In summary, I find that the minors involved in these cases engaged in driving
on the public roads, which is forbidden by the Act. Moreover, the driving engaged in by the minors
was neither incidental nor occasional, much less both incidental and occasional. Therefore, the
exception to the hazardous order does not apply, and the respondents are in violation of the Act.
However, there are still several points that need to be addressed.
Respondents' counsel argues in his brief that much of the evidence in this
proceeding is hearsay and thus should not be used to show violations of the Act. Specifically, he
refers to the compliance officers' use of their notes to testify at the hearing, as well as the admission
in evidence of their notes and interview statements, citing 29 C.F.R. § 580.7(b). By way of
[Page 18]
explanation, the plaintiff chose to present her case through such evidence rather than attempt to
locate and present the testimony of the numerous minors involved in these cases.
As correctly argued by plaintiff's counsel, the type of evidence at issue was
contemplated in promulgating 29 C.F.R. § 580.7(b). That section specifically permits the
testimony of the compliance officers despite the hearsay nature of such testimony. Furthermore, the
admissibility of such testimony, as well as the questioned documentary evidence, clearly is
supported by other authority. 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.612, 18.803(a)(5), (6), (8), (24), 29
C.F.R. § 580.7(b); see, also, e.g., Echaveste v. Henderson, 91-CLA-83 (Sec'y Apr.
18, 1995); M & C Lazzinnaro, 88-WAB-08 @ 4 (WAB Mar. 11, 1991); Saunders v.
American Shamrock Bldg. Maintenance, 92-WAB-31 @ 6 (WAB May 27, 1993).
I should also reiterate that I found the plaintiff met her burden of proof based
solely on the respondents' answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories. Thus, the evidence questioned
by the respondents was not even needed by the plaintiff in making her case. Rather, the questioned
evidence relates to the respondents' burden of proving that the driving by the minors met the
exception to the hazardous order in that it was both incidental and occasional. The evidence offered
by the plaintiff regarding the extent of the minors' driving obviously is not as specific as a trier-of-fact would prefer, but it is the best evidence in the record. The respondents' answers to the
interrogatories regarding the extent of such driving are essentially identical, vague and self-serving.
I should finally note that while respondents' counsel was critical of the evidence in the record
relating to his clients' burden of proving the questioned driving was incidental and occasional,
nothing precluded him from presenting the testimony from employees of the respondents instead of
relying on the answers to the interrogatories. I therefore reject the respondents' objections to the
plaintiff's evidence and find that without such evidence, there would be nothing credible in the
record relating to the questions of whether the minors' driving was incidental and occasional.
Respondents' counsel argued extensively in his clients' brief regarding the
findings of the compliance officers. However, most of the arguments are related to the quality of the
supporting evidence. Again, I reject these arguments because the respondents have the burden of
proving the driving by the minors was incidental and occasional. I again acknowledge that some of
this evidence obviously is unclear but there is no other evidence in the record supporting the
respondents' burden of proof on these matters. I therefore see no reason to discuss any of the
arguments advanced by respondents' counsel regarding the specific respondents other than the
timeliness issue raised with respect to Thomason Auto Group. He argued in this regard that the
evidence supported that three of the violations were not within the two year statutory period. The
investigator indeed acknowledged that perhaps one of these violations was more than two years old.
(Tr. 308-309). However, my review of the evidence leads me to the conclusion that all of the
violations occurred within the two year period covered by the investigation, October 1, 1991 through
September 30, 1993. (PX 89-94). Moreover, counsel has not cited any authority in support of his
position that some of the violations are barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, I reject the
arguments advanced with respect to the determinations made with regard to the Thomason Auto
Group.
[Page 19]
Respondents next claim that they did not have fair notice of the Department's
definition of "incidental" and "occasional" and therefore they should not be
liable for violating the regulations. They cite the case of General Electric Co. v. U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which the Federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found the EPA had not given adequate notice of its interpretation of a
complex environmental regulation. The issue in that case centered around whether distillation of a
solvent used to remove toxic PCBs from electrical transformers equated with disposal of the solvent.
Id.
The differences between the General Electric situation and the one at
hand are significant. For one, the regulation at issue in the General Electric case comprises
almost seven full pages in the Code of Federal Regulations which "on their face . . . reveal no
rule or combination of rules providing fair notice that they prohibit pre-disposal processes such as
distillation." Id. at 1330; 40 C.F.R. § 761.60. In fact, the regulation did not
even mention distillation, and "a person of good faith would not reasonably expect distillation
-- a process which did not and was not intended to prevent the ultimate destruction of PCBs -- to be
barred as an unapproved means of disposal.' " Id. at 1331. The court found that
although the EPA's interpretation was permissible, "it was so far from a reasonable person's
understanding of the regulations that they could not have fairly informed GE of the agency's
perspective." Id.
