigated the complaints pursuant to section 458.50 of the Regulations (29 C.F.R. § 458.50) and concluded that violations of the CSRA had occurred.

   9. By letter dated November 2, 1995, Respondent was notified of the District Director's investigative findings regarding Mr. Wheatley's April 13, 1995 complaint and advised of its right to a conference in accordance with the provisions of section 458.66 of the Regulations (29 C.F.R. § 458.66).

   10. A conference was held on December 13, 1995. By letter dated March 26, 1996, counsel for Respondent advised the Department of Labor that Respondent had agreed to permit Wheatley to "examine records for the period requested by him."²

   11. Respondent was notified on August 11, 1997 of the District Director's investigative findings regarding Wheatley's August 1, 1997 complaint and advised of its right to a conference in accordance with the provision of 29 C.F.R. § 458.66.

   12. No conference was requested or held following the August 11, 1997, letter.

   13. By letter dated August 27, 1997, counsel for Respondent advised Wheatley that he would be contacted to make arrangements for his examination of records relating to the items enumerated in Wheatley's letter of June 24, 1997.

   14. By letter dated November 14, 1997, counsel for Respondent advised the Department of Labor that no such arrangements had been made because some of the records (fiscal year 1994) were in the possession of the AFGE.³

   15. To date, no arrangements have been made by the Council to allow Mr. Wheatley to examine the books, records, and accounts necessary to verify Reports filed by the Council for fiscal years 1991 through 1996.

   16. In the letter referenced in item 5 above, Wheatley identified the following items that concerned him regarding the Council's LM Reports for fiscal years 1991-1994:

i. Cash on hand of $53,454 to begin the reporting period.

ii. The absence of any investment income (on balances above $22,000) during the entire four year period.⁴

iii. The deficit spending in the amount of $30,464 above income in FY 1991.⁵

iv. The deficit spending in the amount of $5,626 above income in FY 1992.⁶

v. Payments to officers of $38,768 in FY 1991, representing 57% of total receipts for the year.

vi. The 64% increase in "other disbursements" payments from FY 1991 to FY 1994.

   17. In the letter referenced in item 5 above, Wheatley asked to be allowed to see all minutes, financial records, budgets, audits, books and accounts necessary to verify the information contained in the LM Reports for fiscal years 1991-1994.

   18. William Wheatley, by memorandum dated September 11, 1995, to the Council's Executive Committee, advised the Council that he was concerned about the possible use of Council funds to handle potential litigation regarding his request to review Council records.

   19. William Wheatley, by letter dated October 20, 1995 to John N. Sturdivant, President, AFGE, advised the AFGE of his request to review the Council's records, and his concern regarding the possible use of Council funds to handle potential litigation regarding his request to review Council records.

   20. Mark D. Roth, General Counsel, AFGE, by letter dated December 11, 1995 to Jesse M. Rios, advised the Council that while it was not clear whether Wheatley was entitled to review all of the Council's records, "he has raised with sufficient specificity questions concerning expenditures on legal fees in 1994/1995. Thus, just cause would be established for Mr. Wheatley to review all records pertinent to the Council's budgets, fees expended, and authorizations."⁷

   21. Robert C. Nelson, National Vice President, Seventh District, AFGE, by letter dated February 20, 1996 to Jesse M. Rios, affirmed Wheatley's right to review, at a minimum, the records referenced in item 20 above. In addition, Vice President Nelson, on behalf of AFGE, initiated a review of the Council's records.⁸

   22. William Wheatley, by letter dated June 24, 1997 to Jesse Rios, President, NCFLL, expanded his request to review the Council's records to include fiscal years 1995 and 1996.

   23. In 1996, Paul Tracy, James Weyrauch and Jesse Rios received reimbursement from the U.S. Department of Labor for travel expenses in connection with a conference at Torrey Pines, California.

   24. In FY 1996, the Council paid expense reimbursement to Paul Tracy, James Weyrauch and Jesse Rios in the amounts of $2,147, ,014, and $4,521, respectively.

   25. On October 2, 1995, Robert C. Nelson, AFGE Vice President, Seventh District made a number of findings in connection with a review of the financial records of Local 648, AFGE. These findings included his conclusion that Jesse Rios signed about forty checks for Local 648 in 1993 and 1994 when he had no authority to do so, that in 1991 about $670 in Local 648 funds were used improperly to pay Council expenses, and that in 1992, 1993, and 1994 about $2,994 in cellular phone use fees were paid on behalf of Jesse Rios without proper documentation and without authorization from Local 648.

