Administrator v. Kilmer's IGA Market,
Inc., 93-CLA-90 (ALJ Dec. 3, 1997)
U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
2600 Mt. Ephraim Avenue
Camden, New Jersey 08104
DATE: December 3, 1997
CASE NO: 93-CLA-00090
In the Matter of
JOHN R. FRASER, Acting Administrator,
Wage and Hour Division, Employment
Standards Administration, U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Plaintiff
v.
KILMER'S IGA MARKET, INCORPORATED
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER BY DEFAULT
This case arises out of the assessment of a civil money penalty against the
Respondent under section 16(e) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. 216(e), and the Department of Labor's implementing Regulations, 29 C.F.R. Parts 579
and 580.
On June 3, 1991, the District Director of the Department of Labor's
Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division notified the Respondent
Kilmer's IGA Market, Inc. that a civil money penalty in the amount of $12,250.00 had been
assessed against the Respondent pursuant to section 16(e) of the FLSA and Parts 579 and 580 of
the Regulations as a result of the Respondent's alleged employment of nine minors in violation of
the child labor provisions of section 12 of the FLSA. On June 27, 1991, the Respondent filed a
timely exception to the assessment, and the matter was referred on April 15, 1993 to the Office
of Administrative Law Judges for a formal hearing.
On June 17, 1997, I issued a notice of hearing, scheduling a hearing for
August 20-21, 1997 in Poughkeepsie, New York. On July 22, 1997, counsel for the Plaintiff
moved for a 90-day continuance based on uncertainty as to the present whereabouts of the
Respondent and the status of its legal representation in this matter. By order issued on August 7,
1997, I rescheduled the hearing to November 24-25, 1997. On October 22, 1997, the Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Default Judgement, alleging that the Respondent has abandoned its request for
hearing and defaulted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.5(b) and 18.39(b) because: (1) the
principal of the Respondent, David Kilmer, could not be located as he has apparently sold the
business involved in the matter and moved without leaving a forwarding address; and (2) the
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attorney for the Respondent has stated that he has no authority to represent the Respondent who
has not informed the Court of the status of its representation. By order issued on October 29,
1997, I stated,
The abandonment and default judgement provisions cited by the Plaintiff are
applicable to situations where a respondent fails to file an answer (§18.5(b))
or fails without good cause to appear at the time and place fixed for a hearing
(§18.39(b)). The Plaintiff has not alleged, nor does it appear, that
Respondent has failed to file an answer, and the Respondent has not to date failed
to appear at the time and place fixed for a hearing which is currently scheduled for
November 24-25, 1997 in Poughkeepsie, New York. However, the notice of
hearing sent to David Kilmer at his address of record was returned by the Postal
Service with a notation that the forwarding address had expired. And, two
attorneys who had previously represented the Respondent have submitted letters
stating that they no longer represent the Respondent which has gone out of
business, that they have no knowledge of David Kilmer's whereabouts and that
they will not appear at any hearing in this matter. In these circumstances, it
appears that neither the Respondent nor any representative intends to appear at the
hearing scheduled for November 24-25, 1997.
1 Section 18.39(b), in pertinent part,
states that a party shall be deemed to have abandoned a request for a hearing if neither the party
nor his or her representative appears for the hearing and does not show good cause prior to the
hearing as to why neither the party nor his or her representative could appear. Section 18.39(b)
further states that a default decision under section 18.5(b) may be entered against any party who
fails, without good cause, to appear at a hearing.
2Section 18.5(b) authorizes an
administrative law judge, upon default by a respondent, to "find the facts as alleged in the
complaint and to enter an initial or final decision containing such findings, appropriate
conclusions, and order."
3 The notice sent via certified mail
to David Kilmer for the Respondent at his last known address was returned to this office as
undeliverable due to expiration of the forwarding address. One of the two attorneys who had
previously represented the Respondent submitted a letter dated October 27, 1997 in which he
reiterated that he had never represented the Respondent in connection with the instant matter.