In contrast, the pertinent regulation in this proceeding, 29 C.F.R. §
570.52, comprises a page and a half, much of which deals with a school bus driver exception. It
clearly bans driving on public roads by minors but, as discussed above, provides an exception to this
ban. 29 C.F.R. § 570.52. Unlike in the GE case, the forbidden action is not hidden in some
tricky, unrevealed, over expansive definition of a key term. "Driving" is clearly banned,
and "incidental" and "occasional", although not defined in the regulations,
by their general meaning indicate a very limited exception. Thus, respondents did have notice from
the face of the regulation that the general rule forbade driving, and that the exception was limited.
Thus, General Electric hinders, rather than helps, respondents' cause, as that case requires
only that respondents received, or should have received, notice of the agency's interpretation by
reading the regulation. Id. at 1329. If a person of good faith could make the same
interpretation as the agency, then the regulation provides sufficient notice. As I have found that the
regulation did provide such notice, I find respondents should have had sufficient notice that the
driving they allowed the minors to engage in was prohibited.
Civil Money Penalties
A civil money penalty may be assessed against an employer for a child labor
violation under Section 12 of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. A violation can
result in a penalty assessment amounting to as much as $10,000 for each minor employee who was
the subject of a violation under Section 12 of the Act. 29 C.F.R. §§ 579.5(a), 579.9.
In determining the amount of a civil money penalty for a child labor violation,
the statute requires consideration of the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of
[Page 20]
the person charged and the gravity of the violation or violations. 29 U.S.C. § 216(e). The
pertinent regulations under Section 12 of the Act initially repeat the specific considerations set forth
in the statute. 29 C.F.R. § 579.5(a). The regulations go on to also require consideration of
additional factors. 29 C.F.R. § 579.5(b)-(d).
To determine the citation amount, the investigators used a Child Labor Civil
Money Penalty Report (Form WH-266) to compute the recommended penalties against the
respondents. The respondents argue that the proposed assessments did not properly take into
account the mitigating factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 579.5. Specifically, the respondents
contend that by relying on a form to calculate the proposed penalties the compliance officers clearly
failed to consider all the relevant factors. However, the Administrative Review Board which
exercises the Secretary's power of review in these cases has already rejected this argument.
Administrator v. Thirsty's Inc., 94-CLA-65 (ARB May 14, 1997).
The compliance officers' recommendations of penalties are entitled to respect.
However, the regulations require the final determination of the penalty be made in a proceeding after
an opportunity for hearing under the Administrative Procedures Act, which in turn requires a
decision by the independent officer conducting the hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 579.5(f); 5 U.S.C.
§ 554. Thus, it is my responsibility to decide whether the penalties recommended by the
compliance officers and approved by their supervisor are appropriate in light of the evidence
presented to me and the factors set forth in Section 579.5.
Section 579.5(b) requires the consideration of additional factors regarding the
size of the business of the person charged with a child labor violation. These factors include (1) the
number of persons employed by the person charged; (2) the volume of sales or business; (3) the
amount of capital investment and financial resources; and, (4) other information relative to the size
of the business.
It is true that the compliance officers gave little consideration to the factors set
forth in Section 579.5(b) in calculating the penalties involved in this case. They did inquire as to the
dealer's volume of sales, but this did not enter into their calculation of the penalty. It is obvious,
however, that the instructions set forth in that form give no recognition to the financial factors set
forth in Section 579.5(b). Also, it is obvious that the compliance officers had no discretion because
they were required to follow the instructions as set forth in the penalty report.
The only Section 579.5(b) factor considered by the compliance officers, or
required to be considered by the instructions set forth on the form, pertains to the number of
employees of the dealer. Even this factor was of no benefit to the respondents. The compliance
officers were instructed by the form to consider the number of the dealers' employees in deciding
whether to reduce the penalties but only if the violations involved such things as record keeping,
improper hours and other factors unrelated to the financial aspects of the dealers, not hazardous order
violations such as those in these cases. (Tr. 25). There is little evidence in the record outside the
gross sales pertaining to investment by its shareholders or partners, and financial resources of the
respondents. Neither side chose to inquire into these matters.