   26. In connection with the imposition of a trusteeship on AFGE Local 648, an AFGE panel recommended that "[a]ll records surrounding any finances for Local 648 and the National Council of Field Labor Locals should be closely audited for mismanagement."

   27. Jesse Rios is, and at all times relevant to this action has been, the President of the Council.

   28. Respondent has implemented all recommendations of the AFGE audit.

   The reporting provisions of Part 403 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations are made applicable to labor organizations subject to the requirements of CSRA by Section 458.3 of the Standards of Conduct Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 458.3. Accordingly, Section 403.8 of Part 403 applies to the Council, and places a duty on the Council to permit a member for just cause to examine any books, records, and accounts necessary to verify the Labor Organization Annual Reports (LM Reports) filed by the Council with the Department of Labor pursuant to Part 403.⁹

   Respondent asserts that only local unions representing field employees and chartered by the AFGE are members of the Council. Respondent contends that Wheatley is not a member of the Council because he is not a local union chartered by the AFGE. The Council's Constitution defines its memberships to include "[a]ll Locals representing field employees of the U.S. Department of Labor chartered by the American Federation of Government Employees." See Respondent's Exhibit P; Complainant's Exhibit N; NCFLL Constitution and Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1. Thus, Respondent maintains that Wheatley is not entitled to examine its records pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 403.8.¹⁰ Nonetheless, despite the fact that no current case law regarding disclosure requirements of the LMRDA has found that members of a local labor organization are members of an intermediate body comparable to the Council for purposes of the LMRDA and CSRA, I find that I am not obliged nor compelled to deny Wheatley access to records based merely on a strict interpretation of the Council's Constitution. Given the structure and purpose of the LMRDA, a member of a local labor organization may be considered a member of an intermediate labor organization with which the local is affiliated for purposes of reviewing and examining the intermediate labor organization's records.

   Accepting the Respondent's argument would have the result of only allowing examination of its records by an AFGE local affiliated with Respondent, presumably through action by the officers of such local. I find that this would clearly be contrary to the purposes and spirit of the LMRDA. For instance, its discussion of a member's right to examine a union's records under Section 201(c) of the LMRDA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that

   In Mallick I, the Court held that under Section 201(c) of the LMRDA, a union member has "just cause" to examine union records relating to "a sudden, apparently significant, and unexplained change in an item on his union's LM-2 [financial] reports,"¹¹ unless the union can demonstrate that the disclosure of this information will cause the union a "genuine harm" that "outweighs the strong policy favoring access for union members who have otherwise satisfied the statutory requirement for examination." Id. at 781, 785 (footnote omitted).

   According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

[j]ust cause need not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence. It need not be enough to convince a reasonable man that some wrong has been done; it is enough if a reasonable union member would be put to further inquiry. Perhaps it will be that a certain item is disproportionately high . . . or that an officer contends that he did not incur the claimed expenses . . . Irrespective of the nature of the asserted cause, the test must be whether reason would require substantiation.

   While the requirement for establishing just cause is minimal, such requirement must be established for each respective record sought to be examined. In other words, the scope of examination to which Wheatley is entitled shall be limited to the underlying records necessary to explain or deny the specific discrepancies alleged by Wheatley. As noted above, 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) provides that "[e]very labor organization required to submit a report . . . shall make available the information required to be contained in such report to all of its members, and every such labor organization and its officers shall be under a duty enforceable at the suit of any member of such organization . . . to permit such member for just cause to examine any books, records, and accounts necessary to verify such report." [italics added]. In the instant case, I find that William Wheatley has met his burden of establishing just cause and is entitled to examine all books, records and accounts of the Council necessary to verify its LM Reports for fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 1996.¹² Just cause includes the following:

   1. Reduction in cash on hand from $53,454 to $22,990 in fiscal year 1991.¹³ This reduction is not explained on the face of the LM Report. An unexplained drop in an item on an LM Report is sufficient to provide just cause to examine a labor organization's records. Such a change could lead a reasonable union member to question the drop in cash on hand, and the LM Report fails to explicitly account for the change. Permitting a union member to inspect union records is a method of ensuring that union members are sufficiently well-informed to participate intelligently in union affairs. See Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 771.

   2. Expenditures in excess of income in the amount of $30,464 in FY 1991 and in the amount of $5,626 in FY 1992.¹⁴ Such a period of deficit spending is sufficient to establish just cause for examining the underlying records of the Council for FY 1991 and FY 1992. A reasonable union member may certainly have an interest in discovering the cause/reason behind the Council's deficit spending.¹⁵

   3. Increases in "other disbursement" from $52,013 in FY 1993 to $74,218 in FY 1994.¹⁶ Such an increase is substantial and unexplained on the face of the LM Reports, and is sufficient to establish just cause for Wheatley to examine all books, records and accounts of the Council necessary to verify its LM Report for FY 1993 and FY 1994.

   4. Absence of investment income reported for FY 1991 through FY 1996.¹⁷ The LM forms, on their face, do not show any investment income on the cash balances.¹⁸ A union member may reasonably question the absence of such investment income.

   5. Expenditures for legal fees incurred by the Council in connection with Wheatley's request to review the Council's records. The AFGE, as noted above, advised the Council that Wheatley raised with sufficient specificity questions concerning expenditures on legal fees in FY 1994 and FY 1995 to establish just cause for Wheatley to review all records pertinent to the Council's budgets, fees expended, and authorizations for those years. A union member may have a reasonable interest in determining whether a labor organization was expending funds to defend legitimate requests for inspection of the labor organization's records.

   6. Travel expense reimbursements by Respondent for certain officers for a January 1996 conference in Torrey Pines (San Diego), California, where such expenses may also have been reimbursed in part by the U.S. Department of Labor.¹⁹ The possibility of double payment constitutes just cause for examination of any books, records and accounts of the Council for FY 1996 necessary to verify the LM Report for 1996. See Landry, 623 F.2d at 349 ("Wrongdoing need not be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and the possibility of double-dipping . . . constitutes just cause.").

   To establish just cause it is not necessary to allege or prove any actual breach of fiduciary duty; just cause is established if the circumstances are such that a reasonable union member would be put to further inquiry. Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 781; Fruits & Vegetable Packers, 378 F.2d at 744. Each of the above circumstances, surrounding the actions of the Council and its finances, provides just cause to support Wheatley's request to examine any books, records and accounts of the Council necessary to verify its LM Report for fiscal years 1991- 1996.

Harassment

   The purpose of the "just cause" requirement is to prevent harassment of the labor organization and "vexatious forays" into the labor organization's books. Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 779.

   In interpreting Section 201(c), several courts have found that the purpose of Congress in creating the just cause requirement is to prevent harassment. See e.g., Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 378 F.2d at 743; Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 777-78 ("[I]t seems clear that Congress designed the just cause requirement to prevent continuous and undue harassment,

    The statute which creates the cause of action in this matter vests the undersigned with discretion as to an award for the costs of this action. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c).²⁰ I find that Complainant, having established just cause from the outset, is entitled to an award for the costs of this action.

¹The District Director does not allege that Mr. Wheatley is a member of the Respondent labor organization, but rather a member of a labor organization affiliated with the Respondent.

²Further, Respondent, in his Reply to the District Director's Motion for Summary Decision, contends that it has sought to negotiate an amicable resolution of the issues in dispute with Mr. Wheatley and the District Director. Respondent further contends that it has reserved and not waived the issues of membership and just cause presented in its Motion for Summary Decision.

³In Respondent's Reply to the District Director's Motion for Summary Decision, Respondent contends that records for fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995 (not merely records for fiscal year 1994) were in the possession of the AFGE until mid-February 1998.

⁴According to the affidavit of Jesse Rios, Respondent had no income-producing investments during fiscal years 1991-1996. Respondent had two certificates of deposits (CDs) during this period, but such CDs were not cashed out during this period.

⁵According to the affidavit of Jesse Rios, Respondent was engaged in contract negotiations during fiscal years 1991 and 1992. The contract had not been re-written for 10 years preceding such negotiations. Negotiators for Respondent made trips around the country to discuss contract proposal with field employees in each region of the country in aid of negotiations. At one point, negotiations continued for 30 days straight.

⁶See fn. 5, supra.

⁷Respondent contends that Mr. Roth's December 11, 1995 letter refers only to books, records and accounts of legal expenses for fiscal year 1995. However, upon review of the letter, it is clear that such refers to both fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1995. While Mr. Roth concludes that "Mr. Wheatley clearly has at the very least the right to review a significant number of the Council's 1995 financial records," this conclusion is inconsistent with his earlier assertion in the same letter which states Mr. Wheatley is entitled to review all records pertaining to 1994/1995 assuming just cause is established. See Complainant's Exhibit K, page 2.

⁸Respondent makes an erroneous assertion in his Reply to the District Director's Summary Decision Motion. Specifically, he asserts that Robert C. Nelson's letter of February 20, 1996 refers solely to books, records, and accounts of legal expenses for fiscal year 1995. However, upon review of the document it is clear that such refers to both fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1995. See Complainant's Exhibit L, page 1.