[Page 21]
I reiterate that I must consider the appropriateness of the civil money penalties.
I must do this in light of the factors set forth in Section 579.5, despite the compliance officers'
failure to consider all of these factors. The fact that the respondents are able to pay the penalties
does not automatically negate my consideration of the financial factors relating to the dealers.
However, the respondents were in the best position to present such financial information for my
consideration and they have not done so. Thus, I cannot conclude from the evidence before me that
the financial matters regarding the respondents support or detract from the appropriateness of the
civil money penalties recommended by the plaintiff.
I repeat that the compliance officers did consider, to some extent, the number
of the dealers' employees in calculating the civil money penalties. However, they did not reduce the
penalties based on this factor because their investigation disclosed violations of a hazardous order. I
agree that the proposed penalties are not inappropriate in view of the number of employees of the
respondents. It appears that many, if not all, the dealers had employed minors in the past, and were
of sufficient size to be knowledgeable of the child labor requirements.
Section 579.5(c) sets forth additional factors to consider in connection with the
appropriateness of the penalties to the gravity of the violations. These factors include consideration
of: (1) any history of prior violations; (2) evidence of willfulness or failure to take reasonable
precautions to avoid violations; (3) the number of minors illegally employed; (4) the age of the
minors, as well as records regarding age; (5) the occupations of the minors; (6) exposure to hazards
and any resulting injury; (7) duration of illegal employment; and (8) the hours of day in which the
employment occurred and whether such employment was during or outside school hours.
The respondents argue that the offenses involved in this case were not of
severe gravity and that the violations were not willful. I believe that the compliance officers took
this factor into consideration. For instance, the recommended penalties are nowhere near the
maximum amounts allowed by the statute. The form utilized by the compliance officers also
requires consideration of additional Section 579.5(c) factors in that varying amounts of penalties are
recommended based on the ages of the employees, the hazardous nature of the occupations, and the
working hours both during and outside school hours. Also, the history of prior violations and
employer knowledge are considered in using the form since the instructions require increasing the
initially recommended penalties by an appropriate multiple if such factors are documented. Thus, I
believe that the compliance officers did consider many of the factors set forth in Section 579.5(c) in
recommending the penalties at issue in these cases.
Section 579.5(d) provides that, where appropriate, consideration shall also be
given to whether penalties are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act. This section goes on to
provide in this connection that consideration shall be given as to whether: (1) the violations are
"de minimis"; (2) there is no previous history of child labor violation; (3) the employers'
assurance of future compliance is credible; and, (4) exposure to obvious hazards was inadvertent
rather than intentional. These factors relate to the degree of willfulness involved in the violations.
[Page 22]
First, I find that the "de minimis" aspect is considered to some
extent in this case because the investigators testified that no penalties were recommended unless the
violations by a specific minor occurred more than once or twice. De minimis is defined as
"very small or trifling matters" for which "the law does not care for or take notice
of." Black's Law Dictionary, 388 (6th Ed. 1990); Echaveste v. Horizon Publishers and
Distributors, 90-CLA-29 @ 7 (Sec'y May 11, 1994), aff'd on recon. July 21, 1994.
Respondents would have me rule that all the violations here were de minimis, as the minors were
frequently only on the road for short periods. However, when these short distances are aggregated
throughout the employment of the minors, the distances are no longer short. Furthermore, it is not
the distance traveled that creates the danger to the minors, but rather the fact of travel at all. I note
that oft-cited piece of conventional wisdom that most automobile accidents take place within five
miles of home, which clearly does not occur because of the small distance involved, but because of
the frequency with which that area is driven. The facts in this case demonstrate that this is not a
situation involving "de minimis" violations.
Some of the additional factors set forth in Section 579.5(d) obviously were
considered by the compliance officers. Indeed, the form utilized by them in computing the penalties
requires consideration as to whether compliance was not assured, violations were recurring and
whether there were any hazardous order violations. However, the extent to which these factors were
considered is not obvious from the form. I do note that the form utilized by the compliance officers
does take into consideration evidence of willfulness or failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid
violations. It requires a fifty percent increase in the calculated penalty if the employer had
knowledge of child labor laws.
It is also evident that the compliance officers considered the ages of the minors
involved in the case. The form utilized to calculate the penalties provides varying amounts based on
the ages of the minors as well as penalties for recordkeeping violations regarding age. It is also true
that the number of minors illegally employed was considered by the compliance officers since the
form which they utilized to calculate the penalties provides for a multiple based on the number of
violations or minors involved in the violations.