⁹Specifically, Section 403.8 provides:

Every labor organization required to submit a report under section 201(b) of the Act and under this part shall make available to all its members the information required to be contained in such reports, and every such labor organization and its officers shall be under a duty to permit such member for just cause to examine any books, records, and accounts necessary to verify such report.

   29 C.F.R. § 403.8

¹⁰Id.

¹¹An LM-2 Report is a financial report that a union is required to submit under Section 201(b) of the LMRDA.

¹²Respondent, in its Memorandum in support of its Summary Decision Motion, contends that the scope of examination sought by Mr. Wheatley is overbroad, and in the event that just cause is established, such examination should be limited to (a) cash on hand records for fiscal year 1991; (b) accounts for fiscal years 1991 and 1992; (c) accounts showing "other expenditures" for fiscal year 1994; (d) records of investments during fiscal years 1991-1996; (e) records of legal fees incurred in connection with Mr. Wheatley's requests for fiscal years 1991-1996; and (f) travel expense reimbursements in connection with the conference at Torrey Pines in 1996. However, Respondent appears to misinterpret the purpose and the reach of the statute. Such examination shall not be limited to specific records, but to all books, records and accounts necessary to verify the alleged discrepancies.

¹³Line 22(A) of the Council's FY 1991 LM Report shows cash on hand at the beginning of fiscal year 1991 as $53,454, and line 22(b) of the same report shows cash on hand at the end of the fiscal year to be $22,990. Complainant's Exhibit A.

¹⁴Line 37 of the Council's fiscal year 1991 LM Report shows total receipts of $67,671 and line 45 of the same report shows total expenditures of $98,135, reflecting expenditures of $30,464 in excess of income. Complainant's Exhibit B. Line 37 of the Council's fiscal year 1992 LM Report shows total receipts of $72,524 and line 45 of the same report shows total expenditures of $78,150, reflecting expenditures of $5,626 in excess of income. Complainant's Exhibit B.

¹⁵Respondent contends that it was engaged in contract negotiations during fiscal years 1991 and 1992. The Complainant does not contest such a statement. See District Director's Answer In Opposition To Respondent's Motion For Summary Decision, footnote 2. In the memorandum in support of its summary decision motion and in the supporting affidavit of Jesse Rios, Respondent attempts to explain some of its financial changes for fiscal years 1991-1996. However, such an attempt does not defeat Wheatley's showing of just cause. No explanation of the items asserted as just cause is found on the fact of the Council's LM Reports. The purpose of Section 201(c) would be frustrated if a labor organization, faced with a showing of just cause, could defeat it by tendering an explanation. See Cook v. Teamsters Local 705, 1997 WL 433659 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1997) ("[P]laintiffs need not accept the Local's explanation, but rather may independently verify . . ."); Campbell v. Local 234 Transportation Workers Union of America, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The fact that defendants provided plaintiff with plausible explanations for all of the questioned items in the LM-2 reports and for all of the discrepancies between the LM-2 reports and the financial statements provided to TWU members does not defeat the claim by plaintiff as plaintiff has a right, having demonstrated just cause, to reject the reasons proffered by defendants and instead to verify the areas of concern by his own examination of the relevant financial records."); Spinowitz v. Herrity, 672 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. N.Y. 1987) (affidavits offering explanations of all challenged items do not defeat a member's right to examine records to verify expenses).

¹⁶Line 44 of the Council's LM Report for fiscal year 1993 shows "other disbursement" in the amount of $52,013. Complainant's Exhibit C. Line 44 of the Council's LM Report for fiscal year 1994 shows "other disbursement" in the amount of $74,218, and increase of about 43% over fiscal year 1993. Complainant's Exhibit D.

¹⁷The total assets reported by the Council at the beginning of each fiscal year were as follows: $53,454 (FY 1991, Line 28 (A)); $22,990 (FY 1992, Line 28(A)); $19,518 (FY 1993, Line 28(A)); $24,704 (FY 1994, Line 28(A)); $46,366 (FY 1995, Line 31(A)); $48,346 (FY 1996, Line 31(A)). Complainant's Exhibit A- F.

¹⁸According the affidavit of Jesse Rios, Respondent had no income-producing investments during fiscal years 1991-1996.

¹⁹In 1996, Paul Tracy, James Weyrauch and Jesse Rios received reimbursements from the U.S. Department of Labor for travel expenses in connection with the conference at Torrey Pines, California. Complainant's Exhibit CC. An attachment to the Council's LM Report for fiscal year 1996 (Line 24) shows expense reimbursements in the amount of $2,147 to Tracy; ,014 to Weyrauch; and $4,521 to Rios. Complainant's Exhibit F.

²⁰Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) provides:

The court in such action may, in its discretion, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.