To reiterate some of my conclusions to this point, there is no question that the
compliance officers considered most of the factors set forth in subsections (c) and (d) of Section
579.5. What remains to be decided is whether their recommendations are appropriate in light of their
failure to consider some of the factors set forth in Section 579.5(b). It is important to remember,
however, that the statute allows for a penalty of as much as $10,000 for each minor involved in a
violation. Thus, the compliance officers technically could have recommended penalties of as much
as $890,000 for the violations.
I find that the investigators, through use of the form report, did take into
account many of the factors required by the regulations. Those that they did not take into account, I
conclude, do not affect my decision. I see no reason to depart from the penalties levied by the
investigators, as these seem reasonable under the circumstances, and are sufficient to accomplish
their purpose of punishing violators of the child labor laws and encouraging future compliance with
those laws. While it may seem to some of the respondents that the violations are trivial, it would
take but one serious automobile accident for all concerned parties to realize the importance of
[Page 23]
enforcing the hazardous order involved in these cases. Therefore, I uphold the civil money penalties
as assessed by the compliance officers. Individual penalties for each respondent will be addressed in
separate orders.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I find the respondents violated the Act by allowing the minors
to drive dealer-owned vehicles on public roads and that such driving does not fall within the
"incidental" and "occasional" driving exception. I also find that the
penalties assessed by the compliance officers are appropriate. The specific amount owed by each
respondent is addressed in separate orders.
DONALD W. MOSSER
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 580.13, any party dissatisfied with
this Decision and Order may appeal it to the Administrative Review Board within 30 days of the date
of this decision, by filing a notice of appeal with the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department
of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20210. The Administrative Review Board has been delegated authority and assigned
responsibility by the Secretary to issue final decisions in Fair Labor Standards Act cases. 61 Fed.
Reg. 19978 (1996). A copy of the notice of appeal must be served on all parties to this Decision and
Order and on the Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, 800 K Street, N.W.,
Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20001-8002. If no timely appeal is filed, this Decision and Order shall
be deemed the final agency action.
[ENDNOTES]
1 Caption is corrected to name the Administrator,
Wage and Hour Division as the plaintiff in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 580.10.
2 References to ALJX, PX, and RX refer to
exhibits of the administrative law judge, plaintiff, and respondent, respectively. The transcript of the hearing is cited by
"Tr." followed by a page number.
3 Unless otherwise noted in this decision,
references to "minors" pertain to respondents' employees who were either 16 or 17 years of age at the
pertinent time.
4 Only that portion of the compliance
officers' investigations pertaining to these driving-related violations is addressed in this decision because only these
violations remain at issue.
5 Citations to administrative decisions, except
those cited to two sources, are to the official copy of the decision located on-line in the Office of Administrative Law
Judges law library, which can be accessed through the Internet at
6 I did find four other cases involving the
incidental and occasional exception. However, in those cases, whether the driving was "incidental" was
either not at issue because of a stipulation, was not defined by the administrative law judge, or was not needed for the
decision. U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Gonzales, 93-CLA-36 (ALJ May 2, 1995); Reich v. Canadian Lakes
Development Co., 92-CLA-69 (ALJ May 9, 1995); Echaveste v. Blackhawk State Bank, 93-CLA-82 (Sec'y
Nov. 20, 1995); U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Bludau, 94-CLA-58 (Mar. 12, 1996).
7 Respondents enlisted the services of an
expert in an attempt to show that "occasional" is a term of art in the labor industry, supposedly meaning an
occupation would involve this sort of work up to one third of the time. (Tr. 189). I found his testimony to be of no
assistance. The expert's rationale was based on a Department of Labor publication designed to help interpret entries in
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Tr. 189). To define how often a person employed in a certain profession might
spend on one particular task, the creators of the Dictionary divided an employee's time into four large categories: never,
up to one-third of the time, one-third of the time to two-thirds of the time, and two-thirds of the time or more. (Tr. 188).
These categories were then labeled "not present", "occasional", "frequent", and
"constant". (Tr. 188). However, it is clear that these are merely broad labels adopted for convenience. Just
as a task performed two-thirds of the time is not being performed constantly, nor is a task being performed one-third of
the time occasional. Nothing in the expert's testimony led me to believe that these terms are terms of art in general
industry. At most, they might possibly be terms of art in the expert's industry of job placement services. However,
these cases were not about job placement, and the parties involved, from the Wage and Hour investigators to the dealers,
would have no reason or need to know of or apply these definitions in their industries.